third point error in Texas

2014See Hollander v. State, 414 S.W.3d 746, 753-56 (Tex.Crim.

2014See Hollander v. State, 414 S.W.3d 746, 753-56 (Tex. Crim.

2003See Louis v. State, 61 S.W.3d 593, 598-99 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, pet. ref’d).

2003See Louis v. State , 61 S.W.3d 593, 598-99 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 2001, pet. ref'd).

2002Factual Sufficiency In his fourth point of error, appellant avers that the “evidence was factually insufficient to support a verdict of guilty on count two.” “Factual sufficiency is not properly raised where appellant’s brief merely claims insufficiency without setting out the proper standard of review, analyzing why the facts fall short of that standard, or discussing the authorities upon which he relied.” 2 Appellant pleaded not guilty to the first count of the indictment while represented by the same counsel. 11 Moon v. State, 44 S.W.3d 589, 593 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref’d) (citi

2002Factual Sufficiency In his fourth point of error, appellant avers that the "evidence was factually insufficient to support a verdict of guilty on count two." "Factual sufficiency is not properly raised where appellant's brief merely claims insufficiency without setting out the proper standard of review, analyzing why the facts fall short of that standard, or discussing the authorities upon which he relied." Moon v. State , 44 S.W.3d 589, 593 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref'd) (citing McDuff v. State , 939 S.W.2d 607, 613 (Tex. Crim.

2002Factual Sufficiency In his fourth point of error, appellant avers that the “evidence was factually insufficient to support a verdict of guilty on count two.” “Factual sufficiency is not properly raised where appellant’s brief merely claims insufficiency without setting out the proper standard of review, analyzing why the facts fall short of that standard, or discussing the authorities upon which he relied.” 2 Appellant pleaded not guilty to the first count of the indictment while represented by the same counsel. 11 Moon v. State, 44 S.W.3d 589, 593 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref’d) (citi

2002Factual Sufficiency In his fourth point of error, appellant avers that the "evidence was factually insufficient to support a verdict of guilty on count two." "Factual sufficiency is not properly raised where appellant's brief merely claims insufficiency without setting out the proper standard of review, analyzing why the facts fall short of that standard, or discussing the authorities upon which he relied." Moon v. State , 44 S.W.3d 589, 593 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref'd) (citing McDuff v. State , 939 S.W.2d 607, 613 (Tex. Crim.

2020A. Ex parte Moore and Moore v. Texas At the time of appellant’s 2016 trial, the State and trial court followed this Court’s holding in Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481 (Tex. Crim.

2016The drawing of a person’s blood is considered a search under the Fourth Amendment.10 Accordingly, a blood draw generally requires a search warrant, unless a “recognized exception” to the warrant requirement applies.11 “‘One well-recognized exception,’ and the one at issue in this case, ‘applies when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’”12 One such exigent circumstance is preventing the destruction of evidence or contraband.13 In DWI cases, the evidence that is at risk of

2016The drawing of a person’s blood is considered a search under the Fourth Amendment.10 Accordingly, a blood draw generally requires a search warrant, unless a “recognized exception” to the warrant requirement applies.11 “‘One well-recognized exception,’ and the one at issue in this case, ‘applies when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’”12 One such exigent circumstance is preventing the destruction of evidence or contraband.13 In DWI cases, the evidence that is at risk of

2016See State v. Trahan, No. 14-15-00472-CR, 2016 WL 269162 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 21, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting that appellate court will uphold trial court’s order granting motion for new trial if any appropriate ground exists to support it) (citing State v. Sanders, 440 S.W.3d 94, 99 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d)).

2016The drawing of a person’s blood is considered a search under the Fourth Amendment.10 Accordingly, a blood draw generally requires a search warrant, unless a “recognized exception” to the warrant requirement applies.11 “‘One well-recognized exception,’ and the one at issue in this case, ‘applies when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’”12 One such exigent circumstance is preventing the destruction of evidence or contraband.13 In DWI cases, the evidence that is at risk of

2016In the State’s view, even in the absence of exigent circumstances, the blood draw was constitutionally permissible because it was authorized by the mandatory-blood-draw statute, section 724.012 of the Texas Transportation Code,26 and because O’Brien “impliedly consented” to the blood draw.27 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, pet. filed) (finding no exigent circumstances when officer testified that he did not obtain warrant because “it was simply not the practice of San Antonio police officers to obtain a warrant under circumstances such as those presented in this case”); Cole, 454 S.W.3d at 103 (co

2016In the State’s view, even in the absence of exigent circumstances, the blood draw was constitutionally permissible because it was authorized by the mandatory-blood-draw statute, section 724.012 of the Texas Transportation Code,26 and because O’Brien “impliedly consented” to the blood draw.27 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, pet. filed) (finding no exigent circumstances when officer testified that he did not obtain warrant because “it was simply not the practice of San Antonio police officers to obtain a warrant under circumstances such as those presented in this case”); Cole, 454 S.W.3d at 103 (co

