supposed error in California

2014“Under the doctrine of invited error, when a party by its own conduct induces the commission of error, it may not claim on appeal that the judgment should be reversed because of that error. [Citations.] But the doctrine does not apply when a party, while making the appropriate objections, acquiesces in a judicial determination. [Citation.] As this court has explained: ‘“An attorney who submits to the authority of an erroneous, adverse ruling after making appropriate objections or motions, does not waive the error in the ruling by proceeding in accordance therewith and endeavoring to make the b

2014“Under the doctrine of invited error, when a party by its own conduct induces the commission of error, it may not claim on appeal that the judgment should be reversed because of that error. [Citations.] But the doctrine does not apply when a party, while making the appropriate objections, acquiesces in a judicial determination. [Citation.] As this court has *1473 explained: ' “An attorney who submits to the authority of an erroneous, adverse ruling after making appropriate objections or motions, does not waive the error in the ruling by proceeding in accordance therewith and endeavoring to mak

1981The existing rule in California comes to us from a 1912 case, People v. Edwards, supra, 163 Cal. 752, 753 (see also People v. Plyler (1899) 126 Cal. 379, 381 [ 58 P. 904 ]; People v. Britton (1897) 118 Cal. 409, 412 [ 50 P. 664 ]; People v. Hamilton (1882) 62 Cal. 377, 382 ; People v. Trask (1907) 7 Cal.App. 103, 105 [ 93 P. 891 ]), in which the court purported to justify its holding with the following observation: “there is an increasing tendency to prolong the proceedings inordinately by allowing counsel on either side to indulge in tedious examinations of jurors apparently with no definite

1973The right of counsel to examine a prospective juror before challenge was established by court decision in 1855. [1] ( People v. Backus (1855) 5 Cal. 275 .) Many years later, however, in People v. Edwards (1912) 163 Cal. 752, 753 [ 127 P. 58 ], the court observed that "The records of the cases appealed to this court in which rulings made while impaneling a jury have been involved, indicate that there is an increasing tendency to prolong the proceedings inordinately by allowing counsel on either side to indulge in tedious examination of jurors, apparently with no definite purpose or object in vi

1957(Riskin v. Towers, 24 Cal.2d 274, 279 [ 148 P.2d 611 , 153 A.L.R 442]; Estate of Simmons, 168 Cal. 390, 396 [ 143 P. 697 ].) The trial court in the present case did not attempt to vacate the judgment on the ground of surprise or inadvertence, but attempted to grant defendant’s request by modifying the interlocutory judgment to correct the supposed error of law.

1957(Riskin v. Towers, 24 Cal.2d 274, 279 [ 148 P.2d 611 , 153 A.L.R 442]; Estate of Simmons, 168 Cal. 390, 396 [ 143 P. 697 ].) The trial court in the present case did not attempt to vacate the judgment on the ground of surprise or inadvertence, but attempted to grant defendant’s request by modifying the interlocutory judgment to correct the supposed error of law.

1957(Riskin v. Towers, 24 Cal.2d 274, 279 [ 148 P.2d 611 , 153 A.L.R 442]; Estate of Simmons, 168 Cal. 390, 396 [ 143 P. 697 ].) The trial court in the present case did not attempt to vacate the judgment on the ground of surprise or inadvertence, but attempted to grant defendant’s request by modifying the interlocutory judgment to correct the supposed error of law.

1957(Riskin v. Towers, 24 Cal.2d 274, 279 [ 148 P.2d 611 , 153 A.L.R 442]; Estate of Simmons, 168 Cal. 390, 396 [ 143 P. 697 ].) The trial court in the present case did not attempt to vacate the judgment on the ground of surprise or inadvertence, but attempted to grant defendant’s request by modifying the interlocutory judgment to correct the supposed error of law.

2014“Under the doctrine of invited error, when a party by its own conduct induces the commission of error, it may not claim on appeal that the judgment should be reversed because of that error. [Citations.] But the doctrine does not apply when a party, while making the appropriate objections, acquiesces in a judicial determination. [Citation.] As this court has explained: ‘“An attorney who submits to the authority of an erroneous, adverse ruling after making appropriate objections or motions, does not waive the error in the ruling by proceeding in accordance therewith and endeavoring to make the b

2014“Under the doctrine of invited error, when a party by its own conduct induces the commission of error, it may not claim on appeal that the judgment should be reversed because of that error. [Citations.] But the doctrine does not apply when a party, while making the appropriate objections, acquiesces in a judicial determination. [Citation.] As this court has *1473 explained: ' “An attorney who submits to the authority of an erroneous, adverse ruling after making appropriate objections or motions, does not waive the error in the ruling by proceeding in accordance therewith and endeavoring to mak

2024(See Vitug v. Alameda Point Storage, Inc. (2010) 7 187 Cal.App.4th 407, 412 [where appellant provided no reasoned argument and cited no statutory or case authority, argument was forfeited on appeal].) Finally, Nina claims that enjoining her “ ‘disturbance of peace’ due to a hypothetical litigation” she might pursue in the future violates her First Amendment rights and renders this lawsuit “a SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation).” Nina never raised this supposed defense to Marc’s DVRO request in the trial court, and in her appellate briefing, has provided no reasoned argument

2024(See People v. Holloway, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 124 [the defendant forfeited a claim he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury “by failing to seek the juror’s excusal or otherwise object to the court’s course of action”].) Finally, Jhons’s claim that Facebook evidence should not have been admitted is forfeited because of the absence of any argument showing how the supposed error 9 prejudiced him, and his claim that Google location evidence should not have been admitted is forfeited due to the absence of citations to the record.

