vital factors in Oklahoma

1994Reciprocal Exch. v. Sims, 293 P.2d 578 (Okla. 1956) (the absence of an instruction dealing with "right of way" was "fatal" error requiring reversal).

1994Reciprocal Exch. v. Sims, 293 P.2d 578 (Okla.1956) (the absence of an instruction dealing with “right of way” was "fatal” error requiring reversal).

1994Co. v. Frank, 452 P.2d 794 (Okla. 1969) (fundamental error for the trial court to fail to give an instruction dealing with the defendant's theory of arson); Lindemann v. Randolph, 414 P.2d 257 (Okla. 1966) (failure to instruct on a vital defense presented by defendant even though there was conflicting evidence was fundamental and reversible error); Subscribers At Cas.

1994Co. v. Frank, 452 P.2d 794 (Okla.1969) (fundamental error for the trial court to fail to give an instruction dealing with the defendant's theory of arson); Linde-mann v. Randolph, 414 P.2d 257 (Okla.1966) (failure to instruct on a vital defense presented by defendant even though there was conflicting evidence was fundamental and reversible error); Subscribers At Cas.

1994Co. v. Frank, 452 P.2d 794 (Okla. 1969) (fundamental error for the trial court to fail to give an instruction dealing with the defendant's theory of arson); Lindemann v. Randolph, 414 P.2d 257 (Okla. 1966) (failure to instruct on a vital defense presented by defendant even though there was conflicting evidence was fundamental and reversible error); Subscribers At Cas.

1994Co. v. Frank, 452 P.2d 794 (Okla.1969) (fundamental error for the trial court to fail to give an instruction dealing with the defendant's theory of arson); Linde-mann v. Randolph, 414 P.2d 257 (Okla.1966) (failure to instruct on a vital defense presented by defendant even though there was conflicting evidence was fundamental and reversible error); Subscribers At Cas.

1956“The instant case is almost identical to, and is controlled by the case of Riser v. Herr, 187 Okl. 211 , 102 P.2d 178, 180 , wherein it was said: ‘Upon the foregoing considerations, we conclude that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to which of two vehicles had the right of way, if they found that one of them entered the intersection before the other. * * * It is the duty of the court without a request and upon its own initiative to instruct the jury upon all of the vital factors of the tenable legal theories of both litigants concerning the issues of fact.’ ” As their s

1956“The instant case is almost identical to, and is controlled by the case of Riser v. Herr, 187 Okl. 211 , 102 P.2d 178, 180 , wherein it was said: ‘Upon the foregoing considerations, we conclude that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to which of two vehicles had the right of way, if they found that one of them entered the intersection before the other. * * * It is the duty of the court without a request and upon its own initiative to instruct the jury upon all of the vital factors of the tenable legal theories of both litigants concerning the issues of fact.’ ” As their s

1940See Liberty National Bank of Weatherford v. Semkoff, 184 Okla. 18 , 84 P. 2d 438 ; Indian Territory Illuminating Co. v. Johnson, 177 Okla. 288 , 58 P. 2d 888 ; Treeman v. Frey, 140 Okla. 201 , 282 P. 452 ; Swift v. McMurray, 133 Okla. 104 , 271 P. 635 ; Clark v. Herbert, 132 Okla. 272 , 270 P. 329 .

1940See Liberty National Bank of Weatherford v. Semkoff, 184 Okla. 18 , 84 P. 2d 438 ; Indian Territory Illuminating Co. v. Johnson, 177 Okla. 288 , 58 P. 2d 888 ; Treeman v. Frey, 140 Okla. 201 , 282 P. 452 ; Swift v. McMurray, 133 Okla. 104 , 271 P. 635 ; Clark v. Herbert, 132 Okla. 272 , 270 P. 329 .

1940Boese v. Childress, 83 Okla. 60 , 200 P. 997 ; Johnston v. Baldock, 83 Okla. 285 , 201 P. 654 .

