7 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Francis v. Arizona Department of Transportationgreen1 sentence2024Id.; see also Francis v. Arizona Dep’t of Transp., 192 Ariz. 269, 271-72, ¶ 9 (App. 1998). ¶14 Allen argues the delayed hearing prejudiced his defense of the case because it allowed the officer time to obtain “unreliable hearsay from the 9-1-1 caller nearly 8 months after the incident took place.” Allen, however, does not state how he was prejudiced by the presentation of this additional evidence or why it was a surprise. | 1 | 1 |
Sotomayor v. Burnsgreen1 sentence2023He argues that ADOT unreasonably failed to act on those points until after his release from prison, and that ADOT is therefore barred from imposing the suspension by the doctrine of laches. ¶11 Kaufman cites the general principle that laches will “bar a claim when the delay is unreasonable and results in prejudice to the opposing party.” Sotomayor v. Burns, 199 Ariz. 81, ¶ 6 (2000). | 1 | 1 |
Woods v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen2 sentences1997See Woods v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 211 Cal.App.3d 1263 , 259 Cal.Rptr. 885, 890 (1989) (California Department of Motor Vehicle’s failure to hold a suspension hearing concerning a driver’s financial responsibility within thirty days after driver’s request would not void suspension of his driver’s license where the driver failed to establish any prejudice caused by the delay). 1997See Woods v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 211 Cal.App.3d 1263 , 259 Cal.Rptr. 885, 890 (1989) (California Department of Motor Vehicle’s failure to hold a suspension hearing concerning a driver’s financial responsibility within thirty days after driver’s request would not void suspension of his driver’s license where the driver failed to establish any prejudice caused by the delay). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
HCZ Construction Inc. v. First Franklin Financial Corp.
green
2 sentences2011"The essential difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is that failure to comply with a directory provision does not invalidate the proceeding to which it relates, while failure to follow a mandatory provision does." HCZ Constr., Inc., 199 Ariz. at 364 n. 1, ¶ 9, 18 P.3d at 158 n. 1. ¶ 18 In Forino , we held that the failure of the Arizona Department of Transportation (ADOT) "to conduct the suspension hearing within the thirty-day time period did not divest the agency of jurisdiction." 191 Ariz. at 81 , 952 P.2d at 319 . 2011"The essential difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is that failure to comply with a directory provision does not invalidate the proceeding to which it relates, while failure to follow a mandatory provision does." HCZ Constr., Inc., 199 Ariz. at 364 n. 1, ¶ 9, 18 P.3d at 158 n. 1. ¶ 18 In Forino , we held that the failure of the Arizona Department of Transportation (ADOT) "to conduct the suspension hearing within the thirty-day time period did not divest the agency of jurisdiction." 191 Ariz. at 81 , 952 P.2d at 319 . | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Forino v. Arizona Department of Transportation
green
2 sentences2011"The essential difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is that failure to comply with a directory provision does not invalidate the proceeding to which it relates, while failure to follow a mandatory provision does." HCZ Constr., Inc., 199 Ariz. at 364 n. 1, ¶ 9, 18 P.3d at 158 n. 1. ¶ 18 In Forino , we held that the failure of the Arizona Department of Transportation (ADOT) "to conduct the suspension hearing within the thirty-day time period did not divest the agency of jurisdiction." 191 Ariz. at 81 , 952 P.2d at 319 . 2011"The essential difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is that failure to comply with a directory provision does not invalidate the proceeding to which it relates, while failure to follow a mandatory provision does." HCZ Constr., Inc., 199 Ariz. at 364 n. 1, ¶ 9, 18 P.3d at 158 n. 1. ¶ 18 In Forino , we held that the failure of the Arizona Department of Transportation (ADOT) "to conduct the suspension hearing within the thirty-day time period did not divest the agency of jurisdiction." 191 Ariz. at 81 , 952 P.2d at 319 . | 2 | 2011–2011 |
In Re Brown
green
2 sentences1989Id. at 7 , 197 S.E.2d at 818 . [14] b. 1989Id. at 7 , 197 S.E.2d at 818 . [14] b. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Commonwealth v. Heresko
green
2 sentences1984The court stated, “the issue ... does not arise until a test is made and the results thereof are offered as evidence against the driver.” In Woolman v. State Department of Motor Vehicles, 15 Wash.App. 115 , 547 P.2d 293 (1976), the same court held that proof that a breathalyzer machine was functioning properly was also not relevant in an implied consent suspension hearing. 1 A Pennsylvania appellate court reached a similar result in Commonwealth v. Heresko, 28 Pa.Cmwlth. 508 , 368 A.2d 1357 (1977). 1984The court stated, “the issue ... does not arise until a test is made and the results thereof are offered as evidence against the driver.” In Woolman v. State Department of Motor Vehicles, 15 Wash.App. 115 , 547 P.2d 293 (1976), the same court held that proof that a breathalyzer machine was functioning properly was also not relevant in an implied consent suspension hearing. 1 A Pennsylvania appellate court reached a similar result in Commonwealth v. Heresko, 28 Pa.Cmwlth. 508 , 368 A.2d 1357 (1977). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Woolman v. Department of Motor Vehicles
green
2 sentences1984The court stated, “the issue ... does not arise until a test is made and the results thereof are offered as evidence against the driver.” In Woolman v. State Department of Motor Vehicles, 15 Wash.App. 115 , 547 P.2d 293 (1976), the same court held that proof that a breathalyzer machine was functioning properly was also not relevant in an implied consent suspension hearing. 1 A Pennsylvania appellate court reached a similar result in Commonwealth v. Heresko, 28 Pa.Cmwlth. 508 , 368 A.2d 1357 (1977). 1984The court stated, “the issue ... does not arise until a test is made and the results thereof are offered as evidence against the driver.” In Woolman v. State Department of Motor Vehicles, 15 Wash.App. 115 , 547 P.2d 293 (1976), the same court held that proof that a breathalyzer machine was functioning properly was also not relevant in an implied consent suspension hearing. 1 A Pennsylvania appellate court reached a similar result in Commonwealth v. Heresko, 28 Pa.Cmwlth. 508 , 368 A.2d 1357 (1977). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.