11 Ohio opinions name it 3 courts 1984–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
City of Dayton v. Woodgeardgreen2 sentences2021Compare Woodgeard, 116 Ohio App. 248 , 187 N.E.2d 921 (finding that failure to read proposed ordinance aloud in full prior to adoption did not invalidate ordinance despite existence of rule requiring ordinance to be read, and opining that a municipal body need not note on its minutes the suspension of a rule in the absence of an objection by its members). {¶ 31} In a final argument under their fourth assignment of error, the appellants raise public-notice issues. 2021Compare Woodgeard, 116 Ohio App. 248 , 187 N.E.2d 921 (finding that failure to read proposed ordinance aloud in full prior to adoption did not invalidate ordinance despite existence of rule requiring ordinance to be read, and opining that a municipal body need not note on its minutes the suspension of a rule in the absence of an objection by its members). {¶ 31} In a final argument under their fourth assignment of error, the appellants raise public-notice issues. | 1 | 1 |
Hoel-Steffen Construction Co. v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2020Co. v. United States, 197 Ct.Cl. 561 , 456 F.2d 760, 766 (1972) (holding that, because the board failed “to heed the different nature of the two separate notice requirements in the suspension clause,” it ultimately erred when it found the contractor failed to timely submit its claim for the government-caused delay within the 20-day period). 2020Co. v. United States, 197 Ct.Cl. 561 , 456 F.2d 760, 766 (1972) (holding that, because the board failed “to heed the different nature of the two separate notice requirements in the suspension clause,” it ultimately erred when it found the contractor failed to timely submit its claim for the government-caused delay within the 20-day period). | 1 | 1 |
Disciplinary Counsel v. Rooneygreen2 sentences2008See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Rooney, 110 Ohio St.3d 349 , 2006-Ohio-4576 , 853 N.E.2d 663 . 2008See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Rooney, 110 Ohio St.3d 349 , 2006-Ohio-4576 , 853 N.E.2d 663 . | 1 | 1 |
Federal Deposit Insurance v. Mallengreen2 sentences2001See id. at 240-241 , 108 S.Ct. 1780 , 100 L.Ed.2d 265 . 2001See id. at 240-241 , 108 S.Ct. 1780 , 100 L.Ed.2d 265 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Helvering v. Mitchell
green
2 sentences1996In this regard, a sanction which involves the suspension of a privilege that was voluntarily granted supports a finding that it is “characteristically free of the punitive criminal element.” Helvering v. Mitchell (1938), 303 U.S. 391, 399 , 58 S.Ct. 630, 633 , 82 L.Ed. 917, 922 . 1996In this regard, a sanction which involves the suspension of a privilege that was voluntarily granted supports a finding that it is “characteristically free of the punitive criminal element.” Helvering v. Mitchell (1938), 303 U.S. 391, 399 , 58 S.Ct. 630, 633 , 82 L.Ed. 917, 922 . | 4 | 1996–1999 |
Hudson v. United States
green
2 sentences1999Further, while the driver is prohibited from driving until the fee is paid, it does not approach the “ ‘ “infamous punishment” of imprisonment.’ ” Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104 , 118 S.Ct. at 496 , 139 L.Ed.2d at 462 , quoting Flemming v. Nestor (1960), 363 U.S. 603, 617 , 80 S.Ct. 1367, 1376 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1435, 1448 . {¶ 27} Therefore, the suspension of a privilege voluntarily granted does not constitute an affirmative disability or restraint. 2. 1999Further, while the driver is prohibited from driving until the fee is paid, it does not approach the “ ‘ “infamous punishment” of imprisonment.’ ” Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104 , 118 S.Ct. at 496 , 139 L.Ed.2d at 462 , quoting Flemming v. Nestor (1960), 363 U.S. 603, 617 , 80 S.Ct. 1367, 1376 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1435, 1448 . {¶ 27} Therefore, the suspension of a privilege voluntarily granted does not constitute an affirmative disability or restraint. 2. | 2 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Schneider
neutral
1 sentence2026Based on this disqualification, Pettigrew was ineligible for ILC under R.C. 2951.041(B)(10). {¶ 17} Although it did not specifically address the meaning of the term “disqualification,” the Twelfth District Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion under an analogous set of facts in State v. Schneider, 2025-Ohio-4625 (12th Dist.). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Flemming v. Nestor
green
2 sentences1999Further, while the driver is prohibited from driving until the fee is paid, it does not approach the “ ‘ “infamous punishment” of imprisonment.’ ” Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104 , 118 S.Ct. at 496 , 139 L.Ed.2d at 462 , quoting Flemming v. Nestor (1960), 363 U.S. 603, 617 , 80 S.Ct. 1367, 1376 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1435, 1448 . {¶ 27} Therefore, the suspension of a privilege voluntarily granted does not constitute an affirmative disability or restraint. 2. 1999Further, while the driver is prohibited from driving until the fee is paid, it does not approach the “ ‘ “infamous punishment” of imprisonment.’ ” Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104 , 118 S.Ct. at 496 , 139 L.Ed.2d at 462 , quoting Flemming v. Nestor (1960), 363 U.S. 603, 617 , 80 S.Ct. 1367, 1376 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1435, 1448 . {¶ 27} Therefore, the suspension of a privilege voluntarily granted does not constitute an affirmative disability or restraint. 2. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Goss v. Lopez
green
1 sentence1987R.C. 3313.66 clearly contemplates expulsions as well as suspensions for good cause and without regard to whether delinquency or criminal proceedings are pending as a result of the same conduct. . • The contention of plaintiffs that the lack of all but hearsay evidence at ■the suspension hearing and the lack of any new •. evidence at the expulsion hearing render the expulsions without justification is likewise without merit. •What ■■ is • constitutionally required is that a student “be told what he is accused of doing and what the basis for the accusation is.” Goss v. Lopez (1975), 419 U.S. 565 | 1 | 1987–1987 |
State ex rel. Peake v. Board of Education of the South Point Local School District
green
2 sentences1984Peake, v. Bd. of Edn. (1975), 44 Ohio St. 2d 119 [ 73 O.O.2d 437 ], Second, the Illinois statute provides that the suspension hearing is to be held only before the board. 1984Peake, v. Bd. of Edn. (1975), 44 Ohio St. 2d 119 [ 73 O.O.2d 437 ], Second, the Illinois statute provides that the suspension hearing is to be held only before the board. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.