1940Boese v. Childress, 83 Okla. 60 , 200 P. 997 ; Johnston v. Baldock, 83 Okla. 285 , 201 P. 654 .

1940See Liberty National Bank of Weatherford v. Semkoff, 184 Okla. 18 , 84 P. 2d 438 ; Indian Territory Illuminating Co. v. Johnson, 177 Okla. 288 , 58 P. 2d 888 ; Treeman v. Frey, 140 Okla. 201 , 282 P. 452 ; Swift v. McMurray, 133 Okla. 104 , 271 P. 635 ; Clark v. Herbert, 132 Okla. 272 , 270 P. 329 .

1940See Liberty National Bank of Weatherford v. Semkoff, 184 Okla. 18 , 84 P. 2d 438 ; Indian Territory Illuminating Co. v. Johnson, 177 Okla. 288 , 58 P. 2d 888 ; Treeman v. Frey, 140 Okla. 201 , 282 P. 452 ; Swift v. McMurray, 133 Okla. 104 , 271 P. 635 ; Clark v. Herbert, 132 Okla. 272 , 270 P. 329 .

1940Boese v. Childress, 83 Okla. 60 , 200 P. 997 ; Johnston v. Baldock, 83 Okla. 285 , 201 P. 654 .

1940Boese v. Childress, 83 Okla. 60 , 200 P. 997 ; Johnston v. Baldock, 83 Okla. 285 , 201 P. 654 .

1940See Liberty National Bank of Weatherford v. Semkoff, 184 Okla. 18 , 84 P. 2d 438 ; Indian Territory Illuminating Co. v. Johnson, 177 Okla. 288 , 58 P. 2d 888 ; Treeman v. Frey, 140 Okla. 201 , 282 P. 452 ; Swift v. McMurray, 133 Okla. 104 , 271 P. 635 ; Clark v. Herbert, 132 Okla. 272 , 270 P. 329 .

1940See Liberty National Bank of Weatherford v. Semkoff, 184 Okla. 18 , 84 P. 2d 438 ; Indian Territory Illuminating Co. v. Johnson, 177 Okla. 288 , 58 P. 2d 888 ; Treeman v. Frey, 140 Okla. 201 , 282 P. 452 ; Swift v. McMurray, 133 Okla. 104 , 271 P. 635 ; Clark v. Herbert, 132 Okla. 272 , 270 P. 329 .

1940See Liberty National Bank of Weatherford v. Semkoff, 184 Okla. 18 , 84 P. 2d 438 ; Indian Territory Illuminating Co. v. Johnson, 177 Okla. 288 , 58 P. 2d 888 ; Treeman v. Frey, 140 Okla. 201 , 282 P. 452 ; Swift v. McMurray, 133 Okla. 104 , 271 P. 635 ; Clark v. Herbert, 132 Okla. 272 , 270 P. 329 .

1940See Liberty National Bank of Weatherford v. Semkoff, 184 Okla. 18 , 84 P. 2d 438 ; Indian Territory Illuminating Co. v. Johnson, 177 Okla. 288 , 58 P. 2d 888 ; Treeman v. Frey, 140 Okla. 201 , 282 P. 452 ; Swift v. McMurray, 133 Okla. 104 , 271 P. 635 ; Clark v. Herbert, 132 Okla. 272 , 270 P. 329 .

1939Section 6860, O. 'S. 1931, reads in part as follows: “Territory outside the limit of any city or town within an independent district may be added to such city or town for school purposes * * * and such territory shall, after being attached from the date of such order, be and compose a part of such city for school purposes only, and the taxable property of such adjacent territory shall be subject to taxation and shall bear its full proportion of all expenses incurred in the erection of school buildings and in maintaining the schools of such city. * * *” A statute identical' to the foregoing was

1936A. 223; Pocatello v. Fargo, 41 Idaho, 432, 242 P. 297 .” Like any other promissory note a certificate of deposit may or may not be paid by the maker upon its due date or when presented for payment; therefore, when plaintiff in error lays down as his major premise the proposition that the certificates of deposit were the equivalent of money he makes a vital error.

