Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
47 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Meh v. Lhgreen2 sentences2025M.E.H. v. L.H., 177 Ill. 2d 207, 214 (1997). 2009M.E.H. 177 Ill. 2d at 214-15 , 685 N.E.2d at 339 . | 5 | 11 |
People v. Pinkonslygreen2 sentences2026“If the party opposing the section 2-1401 petition does not raise the limitations period as a defense, it may be waived.” People v. Pinkonsly, 207 Ill. 2d 555, 562 (2003). 2022“If the party opposing the section 2-1401 petition does not raise the limitations period as a defense, it may be waived.” Pinkonsly, 207 Ill. 2d at 562. ¶ 13 Here, the State failed to raise the issue of timeliness below, and therefore it waived this argument. ¶ 14 B. | 4 | 4 |
Rognant v. Palaciosgreen2 sentences2015App. 3d 390, 399 (2001) (finding "it was within the discretion of the trial court *** to allow the affirmative defense in defendant's motion for summary judgment"); Rognant v. Palacios, 224 Ill. 2015App. 3d 390, 399 (2001) (finding "it was within the discretion of the trial court *** to allow the affirmative defense in defendant's motion for summary judgment"); Rognant v. Palacios, 224 Ill. | 3 | 3 |
HORWITZ EX REL. v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co.green2 sentences2015App. 3d 562, 570 (2002) ("[A] party may well assert a limitations period defense in its summary judgment motion***."); Horwitz v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 6 319 Ill. 2015App. 3d 562, 570 (2002) ("[A] party may well assert a limitations period defense in its summary judgment motion***."); Horwitz v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 6 319 Ill. | 3 | 3 |
Porter v. Decatur Memorial Hospitalgreen2 sentences2017Thus, with respect to section 2-616(d), due to the similarities between section 2-616(d) and Rule 15(c), “Illinois courts have looked to federal precedent interpreting Rule 15(c)(1)(C) for guidance in interpreting section 2-616(d).” Zlatev v. Millette, 2015 IL App (1st) 143173 , ¶ 24; see, e.g., Borchers, 2011 IL App (2d) 101257 , ¶ 45; Maggi v. RAS 11 No. 1-16-1709 Development, Inc., 2011 IL App (1st) 091955, ¶ 28 ; see also Porter v. Decatur Memorial Hospital, 227 Ill. 2d 343, 358 (2008) (in interpreting a different subsection of section 2-616, “find[ing] it significant” that prior Illinois 2017Thus, with respect to section 2-616(d), due to the similarities between section 2-616(d) and Rule 15(c), “Illinois courts have looked to federal precedent interpreting Rule 15(c)(1)(C) for guidance in interpreting section 2-616(d).” Zlatev v. Millette, 2015 IL App (1st) 143173 , ¶ 24; see, e.g., Borchers, 2011 IL App (2d) 101257 , ¶ 45; Maggi v. RAS Development, Inc., 2011 IL App (1st) 091955, ¶ 28 ; see also Porter v. Decatur Memorial Hospital, 227 Ill. 2d 343, 358 (2008) (in interpreting a different subsection of section 2-616, “find[ing] it significant” that prior Illinois Supreme Court cas | 2 | 3 |
People v. Harveygreen2 sentences2003See Harvey , 196 Ill. 2d at 447 . 2003See Harvey, 196 Ill. 2d at 447 . | 2 | 2 |
Florsheim v. Travelers Indemnity Co.green2 sentences2002See Florsheim , 75 Ill. 2002See Florsheim, 75 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Salazar v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurancegreen2 sentences2002Those cases have found that the requirement that this affirmative defense be set forth in an answer "does not place a restriction on motions for summary judgment." Salazar v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. , 191 Ill. 2002Those cases have found that the requirement that this affirmative defense be set forth in an answer “does not place a restriction on motions for summary judgment.” Salazar v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 191 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Smith v. Airoom, Inc.green1 sentence2026“To obtain relief under section 2-1401, the defendant ‘must affirmatively set forth specific factual allegations supporting each of the following elements: (1) the existence of a meritorious defense or claim; (2) due diligence in presenting this defense or claim to the circuit court in the original action; and (3) due diligence in filing the section 2-1401 petition for relief.’ ” Id. at 565 (quoting Smith v. Airoom, Inc., 114 Ill. 2d 209, 220-221 (1986)). | 1 | 1 |
