vital principle in New York

1912Co . v. Chicago ( 166 U.S. 226 ) the court say: "Due protection of the rights of property has been regarded as a vital principle of republican institutions. * * * The requirement that the property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation is but `an affirmance of a great doctrine established by the common law for the protection of private property.

1912Co. v. Chicago ( 166 U. S. 226 ) the court say: “ Due protection of the rights of property has been regarded as a vital principle of republican institutions. * * * The requirement that the property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation is but ‘an affirmance of a great doctrine established by the common law for the protection of private property.

1996As is the case when the rational basis standard is applied to constitutional litigation in the equal protection context, judging the constitutionality of special State local legislation will almost invariably result in upholding the statute over home rule objections, if it is sufficient for its validity that the law merely bears some relationship to some conceivable State interest. 4 In recognition of the competing constitutional values involved when State legislation impinges on and overlaps with local concerns and that, therefore, a more substantive nexus should be required if home rule is t

1996As is the case when the rational basis standard is applied to constitutional litigation in the equal protection context, judging the constitutionality of special State local legislation will almost invariably result in upholding the statute over home rule objections, if it is sufficient for its validity that the law merely bears some relationship to some conceivable State interest. 4 In recognition of the competing constitutional values involved when State legislation impinges on and overlaps with local concerns and that, therefore, a more substantive nexus should be required if home rule is t

1980Such ruling in Garfield (supra) turned the vital inquiry from the nature of the court (that is, was it principally concerned with the trial of equitable issues?) to the nature of the cause of action (that is, was it one in which the Constitution guaranteed the right to jury trial?).

1971A plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction [and] nothing [else] remains but to give judgment and determine punishment ” (Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 242 ).

1950Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585, 598-599 ; Board of Comrs. of Excise v. Merchant, 103 N. Y. 143 ; People v. Cannon, 139 N. Y. 32 ; People v. Murphy, 276 N. Y. 612 ; People v. Gerschinsky, 281 N. Y. 581 ; People ex rel.

1950Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585, 598-599 ; Board of Comrs. of Excise v. Merchant, 103 N. Y. 143 ; People v. Cannon, 139 N. Y. 32 ; People v. Murphy, 276 N. Y. 612 ; People v. Gerschinsky, 281 N. Y. 581 ; People ex rel.

1950Such presumption, even in criminal statutes, where the presumption of innocence is a vital principle, is held not to violate that constitutional protection (People v. Farina, 290 N. Y. 272, 275-276 ; People v. Pieri, 269 N. Y. 315, 324 ; People v. Adams, 176 N. Y. 351, 360-362 , affd. sub nom.

1950Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585, 598-599 ; Board of Comrs. of Excise v. Merchant, 103 N. Y. 143 ; People v. Cannon, 139 N. Y. 32 ; People v. Murphy, 276 N. Y. 612 ; People v. Gerschinsky, 281 N. Y. 581 ; People ex rel.

1950Such presumption, even in criminal statutes, where the presumption of innocence is a vital principle, is held not to violate that constitutional protection (People v. Farina, 290 N. Y. 272, 275-276 ; People v. Pieri, 269 N. Y. 315, 324 ; People v. Adams, 176 N. Y. 351, 360-362 , affd. sub nom.

1950Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585, 598-599 ; Board of Comrs. of Excise v. Merchant, 103 N. Y. 143 ; People v. Cannon, 139 N. Y. 32 ; People v. Murphy, 276 N. Y. 612 ; People v. Gerschinsky, 281 N. Y. 581 ; People ex rel.

1950Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585, 598-599 ; Board of Comrs. of Excise v. Merchant, 103 N. Y. 143 ; People v. Cannon, 139 N. Y. 32 ; People v. Murphy, 276 N. Y. 612 ; People v. Gerschinsky, 281 N. Y. 581 ; People ex rel.

1950Such presumption, even in criminal statutes, where the presumption of innocence is a vital principle, is held not to violate that constitutional protection (People v. Farina, 290 N. Y. 272, 275-276 ; People v. Pieri, 269 N. Y. 315, 324 ; People v. Adams, 176 N. Y. 351, 360-362 , affd. sub nom.

1931Law Rev. 70 [1920]; Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433 .) In a word, the vital inquiry is whether the offenses are identical in law and in fact.

1931The opinion' in the Becker case significantly refers to the equally celebrated Patrick case, where Judge Gray writes: “ It is sufficient if he is corroborated as to some material fact, or facts, which go to prove the connection of the defendant with the criminal intent and its execution.” [Italics are writer’s.] (People v. Patrick, 182 N. Y. 131, 156 .) The evidence presented on these appeals is wholly deficient in this latter vital requirement.

1905While it is trae that the rules by which the sufficiency of a pleading is ordinarily determined cannot in all their strictness be applied to a partial defense pleaded' by way of mitigating circumstances in an action for libel (Morgan v. Bennett, 44 App. Div. 323 ) and that not only the facts directly alleged but those which by fair and reasonable intendment may be implied from the direct allegations are good on demurrer (Wenk v. City of New York, 171 N. Y. 607 ), yet it seems to us that the vital defense sought to be plead has been omitted and cannot be read into the answer.

1905While it is trae that the rules by which the sufficiency of a pleading is ordinarily determined cannot in all their strictness be applied to a partial defense pleaded' by way of mitigating circumstances in an action for libel (Morgan v. Bennett, 44 App. Div. 323 ) and that not only the facts directly alleged but those which by fair and reasonable intendment may be implied from the direct allegations are good on demurrer (Wenk v. City of New York, 171 N. Y. 607 ), yet it seems to us that the vital defense sought to be plead has been omitted and cannot be read into the answer.

1902(Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41 .) The Federal taxis necessarily of this character, for a direct tax, unless apportioned according to population, would be repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.

1896In Phillips v. Phillips, 112 N. Y. 197 , the court, distinguishing - the case from Lawrence v. Cooke, said, per Finch, J., that the important and vital inquiry is whether the bequest “'so depends upon the discretion of the general devisee as to be incapable of execution without superseding that discretion.”.