leading inquiry in Alabama

2011But where the direct evidence is in conflict as to whether the accused did the act, or is partially or wholly circumstantial upon that issue, the question of motive becomes a leading inquiry.” ‘“Fuller v. State, 269 Ala. 312 , 113 So.2d 153, 175 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 936 , 80 S.Ct. 380 , 4 L.Ed.2d 358 (1960) (quoting Harden v. State, 211 Ala. 656 , 101 So. 442, 444 (1924)).

2003But where the direct evidence is in conflict as to whether the accused did the act, or is partially or wholly circumstantial upon that issue, the question of motive becomes a leading inquiry." "` Fuller v. State, 269 Ala. 312 , 113 So.2d 153, 175 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 936 , 80 S.Ct. 380 , 4 L.Ed.2d 358 (1960) (quoting Harden v. State, 211 Ala. 656 , 101 So. 442, 444 (1924)).

2011“It is permissible in every criminal case to show that there was an influence, an inducement, operating on the accused, which may have led or tempted him to commit the offense.” Bowden v. State, 538 So.2d 1226, 1235 (Ala.1988) (quoting earlier cases, emphasis in Bowden).’ “577 So.2d at 549.” Presley v. State, 770 So.2d 104, 110 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), affirmed, 770 So.2d 114 (Ala.2000), cert. denied, Presley v. Alabama, 531 U.S. 881 , 121 S.Ct. 194 , 148 L.Ed.2d 135 (2000).

2011“It is permissible in every criminal case to show that there was an influence, an inducement, operating on the accused, which may have led or tempted him to commit the offense.” Bowden v. State, 538 So.2d 1226, 1235 (Ala.1988) (quoting earlier cases, emphasis in Bowden).’ “577 So.2d at 549.” Presley v. State, 770 So.2d 104, 110 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), affirmed, 770 So.2d 114 (Ala.2000), cert. denied, Presley v. Alabama, 531 U.S. 881 , 121 S.Ct. 194 , 148 L.Ed.2d 135 (2000).

2011“It is permissible in every criminal case to show that there was an influence, an inducement, operating on the accused, which may have led or tempted him to commit the offense.” Bowden v. State, 538 So.2d 1226, 1235 (Ala.1988) (quoting earlier cases, emphasis in Bowden).’ “577 So.2d at 549.” Presley v. State, 770 So.2d 104, 110 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), affirmed, 770 So.2d 114 (Ala.2000), cert. denied, Presley v. Alabama, 531 U.S. 881 , 121 S.Ct. 194 , 148 L.Ed.2d 135 (2000).

2011“It is permissible in every criminal case to show that there was an influence, an inducement, operating on the accused, which may have led or tempted him to commit the offense.” Bowden v. State, 538 So.2d 1226, 1235 (Ala.1988) (quoting earlier cases, emphasis in Bowden).’ “577 So.2d at 549.” Presley v. State, 770 So.2d 104, 110 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), affirmed, 770 So.2d 114 (Ala.2000), cert. denied, Presley v. Alabama, 531 U.S. 881 , 121 S.Ct. 194 , 148 L.Ed.2d 135 (2000).

1999In this Court's review of that case, this Court stated that "[u]nder Rule 24, the leading inquiry is whether the church possesses a sufficient interest in the matter of the injunctive relief action instituted by the Williams group." Bell , 579 So.2d at 618 .

1997We recognize that the most recent cases holding that evidence of a collateral sex offense was admissible under the particular facts as relevant to prove motive involved the molestation by the accused of his children or stepchildren, see Register, Bowden , and Atkisson v. State , 640 So.2d 33 (Ala.Cr.App. 1993), or the molestation by the accused of essentially his foster-children, see Hatcher (the victims were sisters and orphans, the accused was their brother-in-law, and the victims both lived in the appellant's household). 3 However, we do not think that the Alabama Supreme Court intended to

1991Randolph County v. Thompson, 502 So.2d 357 (Ala.1987).

1987Moreover, today's holding is out of step with federal precedent, beginning with Lewis v. United States , 146 U.S. 370 , 372 , 13 S.Ct. 136 , 137 , 36 L.Ed. 1011 (1892): "A leading principle that pervades the entire law of criminal procedure is that, after indictment found, nothing shall be done in the absence of the prisoner.

1987Moreover, today's holding is out of step with federal precedent, beginning with Lewis v. United States , 146 U.S. 370 , 372 , 13 S.Ct. 136 , 137 , 36 L.Ed. 1011 (1892): "A leading principle that pervades the entire law of criminal procedure is that, after indictment found, nothing shall be done in the absence of the prisoner.

