cautionary jury instruction in Wisconsin

2025The challenged evidence was 8 No. 2024AP650-CR admissible because it was relevant as “part of the panorama of evidence needed to completely describe the crime that occurred and is thereby inextricably intertwined with the crime.” See State v. Dukes, 2007 WI App 175, ¶28 , 303 Wis. 2d 208 , 736 N.W.2d 515 . ¶18 Finally, Pitzka complains that the cautionary jury instruction given by the circuit court regarding the other-acts evidence was insufficient because it provided the jury with potential purposes for consideration of the evidence beyond motive or intent.

2025The challenged evidence was 8 No. 2024AP650-CR admissible because it was relevant as “part of the panorama of evidence needed to completely describe the crime that occurred and is thereby inextricably intertwined with the crime.” See State v. Dukes, 2007 WI App 175, ¶28 , 303 Wis. 2d 208 , 736 N.W.2d 515 . ¶18 Finally, Pitzka complains that the cautionary jury instruction given by the circuit court regarding the other-acts evidence was insufficient because it provided the jury with potential purposes for consideration of the evidence beyond motive or intent.

2023He argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by denying his request for a cautionary jury instruction when other-acts evidence and damaging character evidence were introduced through Lessard’s testimony. ¶14 “A court has broad discretion in deciding whether to give a particular jury instruction.” State v. Hubbard, 2008 WI 92, ¶23 , 313 Wis. 2d 1 , 752 N.W.2d 839 .

2023He argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by denying his request for a cautionary jury instruction when other-acts evidence and damaging character evidence were introduced through Lessard’s testimony. ¶14 “A court has broad discretion in deciding whether to give a particular jury instruction.” State v. Hubbard, 2008 WI 92, ¶23 , 313 Wis. 2d 1 , 752 N.W.2d 839 .

2023“A discretionary decision will be sustained if the circuit court has examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, and, using a demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach.” Hefty v. Strickhouser, 2008 WI 96, ¶28 , 312 Wis. 2d 530 , 752 N.W.2d 820 (citation omitted).

2023“A discretionary decision will be sustained if the circuit court has examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, and, using a demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach.” Hefty v. Strickhouser, 2008 WI 96, ¶28 , 312 Wis. 2d 530 , 752 N.W.2d 820 (citation omitted).

2021Our discretionary reversal power “should be used only in exceptional cases.” State v. McKellips, 2016 WI 51, ¶52 , 369 Wis. 2d 437 , 881 N.W.2d 258 . ¶35 Lozornio argues that absent a cautionary jury instruction regarding the other acts evidence, we cannot be sure that the jury did not consider the other- 18 No. 2019AP1075-CR acts evidence for an improper purpose.

2021Our discretionary reversal power “should be used only in exceptional cases.” State v. McKellips, 2016 WI 51, ¶52 , 369 Wis. 2d 437 , 881 N.W.2d 258 . ¶35 Lozornio argues that absent a cautionary jury instruction regarding the other acts evidence, we cannot be sure that the jury did not consider the other- 18 No. 2019AP1075-CR acts evidence for an improper purpose.

2020Id. (citations omitted); see also Abaly v. State, 163 Wis. 609, 612 , 158 N.W. 308 (1916) (holding that a circuit court prejudicially erred in not providing a cautionary instruction to the jury to use great caution when weighing the testimony of an uncorroborated, complaining witness). ¶37 The circuit court examined the evidence corroborating Hilson’s testimony and the “compelling direct and circumstantial evidence of guilt that was presented.” We recite the highlights of that evidence. ¶38 The State’s chief witness was the victim of the shooting, E.B., who identified Coleman to the police pri

2019Child 2 also said that Miller "did the same thing to" Child 2, touching and "suck[ing] on his penis." Child 2 also said that when he tried to leave, Miller "grabbed his arm, stopp[ing] him from leaving." Both Child 1 and Child 2 said that Miller exposed his penis to the two boys but "did not ask the victims to do anything to him." The officer confirmed with a person identified in the complaint that she had hired Miller to babysit at this house that day. ¶30 Regarding the 1990 other-acts evidence, the defense did not request, and the court did not give, a cautionary jury instruction to "help to

2019Child 2 also said that Miller "did the same thing to" Child 2, touching and "suck[ing] on his penis." Child 2 also said that when he tried to leave, Miller "grabbed his arm, stopp[ing] him from leaving." Both Child 1 and Child 2 said that Miller exposed his penis to the two boys but "did not ask the victims to do anything to him." The officer confirmed with a person identified in the complaint that she had hired Miller to babysit at this house that day. ¶30 Regarding the 1990 other-acts evidence, the defense did not request, and the court did not give, a cautionary jury instruction to "help to

2018However, while a defendant "need not prove the jury would have acquitted him ... he must prove there is a reasonable probability it would have, absent the error." Id. , ¶ 47. ¶ 34 Here, Hobbick cannot establish a reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted him if Harrelson had cross-examined Gloss about the plea agreement and requested a cautionary jury instruction.