rational relationship test in New York

1986It only requires that classification rest on real and not feigned differences, that the distinction have some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made, and that the different treatments be not so disparate, relative to the difference in classification, as to be wholly arbitrary.’ ” (Drayton v People, 423 F Supp 786, 789 , supra; emphasis supplied; see also, Baxstrom v Herold, 383 US 107 .) The Second Circuit Court of Appeals preferred to call it "the rational relationship test”, citing McGinnis v Royster (supra) but did not choose to set forth its preferred formulation.

1979(Baxtrom v Herold, 383 US 107, 111 .) The defendant asserts that the discriminatory classification in the case at bar bears no rational relationship to the State’s interest (public safety); that the definition of "armed felony” is itself arbitrary in that it includes harmless toy guns, while excluding dangerous knives and other instruments; that other "armed felonies” involving juveniles, such as criminal possession of a dangerous weapon (Penal Law, §§ 265.03, 265.04) and attempted robbery (Penal Law, §§ 110.00, 160.10, 160.15) are totally exempt from criminal court jurisdiction; and the State

2006As the Court of Appeals observed in Port Jefferson Health Care Facility v Wing ( 94 NY2d 284, 290-291 [1999]): “Under the rational basis standard, the Legislature, in creating a classification, ‘need not actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification.

2006A legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.’ ” (Affronti v Crosson, 95 NY2d 713, 719 [2001] [citations omitted]; see also Hernandez v Robles, 7 NY3d at 367 .) “Legislative enactments are entitled to ‘a strong presumption of constitutionality. ’ ‘While the presumption is not irrefutable, parties challenging a duly enacted statute face the initial burden of demonstrating the statute’s invalidity “beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (Dalton v Pataki, 5 NY3d 243, 255 [2005] [citations omitted]; accord

2006A legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.’ ” (Affronti v Crosson, 95 NY2d 713, 719 [2001] [citations omitted]; see also Hernandez v Robles, 7 NY3d at 367 .) “Legislative enactments are entitled to ‘a strong presumption of constitutionality. ’ ‘While the presumption is not irrefutable, parties challenging a duly enacted statute face the initial burden of demonstrating the statute’s invalidity “beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (Dalton v Pataki, 5 NY3d 243, 255 [2005] [citations omitted]; accord

2006A legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.’ ” (Affronti v Crosson, 95 NY2d 713, 719 [2001] [citations omitted]; see also Hernandez v Robles, 7 NY3d at 367 .) “Legislative enactments are entitled to ‘a strong presumption of constitutionality. ’ ‘While the presumption is not irrefutable, parties challenging a duly enacted statute face the initial burden of demonstrating the statute’s invalidity “beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (Dalton v Pataki, 5 NY3d 243, 255 [2005] [citations omitted]; accord

2006(See Hernandez v Robles, 7 NY3d 338 [2006].) .

2006A legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.’ ” (Affronti v Crosson, 95 NY2d 713, 719 [2001] [citations omitted]; see also Hernandez v Robles, 7 NY3d at 367 .) “Legislative enactments are entitled to ‘a strong presumption of constitutionality. ’ ‘While the presumption is not irrefutable, parties challenging a duly enacted statute face the initial burden of demonstrating the statute’s invalidity “beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (Dalton v Pataki, 5 NY3d 243, 255 [2005] [citations omitted]; accord

2006A legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.’ ” (Affronti v Crosson, 95 NY2d 713, 719 [2001] [citations omitted]; see also Hernandez v Robles, 7 NY3d at 367 .) “Legislative enactments are entitled to ‘a strong presumption of constitutionality. ’ ‘While the presumption is not irrefutable, parties challenging a duly enacted statute face the initial burden of demonstrating the statute’s invalidity “beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (Dalton v Pataki, 5 NY3d 243, 255 [2005] [citations omitted]; accord

2006The statement in Janklow v Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic ( 517 US 1174, 1175 [1996]) that “a facial challenge may be more difficult to mount than an as-applied challenge” is dicta commenting on dicta in United States v Salerno ( 481 US 739, 745 [1987]). 11 F. Application of the Rational Relationship Standard The challenged provisions of SORA undoubtedly pass constitutional muster under the rational relationship test. 12 The legislative history of JWA reflects that Congress intentionally included kidnapping and unlawful imprisonment of a minor in the crimes subject to registration requ

2006That exercise of discretion, however, is a legislative, not a judicial, function.’ ” (Montgomery v Daniels, 38 NY2d 41, 61, 64 [1975] [citations omitted].) Although any legislative history indicating the basis for adopting a law is relevant, it is not necessary to the court’s analysis of a statute under the rational relationship test.

2006The statement in Janklow v Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic ( 517 US 1174, 1175 [1996]) that “a facial challenge may be more difficult to mount than an as-applied challenge” is dicta commenting on dicta in United States v Salerno ( 481 US 739, 745 [1987]). 11 F. Application of the Rational Relationship Standard The challenged provisions of SORA undoubtedly pass constitutional muster under the rational relationship test. 12 The legislative history of JWA reflects that Congress intentionally included kidnapping and unlawful imprisonment of a minor in the crimes subject to registration requ

2003See F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 , 313 . . . (1993) (Tn areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld ... if there is any reasonable conceivable basis for the classification.’).

1995Applying the rational relationship test, the court found that, while the statute "may not be the perfect remedy, [it] cannot be faulted as unreasonable” (Gold v DiCarlo, supra, at 821).

1986It only requires that classification rest on real and not feigned differences, that the distinction have some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made, and that the different treatments be not so disparate, relative to the difference in classification, as to be wholly arbitrary.’ ” (Drayton v People, 423 F Supp 786, 789 , supra; emphasis supplied; see also, Baxstrom v Herold, 383 US 107 .) The Second Circuit Court of Appeals preferred to call it "the rational relationship test”, citing McGinnis v Royster (supra) but did not choose to set forth its preferred formulation.