16 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1924–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Church v. Stategreen2 sentences2003See Church v. State, 942 S.W.2d 139, 140 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. refd) (holding that the determination whether the driver did in fact operate a vehicle while intoxicated was a criminal matter, while license suspension was a civil matter, requiring only probable cause to believe the driver was driving while intoxicated, and that “[t]he statute authorizing the suspension hearing neither requires nor empowers the ALJ to decide the ultimate issue of whether [the driver] was actually operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated”). 2 We reverse the county court’s judgment and render 2003See Church v. State , 942 S.W.2d 139, 140 (Tex. App. C Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. ref’d) (holding that the determination whether the driver did in fact operate a vehicle while intoxicated was a criminal matter, while license suspension was a civil matter, requiring only probable cause to believe the driver was driving while intoxicated, and that “[t]he statute authorizing the suspension hearing neither requires nor empowers the ALJ to decide the ultimate issue of whether [the driver] was actually operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated”). [2] We reverse the county court’s judgment and | 3 | 3 |
Texas Department of Public Safety v. Piercegreen1 sentence2013DPS argued that the request was “improper and untimely” because Patel had already announced that he was ready to proceed and had “made a decision not to subpoena anyone.” In Texas Department of Public Safety v. Pierce, the defendant argued that the ALJ abused its discretion in denying his fourth request for a continuance when DPS provided him a second copy of the offense report only two days before the suspension hearing. 238 S.W.3d 832, 834 (Tex.App-El Paso 2007, no pet.). | 1 | 1 |
Mireles v. Texas Department of Public Safetygreen2 sentences2012Safety, 9 S.W.3d 128, 132 (Tex.1999). 2012See generally id. | 1 | 1 |
Texas Department of Public Safety v. Cortinasgreen1 sentence2012See Cortinas, 996 S.W.2d at 891 ; see also Tex.R. | 1 | 1 |
Texas Department of Public Safety v. Deargreen1 sentence2000See Dear, 999 S.W.2d at 151-53 . | 1 | 1 |
Todd v. Stategreen1 sentence2000See Todd v. State, 956 S.W.2d 777, 778 (Tex.App.—Waco 1997, pet. ref'd) (noting that issues at license suspension hearings differ depending on whether the hearing is held under chapter 524 or chapter 724). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Aguilargreen1 sentence1999See id. at 183-84 ; State v. Aguilar, 947 S.W.2d 257, 259-60 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Brabsongreen1 sentence1999See id. at 183-84 ; State v. Aguilar, 947 S.W.2d 257, 259-60 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). | 1 | 1 |
Preble v. Stategreen1 sentence1991Preble v. State, 402 S.W.2d 902, 904 (Tex.Crim.App.1966); Department of Public Safety v. Preble, 398 S.W.2d 785, 788 (Tex.Civ.App.1966, no writ). | 1 | 1 |
Texas Department of Public Safety v. Preblegreen2 sentences1991Preble v. State, 402 S.W.2d 902, 904 (Tex.Crim.App.1966); Department of Public Safety v. Preble, 398 S.W.2d 785, 788 (Tex.Civ.App.1966, no writ). 1991De los Santos, 622 S.W.2d at 624 ; Preble, 398 S.W.2d at 787 . | 1 | 1 |
Simmons v. Stategreen1 sentence1970See Simmons v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 443 S.W.2d 852 , where an almost identical fact situation concerning lack of notice was before the Court and resulted in a reversal. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Day Land & Cattle Co. v. State
green
2 sentences1977The Supreme Court, in Day Land & Cattle Co. v. State of Texas, 68 Tex. 526 , 4 S.W. 865, 873 , stated the rule: ‘If the legislature states facts or reasons which in its judgment authorize the suspension of the rule and the immediate passage of a bill, the courts certainly have no power to re-examine that question, and to declare that the legislature came to an erroneous conclusion. 1977The Supreme Court, in Day Land & Cattle Co. v. State of Texas, 68 Tex. 526 , 4 S.W. 865, 873 , stated the rule: ‘If the legislature states facts or reasons which in its judgment authorize the suspension of the rule and the immediate passage of a bill, the courts certainly have no power to re-examine that question, and to declare that the legislature came to an erroneous conclusion. | 2 | 1960–1977 |
City of DeSoto v. White
green
