leading principle in Michigan

1981II While the power to set the range of punishment for a given offense is legislative, 3 bringing that statutory range of discretion to bear upon an individual defendant in the form of a sentence has been confided to the judiciary. 4 The exertion of such judicial process has traditionally required that the accused be given the opportunity to personally participate. 5 " 'A leading principle that pervades the entire law of criminal procedure is that, after indictment found, nothing shall be done in the absence of the prisoner.’ ” People v Medcoff, 344 Mich 108, 114 ; 73 NW2d 537 (1955), quoting L

1981II While the power to set the range of punishment for a given offense is legislative, 3 bringing that statutory range of discretion to bear upon an individual defendant in the form of a sentence has been confided to the judiciary. 4 The exertion of such judicial process has traditionally required that the accused be given the opportunity to personally participate. 5 " 'A leading principle that pervades the entire law of criminal procedure is that, after indictment found, nothing shall be done in the absence of the prisoner.’ ” People v Medcoff, 344 Mich 108, 114 ; 73 NW2d 537 (1955), quoting L

1924As was said by Chief Justice Steere in the case of In re Gould, 174 Mich. 673 : “ ‘The leading principle being that, when the right of the parent is not clear and imperative, the best interests and happiness of the child must always control the decision of the court.’ ” We have examined the cases cited by counsel of In re Goldinger, 207 Mich. 99 ; In re Adams, 214 Mich. 199 , and think a reading of the opinions therein will show they are clearly distinguishable from the instant case.

1918As was said by Chief Justice Steere in the case of In re Gould, 174 Mich. 673 : “The leading principle being that, when the right of the parent is not clear and imperative, the best interests and happiness of the child must always control the decision of the court.” Whether or not the alleged conduct of those now in charge towards the father seriously affects the best interests of the child, cannot be determined until thé proofs have been taken and the case heard on its-merits.

1981II While the power to set the range of punishment for a given offense is legislative, 3 bringing that statutory range of discretion to bear upon an individual defendant in the form of a sentence has been confided to the judiciary. 4 The exertion of such judicial process has traditionally required that the accused be given the opportunity to personally participate. 5 " 'A leading principle that pervades the entire law of criminal procedure is that, after indictment found, nothing shall be done in the absence of the prisoner.’ ” People v Medcoff, 344 Mich 108, 114 ; 73 NW2d 537 (1955), quoting L

1981II While the power to set the range of punishment for a given offense is legislative, 3 bringing that statutory range of discretion to bear upon an individual defendant in the form of a sentence has been confided to the judiciary. 4 The exertion of such judicial process has traditionally required that the accused be given the opportunity to personally participate. 5 " 'A leading principle that pervades the entire law of criminal procedure is that, after indictment found, nothing shall be done in the absence of the prisoner.’ ” People v Medcoff, 344 Mich 108, 114 ; 73 NW2d 537 (1955), quoting L

1961On a review of the whole case from every angle, it was held that the child should remain in the custody of its grandparents, to whom it was devotedly attached and with whom it preferred to live; the leading principle being that, when the right of the parent is not clear and imperative, the best interests and happiness of the child must always control the decision of the court." (pp 672, 673.) I would adopt Judge Falahee's opinion and present it to the profession as follows (deleting only extensive quotations from Fritts v. Krugh, 354 Mich 97 , and authorities considered therein): "This is a ha

1961On a review of the whole case from every angle, it was held that the child should remain in the custody of its grandparents, to whom it was devotedly attached and with whom it preferred to live; the leading principle being that, when the right of the parent is not clear and imperative, the best interests and happiness of the child must always control the decision of the court.” (pp 672, 673.) I would adopt Judge Palahee’s opinion and present it to the profession as follows (deleting only extensive quotations from Fritts v. Krugh, 354 Mich 97 , and authorities considered therein): “This is a ha

1955The aforementioned right to trial by an impartial jury, from which the right to be present is derived, applies to “every criminal prosecution.” The United States supreme court in Lewis v. United States, 146 US 370 ( 13 S Ct 136 , 36 L ed 1011), a case upholding the right of a defendant to be present when jurors are challenged, said (p 372): “A leading principle that pervades the entire law of criminal procedure is that, after indictment found,, nothing shall be done in the absence of the prisoner.” In Hopt v. Utah, 110 US 574 ( 4 S Ct 202 , 28 L ed 262), the court, under a statute of the terri

