heavy presumption in Michigan

2026“A defendant claiming judicial bias must overcome a heavy presumption of judicial impartiality.” Id. at 598 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2026“A defendant claiming judicial bias must overcome a heavy presumption of judicial impartiality.” Id. at 598 .

2026But “the party who challenges a judge on the basis of bias or prejudice must overcome a heavy presumption of judicial impartiality.” Cain v Dep’t of Corrections, 451 Mich 470, 497 ; 548 NW2d 210 (1996).

2026But “the party who challenges a judge on the basis of bias or prejudice must overcome a heavy presumption of judicial impartiality.” Cain v Dep’t of Corrections, 451 Mich 470, 497 ; 548 NW2d 210 (1996).

2026Under MCR 2.003(C)(1)(a), a judge must be disqualified from hearing a case in which he or she cannot act impartially or is biased against a party. “[J]udicial rulings, in and of themselves, almost never constitute a valid basis for a motion alleging bias, unless the judicial opinion displays a ‘deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible and overcomes a heavy presumption of judicial impartiality.’ ” Armstrong v Ypsilanti Charter Twp, 248 Mich App 573, 597 ; 640 NW2d 321 (2001), quoting Cain, 451 Mich at 496 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2026Under MCR 2.003(C)(1)(a), a judge must be disqualified from hearing a case in which he or she cannot act impartially or is biased against a party. “[J]udicial rulings, in and of themselves, almost never constitute a valid basis for a motion alleging bias, unless the judicial opinion displays a ‘deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible and overcomes a heavy presumption of judicial impartiality.’ ” Armstrong v Ypsilanti Charter Twp, 248 Mich App 573, 597 ; 640 NW2d 321 (2001), quoting Cain, 451 Mich at 496 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2024See, e.g., Caperton, 556 US at 886-887 (finding that the failure to recuse was error when a party had made substantial monetary contributions to a judge’s election campaign and “the probability of actual bias rises to an unconstitutional level”); United States v Liggins, 76 F4th 500, 503 (CA 6, 2023) (requiring disqualification on grounds of a district court judge’s comments that the defendant “looks like a criminal to me”).1 In light of the foregoing, and considering the heavy presumption that a judge is impartial, see Wells, 238 Mich App at 391 , we see no reason for the trial judge to have

2022In relevant part, the rule allows for judicial disqualification if: (a) The judge is biased or prejudiced for or against a party or attorney. (b) The judge, based on objective and reasonable perceptions, has either (i) a serious risk of actual bias impacting the due process rights of a party as enunciated in Caperton v [A.T.] Massey [Coal Co, Inc], [ 556 US 868 ]; 129 S Ct 2252 ; 173 L Ed 2d 1208 (2009), or (ii) has failed to adhere to the appearance of impropriety standard set forth in Canon 2 of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct. [MCR 2.003(C)(1)(a) and (b) (third alteration in original)

2021Defendant sought review by the chief judge, who also denied the motion. “[A] party challenging the impartiality of a judge must overcome a heavy presumption of judicial impartiality.” Van Buren Charter Twp v Garter Belt, Inc, 258 Mich App 594, 598 , 673 NW2d 111 (2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2021Defendant sought review by the chief judge, who also denied the motion. “[A] party challenging the impartiality of a judge must overcome a heavy presumption of judicial impartiality.” Van Buren Charter Twp v Garter Belt, Inc, 258 Mich App 594, 598 , 673 NW2d 111 (2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2024Any party challenging a judge for bias “must overcome a heavy presumption of judicial impartiality.” Id.

