Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
11 New York opinions name it 4 courts 1999–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gilbert Frank Corp. v. Federal Insurancegreen2 sentences2010Co., 70 NY2d 966, 968 [1988]; Halim v State Farm Fire & Cas. 2006Co., 70 NY2d 966 [1988]; Schachter v Royal Ins. | 1 | 3 |
Carr v. Town of Fleminggreen1 sentence2010In any event, as Verizon correctly contends, viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the initial attachment of the terminal and wiring was a discrete, well- defined taking of property, and the mere addition of cable did not afford the plaintiffs a new limitations period (see Carr v Town of Fleming, 122 AD2d 540, 541 [1986] [de facto taking claim would have accrued when the condemnor physically entered upon the land and installed the subject sewer line]). | 1 | 1 |
Kempf v. Magidagreen1 sentence2010Moreover, with respect to Verizon’s alleged conduct in attaching additional cables to the plaintiffs’ building in 2004 or 2005, even if we afford the pleadings a liberal construction (see Kempf v Magida, 37 AD3d 763, 764 [2007]), the plaintiffs failed to allege that said conduct constituted another de facto taking so as to trigger a limitations period for a claim of inverse condemnation. | 1 | 1 |
Myers v. Frankelgreen1 sentence1999Finding support for his claim in the language of several nisi prius decisions (Myers v Frankel, 179 Misc 2d 225, 229 [“the date the (statute) starts to run is the date when the rent is registered”]; Crabtree v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, NYLJ, Dec. 9, 1998, at 26, col 1 [Sup Ct, NY County] [“the filing of the registration statement (supplies) the measuring date for purposes of establishing the four year limitation period”]), tenant argues that the limitations period for a claim of rent overcharge begins to run on the date that the rent is registered. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Havell v. Islam
green
2 sentences2013In any event, the limitations period for a claim of prima facie tort is one year (Havell v Islam, 292 AD2d 210 [1st Dept 2002]). 2013In any event, the limitations period for a claim of prima facie tort is one year (Havell v Islam, 292 AD2d 210 [1st Dept 2002]). | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Matter of Crowell v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the Town of Queensbury
green
1 sentence2025Conservation , 125 AD3d 974, 976-977 ; cf. Matter of Crowell v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the Town of Queensbury , 151 AD3d at 1249 ). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Riverso v. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation
green
1 sentence2025Conservation , 125 AD3d 974, 976-977 ; cf. Matter of Crowell v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the Town of Queensbury , 151 AD3d at 1249 ). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People Ex Rel. Silberman Ex Rel. Omatiga v. Department of Corrections
green
1 sentence2019In any event, the mortgage moratorium cases enabled a plaintiff to assert claims for only a limited subset of unpaid interest payments that accrued no later than the expiration of the limitations period on the claim for principal—claims that, in this case, would be time-barred. - 10 - - 11 - No. 18 Amrusi, 155 AD3d at 8165 ). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Gress v. Brown
green
1 sentence2014The limitations period for a challenge of a legislative resolution is four months (see Gress v Brown, 20 NY3d 957 [2012]; Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224 [1980]). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Solnick v. Whalen
green
1 sentence2014The limitations period for a challenge of a legislative resolution is four months (see Gress v Brown, 20 NY3d 957 [2012]; Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224 [1980]). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
New York State Psychiatric Ass'n v. New York State Department of Health
green
1 sentence2013Therein, the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that where a continuing duty is imposed upon an administrative agency, as, for example, the duty to provide reimbursement of the Medicare deductible and coinsurance fees for services rendered to and claims processed for individuals eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid coverage, the statute of limitations is not a defense to claims based on breaches of a continuing duty which occurred within the limitations period and the defense of laches should not be applied to any of the repeated violations occurring within the limitations period, | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Graham v. City of New York
neutral
1 sentence2013It must also be recognized that since Public Housing Law § 157 (1) requires that 30 days must elapse after service of a notice of claim before an action may be commenced, the statute of limitations is tolled during that 30-day period (Graham v City of New York, 199 AD2d 304 [1993], citing Public Housing Law § 157 [1]; CPLR 204 [a]; Serravillo v New York City Tr. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.