1955The aforementioned right to trial by an impartial jury, from which the right to be present is derived, applies to “every criminal prosecution.” The United States supreme court in Lewis v. United States, 146 US 370 ( 13 S Ct 136 , 36 L ed 1011), a case upholding the right of a defendant to be present when jurors are challenged, said (p 372): “A leading principle that pervades the entire law of criminal procedure is that, after indictment found,, nothing shall be done in the absence of the prisoner.” In Hopt v. Utah, 110 US 574 ( 4 S Ct 202 , 28 L ed 262), the court, under a statute of the terri

1955To change his home now, to my mind, would lead only to unhappiness and confusion of this young boy.” In Greene v. Walker, 227 Mich 672 , we say (syllabus 1): “In habeas corpus proceedings by a father to obtain the custody of his 9-year-old daughter, evidence that the daughter had been in the custody of her grandmother and aunt ever since the death of her mother when she was only 13 days old, that the father has nevér paid a cent toward her maintenance or support or shown any interest in her previous to the institution of these proceedings, and that she has a good home, held, to justify the con

1955To change his home now, to my mind, would lead only to unhappiness and confusion of this young boy.” In Greene v. Walker, 227 Mich 672 , we say (syllabus 1): “In habeas corpus proceedings by a father to obtain the custody of his 9-year-old daughter, evidence that the daughter had been in the custody of her grandmother and aunt ever since the death of her mother when she was only 13 days old, that the father has nevér paid a cent toward her maintenance or support or shown any interest in her previous to the institution of these proceedings, and that she has a good home, held, to justify the con

1955To change his home now, to my mind, would lead only to unhappiness and confusion of this young boy.” In Greene v. Walker, 227 Mich 672 , we say (syllabus 1): “In habeas corpus proceedings by a father to obtain the custody of his 9-year-old daughter, evidence that the daughter had been in the custody of her grandmother and aunt ever since the death of her mother when she was only 13 days old, that the father has nevér paid a cent toward her maintenance or support or shown any interest in her previous to the institution of these proceedings, and that she has a good home, held, to justify the con

1955To change his home now, to my mind, would lead only to unhappiness and confusion of this young boy.” In Greene v. Walker, 227 Mich 672 , we say (syllabus 1): “In habeas corpus proceedings by a father to obtain the custody of his 9-year-old daughter, evidence that the daughter had been in the custody of her grandmother and aunt ever since the death of her mother when she was only 13 days old, that the father has nevér paid a cent toward her maintenance or support or shown any interest in her previous to the institution of these proceedings, and that she has a good home, held, to justify the con

1924On a review of the whole case from every angle, it was held that the child should remain in the custody of its grandparents, to whom it was devotedly attached and with whom it preferred to live; the leading principle being that, when the right of the parent is not clear and imperative, the best interests and happiness of the child must always control the decision of the court.” In Martin v. Benzie Circuit Judge, 200 Mich. 549 , Justice Kuhn, speaking for the court, said in part: “The superior right of the parent to the child should only be enforced when it accords with the best interests of th

1924As was said by Chief Justice Steere in the case of In re Gould, 174 Mich. 673 : “ ‘The leading principle being that, when the right of the parent is not clear and imperative, the best interests and happiness of the child must always control the decision of the court.’ ” We have examined the cases cited by counsel of In re Goldinger, 207 Mich. 99 ; In re Adams, 214 Mich. 199 , and think a reading of the opinions therein will show they are clearly distinguishable from the instant case.

1924As was said by Chief Justice Steere in the case of In re Gould, 174 Mich. 673 : “ ‘The leading principle being that, when the right of the parent is not clear and imperative, the best interests and happiness of the child must always control the decision of the court.’ ” We have examined the cases cited by counsel of In re Goldinger, 207 Mich. 99 ; In re Adams, 214 Mich. 199 , and think a reading of the opinions therein will show they are clearly distinguishable from the instant case.

1924As was said by Chief Justice Steere in the case of In re Gould, 174 Mich. 673 : “ ‘The leading principle being that, when the right of the parent is not clear and imperative, the best interests and happiness of the child must always control the decision of the court.’ ” We have examined the cases cited by counsel of In re Goldinger, 207 Mich. 99 ; In re Adams, 214 Mich. 199 , and think a reading of the opinions therein will show they are clearly distinguishable from the instant case.

1924As was said by Chief Justice Steere in the case of In re Gould, 174 Mich. 673 : “ ‘The leading principle being that, when the right of the parent is not clear and imperative, the best interests and happiness of the child must always control the decision of the court.’ ” We have examined the cases cited by counsel of In re Goldinger, 207 Mich. 99 ; In re Adams, 214 Mich. 199 , and think a reading of the opinions therein will show they are clearly distinguishable from the instant case.