2024See, e.g., Caperton, 556 US at 886-887 (finding that the failure to recuse was error when a party had made substantial monetary contributions to a judge’s election campaign and “the probability of actual bias rises to an unconstitutional level”); United States v Liggins, 76 F4th 500, 503 (CA 6, 2023) (requiring disqualification on grounds of a district court judge’s comments that the defendant “looks like a criminal to me”).1 In light of the foregoing, and considering the heavy presumption that a judge is impartial, see Wells, 238 Mich App at 391 , we see no reason for the trial judge to have

2026Regardless, plaintiff has identified no court rule or statute requiring the trial court to sanction defendant, see, e.g., MCR 2.625(A)(2) or MCL 600.2591, and the trial court’s decision to not impose discretionary sanctions against defendant does not display an extrajudicial source of bias, In re MKK, 286 Mich App at 566 , or deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible and overcome the heavy presumption of judicial impartiality, see Gates, 256 Mich App at 440 .

2025See MCR 2.003(1)(b); MCR 2.003(C)(1)(b); see also In re MKK, 286 Mich App 546, 566 ; 781 NW2d 132 (2009) (“Disqualification on the basis of bias or prejudice cannot be established merely by repeated rulings against a litigant, even if the rulings are erroneous.”); Kern v Kern-Koskela, 320 Mich App 212 , 231-232; 905 NW2d 453 (2017)(“[J]udicial rulings, in and of themselves, almost never constitute a valid basis for a motion alleging bias, unless the judicial opinion displays a ‘deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible and overcomes a heavy presumption of ju

2023Judicial rulings, in and of themselves, almost never constitute a valid basis for a motion alleging bias, unless the judicial opinion displays a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible and overcomes a heavy presumption of judicial impartiality. [In re Contempt of Henry, 282 Mich App 656, 680 ; 765 NW2d 44 (2009) (quotation marks and citations omitted).] In further support of his bias allegation, defendant argues he has “personal knowledge” of a “friendly relationship” between the trial court judge and plaintiff’s counsel, contending they “may have engaged

2023Judicial rulings, in and of themselves, almost never constitute a valid basis for a motion alleging bias, unless the judicial opinion displays a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible and overcomes a heavy presumption of judicial impartiality. [In re Contempt of Henry, 282 Mich App 656, 680 ; 765 NW2d 44 (2009) (quotation marks and citations omitted).] In further support of his bias allegation, defendant argues he has “personal knowledge” of a “friendly relationship” between the trial court judge and plaintiff’s counsel, contending they “may have engaged

2024It is well established that “judicial rulings, in and of themselves, almost never constitute a valid basis for a motion alleging bias, unless the judicial opinion displays a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment -8- impossible and overcomes a heavy presumption of judicial impartiality.” Armstrong v Ypsilanti Twp, 248 Mich App 573, 597 ; 640 NW2d 321 (2001) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Bayati v Bayati, 264 Mich App 595, 603 ; 691 NW2d 812 (2004).

2024It is well established that “judicial rulings, in and of themselves, almost never constitute a valid basis for a motion alleging bias, unless the judicial opinion displays a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment -8- impossible and overcomes a heavy presumption of judicial impartiality.” Armstrong v Ypsilanti Twp, 248 Mich App 573, 597 ; 640 NW2d 321 (2001) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Bayati v Bayati, 264 Mich App 595, 603 ; 691 NW2d 812 (2004).

2023Therefore, the reasoning provided by the trial court is likewise “sufficient to depart from the heavy presumption in favor of concurrent sentences and to order one of the sentences to be served consecutively to another.” Id. at 73 .

2021On appeal, this Court agreed that “this combination of facts was sufficient to depart from the heavy presumption in favor of concurrent sentences and to order one of the sentences to be served consecutively to another.” Id. at 73 .

2023Judicial rulings, in and of themselves, almost never constitute a valid basis for a motion alleging bias, unless the judicial opinion displays a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible and overcomes a heavy presumption of judicial impartiality. [In re Contempt of Henry, 282 Mich App 656, 680 ; 765 NW2d 44 (2009) (quotation marks and citations omitted).] In further support of his bias allegation, defendant argues he has “personal knowledge” of a “friendly relationship” between the trial court judge and plaintiff’s counsel, contending they “may have engaged

2019However “[a] trial judge is presumed unbiased, and the party asserting otherwise has the heavy burden of overcoming the presumption.” Mitchell, 296 Mich App at 523 . “[J]udicial rulings, in and of themselves, almost never constitute a valid basis for a motion alleging bias, unless the judicial opinion displays a “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible” and overcomes a heavy presumption of judicial impartiality.