2011They glean this supposed requirement from previous equitable easement cases involving decades-long encroachments or uses (Linthicum, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 262 [over 50 years]; Hirshfield, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 756 [over 20 years]; Field-Escandon v. DeMann, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at p. 237 [over 25 years]; Miller, supra, 270 Cal.App.2d at p. 293 [more than 15 years]; Christensen, supra, 114 Cal.App.2d at pp. 555-556 [over 10 years]), and they also rely on the Miller and Starr real estate treatise, which cites Hirshfield, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th 749 and Miller, supra, 270 Cal.App.2d 28

2011They glean this supposed requirement from previous equitable easement cases involving decades-long encroachments or uses (Linthicum, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 262 [over 50 years]; Hirshfield, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 756 [over 20 years]; Field-Escandon v. DeMann, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at p. 237 [over 25 years]; Miller, supra, 270 Cal.App.2d at p. 293 [more than 15 years]; Christensen, supra, 114 Cal.App.2d at pp. 555-556 [over 10 years]), and they also rely on the Miller and Starr real estate treatise, which cites Hirshfield, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th 749 and Miller, supra, 270 Cal.App.2d 28

2011They glean this supposed requirement from previous equitable easement cases involving decades-long encroachments or uses (Linthicum, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 262 [over 50 years]; Hirshfield, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 756 [over 20 years]; Field-Escandon v. DeMann, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at p. 237 [over 25 years]; Miller, supra, 270 Cal.App.2d at p. 293 [more than 15 years]; Christensen, supra, 114 Cal.App.2d at pp. 555-556 [over 10 years]), and they also rely on the Miller and Starr real estate treatise, which cites Hirshfield, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th 749 and Miller, supra, 270 Cal.App.2d 28

2011They glean this supposed requirement from previous equitable easement cases involving decades-long encroachments or uses (Linthicum, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 262 [over 50 years]; Hirshfield, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 756 [over 20 years]; Field-Escandon v. DeMann, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at p. 237 [over 25 years]; Miller, supra, 270 Cal.App.2d at p. 293 [more than 15 years]; Christensen, supra, 114 Cal.App.2d at pp. 555-556 [over 10 years]), and they also rely on the Miller and Starr real estate treatise, which cites Hirshfield, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th 749 and Miller, supra, 270 Cal.App.2d 28

2011They glean this supposed requirement from previous equitable easement cases involving decades-long encroachments or uses (Linthicum, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 262 [over 50 years]; Hirshfield, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 756 [over 20 years]; Field-Escandon v. DeMann, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at p. 237 [over 25 years]; Miller, supra, 270 Cal.App.2d at p. 293 [more than 15 years]; Christensen, supra, 114 Cal.App.2d at pp. 555-556 [over 10 years]), and they also rely on the Miller and Starr real estate treatise, which cites Hirshfield, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th 749 and Miller, supra, 270 Cal.App.2d 28

2011They glean this supposed requirement from previous equitable easement cases involving decades-long encroachments or uses (Linthicum, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 262 [over 50 years]; Hirshfield, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 756 [over 20 years]; Field-Escandon v. DeMann, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at p. 237 [over 25 years]; Miller, supra, 270 Cal.App.2d at p. 293 [more than 15 years]; Christensen, supra, 114 Cal.App.2d at pp. 555-556 [over 10 years]), and they also rely on the Miller and Starr real estate treatise, which cites Hirshfield, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th 749 and Miller, supra, 270 Cal.App.2d 28

2009First, the weight of authority in this state holds that the writ of error coram nobis “ ‘is not broad enough to reach every case in which there has been an erroneous or unjust judgment on the sole ground that no other remedy exists, but it must be confined to cases in which the supposed error inheres in facts not actually in issue under the pleadings at the trial and were unknown to the court when the judgment was entered, but which, if known, would have prevented the judgment.’ ” (In re Lindley, supra, 29 Cal.2d at pp. 725-726; see also People v. Hayman, supra, 145 Cal.App.2d at p. 623 [coram

2009First, the weight of authority in this state holds that the writ of error coram nobis “ ‘is not broad enough to reach every case in which there has been an erroneous or unjust judgment on the sole ground that no other remedy exists, but it must be confined to cases in which the supposed error inheres in facts not actually in issue under the pleadings at the trial and were unknown to the court when the judgment was entered, but which, if known, would have prevented the judgment.’ ” (In re Lindley, supra, 29 Cal.2d at pp. 725-726; see also People v. Hayman, supra, 145 Cal.App.2d at p. 623 [coram

