heavy presumption in Maryland

2004Organization for a Better *577 Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 , 91 S.Ct. 1575, 1577-78 , 29 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971).

2004Organization for a Better *577 Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 , 91 S.Ct. 1575, 1577-78 , 29 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971).

2004Because “prior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights,” id. at 559 , 96 S.Ct. at 2803 , any prior restraint bears a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.

2004Because “prior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights,” id. at 559 , 96 S.Ct. at 2803 , any prior restraint bears a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.

2012Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corporation, 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 , 103 S.Ct. 927 , 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983), the Court announced its “healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration” and went on to say that the Federal Arbitration Act “establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitration issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” More recently, the Fourth Circuit reiterated in

2012Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corporation, 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 , 103 S.Ct. 927 , 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983), the Court announced its “healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration” and went on to say that the Federal Arbitration Act “establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitration issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” More recently, the Fourth Circuit reiterated in

2012Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corporation, 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 , 103 S.Ct. 927 , 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983), the Court announced its “healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration” and went on to say that the Federal Arbitration Act “establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitration issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” More recently, the Fourth Circuit reiterated in

2005The Court of Special Appeals rejected the State’s argument, which, relying on Brown, 341 Md. 609 , 672 A.2d 602 , and Glenn, 299 Md. 464 , 474 A.2d 509 , stressed that there were eighty-eight days left to run in the 180 day time period when the nolle pros was entered, concluding that the nolle pros did not have the “necessary effect” of circumventing the 180 day period: “In Brown, however, there was no ruling from the administrative judge.

2005The Court of Special Appeals rejected the State’s argument, which, relying on Brown, 341 Md. 609 , 672 A.2d 602 , and Glenn, 299 Md. 464 , 474 A.2d 509 , stressed that there were eighty-eight days left to run in the 180 day time period when the nolle pros was entered, concluding that the nolle pros did not have the “necessary effect” of circumventing the 180 day period: “In Brown, however, there was no ruling from the administrative judge.

2005As to the latter, more specifically, the court found significant that *277 the county administrative judge’s discretion to determine whether good cause exists to extend the trial date “carries a heavy presumption of validity” and is “rarely subject to reversal upon review.” Id. at 364-65 , 700 A.2d at 286 , quoting Dalton v. State, 87 Md.App. 673, 682 , 591 A.2d 531 , cert, denied, 325 Md. 16 , 599 A.2d 89 (1991) and State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 451 , 470 A.2d 1269, 1284 (1984) (footnote omitted).

2005As to the latter, more specifically, the court found significant that *277 the county administrative judge’s discretion to determine whether good cause exists to extend the trial date “carries a heavy presumption of validity” and is “rarely subject to reversal upon review.” Id. at 364-65 , 700 A.2d at 286 , quoting Dalton v. State, 87 Md.App. 673, 682 , 591 A.2d 531 , cert, denied, 325 Md. 16 , 599 A.2d 89 (1991) and State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 451 , 470 A.2d 1269, 1284 (1984) (footnote omitted).

2005The Court of Special Appeals rejected the State’s argument, which, relying on Brown, 341 Md. 609 , 672 A.2d 602 , and Glenn, 299 Md. 464 , 474 A.2d 509 , stressed that there were eighty-eight days left to run in the 180 day time period when the nolle pros was entered, concluding that the nolle pros did not have the “necessary effect” of circumventing the 180 day period: “In Brown, however, there was no ruling from the administrative judge.

2005The Court of Special Appeals rejected the State’s argument, which, relying on Brown, 341 Md. 609 , 672 A.2d 602 , and Glenn, 299 Md. 464 , 474 A.2d 509 , stressed that there were eighty-eight days left to run in the 180 day time period when the nolle pros was entered, concluding that the nolle pros did not have the “necessary effect” of circumventing the 180 day period: “In Brown, however, there was no ruling from the administrative judge.

2001Jakanna Woodworks, 344 Md. at 599 , 689 A.2d 65 (citing Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 , 83 S.Ct. 631, 639 , 9 L.Ed.2d 584, 593 (1963)); see also 11126 Baltimore Boulevard, Inc. v. Prince George’s County, 58 F.3d 988, 996 (4th Cir.1995)(en banc)(stating that “[t]he guarantee of freedom of speech afforded by the First Amendment is abridged whenever the government makes enjoyment of protected speech contingent upon obtaining permission from government officials to engage in its exercise under circumstances that permit government officials unfettered discretion to grant or deny t

2001Jakanna Woodworks, 344 Md. at 599 , 689 A.2d 65 (citing Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 , 83 S.Ct. 631, 639 , 9 L.Ed.2d 584, 593 (1963)); see also 11126 Baltimore Boulevard, Inc. v. Prince George’s County, 58 F.3d 988, 996 (4th Cir.1995)(en banc)(stating that “[t]he guarantee of freedom of speech afforded by the First Amendment is abridged whenever the government makes enjoyment of protected speech contingent upon obtaining permission from government officials to engage in its exercise under circumstances that permit government officials unfettered discretion to grant or deny t

1997Prior restraints “present[ the] danger of unduly suppressing protected expression,” see Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. at 54 , 85 S.Ct. at 737 , 13 L.Ed.2d at 652 , and therefore, “bear[] a heavy presumption against [their] constitutional validity.” Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 , 83 S.Ct. 631, 639 , 9 L.Ed.2d 584, 593 (1963).

1997Prior restraints “present[ the] danger of unduly suppressing protected expression,” see Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. at 54 , 85 S.Ct. at 737 , 13 L.Ed.2d at 652 , and therefore, “bear[] a heavy presumption against [their] constitutional validity.” Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 , 83 S.Ct. 631, 639 , 9 L.Ed.2d 584, 593 (1963).

1991Id.

1991Id.

1982Furthermore, the court stated that the heavy presumption against sterilization will be even more difficult to overcome in the case of an incompetent minor, whose youth may "make it difficult or impossible to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she will never be capable of making an informed judgment about sterilization or of caring for a child." Id.

1982Furthermore, the court stated that the heavy presumption against sterilization will be even more difficult to overcome in the case of an incompetent minor, whose youth may "make it difficult or impossible to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she will never be capable of making an informed judgment about sterilization or of caring for a child.” Id.