Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
9 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 1933–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ledbetter v. Ledbettergreen1 sentence2025Ledbetter v. Ledbetter, 163 S.W.3d 681, 684 (Tenn. 2005). | 1 | 1 |
Burgess v. Ryangreen1 sentence2010However, the district court stated that whether the commissioners properly understood the statute is not outcome determinative since “[t]he Constitution does not require states to administer them laws correctly” and “it is not appropriate for a federal court, hearing a case under § 1983, to upbraid state officials for a supposed error of state law.” The court noted that “[blunders in the implementation of state law are inevitable; state courts provide the remedy.” Id. at *7-8. (citing Burgess v. Ryan, 996 F.2d 180, 184 (7th Cir.1993)). | 1 | 1 |
Suttles v. Suttlesgreen1 sentence2001Cf. Suttles, 748 S.W,2d at 429 (describing multiple facts justifying reversal of visitation as ordered by the trial court). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Harbour v. Brown for Ulrich
green
2 sentences2025Thus, “until entered by the court, the matter being the question of an agreement between the parties, either party may repudiate the agreement because of an actual or supposed defense to the agreement.” Harbour, 732 S.W.2d at 600 . 2007Thus, “until entered by the court, the matter being the question of an agreement between the parties, either party may repudiate the agreement because of an actual or supposed defense to the agreement.” Harbour, 732 S.W.2d at 600 . [[Image here]] Citing to language in Harbour , the Court of Appeals in Environmental Abatement [, Inc. v. Astrum R.E. | 5 | 2002–2025 |
Van Donselaar v. Van Donselaar
green
2 sentences2005“The reason for the rule is that a consent judgment does not represent the reasoned decision of. the court but is merely the agreement of the parties, made a matter of record by the court.” Id. at 599-600 (citing Van Donselaar v. Van Donselaar, 249 Iowa 504 , 87 N.W.2d 311 (1958)). 2005“The reason for the rule is that a consent judgment does not represent the reasoned decision of. the court but is merely the agreement of the parties, made a matter of record by the court.” Id. at 599-600 (citing Van Donselaar v. Van Donselaar, 249 Iowa 504 , 87 N.W.2d 311 (1958)). | 2 | 2003–2005 |
Environmental Abatement, Inc. v. Astrum R.E. Corp.
green
1 sentence2007Corp., 27 S.W.3d 530 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000)] noted an exception to the general rule that consent must exist at the time of judgment. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Shelby County v. Mississippi & Tennessee Railroad
neutral
1 sentence1944Co., 84 Tenn. 401 , 16 Lea, 401 , 1 S. W. 32 , 36, where the Court expressed “grave doubt” that certiorari can be resorted to for the purpose of correcting a supposed error of valuation for purposes of taxation. | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Memphis Street Railway Co. v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1933Pr., 846; 2 Elliott on General Pr., section 987, cited and approved in Railroad v. Johnson, 114 Tenn. 632 , 88 S.W. 169 ." It seems logical, therefore, that if an error is committed in attempting to correct a supposed error of law, made upon the trial, the appellate court may reverse the action taken and enter such judgment as should have been entered below; for it would not be passing upon the facts but upon the law. 1933Pl. & Pr., 846; 2 Elliott on General Pr., section 987, cited and approved in Railroad v. Johnson, 114 Tenn., 632 , 88 S. W., 169 .” It seems logical, therefore, that if an error is committed in attempting to correct a supposed error of law, made upon the trial, the appellate court may reverse the action taken and enter such judgment as should have been entered below; for it would not be passing upon the facts but upon the law. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.