2016On this record, the trial court did not err in concluding that there were no exigent circumstances sufficient to justify dispensing with the warrant requirement.25 We overrule the State’s third point of error. 24 Cf. Pearson v. State, No. 13-11-00137-CR, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 2514 , at *10-11 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Mar. 6, 2014, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding that there were exigent circumstances present when officer testified that he was “the only officer on duty,” was “solely responsible for securing the scene of the accident,” and had to wait “at least

2016The drawing of a person’s blood is considered a search under the Fourth Amendment.10 Accordingly, a blood draw generally requires a search warrant, unless a “recognized exception” to the warrant requirement applies.11 “‘One well-recognized exception,’ and the one at issue in this case, ‘applies when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’”12 One such exigent circumstance is preventing the destruction of evidence or contraband.13 In DWI cases, the evidence that is at risk of

2016On this record, the trial court did not err in concluding that there were no exigent circumstances sufficient to justify dispensing with the warrant requirement.25 We overrule the State’s third point of error. 24 Cf. Pearson v. State, No. 13-11-00137-CR, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 2514 , at *10-11 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Mar. 6, 2014, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding that there were exigent circumstances present when officer testified that he was “the only officer on duty,” was “solely responsible for securing the scene of the accident,” and had to wait “at least

2016In the State’s view, even in the absence of exigent circumstances, the blood draw was constitutionally permissible because it was authorized by the mandatory-blood-draw statute, section 724.012 of the Texas Transportation Code,26 and because O’Brien “impliedly consented” to the blood draw.27 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, pet. filed) (finding no exigent circumstances when officer testified that he did not obtain warrant because “it was simply not the practice of San Antonio police officers to obtain a warrant under circumstances such as those presented in this case”); Cole, 454 S.W.3d at 103 (co

2016In the State’s view, even in the absence of exigent circumstances, the blood draw was constitutionally permissible because it was authorized by the mandatory-blood-draw statute, section 724.012 of the Texas Transportation Code,26 and because O’Brien “impliedly consented” to the blood draw.27 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, pet. filed) (finding no exigent circumstances when officer testified that he did not obtain warrant because “it was simply not the practice of San Antonio police officers to obtain a warrant under circumstances such as those presented in this case”); Cole, 454 S.W.3d at 103 (co

2015App. 2009); Warner v. State, 969 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex. Crim.

2015Introduction In a cross-point of error, which is set forth below in this brief and incorporated herein by this reference, the State asserts that the trial court erred when it ruled that the spreadsheets at issue in the appellant’s third point of error constituted material, exculpatory evidence that the State was required, by Brady and its progeny, to produce to defense counsel.12 To the extent that the appellant’s 12 Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the State has an affirmative duty to disclose favorable, material evidence to the defense.

2015See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 .

2015In this third point of error, Barrett asserts that the district court, by sustaining the State’s objections, denied him his right to present a complete defense.26 It is well established that in order to preserve error in the exclusion of evidence, the complaining party must comply with Rule of Evidence 103 by making an offer of proof that sets forth the substance of the proffered evidence.27 “The offer of proof may consist of a concise statement by counsel, or it may be in question-and-answer form.”28 “If in the form of a statement, the proffer ‘must include a reasonably specific summary of th

2015This Court's decision in Zuniga v. Grose, Locke, & Hebdon, 878 S.W. 2d 313, 318 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1994, writ refd), underscores the need for measures to deter and sanction violations of TCPA's automatic stay provisions comparable to those applied in other settings: For the law to countenance ... abrupt and shameless shift[s] of positions would give prominence (and substance) to the image that lawyers will take any position, depending upon where the money lies, and that litigation is a mere game and not a search for truth ...

2010Co., 977 S.W.2d 634, 637-38 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1998, no pet.) (equitable subrogation claim involves balancing of equities). 5 Service Lloyds asserts a third point of error—that the Division’s award of $81,501 plus interest was error.

2008The third point of error is overruled. 10 In Hurrelbrink v. State, 46 S.W.3d 350, 353-54 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, pet. ref’d), Dr. Alexander Sonek, a professor of anthropology at San Diego State University was shown to be a recognized expert in the field of footprint comparison, and he was testifying for the first time in that case as an expert witness in that field. 27 EXTRANEOUS OFFENSE In his fourth point of error, appellant contends that the “trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the admission of an extraneous offense that occurred during the trial of this case and for which t

2008Under these circumstances, we have held, "appellate courts must defer to any reasonable implied factual findings that the trial court might have made in denying a motion for new trial." Charles v. State, 146 S.W.3d 204, 211 (Tex. Crim.App.2004). [49] This issue was raised in the appellant's third point of error on appeal.