leading principle in New York

1955(People v. Dunford, 207 N. Y. 17 ; People v. Moses, 140 N. Y. 214 .) The intention of the Legislature was to prohibit the carrying on of public selling to the extent of seriously interrupting the religious observance of Sunday.

1955(People v. Dunford, 207 N. Y. 17 ; People v. Moses, 140 N. Y. 214 .) The intention of the Legislature was to prohibit the carrying on of public selling to the extent of seriously interrupting the religious observance of Sunday.

1947The leading principle -of the cases is, that when the testator bequeath a sum of money, or, which is the same thing, a life annuity, in such a manner as to show a separate and independent intention that, the money shall be paid to the legatee at all events, that intention will not be permitted to be overruled, merely by a direction in the will that the money is to be raised in a particular way, or out of a particular fund. * * * If we were to hold that the widow was to have nothing, less the property or securities in which the estate happened to be invested yielded income, and that, she was no

1947Matter of Weir ( 172 Misc. 74 ) the testator’s residuary estate was given t° his children with the direction to pay his widow $2,500 per year “ out of the income thereof ”.

1944Thus the trustees were directed “ to pay to the widow $7,000 per annum so long as she should remain a widow ” (Pierrepont v. Edwards, supra); to “ pay over to my wife out of the income of such trust fund a yearly income of Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000.00) to be paid in quarterly installments as long as she shall live ” (Matter of Whitcomb, supra).

1944Thus the trustees were directed “ to pay to the widow $7,000 per annum so long as she should remain a widow ” (Pierrepont v. Edwards, supra); to “ pay over to my wife out of the income of such trust fund a yearly income of Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000.00) to be paid in quarterly installments as long as she shall live ” (Matter of Whitcomb, supra).

1927(Matter of Becker, 59 Misc. 135 ; Matter of Conger, 81 App. Div. 493 .) A legacy is contingent when the enjoyment of it depends upon some particular event, as the arrival of the legatee at a certain age, but if it appears to relate to the time of payment only, the legacy vests .immediately.

1927(Matter of Becker, 59 Misc. 135 ; Matter of Conger, 81 App. Div. 493 .) A legacy is contingent when the enjoyment of it depends upon some particular event, as the arrival of the legatee at a certain age, but if it appears to relate to the time of payment only, the legacy vests .immediately.

1896(Vanderpoel v. Loew, 112 N. Y. 167 -181.) But there were other provisions in this will connected with this trust and with the final disposition of the property.

1894Thurber v. Chambers, 66 N. Y. 42 ; Slimson v. Vroman, 99 N. Y. 80 .

1893The leading rule of exposition is, that a contract shall be interpreted to give effect to the intention of the parties, Story on Cont, § 634; 2 Parsons on Cont, 494; Bishop on Cont, § 575; Parshall v. Eggerl, 54 N. Y., 18 , and it does seem rational and manifestly just that a party should know with whom he is contracting, before or at the time of the sale, and that no stranger "can be thrust upon him afterwards to his possible disadvantage, and this is evidently just what was contemplated and intended here.

1891This is the leading principle which runs through the cases cited upon this point. * * * It is the duty of courts to search for a construction that will carry the plain purpose of the testator’s bounty into effect.” Again: “The common law rule that the personal estate of a deceased person will be applied to the payment of his contract debts, to the relief of his real estate, is not, however, of universal application, and will not be enforced where it is in apparent hostility to' the plain intent of the deceased as expressed in his will, and would defeat bequests made therein.” Rice v. Harbeson,

1889(Leake v. Robinson, 2 Mer. 363; Warner v. Durant, 76 N. Y. 133 ; Smith v. Edwards, 88 id. 92.) The latter principle is invoked in this case.

1882Cases, 284; Jackson v. Rosevelt, 13 Johns., 97 ; O'Donnells v. Lindsay, 39 Superior Ct., 537.) A leading rule of the interpretation of the description of land contained in deeds among private parties is, that that which is certain must prevail over that which is less so, and hence quantity, as the less certain call of the deed, often yields to courses and distances which are more certain, and these again to fixed natural objects which are still more certain. ( Wendell v. The People, 8 Wend., 183 ; Northrop v. Sumney, 27 Barb., 196 ; Higinbotham, v. Stoddard, 72 N. Y., 94 .) It is apparent in t

1882Cases, 284; Jackson v. Rosevelt, 13 Johns., 97 ; O'Donnells v. Lindsay, 39 Superior Ct., 537.) A leading rule of the interpretation of the description of land contained in deeds among private parties is, that that which is certain must prevail over that which is less so, and hence quantity, as the less certain call of the deed, often yields to courses and distances which are more certain, and these again to fixed natural objects which are still more certain. ( Wendell v. The People, 8 Wend., 183 ; Northrop v. Sumney, 27 Barb., 196 ; Higinbotham, v. Stoddard, 72 N. Y., 94 .) It is apparent in t

1882Cases, 284; Jackson v. Rosevelt, 13 Johns., 97 ; O'Donnells v. Lindsay, 39 Superior Ct., 537.) A leading rule of the interpretation of the description of land contained in deeds among private parties is, that that which is certain must prevail over that which is less so, and hence quantity, as the less certain call of the deed, often yields to courses and distances which are more certain, and these again to fixed natural objects which are still more certain. ( Wendell v. The People, 8 Wend., 183 ; Northrop v. Sumney, 27 Barb., 196 ; Higinbotham, v. Stoddard, 72 N. Y., 94 .) It is apparent in t

1882Cases, 284; Jackson v. Rosevelt, 13 Johns., 97 ; O'Donnells v. Lindsay, 39 Superior Ct., 537.) A leading rule of the interpretation of the description of land contained in deeds among private parties is, that that which is certain must prevail over that which is less so, and hence quantity, as the less certain call of the deed, often yields to courses and distances which are more certain, and these again to fixed natural objects which are still more certain. ( Wendell v. The People, 8 Wend., 183 ; Northrop v. Sumney, 27 Barb., 196 ; Higinbotham, v. Stoddard, 72 N. Y., 94 .) It is apparent in t

1864If futurity is annexed to the substance of the gift, the vesting is suspended; but if it appear to relate to the time of payment only, the legacy vests instanter. (1 Jarman on Wills, 760; Gilman v. Reddington, 24 N.Y. 9 .) And words directing division or distribution between two or more objects at a future time are equivalent to a direction to pay.