suspension privilege in California

1981The court noted that the unrepresented licensee at the departmental hearing did not object to the admission of the officer’s sworn statement, and that such a statement should have the dignity of prima facie evidence if received without objection and without a request to cross-examine the officer. {Id., at pp. 62-63.) The August court had occasion to consider the implied consent law again in Fallis v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 373 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 595 ], another appeal from a judgment commanding the DMV to set aside the suspension of a driver’s license.

1981The court noted that the unrepresented licensee at the departmental hearing did not object to the admission of the officer’s sworn statement, and that such a statement should have the dignity of prima facie evidence if received without objection and without a request to cross-examine the officer. {Id., at pp. 62-63.) The August court had occasion to consider the implied consent law again in Fallis v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 373 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 595 ], another appeal from a judgment commanding the DMV to set aside the suspension of a driver’s license.

2021(People v. Germany (Colo. 1983) 674 P.2d 345, 353 [statute barring all collateral challenges commenced after a period of limitation violates state and federal due process in that it “makes no attempt to distinguish between those constitutional challenges which could and should have been asserted in a timely manner and those which, due to special circumstances or causes, could not have been raised within the applicable period of limitation”]; Lott v. State (2006) 334 Mont. 270 , 278–279 [precluding invalid-conviction claim that is based on an intervening statutory interpretation would violate t

2021Amicus curiae CJLF argues that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Felker v. Turpin (1996) 518 U.S. 651 (Felker) disposes of any questions that might arise about the scope of Proposition 66’s successiveness provisions.

2014Vehicle Code section 13380, subdivision (a) provides that an arresting officer must submit to the Department a sworn report of “all information relevant to the enforcement action.” Vehicle Code section 13557, subdivision (a) directs the Department to take into account in deciding to suspend a person’s license the sworn report and “any other evidence accompanying the report.” In MacDonald v. Gutierrez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 150, 159 , the court concluded that under the above-mentioned statutory scheme, the Department could consider the arresting officer’s sworn and unsworn reports at the suspension

2013(Id. at pp. 484, 485.) The Yaqub court acknowledged that these facts brought the hearing officer’s appointment “within the ambit of Haas.” (Id. at p. 484.) But it also suggested there was no evidence “of a direct financial interest in the outcome of the case.” (Id. at p. 485) That suggestion was inconsistent with Haas where the court expressly concluded that the appointment and payment procedure, implicitly offering the possibility of future employment as an adjudicator in exchange for favorable decisions, created “an impermissible financial interest in the outcome of the cases . . . .” (Haas,

2013(Id. at pp. 484, 485.) The Yaqub court acknowledged that these facts brought the hearing officer’s appointment “within the ambit of Haas.” (Id. at p. 484.) But it also suggested there was no evidence “of a direct financial interest in the outcome of the case.” (Id. at p. 485) That suggestion was inconsistent with Haas where the court expressly concluded that the appointment and payment procedure, implicitly offering the possibility of future employment as an adjudicator in exchange for favorable decisions, created “an impermissible financial interest in the outcome of the cases . . . .” (Haas,

2013(Id. at pp. 484, 485.) The Yaqub court acknowledged that these facts brought the hearing officer’s appointment “within the ambit of Haas.” (Id. at p. 484.) But it also suggested there was no evidence “of a direct financial interest in the outcome of the case.” (Id. at p. 485) That suggestion was inconsistent with Haas where the court expressly concluded that the appointment and payment procedure, implicitly offering the possibility of future employment as an adjudicator in exchange for favorable decisions, created “an impermissible financial interest in the outcome of the cases . . . .” (Haas,

1989Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 501, 509-510 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 58 ] [a ‘monstrous’ result]; Peak v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 926, 932 [ 187 P.2d 905 ] [an ‘absurd’ result]; Radovich v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., supra, 72 Cal.App.3d at p. 47 .)” However, even if we were to accept Woods’s argument that the Legislature intended the changes in the financial responsibility laws to benefit the uninsured motorist facing a suspension hearing, and therefore failure to conduct a hearing within 30 days could invalidate the Department’s determination, we would nonetheless