Parker v. Piskurgreen1 sentence2025See Parker v. Piskur, 258 Ill. App. 3d 344, 349 (1994) (“The language of Rule 103(b) protects minors from a shortening of the statute of limitations applicable to them in a case where the defendant is entitled to a dismissal.”). | 1 | 1 |
Oldendorf v. General Motors Corp.green1 sentence2021See People v. Pinkonsly, 207 Ill. 2d 555, 562 (2003) (failure to raise the limitations period as a defense, waives the defense). -4- ¶ 13 ANALYSIS ¶ 14 A section 2-615 motion attacks the legal sufficiency of the complaint and raises the question of whether the complaint states a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2016); Oldendorf v. General Motors Corp., 322 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
James E. Peterson v. Harold Kennedy, Richard A. Berthelsen, and National Football League Players Associationgreen1 sentence2019See Peterson, 771 F.2d at 1259 (observing that, under such a rule, “the union attorney would often be the only defendant against whom a disappointed [union member] could proceed”). ¶ 16 For these reasons, courts have consistently followed Peterson in “reject[ing] efforts to distinguish lawyers from other union agents for purposes of Atkinson immunity” (Arnold v. Air Midwest, Inc., 100 F.3d 857, 862 (10th Cir. 1996)) and “have uniformly concluded that Atkinson prohibits claims made by a union member against attorneys employed by or retained by the union to represent the member in a labor disput | 1 | 1 |
Gisela Carino v. Marc Stefan, Esq Butsavage & Associates, LLCgreen1 sentence2019See Peterson, 771 F.2d at 1259 (observing that, under such a rule, “the union attorney would often be the only defendant against whom a disappointed [union member] could proceed”). ¶ 16 For these reasons, courts have consistently followed Peterson in “reject[ing] efforts to distinguish lawyers from other union agents for purposes of Atkinson immunity” (Arnold v. Air Midwest, Inc., 100 F.3d 857, 862 (10th Cir. 1996)) and “have uniformly concluded that Atkinson prohibits claims made by a union member against attorneys employed by or retained by the union to represent the member in a labor disput | 1 | 1 |
Arnold v. Air Midwest, Inc.green1 sentence2019See Peterson, 771 F.2d at 1259 (observing that, under such a rule, “the union attorney would often be the only defendant against whom a disappointed [union member] could proceed”). ¶ 16 For these reasons, courts have consistently followed Peterson in “reject[ing] efforts to distinguish lawyers from other union agents for purposes of Atkinson immunity” (Arnold v. Air Midwest, Inc., 100 F.3d 857, 862 (10th Cir. 1996)) and “have uniformly concluded that Atkinson prohibits claims made by a union member against attorneys employed by or retained by the union to represent the member in a labor disput | 1 | 1 |
| Hun v. Center Propertiesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hogan v. Hermanngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Casas
green
2 sentences2018JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. ¶ 1 In our first opinion in this case, we held that "the offense of violation of bail bond is a continuing offense such that the limitations period on a violation-of-bail-bond prosecution is tolled until an offender is returned to custody." People v. Casas , 2016 IL App (2d) 150456 , ¶ 1, 406 Ill.Dec. 7 , 59 N.E.3d 785 . 2018JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. ¶ 1 In our first opinion in this case, we held that "the offense of violation of bail bond is a continuing offense such that the limitations period on a violation-of-bail-bond prosecution is tolled until an offender is returned to custody." People v. Casas , 2016 IL App (2d) 150456 , ¶ 1, 406 Ill.Dec. 7 , 59 N.E.3d 785 . | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Maggi v. RAS Development, Inc.
