leading rule in Arkansas

1996The Court said: A leading principle that pervades the entire law of criminal procedure is that, after indictment found, nothing shall be done in the absence of the prisoner . . . ,[I]n felonies, it is not in the power of the prisoner, either by himself or his counsel, to waive the right to be personally present during the trial. 146 U.S. at 372 .

1996In Badger v. Cardwell, 587 F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1978), the defendant was accused of assault to commit murder of a prison guard, and was acting as his own attorney with stand-by counsel, when he was expelled from the courtroom three times.

1988On the contrary, there has been adopted, as a leading principle, the proposition that whether a duty to speak exists is determinable by reference to all the circumstances of the case, and by comparing the facts not disclosed with the object and end sought by the contracting parties. . . . 671 S.W.2d at 216 .

1988The court in Camp, 671 S.W.2d at 216 , also quotes the following language from the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision in Hanson Motor Co. v. Young, 223 Ark. 191 , 265 S.W.2d 501 (1954): The duty of disclosure . . . arises where one person is in position to have and to exercise influence over another who reposes confidence in him whether a fiduciary relationship in the strict sense of the term exists between them or not.

1988The court in Camp, 671 S.W.2d at 216 , also quotes the following language from the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision in Hanson Motor Co. v. Young, 223 Ark. 191 , 265 S.W.2d 501 (1954): The duty of disclosure . . . arises where one person is in position to have and to exercise influence over another who reposes confidence in him whether a fiduciary relationship in the strict sense of the term exists between them or not.

1988The court in Camp, 671 S.W.2d at 216 , also quotes the following language from the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision in Hanson Motor Co. v. Young, 223 Ark. 191 , 265 S.W.2d 501 (1954): The duty of disclosure . . . arises where one person is in position to have and to exercise influence over another who reposes confidence in him whether a fiduciary relationship in the strict sense of the term exists between them or not.

1957In the Campbell case, supra, the rule was stated this way: ‘ ‘ The leading rule in the construction of wills, is to give effect to what appears to be the intention of the testator, in view of all the provisions of the will; and if this intention can be ascertained, it should be carried out, unless contrary to law or against public policy.” In the Park case, supra, this language was used: “The polestar of the court, in construing a will, should always be the intention of the testator; . . .” In Jackson v. Robinson, 195 Ark. 431 , 112 S. W. 2d 417 , this clear language was employed: “All of our

1957In the Campbell case, supra, the rule was stated this way: ‘ ‘ The leading rule in the construction of wills, is to give effect to what appears to be the intention of the testator, in view of all the provisions of the will; and if this intention can be ascertained, it should be carried out, unless contrary to law or against public policy.” In the Park case, supra, this language was used: “The polestar of the court, in construing a will, should always be the intention of the testator; . . .” In Jackson v. Robinson, 195 Ark. 431 , 112 S. W. 2d 417 , this clear language was employed: “All of our

1914This court early announced that “The leading rule'in the construction of wills, is to give effect to what appears to be the intention of the testator in view of all the provisions of the will.” See Campbell v. Campbell, 13 Ark. 513 -518; Cockrill v. Armstrong, 31 Ark. 580 ; Bloom v. Strauss, 73 Ark, 56; Galloway v. Darby, 105 Ark. 558 .

1914At the present day, however, more respect is paid to the intention of testators, and in seeking to ascertain, in any particular case, what the intention is the court proceeds on the theory that aman who makes a will does not, as a general rule,’ wish to die intestate as to any part of his property.” In Webb v. Webb, 111 Ark. 54 , we said: “This court early announced that ‘the leading rule in the construction -of wills is to give effect to what appears to be the intention of the testator in view of'all the provisions of the will. ’ ’ ’ (2) This court has often announced the familiar rulé, ‘ ‘ T

1914In the latter case, after quoting the above rule from former cases, we said: “But in Patty v. Goolsby, supra, and other cases in which this rule was -announced, the language of the will construed showed a purpose to dispose, by will, of the entire estate of the testator. ’ ’ The same thought is well expressed in Gallagher v. McKeague, 110 Am.