1989Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 501, 509-510 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 58 ] [a ‘monstrous’ result]; Peak v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 926, 932 [ 187 P.2d 905 ] [an ‘absurd’ result]; Radovich v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., supra, 72 Cal.App.3d at p. 47 .)” However, even if we were to accept Woods’s argument that the Legislature intended the changes in the financial responsibility laws to benefit the uninsured motorist facing a suspension hearing, and therefore failure to conduct a hearing within 30 days could invalidate the Department’s determination, we would nonetheless

1983Subsection (a) sets out an exception to the suspension rule in that it provides that “if a bank is drawer, maker or acceptor of the instrument and there is no recourse on the instrument against the underlying obligor[,]” the taking of the instrument does not result in suspension pro tanto but, rather, the underlying obligation is “pro tanto discharged. ...”(§ 3802, subd. (l)(a); italics added.) In McDowell v. Miller (Mo.App. 1977) 557 S.W.2d 266 , the court makes the following pertinent comment: “Does this combination of three simple words [‘Unless otherwise agreed. . .’] mean what it plainly

1983Subsection (a) sets out an exception to the suspension rule in that it provides that "if a bank is drawer, maker or acceptor of the instrument and there is no recourse on the instrument against the underlying obligor[,]" the taking of the instrument does not result in suspension pro tanto but, rather, the underlying obligation is "pro tanto discharged. ..." (§ 3802, subd. (1)(a); italics added.) [18] In McDowell v. Miller (Mo. App. 1977) 557 S.W.2d 266 , the court makes the following pertinent comment: "Does this combination of three simple words [`Unless otherwise agreed...'] mean what it pla

1983In Skinner v. Sillas (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 591 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 91 ], the court held an allegedly erroneously submitted notification to DMV of the respondent’s submission to a chemical test did not divest DMV of jurisdiction to suspend respondent’s driver’s license.

1983In Skinner v. Sillas (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 591 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 91 ], the court held an allegedly erroneously submitted notification to DMV of the respondent’s submission to a chemical test did not divest DMV of jurisdiction to suspend respondent’s driver’s license.

1982As pointed out in Mackey ( 443 U.S. at p. 15 [ 61 L.Ed.2d at p. 333 , 99 S.Ct. at p. 2619 ]), these issues do not carry with them a substantial risk of error. ...” (Burkhart v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 124 Cal. App.3d at p. 109 .) The Burkhart court concluded that a confrontation between the arresting officer and the licensee was not required by federal due process, and declared that the physical presence of the officer at the hearing would not substantially enhance the reliability of the hearing process since, as the court conjectured, officer and licensee were likely merely to en

1982As pointed out in Mackey ( 443 U.S. at p. 15 [ 61 L.Ed.2d at p. 333 , 99 S.Ct. at p. 2619 ]), these issues do not carry with them a substantial risk of error...." ( Burkhart v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 124 Cal. App.3d at p. 109 .) The Burkhart court concluded that a confrontation between the arresting officer and the licensee was not required by federal due process, and declared that the physical presence of the officer at the hearing would not substantially enhance the reliability of the hearing process since, as the court conjectured, officer and licensee were likely merely to en

1981Throughout their brief the People assert People v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 457 , 430 P.2d 15 ] to be both “good constitutional law but poor criminal procedure.” Seemingly in the same vein, the People cite the cases of Thomas v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1970) 3 Cal.3d 335 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 475 P.2d 858 ], Hasson v. Cozens (1970) 1 Cal.3d 576 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 463 P.2d 385 ] and Mitchell v. Orr (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d 813 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 407 ], which allow a court to strike a prior for a pending suspension hearing with the Department of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter DMV)

