general demurrer error in Georgia

2024See also Hames, 287 Ga. at 538-539 (3) (holding that an indictment failed to charge the defendant with the full mens rea necessary to commit the charged crime because the indictment “omitted entirely any reference to [part of the] statutory [mens rea] requirement,” and the facts alleged did not necessarily satisfy that mens rea requirement).

2024See also Hames, 287 Ga. at 538-539 (3) (holding that an indictment failed to charge the defendant with the full mens rea necessary to commit the charged crime because the indictment “omitted entirely any reference to [part of the] statutory [mens rea] requirement,” and the facts alleged did not necessarily satisfy that mens rea requirement).

2024As such, the indictment satisfies the general demurrer standard as set forth in Mondor and Jackson insofar as it “recite[s] the language of the statute that sets out all the elements of the offense charged.” Mondor, 306 Ga. at 341 (1).

2024However, under these circumstances, if the indictment here only recited “the language of the statute that sets out all the elements of the offense charged”—and therefore satisfied the general demurrer standard, Mondor, 306 Ga. at 341 (1)—the indictment would not be sufficient to withstand a special demurrer, which “challenges the sufficiency of the form of the indictment.” Kimbrough v. State, 300 Ga. 878, 880 (2) (799 SE2d 229) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original).

2024However, under these circumstances, if the indictment here only recited “the language of the statute that sets out all the elements of the offense charged”—and therefore satisfied the general demurrer standard, Mondor, 306 Ga. at 341 (1)—the indictment would not be sufficient to withstand a special demurrer, which “challenges the sufficiency of the form of the indictment.” Kimbrough v. State, 300 Ga. 878, 880 (2) (799 SE2d 229) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original).

2024However, under these circumstances, if the indictment here only recited “the language of the statute that sets out all the elements of the offense charged”—and therefore satisfied the general demurrer standard, Mondor, 306 Ga. at 341 (1)—the indictment would not be sufficient to withstand a special demurrer, which “challenges the sufficiency of the form of the indictment.” Kimbrough v. State, 300 Ga. 878, 880 (2) (799 SE2d 229) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original).

2024See also Jackson, 301 Ga. at 139 (1) (“[T]o withstand a general demurrer, an indictment must . . . recite the language of the statute that sets out all the elements of the offense charged[.]”).

2024See also Jackson, 301 Ga. at 141 (1) (“[T]o withstand a general demurrer, an indictment must . . . recite the language of the statute that sets out all the elements of the offense charged[.]”).

2024This Court has explained that Brady “does not require the pre-trial disclosure of exculpatory evidence,” Davis v. State, 261 Ga. 382, 385 (8) (b) (405 SE2d 648) (1991) (citation omitted; emphasis supplied), and does not impose a duty upon the State to investigate.

2024This Court has explained that Brady “does not require the pre-trial disclosure of exculpatory evidence,” Davis v. State, 261 Ga. 382, 385 (8) (b) (405 SE2d 648) (1991) (citation omitted; emphasis supplied), and does not impose a duty upon the State to investigate.

2024The first indictment is not part of the record in this case; however, the procedural history of that indictment was referenced at the general demurrer hearing in January 2022. 12 either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.

2024The first indictment is not part of the record in this case; however, the procedural history of that indictment was referenced at the general demurrer hearing in January 2022. 12 either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady, 373 U. S. at 87 .

2024See Powell, 318 Ga. at 880 (2) (noting that we have framed the general-demurrer inquiry both ways).

2012See Shelton v. State, 307 Ga. App. 599, 603 (3) (b) ( 705 SE2d 699 ) (2011) (where no general demurrer was interposed and judgment of conviction was entered, a motion in arrest of judgment or habeas corpus are the only remedies available to challenge the validity of the indictment).

2012See Shelton v. State, 307 Ga. App. 599, 603 (3) (b) ( 705 SE2d 699 ) (2011) (where no general demurrer was interposed and judgment of conviction was entered, a motion in arrest of judgment or habeas corpus are the only remedies available to challenge the validity of the indictment).

1965Under circumstances similar to these the Supreme Court has said that “The defendant waived process by his general demurrer, the second paragraph of the demurrer being 'that no cause of action is set out in said petition.’ Under § 5559 of the Code of 19Í0 [now Code § 81-209], the defendant was pleading to the merits in the same breath that he was asserting that there was no process; but this court has uniformly held that the filing of a general demurrer is a waiver of process.” Wilson v. City Council of Augusta, 165 Ga. 520, 522 ( 141 SE 412 ); Chance v. Planters Rural Telephone Cooperative, In

1965Under circumstances similar to these the Supreme Court has said that “The defendant waived process by his general demurrer, the second paragraph of the demurrer being 'that no cause of action is set out in said petition.’ Under § 5559 of the Code of 19Í0 [now Code § 81-209], the defendant was pleading to the merits in the same breath that he was asserting that there was no process; but this court has uniformly held that the filing of a general demurrer is a waiver of process.” Wilson v. City Council of Augusta, 165 Ga. 520, 522 ( 141 SE 412 ); Chance v. Planters Rural Telephone Cooperative, In

1963Lyons v. Planters Bank, 86 Ga. 485 ( 12 SE 882 , 12 LRA 155).” See Paulk v. Tanner, 106 Ga. 219, 220 (1) ( 32 SE 99 ).

1963Lyons v. Planters Bank, 86 Ga. 485 ( 12 SE 882 , 12 LRA 155).” See Paulk v. Tanner, 106 Ga. 219, 220 (1) ( 32 SE 99 ).