1936A. 223; Pocatello v. Fargo, 41 Idaho, 432, 242 P. 297 .” Like any other promissory note a certificate of deposit may or may not be paid by the maker upon its due date or when presented for payment; therefore, when plaintiff in error lays down as his major premise the proposition that the certificates of deposit were the equivalent of money he makes a vital error.

1934Hegwer v. Goodykoontz, 22 Colo. 507 , 45 P. 414 ; State ex rel.

1934It seems to us to be but necessary to state the proposition, to cause its instantaneous rejection.’ “This vital principle announced in Thomas v. Owens, supra, has remained inflexible under every test, and has been accepted for years without a question in nearly every state which has considered the question, as evidenced by the following authorities : People ex rel.

1934Hegwer v. Goodykoontz, 22 Colo. 507 , 45 P. 414 ; State ex rel.

1917Such a Change of position is sternly forbidden, ttt involves fraud and- falsehood, and the law abhors both.” Dover v. Pittsburg Oil Co. et al., 143 Cal. 501 , 77 Pac. 405 ; Woodsum v. Cole, 69 Cal. 142 , 10 Pac. 331 . 2. (a) But, though we hav-e found Noe to be an innocent purchaser, that is, without notice of the equities of Smith, yet the further question is involved in this case, Was he an innocent purchaser for value ?Two hundred and ninety-five dollars of the consideration was an antecedent debt; a debt that Marlow owed Noe Bros, at the time the deed was made.

1917Such a Change of position is sternly forbidden, ttt involves fraud and- falsehood, and the law abhors both.” Dover v. Pittsburg Oil Co. et al., 143 Cal. 501 , 77 Pac. 405 ; Woodsum v. Cole, 69 Cal. 142 , 10 Pac. 331 . 2. (a) But, though we hav-e found Noe to be an innocent purchaser, that is, without notice of the equities of Smith, yet the further question is involved in this case, Was he an innocent purchaser for value ?Two hundred and ninety-five dollars of the consideration was an antecedent debt; a debt that Marlow owed Noe Bros, at the time the deed was made.

1917Such a Change of position is sternly forbidden, ttt involves fraud and- falsehood, and the law abhors both.” Dover v. Pittsburg Oil Co. et al., 143 Cal. 501 , 77 Pac. 405 ; Woodsum v. Cole, 69 Cal. 142 , 10 Pac. 331 . 2. (a) But, though we hav-e found Noe to be an innocent purchaser, that is, without notice of the equities of Smith, yet the further question is involved in this case, Was he an innocent purchaser for value ?Two hundred and ninety-five dollars of the consideration was an antecedent debt; a debt that Marlow owed Noe Bros, at the time the deed was made.

1917Such a Change of position is sternly forbidden, ttt involves fraud and- falsehood, and the law abhors both.” Dover v. Pittsburg Oil Co. et al., 143 Cal. 501 , 77 Pac. 405 ; Woodsum v. Cole, 69 Cal. 142 , 10 Pac. 331 . 2. (a) But, though we hav-e found Noe to be an innocent purchaser, that is, without notice of the equities of Smith, yet the further question is involved in this case, Was he an innocent purchaser for value ?Two hundred and ninety-five dollars of the consideration was an antecedent debt; a debt that Marlow owed Noe Bros, at the time the deed was made.

1915Rep. 360 , wherein it is said: “They say [appellant’s counsel] : ‘The vital error in this instruction, however, is that it directs a recovery for loss of future earnings that the plaintiff may sustain by reason of diminished earning capacity that may be occasioned by his injury.’ The counsel give to the word ‘may’ in that connection the meaning of the term ‘possibly might,’ and they say: ‘This instruction violates the rule that future damages for injuries, pain, or suffering must be confined to such as the evidence renders it reasonably certain will result from the injury.’ That is the correct

1915Rep. 325 ; Bradley v. Railway, 138 Mo. 301 , 39 S. W. 763 ; Chilton v. St.