1981Throughout their brief the People assert People v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 457 , 430 P.2d 15 ] to be both “good constitutional law but poor criminal procedure.” Seemingly in the same vein, the People cite the cases of Thomas v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1970) 3 Cal.3d 335 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 475 P.2d 858 ], Hasson v. Cozens (1970) 1 Cal.3d 576 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 463 P.2d 385 ] and Mitchell v. Orr (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d 813 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 407 ], which allow a court to strike a prior for a pending suspension hearing with the Department of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter DMV)

1981Throughout their brief the People assert People v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 457 , 430 P.2d 15 ] to be both “good constitutional law but poor criminal procedure.” Seemingly in the same vein, the People cite the cases of Thomas v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1970) 3 Cal.3d 335 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 475 P.2d 858 ], Hasson v. Cozens (1970) 1 Cal.3d 576 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 463 P.2d 385 ] and Mitchell v. Orr (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d 813 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 407 ], which allow a court to strike a prior for a pending suspension hearing with the Department of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter DMV)

1981Throughout their brief the People assert People v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 457 , 430 P.2d 15 ] to be both “good constitutional law but poor criminal procedure.” Seemingly in the same vein, the People cite the cases of Thomas v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1970) 3 Cal.3d 335 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 475 P.2d 858 ], Hasson v. Cozens (1970) 1 Cal.3d 576 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 463 P.2d 385 ] and Mitchell v. Orr (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d 813 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 407 ], which allow a court to strike a prior for a pending suspension hearing with the Department of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter DMV)

1981Throughout their brief the People assert People v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 457 , 430 P.2d 15 ] to be both “good constitutional law but poor criminal procedure.” Seemingly in the same vein, the People cite the cases of Thomas v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1970) 3 Cal.3d 335 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 475 P.2d 858 ], Hasson v. Cozens (1970) 1 Cal.3d 576 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 463 P.2d 385 ] and Mitchell v. Orr (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d 813 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 407 ], which allow a court to strike a prior for a pending suspension hearing with the Department of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter DMV)

1981Throughout their brief the People assert People v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 457 , 430 P.2d 15 ] to be both “good constitutional law but poor criminal procedure.” Seemingly in the same vein, the People cite the cases of Thomas v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1970) 3 Cal.3d 335 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 475 P.2d 858 ], Hasson v. Cozens (1970) 1 Cal.3d 576 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 463 P.2d 385 ] and Mitchell v. Orr (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d 813 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 407 ], which allow a court to strike a prior for a pending suspension hearing with the Department of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter DMV)

1981Throughout their brief the People assert People v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 457 , 430 P.2d 15 ] to be both “good constitutional law but poor criminal procedure.” Seemingly in the same vein, the People cite the cases of Thomas v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1970) 3 Cal.3d 335 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 475 P.2d 858 ], Hasson v. Cozens (1970) 1 Cal.3d 576 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 463 P.2d 385 ] and Mitchell v. Orr (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d 813 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 407 ], which allow a court to strike a prior for a pending suspension hearing with the Department of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter DMV)

1981Throughout their brief the People assert People v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 457 , 430 P.2d 15 ] to be both “good constitutional law but poor criminal procedure.” Seemingly in the same vein, the People cite the cases of Thomas v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1970) 3 Cal.3d 335 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 475 P.2d 858 ], Hasson v. Cozens (1970) 1 Cal.3d 576 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 463 P.2d 385 ] and Mitchell v. Orr (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d 813 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 407 ], which allow a court to strike a prior for a pending suspension hearing with the Department of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter DMV)

1981Throughout their brief the People assert People v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 457 , 430 P.2d 15 ] to be both “good constitutional law but poor criminal procedure.” Seemingly in the same vein, the People cite the cases of Thomas v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1970) 3 Cal.3d 335 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 475 P.2d 858 ], Hasson v. Cozens (1970) 1 Cal.3d 576 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 463 P.2d 385 ] and Mitchell v. Orr (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d 813 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 407 ], which allow a court to strike a prior for a pending suspension hearing with the Department of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter DMV)