green
2 sentences2017Thus, with respect to section 2-616(d), due to the similarities between section 2-616(d) and Rule 15(c), “Illinois courts have looked to federal precedent interpreting Rule 15(c)(1)(C) for guidance in interpreting section 2-616(d).” Zlatev v. Millette, 2015 IL App (1st) 143173 , ¶ 24; see, e.g., Borchers, 2011 IL App (2d) 101257 , ¶ 45; Maggi v. RAS 11 No. 1-16-1709 Development, Inc., 2011 IL App (1st) 091955, ¶ 28 ; see also Porter v. Decatur Memorial Hospital, 227 Ill. 2d 343, 358 (2008) (in interpreting a different subsection of section 2-616, “find[ing] it significant” that prior Illinois 2017Thus, with respect to section 2-616(d), due to the similarities between section 2-616(d) and Rule 15(c), “Illinois courts have looked to federal precedent interpreting Rule 15(c)(1)(C) for guidance in interpreting section 2-616(d).” Zlatev v. Millette, 2015 IL App (1st) 143173 , ¶ 24; see, e.g., Borchers, 2011 IL App (2d) 101257 , ¶ 45; Maggi v. RAS Development, Inc., 2011 IL App (1st) 091955, ¶ 28 ; see also Porter v. Decatur Memorial Hospital, 227 Ill. 2d 343, 358 (2008) (in interpreting a different subsection of section 2-616, “find[ing] it significant” that prior Illinois Supreme Court cas | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Zlatev v. Millette
green
2 sentences2017Thus, with respect to section 2-616(d), due to the similarities between section 2-616(d) and Rule 15(c), “Illinois courts have looked to federal precedent interpreting Rule 15(c)(1)(C) for guidance in interpreting section 2-616(d).” Zlatev v. Millette, 2015 IL App (1st) 143173 , ¶ 24; see, e.g., Borchers, 2011 IL App (2d) 101257 , ¶ 45; Maggi v. RAS 11 No. 1-16-1709 Development, Inc., 2011 IL App (1st) 091955, ¶ 28 ; see also Porter v. Decatur Memorial Hospital, 227 Ill. 2d 343, 358 (2008) (in interpreting a different subsection of section 2-616, “find[ing] it significant” that prior Illinois 2017Thus, with respect to section 2-616(d), due to the similarities between section 2-616(d) and Rule 15(c), “Illinois courts have looked to federal precedent interpreting Rule 15(c)(1)(C) for guidance in interpreting section 2-616(d).” Zlatev v. Millette, 2015 IL App (1st) 143173 , ¶ 24; see, e.g., Borchers, 2011 IL App (2d) 101257 , ¶ 45; Maggi v. RAS Development, Inc., 2011 IL App (1st) 091955, ¶ 28 ; see also Porter v. Decatur Memorial Hospital, 227 Ill. 2d 343, 358 (2008) (in interpreting a different subsection of section 2-616, “find[ing] it significant” that prior Illinois Supreme Court cas | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Board of Education v. Blodgett
green
2 sentences2009That right cannot be taken away by the legislature without offending the due process protections of our state's constitution.” M.E.H. v. L.H., 177 Ill. 2d 207, 214-15 , 685 N.E.2d 335, 339 (1997), citing Board of Education of Normal School District v. Blodgett, 155 Ill. 441, 445-50 , 40 N.E.1025 (1895). 2009That right cannot be taken away by the legislature without offending the due process protections of our state’s constitution.” M.E.H. v. L.H., 177 Ill. 2d 207, 214-15 , 685 N.E.2d 335, 339 (1997), citing Board of Education of Normal School District v. Blodgett, 155 Ill. 441, 445-50 , 40 N.E. 1025 (1895). | 2 | 2009–2009 |
In Re Joseph B.
green
2 sentences2003In re Joseph B., Jr. , 258 Ill. 2003In re Joseph B., Jr., 258 Ill. | 2 | 2003–2003 |
Whitaker v. Human Rights Commission
green
2 sentences2003App. 3d 356, 359 , 540 N.E.2d 361 (1989), the court recognized estoppel as "a valid exception to the 180-day requirement" in circumstances "where the agency's misleading conduct causes the claimant to miss the deadline." While equitable tolling addresses the running or suspension of a limitations period, estoppel comes into play only after the limitations period has run and addresses itself to the circumstances in which a party will be prevented from asserting the passage of the limitations period as a defense. 2003App. 3d 356, 359 , 540 N.E.2d 361 (1989), the court recognized estoppel as “a valid exception to the 180-day requirement” in circumstances “where the agency’s misleading conduct causes the claimant to miss the deadline.” While equitable tolling addresses the running or suspension of a limitations period, estoppel comes into play only after the limitations period has run and addresses itself to the circumstances in which a party will be prevented from asserting the passage of the limitations period as a defense. | 2 | 2003–2003 |
Ciers v. O.L. Schmidt Barge Lines, Inc.
green
2 sentences2002Ciers , 285 Ill. 2002Ciers, 285 Ill. | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Senior Housing, Inc. v. Nakawatase, Rutkowski, Wyns & Yi, Inc.
green
2 sentences1999Senior Housing, Inc. v. Nakawatase, Rutkowski, Wyns & Yi, Inc. , 192 Ill. 1999Senior Housing, Inc. v. Nakawatase, Rutkowski, Wyns & Yi, Inc., 192 Ill. | 2 | 1999–1999 |
York v. Village of Wilmette
neutral
2 sentences1999York , 148 Ill. 1999York, 148 Ill. | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Anixter Bros, Inc. v. Cen. Steel & Wire Co.