1914At the present day, however, more respect is paid to the intention of testators, and in seeking to ascertain, in any particular case, what the intention is the court proceeds on the theory that aman who makes a will does not, as a general rule,’ wish to die intestate as to any part of his property.” In Webb v. Webb, 111 Ark. 54 , we said: “This court early announced that ‘the leading rule in the construction -of wills is to give effect to what appears to be the intention of the testator in view of'all the provisions of the will. ’ ’ ’ (2) This court has often announced the familiar rulé, ‘ ‘ T

1914At the present day, however, more respect is paid to the intention of testators, and in seeking to ascertain, in any particular case, what the intention is the court proceeds on the theory that aman who makes a will does not, as a general rule,’ wish to die intestate as to any part of his property.” In Webb v. Webb, 111 Ark. 54 , we said: “This court early announced that ‘the leading rule in the construction -of wills is to give effect to what appears to be the intention of the testator in view of'all the provisions of the will. ’ ’ ’ (2) This court has often announced the familiar rulé, ‘ ‘ T

1914At the present day, however, more respect is paid to the intention of testators, and in seeking to ascertain, in any particular case, what the intention is the court proceeds on the theory that aman who makes a will does not, as a general rule,’ wish to die intestate as to any part of his property.” In Webb v. Webb, 111 Ark. 54 , we said: “This court early announced that ‘the leading rule in the construction -of wills is to give effect to what appears to be the intention of the testator in view of'all the provisions of the will. ’ ’ ’ (2) This court has often announced the familiar rulé, ‘ ‘ T

1914At the present day, however, more respect is paid to the intention of testators, and in seeking to ascertain, in any particular case, what the intention is the court proceeds on the theory that aman who makes a will does not, as a general rule,’ wish to die intestate as to any part of his property.” In Webb v. Webb, 111 Ark. 54 , we said: “This court early announced that ‘the leading rule in the construction -of wills is to give effect to what appears to be the intention of the testator in view of'all the provisions of the will. ’ ’ ’ (2) This court has often announced the familiar rulé, ‘ ‘ T

1914This court early announced that “The leading rule'in the construction of wills, is to give effect to what appears to be the intention of the testator in view of all the provisions of the will.” See Campbell v. Campbell, 13 Ark. 513 -518; Cockrill v. Armstrong, 31 Ark. 580 ; Bloom v. Strauss, 73 Ark, 56; Galloway v. Darby, 105 Ark. 558 .

1914In the latter case, after quoting the above rule from former cases, we said: “But in Patty v. Goolsby, supra, and other cases in which this rule was -announced, the language of the will construed showed a purpose to dispose, by will, of the entire estate of the testator. ’ ’ The same thought is well expressed in Gallagher v. McKeague, 110 Am.

1892The authorities to this effect are exceedingly numerous, both in England and America; but it seems to us unnecessary, in the present state of the law, to do more than to refer to the leading principle as recognized by this court in Fenwick v. Sears, 1 Cranch, 259 ; Dixon's Exrs. v. Ramsay's Exrs. 3 Cranch, 319 ; and Kerr v. Moon, 9 Wheat. 565 .” The authority of this case was not impaired by a dissenting opinion, and has been recognized without question by that court as a correct and final statement of the law.

1892The authorities to this effect are exceedingly numerous, both in England and America; but it seems to us unnecessary, in the present state of the law, to do more than to refer to the leading principle as recognized by this court in Fenwick v. Sears, 1 Cranch, 259 ; Dixon's Exrs. v. Ramsay's Exrs. 3 Cranch, 319 ; and Kerr v. Moon, 9 Wheat. 565 .” The authority of this case was not impaired by a dissenting opinion, and has been recognized without question by that court as a correct and final statement of the law.

1892The authorities to this effect are exceedingly numerous, both in England and America; but it seems to us unnecessary, in the present state of the law, to do more than to refer to the leading principle as recognized by this court in Fenwick v. Sears, 1 Cranch, 259 ; Dixon's Exrs. v. Ramsay's Exrs. 3 Cranch, 319 ; and Kerr v. Moon, 9 Wheat. 565 .” The authority of this case was not impaired by a dissenting opinion, and has been recognized without question by that court as a correct and final statement of the law.