1981Throughout their brief the People assert People v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 457 , 430 P.2d 15 ] to be both “good constitutional law but poor criminal procedure.” Seemingly in the same vein, the People cite the cases of Thomas v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1970) 3 Cal.3d 335 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 475 P.2d 858 ], Hasson v. Cozens (1970) 1 Cal.3d 576 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 463 P.2d 385 ] and Mitchell v. Orr (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d 813 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 407 ], which allow a court to strike a prior for a pending suspension hearing with the Department of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter DMV)

1981Throughout their brief the People assert People v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 457 , 430 P.2d 15 ] to be both “good constitutional law but poor criminal procedure.” Seemingly in the same vein, the People cite the cases of Thomas v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1970) 3 Cal.3d 335 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 475 P.2d 858 ], Hasson v. Cozens (1970) 1 Cal.3d 576 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 463 P.2d 385 ] and Mitchell v. Orr (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d 813 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 407 ], which allow a court to strike a prior for a pending suspension hearing with the Department of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter DMV)

1981Throughout their brief the People assert People v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 457 , 430 P.2d 15 ] to be both “good constitutional law but poor criminal procedure.” Seemingly in the same vein, the People cite the cases of Thomas v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1970) 3 Cal.3d 335 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 475 P.2d 858 ], Hasson v. Cozens (1970) 1 Cal.3d 576 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 463 P.2d 385 ] and Mitchell v. Orr (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d 813 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 407 ], which allow a court to strike a prior for a pending suspension hearing with the Department of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter DMV)

1981Throughout their brief the People assert People v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 457 , 430 P.2d 15 ] to be both “good constitutional law but poor criminal procedure.” Seemingly in the same vein, the People cite the cases of Thomas v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1970) 3 Cal.3d 335 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 475 P.2d 858 ], Hasson v. Cozens (1970) 1 Cal.3d 576 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 463 P.2d 385 ] and Mitchell v. Orr (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d 813 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 407 ], which allow a court to strike a prior for a pending suspension hearing with the Department of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter DMV)

1981Where conflicting evidence is introduced, the Officer’s statement is not properly considered by determining factual issues at the suspension hearing.” *105 There is language in August v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 52 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 172 ] to support the assertion that an officer’s sworn statement made pursuant to section 13353 may support a finding by the referee only if not contradicted by other evidence. 9 The actual holding in August was that there was no dispute as to the existence of the facts upon which DMV was authorized to suspend a license under section 13353, a

1981Where conflicting evidence is introduced, the Officer’s statement is not properly considered by determining factual issues at the suspension hearing.” *105 There is language in August v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 52 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 172 ] to support the assertion that an officer’s sworn statement made pursuant to section 13353 may support a finding by the referee only if not contradicted by other evidence. 9 The actual holding in August was that there was no dispute as to the existence of the facts upon which DMV was authorized to suspend a license under section 13353, a

1981Throughout their brief the People assert People v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 457 , 430 P.2d 15 ] to be both “good constitutional law but poor criminal procedure.” Seemingly in the same vein, the People cite the cases of Thomas v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1970) 3 Cal.3d 335 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 475 P.2d 858 ], Hasson v. Cozens (1970) 1 Cal.3d 576 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 463 P.2d 385 ] and Mitchell v. Orr (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d 813 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 407 ], which allow a court to strike a prior for a pending suspension hearing with the Department of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter DMV)

1981Throughout their brief the People assert People v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 457 , 430 P.2d 15 ] to be both “good constitutional law but poor criminal procedure.” Seemingly in the same vein, the People cite the cases of Thomas v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1970) 3 Cal.3d 335 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 475 P.2d 858 ], Hasson v. Cozens (1970) 1 Cal.3d 576 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 463 P.2d 385 ] and Mitchell v. Orr (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d 813 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 407 ], which allow a court to strike a prior for a pending suspension hearing with the Department of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter DMV)