supposed principle in New Jersey

2021Id. at 444-45 39 (finding that a car stop for a supposed violation of statutes requiring two working rear lamps -- one on each side -- was not a reasonable mistake of law because the statutes were clear and the driver had two functioning rear lamps); Scriven, 226 N.J. at 35-36 (finding that a car stop for a supposed violation of a statute requiring drivers to dim their high beams when approaching “an oncoming vehicle” was not a reasonable mistake of law because the statute was clear and the driver was not approaching any vehicles).

2021Id. at 444-45 39 (finding that a car stop for a supposed violation of statutes requiring two working rear lamps -- one on each side -- was not a reasonable mistake of law because the statutes were clear and the driver had two functioning rear lamps); Scriven, 226 N.J. at 35-36 (finding that a car stop for a supposed violation of a statute requiring drivers to dim their high beams when approaching “an oncoming vehicle” was not a reasonable mistake of law because the statute was clear and the driver was not approaching any vehicles).

1984It noted that prior cases had recognized the supposed principle, expressed in Sobel, supra, that, in the absence of “extenuating circumstances” a father has a “right to expect his kin to bear his name”. 46 N.J.Super. at 287 .

1984It noted that prior cases had recognized the supposed principle, expressed in Sobel, supra, that, in the absence of “extenuating circumstances” a father has a “right to expect his kin to bear his name”. 46 N.J.Super. at 287 .

1997Instead, we perceive concerns arising from the disclosure of evaluative and deliberative materials to be amply accommodated by the “exquisite weighing process,” Loigman, supra, 102 N.J. at 108 , 505 A.2d 958 (quoting Beck v. Bluestein, 194 N.J.Super. 247, 263 , 476 A.2d 842 (App.Div.1984)), that our courts regularly undertake when determining whether to order disclosure of sensitive documents in a variety of contexts.

1997Instead, we perceive concerns arising from the disclosure of evaluative and deliberative materials to be amply accommodated by the “exquisite weighing process,” Loigman, supra, 102 N.J. at 108 , 505 A.2d 958 (quoting Beck v. Bluestein, 194 N.J.Super. 247, 263 , 476 A.2d 842 (App.Div.1984)), that our courts regularly undertake when determining whether to order disclosure of sensitive documents in a variety of contexts.

1997Instead, we perceive concerns arising from the disclosure of evaluative and deliberative materials to be amply accommodated by the “exquisite weighing process,” Loigman, supra, 102 N.J. at 108 , 505 A.2d 958 (quoting Beck v. Bluestein, 194 N.J.Super. 247, 263 , 476 A.2d 842 (App.Div.1984)), that our courts regularly undertake when determining whether to order disclosure of sensitive documents in a variety of contexts.

1997Instead, we perceive concerns arising from the disclosure of evaluative and deliberative materials to be amply accommodated by the “exquisite weighing process,” Loigman, supra, 102 N.J. at 108 , 505 A.2d 958 (quoting Beck v. Bluestein, 194 N.J.Super. 247, 263 , 476 A.2d 842 (App.Div.1984)), that our courts regularly undertake when determining whether to order disclosure of sensitive documents in a variety of contexts.

1986However, the cited section does not refer to the "scientific community" but says, "All are now generally scientifically recognized as sufficiently reliable." [7] The courts have recognized three methods of proving scientific acceptance: ... (1) by expert testimony as to the general acceptance, among those in the profession, of the premises on which the proffered expert witness based his or her analysis; (2) by authoritative scientific and legal writings indicating that the scientific community accepts the premises underlying the proffered testimony; and (3) by judicial opinions that indicate t

1986However, the cited section does not refer to the "scientific community" but says, "All are now generally scientifically recognized as sufficiently reliable." [7] The courts have recognized three methods of proving scientific acceptance: ... (1) by expert testimony as to the general acceptance, among those in the profession, of the premises on which the proffered expert witness based his or her analysis; (2) by authoritative scientific and legal writings indicating that the scientific community accepts the premises underlying the proffered testimony; and (3) by judicial opinions that indicate t

1984In W. v. H., supra, a presumption was recognized favoring “the father’s right to have his progeny bear his name”.

1957"The justification must be `as broad as the act, and must cover not only the motive and the purpose, or, in other words, the object sought, but also the means used.'" Louis Kamm, Inc., v. Flink, supra ( 113 N.J.L., at page 589 ).

1955The applicable section of the statute ( R.S. 43:4-2) awards the veteran retirement on pension on his own request who shall have been for 20 years "continuously or in the aggregate" in "office, position or employment * * * of a * * * board of education." By reason of its parallel analogy this supposed defense was erased by the precedential decision in Murphy v. Zink, 136 N.J.L. 235 ( Sup. Ct. 1947), affirmed 136 N.J.L. 635 *337 ( E. & A. 1948), in which it was declared that the veteran's period of service is not required by the terms of the statute to have been rendered exclusively in the emplo

1932They are universally founded on the supposed violation of rights, which, in contemplation of law, have no locality.” In Dennick v. Central Railroad Co., 103 U. S. 11 , it was said: “Wherever, by either the common law or the statute law of a state, a right of action has become vested and a legal liability incurred, that liability may be enforced and the right of action pursued in any court which has competent jurisdiction of such matter and can obtain‘jurisdiction over the parties.” In such actions the law of the state in which the cause of action arose will by comity be applied, if comity shou