green
2 sentences1994On appeal, this court reversed, finding that the limitations period for a claim based on an implied contract of indemnity is governed by the general five-year statute of limitations in section 13 — 205 of the Code of Civil Procedure, rather than the UCC, because "an implied contract of indemnity action is not a contract action.” (Anixter, 123 Ill. 1994The trial court dismissed Central Steel's third-party complaint on the ground that it was time barred under the four year limitation period for bringing an action set forth in section 2-725(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 26, par. 2-725(1).) On appeal, this court reversed, finding that the limitations period for a claim based on an implied contract of indemnity is governed by the general five-year statute of limitations in section 13-205 of the Code of Civil Procedure, rather than the UCC because "an implied contract of indemnity action is not a contract action. | 2 | 1992–1994 |
Neaterour v. Holt
green
2 sentences1990The trial court found that equitable estoppel did not apply because the person that petitioner claimed acted to prevent his suit was not a party to the action. • 14 Equitable estoppel is a doctrine developed in equity to prevent one party from asserting rights where assertion of the rights would work a fraud or injustice on another party. ( Launius v. Najman (1984), 129 Ill. App.3d 498, 504 , 472 N.E.2d 170 .) The doctrine has been applied to prevent a litigant, whose conduct has caused a party to delay filing suit until after the limitations period has run, from relying upon the limitations p 1990The trial court found that equitable estoppel did not apply because the person that petitioner claimed acted to prevent his suit was not a party to the action. • 14 Equitable estoppel is a doctrine developed in equity to prevent one party from asserting rights where assertion of the rights would work a fraud or injustice on another party. ( Launius v. Najman (1984), 129 Ill. App.3d 498, 504 , 472 N.E.2d 170 .) The doctrine has been applied to prevent a litigant, whose conduct has caused a party to delay filing suit until after the limitations period has run, from relying upon the limitations p | 2 | 1990–1990 |
Launius v. Najman
green
2 sentences1990The trial court found that equitable estoppel did not apply because the person that petitioner claimed acted to prevent his suit was not a party to the action. • 14 Equitable estoppel is a doctrine developed in equity to prevent one party from asserting rights where assertion of the rights would work a fraud or injustice on another party. ( Launius v. Najman (1984), 129 Ill. App.3d 498, 504 , 472 N.E.2d 170 .) The doctrine has been applied to prevent a litigant, whose conduct has caused a party to delay filing suit until after the limitations period has run, from relying upon the limitations p 1990The trial court found that equitable estoppel did not apply because the person that petitioner claimed acted to prevent his suit was not a party to the action. • 14 Equitable estoppel is a doctrine developed in equity to prevent one party from asserting rights where assertion of the rights would work a fraud or injustice on another party. ( Launius v. Najman (1984), 129 Ill. App.3d 498, 504 , 472 N.E.2d 170 .) The doctrine has been applied to prevent a litigant, whose conduct has caused a party to delay filing suit until after the limitations period has run, from relying upon the limitations p | 2 | 1990–1990 |
Salloum Foods & Liquor, Inc. v. Parliament Insurance
green
1 sentence2025Id. at 433 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Swann & Weiskopf, Ltd. v. Meed Associates, Inc.
green
1 sentence2023Instead, “this court must rely on less legal, more equitable concepts of ‘conscience and duty of honest dealing’ in determining if the defendant’s words or conduct should deny it the right to assert a limitations period defense.” Id. ¶ 37 Cases where an insurer’s conduct was found to have amounted to an estoppel typically involve a concession of liability by the insurer, advance payments by the insurer to plaintiff in contemplation of eventual settlement, and statements by the insurer encouraging plaintiff to delay filing his action. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Henderson-Smith & Associates, Inc. v. Nahamani Family Service Center, Inc.
green
1 sentence2013We note that, in Henderson-Smith, 323 Ill. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Weatherly v. ILLINOIS HUMAN RIGHTS COM'N
green
1 sentence2013Weatherly, 338 Ill. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Parks v. Kownacki green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Switzer v. Reynolds green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Ashley v. Evangelical Hospitals Corp. green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Witherell v. Weimer green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Walicek v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Lee v. Human Rights Commission green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Sabath v. Morris Handler Co. green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.