1987While this rule has, at times, and in the cases of misdemeanors, been somewhat relaxed, yet in felonies, it is not in the power of the prisoner, either by himself *Page 156 or his counsel, to waive the right to be personally present during the trial." Subsequent federal cases, reaffirming this right, have recognized three exceptions: 1) Where the defendant waives the right by voluntary absence, Taylor v. United States , 414 U.S. 17 , 94 S.Ct. 194 , 38 L.Ed.2d 174 (1973); Diaz v. United States , 223 U.S. 442 , 32 S.Ct. 250 , 56 L.Ed. 500 (1912); 2) in the case of the disruptive defendant, Illin

1987While this rule has, at times, and in the cases of misdemeanors, been somewhat relaxed, yet in felonies, it is not in the power of the prisoner, either by himself *Page 156 or his counsel, to waive the right to be personally present during the trial." Subsequent federal cases, reaffirming this right, have recognized three exceptions: 1) Where the defendant waives the right by voluntary absence, Taylor v. United States , 414 U.S. 17 , 94 S.Ct. 194 , 38 L.Ed.2d 174 (1973); Diaz v. United States , 223 U.S. 442 , 32 S.Ct. 250 , 56 L.Ed. 500 (1912); 2) in the case of the disruptive defendant, Illin

1987While this rule has, at times, and in the cases of misdemeanors, been somewhat relaxed, yet in felonies, it is not in the power of the prisoner, either by himself *Page 156 or his counsel, to waive the right to be personally present during the trial." Subsequent federal cases, reaffirming this right, have recognized three exceptions: 1) Where the defendant waives the right by voluntary absence, Taylor v. United States , 414 U.S. 17 , 94 S.Ct. 194 , 38 L.Ed.2d 174 (1973); Diaz v. United States , 223 U.S. 442 , 32 S.Ct. 250 , 56 L.Ed. 500 (1912); 2) in the case of the disruptive defendant, Illin

1987While this rule has, at times, and in the cases of misdemeanors, been somewhat relaxed, yet in felonies, it is not in the power of the prisoner, either by himself *156 or his counsel, to waive the right to be personally present during the trial." Subsequent federal cases, reaffirming this right, have recognized three exceptions: 1) Where the defendant waives the right by voluntary absence, Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17 , 94 S.Ct. 194 , 38 L.Ed.2d 174 (1973); Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 , 32 S.Ct. 250 , 56 L.Ed. 500 (1912); 2) in the case of the disruptive defendant, Illinois v.

1987While this rule has, at times, and in the cases of misdemeanors, been somewhat relaxed, yet in felonies, it is not in the power of the prisoner, either by himself *Page 156 or his counsel, to waive the right to be personally present during the trial." Subsequent federal cases, reaffirming this right, have recognized three exceptions: 1) Where the defendant waives the right by voluntary absence, Taylor v. United States , 414 U.S. 17 , 94 S.Ct. 194 , 38 L.Ed.2d 174 (1973); Diaz v. United States , 223 U.S. 442 , 32 S.Ct. 250 , 56 L.Ed. 500 (1912); 2) in the case of the disruptive defendant, Illin

1987While this rule has, at times, and in the cases of misdemeanors, been somewhat relaxed, yet in felonies, it is not in the power of the prisoner, either by himself *Page 156 or his counsel, to waive the right to be personally present during the trial." Subsequent federal cases, reaffirming this right, have recognized three exceptions: 1) Where the defendant waives the right by voluntary absence, Taylor v. United States , 414 U.S. 17 , 94 S.Ct. 194 , 38 L.Ed.2d 174 (1973); Diaz v. United States , 223 U.S. 442 , 32 S.Ct. 250 , 56 L.Ed. 500 (1912); 2) in the case of the disruptive defendant, Illin

1987While this rule has, at times, and in the cases of misdemeanors, been somewhat relaxed, yet in felonies, it is not in the power of the prisoner, either by himself *Page 156 or his counsel, to waive the right to be personally present during the trial." Subsequent federal cases, reaffirming this right, have recognized three exceptions: 1) Where the defendant waives the right by voluntary absence, Taylor v. United States , 414 U.S. 17 , 94 S.Ct. 194 , 38 L.Ed.2d 174 (1973); Diaz v. United States , 223 U.S. 442 , 32 S.Ct. 250 , 56 L.Ed. 500 (1912); 2) in the case of the disruptive defendant, Illin

1987While this rule has, at times, and in the cases of misdemeanors, been somewhat relaxed, yet in felonies, it is not in the power of the prisoner, either by himself *Page 156 or his counsel, to waive the right to be personally present during the trial." Subsequent federal cases, reaffirming this right, have recognized three exceptions: 1) Where the defendant waives the right by voluntary absence, Taylor v. United States , 414 U.S. 17 , 94 S.Ct. 194 , 38 L.Ed.2d 174 (1973); Diaz v. United States , 223 U.S. 442 , 32 S.Ct. 250 , 56 L.Ed. 500 (1912); 2) in the case of the disruptive defendant, Illin

1986"Where evidence is in conflict as to whether the accused did the act, or is partially or wholly circumstantial upon that issue, the question of motive becomes the leading inquiry." Kelley v. State , 409 So.2d 909 , *Page 530 914 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981); Dolvin v. State , 391 So.2d at 672 .

1986"Where evidence is in conflict as to whether the accused did the act, or is partially or wholly circumstantial upon that issue, the question of motive becomes the leading inquiry." Kelley v. State , 409 So.2d 909 , *Page 530 914 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981); Dolvin v. State , 391 So.2d at 672 .

1843The leading principle, involved in this case, has been well examined, and well settled, by the opinion of the court, in the case of Haley, et al. v. Bennett, reported in 5 Porter, 452, 473 .