2026Regardless, plaintiff has identified no court rule or statute requiring the trial court to sanction defendant, see, e.g., MCR 2.625(A)(2) or MCL 600.2591, and the trial court’s decision to not impose discretionary sanctions against defendant does not display an extrajudicial source of bias, In re MKK, 286 Mich App at 566 , or deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible and overcome the heavy presumption of judicial impartiality, see Gates, 256 Mich App at 440 .

2016More importantly, repeated rulings against a litigant do not merit disqualification “unless the opinion displays a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible and overcomes a heavy presumption of judicial impartiality.” Gates v Gates, 256 Mich App 420, 440 ; 664 NW2d 231 (2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2003We disagree. “[JJudicial rulings, in and of themselves, almost never constitute a valid basis for a motion alleging bias, unless the judicial opinion displays a ‘ “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible” ’ and overcomes a heavy presumption of judicial impartiality.” Armstrong, supra at 597 , quoting Cain, supra at 496 , quoting Liteky v United States, 510 US 540, 555 ; 114 S Ct 1147 ; 127 L Ed 2d 474 (1994).

2003We disagree. “[JJudicial rulings, in and of themselves, almost never constitute a valid basis for a motion alleging bias, unless the judicial opinion displays a ‘ “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible” ’ and overcomes a heavy presumption of judicial impartiality.” Armstrong, supra at 597 , quoting Cain, supra at 496 , quoting Liteky v United States, 510 US 540, 555 ; 114 S Ct 1147 ; 127 L Ed 2d 474 (1994).

2024See, e.g., Caperton, 556 US at 886-887 (finding that the failure to recuse was error when a party had made substantial monetary contributions to a judge’s election campaign and “the probability of actual bias rises to an unconstitutional level”); United States v Liggins, 76 F4th 500, 503 (CA 6, 2023) (requiring disqualification on grounds of a district court judge’s comments that the defendant “looks like a criminal to me”).1 In light of the foregoing, and considering the heavy presumption that a judge is impartial, see Wells, 238 Mich App at 391 , we see no reason for the trial judge to have

2020See, e.g., Brown v State, 2012 Ark 399, 5 (2012) (“Likewise, the mere fact that a judge previously prosecuted a defendant for a separate crime is not by itself grounds for recusal.”); In re Disqualification of Selvaggio, 153 Ohio St 3d 1201 (2017) (“Judge Selvaggio’s disqualification is not required merely because he previously prosecuted this defendant in a separate matter.”); People v Sloley, 179 AD3d 1308, 1312 (2020) (“Defendant also argues that a conflict of interest was created because the judge presiding over his trial previously served as the District Attorney when he was prosecuted on

2020Therefore, regardless of whether the modern trend or the rule announced in McFadden, 4 Mich App at 558 , is adopted, the issuance of the PPO here, because of the trial court’s failure to determine that the speech actually was false, fails to overcome the heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. [TM, 326 Mich App at 244-246 (quotation marks and citations omitted; ellipses in original).] “Numerous courts, both federal and state, have held that a trial court may enjoin a defendant from making defamatory speech after there has been a determination that the speech was, in fact, false.

2020Therefore, regardless of whether the modern trend or the rule announced in McFadden, 4 Mich App at 558 , is adopted, the issuance of the PPO here, because of the trial court’s failure to determine that the speech actually was false, fails to overcome the heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. [TM, 326 Mich App at 244-246 (quotation marks and citations omitted; ellipses in original).] “Numerous courts, both federal and state, have held that a trial court may enjoin a defendant from making defamatory speech after there has been a determination that the speech was, in fact, false.