2006No part of the standard form shall be omitted therefrom,” with an exception not relevant here. (§ 2070.) “Our primary aim in construing any law is to determine the legislative intent. [Citation.] In doing so we look first to the words of the statute, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning. [Citations.]” (Committee of Seven Thousand v. Superior Court (1988) 45 Cal.3d 491, 501 [ 247 Cal.Rptr. 362 , 754 P.2d 708 ].) Here, the supposed waiver of the appraisal panel’s circumscribed authority, appearing in the appraisal award form, does not comply with the plain language of section 2071, subdi

2006No part of the standard form shall be omitted therefrom,” with an exception not relevant here. (§ 2070.) “Our primary aim in construing any law is to determine the legislative intent. [Citation.] In doing so we look first to the words of the statute, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning. [Citations.]” (Committee of Seven Thousand v. Superior Court (1988) 45 Cal.3d 491, 501 [ 247 Cal.Rptr. 362 , 754 P.2d 708 ].) Here, the supposed waiver of the appraisal panel’s circumscribed authority, appearing in the appraisal award form, does not comply with the plain language of section 2071, subdi

2006(See Ryan v. Ford (Mo.Ct.App. 2000) 16 S.W.3d 644, 651 [client sued lawyer for legal malpractice based on lawyer’s handling of court approved personal injury settlement]; City of Long Beach v. Mansell (1970) 3 Cal.3d 462, 487 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 23 , 476 P.2d 423 ] [city estopped from challenging subdivision of tidelands]; Development Co. v. Seaboard D.

2006(See Ryan v. Ford (Mo.Ct.App. 2000) 16 S.W.3d 644, 651 [client sued lawyer for legal malpractice based on lawyer’s handling of court approved personal injury settlement]; City of Long Beach v. Mansell (1970) 3 Cal.3d 462, 487 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 23 , 476 P.2d 423 ] [city estopped from challenging subdivision of tidelands]; Development Co. v. Seaboard D.

2006(See Ryan v. Ford (Mo.Ct.App. 2000) 16 S.W.3d 644, 651 [client sued lawyer for legal malpractice based on lawyer’s handling of court approved personal injury settlement]; City of Long Beach v. Mansell (1970) 3 Cal.3d 462, 487 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 23 , 476 P.2d 423 ] [city estopped from challenging subdivision of tidelands]; Development Co. v. Seaboard D.

1999(People v. Alvarado (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 1003, 1021-1022 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 483 ].) Here the testimony of defendant, Hermasi Latu, and the other defense witnesses was more than minimal and insubstantial and would have supported the giving of a claim-of-right instruction. 3 The 1850 theft statute provided that persons “who shall feloniously steal, take and carry, lead or drive away the personal goods or property of another” (italics added) were guilty of theft.

1999(People v. Alvarado (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 1003, 1021-1022 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 483 ].) Here the testimony of defendant, Hermasi Latu, and the other defense witnesses was more than minimal and insubstantial and would have supported the giving of a claim-of-right instruction. 3 The 1850 theft statute provided that persons “who shall feloniously steal, take and carry, lead or drive away the personal goods or property of another” (italics added) were guilty of theft.

1994(Hibernia Sav. and Loan Soc. v. Farnham (1908) 153 Cal. 578, 584 [ 96 P. 9 ].) Here, in three sentences at the end of a footnote to the introduction to their opening brief, the defendants mentioned the alleged inadmissibility of the supporting evidence, but never discussed the supposed error in the body of their brief.

1994(Hibernia Sav. and Loan Soc. v. Farnham (1908) 153 Cal. 578, 584 [ 96 P. 9 ].) Here, in three sentences at the end of a footnote to the introduction to their opening brief, the defendants mentioned the alleged inadmissibility of the supporting evidence, but never discussed the supposed error in the body of their brief.

1993Justice Grodin concurred in the affirmance of the conviction, since the plurality opinion found the supposed error was harmless; but he pointed out that the rationale invoked was at variance with the constitutional language allowing admission of “any prior felony conviction . . . ‘without limitation’ . . . .” (People v. Castro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 319-320 (cone, and dis. opn. of Grodin, J.).) He suggested that the only question as to admission of a prior conviction was relevance for impeachment, although this question could in practice be the same as the question of whether the prior felon

1993Justice Grodin concurred in the affirmance of the conviction, since the plurality opinion found the supposed error was harmless; but he pointed out that the rationale invoked was at variance with the constitutional language allowing admission of “any prior felony conviction . . . ‘without limitation’ . . . .” (People v. Castro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 319-320 (cone, and dis. opn. of Grodin, J.).) He suggested that the only question as to admission of a prior conviction was relevance for impeachment, although this question could in practice be the same as the question of whether the prior felon