2 sentences2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 City of DeSoto v. White, 288 S.W.3d 389 (2009) 29 IER Cases 555 , 52 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 893 White elected to appeal the suspension to a hearing examiner, Attorneys and Law Firms where he was represented by counsel. 2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 City of DeSoto v. White, 288 S.W.3d 389 (2009) 29 IER Cases 555 , 52 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 893 White elected to appeal the suspension to a hearing examiner, Attorneys and Law Firms where he was represented by counsel. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Ex Parte Kohut
green
1 sentence1999Id. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Tharp v. State
green
1 sentence1997Id. at 159 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Texas Department of Public Safety v. Santos
neutral
1 sentence1991De los Santos, 622 S.W.2d at 624 ; Preble, 398 S.W.2d at 787 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Williams v. City of Borger
neutral
1 sentence1977The legislature ascertains in its own way the facts on which it bases its action, and it is made the sole judge whether facts exist to authorize the immediate passage of a bill; and whatever facts or reasons it may give for such action must be held sufficient.’ We therefore conclude that the ordinance complained of complies with the provisions of the city charter pertaining to the passage of emergency measures, and was therefore valid and sufficient to form a legal basis for the election which it called for.” In both Bradshaw, supra, and Williams, supra, it was observed that our Supreme Court | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Holloman v. Black
green
1 sentence1977The legislature ascertains in its own way the facts on which it bases its action, and it is made the sole judge whether facts exist to authorize the immediate passage of a bill; and whatever facts or reasons it may give for such action must be held sufficient.’ We therefore conclude that the ordinance complained of complies with the provisions of the city charter pertaining to the passage of emergency measures, and was therefore valid and sufficient to form a legal basis for the election which it called for.” In both Bradshaw, supra, and Williams, supra, it was observed that our Supreme Court | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Hays v. Department of Public Safety
green
1 sentence1966Hays v. Department of Public Safety, 301 S.W.2d 276 (Tex.Civ.App.), writ dism.; Gilbert v. State, 152 Tex.Cr.R. 200 , 212 S.W.2d 182 ; Tatum v. Texas Department of Public Safety, 241 S.W.2d 167 (Tex.Civ.App.), writ ref.; Beach v. State, 150 Tex.Cr.R. 193 , 199 S.W.2d 1020 . | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Tatum v. Texas Department of Public Safety
neutral
1 sentence1966Hays v. Department of Public Safety, 301 S.W.2d 276 (Tex.Civ.App.), writ dism.; Gilbert v. State, 152 Tex.Cr.R. 200 , 212 S.W.2d 182 ; Tatum v. Texas Department of Public Safety, 241 S.W.2d 167 (Tex.Civ.App.), writ ref.; Beach v. State, 150 Tex.Cr.R. 193 , 199 S.W.2d 1020 . | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Beach v. State
green
2 sentences1966Hays v. Department of Public Safety, 301 S.W.2d 276 (Tex.Civ.App.), writ dism.; Gilbert v. State, 152 Tex.Cr.R. 200 , 212 S.W.2d 182 ; Tatum v. Texas Department of Public Safety, 241 S.W.2d 167 (Tex.Civ.App.), writ ref.; Beach v. State, 150 Tex.Cr.R. 193 , 199 S.W.2d 1020 . 1966Hays v. Department of Public Safety, 301 S.W.2d 276 (Tex.Civ.App.), writ dism.; Gilbert v. State, 152 Tex.Cr.R. 200 , 212 S.W.2d 182 ; Tatum v. Texas Department of Public Safety, 241 S.W.2d 167 (Tex.Civ.App.), writ ref.; Beach v. State, 150 Tex.Cr.R. 193 , 199 S.W.2d 1020 . | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Gilbert v. State
neutral
2 sentences1966Hays v. Department of Public Safety, 301 S.W.2d 276 (Tex.Civ.App.), writ dism.; Gilbert v. State, 152 Tex.Cr.R. 200 , 212 S.W.2d 182 ; Tatum v. Texas Department of Public Safety, 241 S.W.2d 167 (Tex.Civ.App.), writ ref.; Beach v. State, 150 Tex.Cr.R. 193 , 199 S.W.2d 1020 . 1966Hays v. Department of Public Safety, 301 S.W.2d 276 (Tex.Civ.App.), writ dism.; Gilbert v. State, 152 Tex.Cr.R. 200 , 212 S.W.2d 182 ; Tatum v. Texas Department of Public Safety, 241 S.W.2d 167 (Tex.Civ.App.), writ ref.; Beach v. State, 150 Tex.Cr.R. 193 , 199 S.W.2d 1020 . | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. v. School Dist. No. 62 of Jackson Counts
neutral
1 sentence1924The Oklahoma case of Insurance Co. v. School District, 174 Pac. 513 , is directly in point, holding that a suspension clause for nonpayment of premium, embodied both in the policy and in the premium note, is void where the statutory uniform policy contains no such provision. | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.