suspension clause (Washington) · Go Syfert
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suspension clause in Washington

9 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2011 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (1)

CaseFollowedCited
In Re Behrensgreen
wash · 1945 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
1 sentence

2011E.g., Clark, 24 Wn.2d at 111 ; Behrens, 24 Wn.2d at 133 (proceeding to obtain a writ of habeas corpus was not available where the judgment did “not show upon its face, nor when read in connection with any applicable statute, that it [wa]s void”). ¶64 In enacting RCW 10.73.090(1), the legislature understood the scope of the right to collaterally attack a judgment in a criminal case as protected by the suspension clause and as it had developed at common law.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (14)

CaseCitedYears
City of Redmond v. Moore green
wash · 2004
2 sentences

2006City of Redmond v. Moore, 151 Wash.2d 664, 668 , 91 P.3d 875 (2004).

2006City of Redmond v. Moore, 151 Wn.2d 664, 668 , 91 P.3d 875 (2004).

22006–2006
City of Redmond v. Moore green
wash · 2004
2 sentences

2006City of Redmond v. Moore, 151 Wash.2d 664, 668 , 91 P.3d 875 (2004).

2006City of Redmond v. Moore, 151 Wn.2d 664, 668 , 91 P.3d 875 (2004).

22006–2006
Warner v. Trombetta green
pamd · 1972
2 sentences

2005The risk of erroneous deprivation of this important property interest is significant. 6 ¶21 In Moore we relied on Warner v. Trombetta, 348 F. Supp. 1068 (M.D.

2005The risk of erroneous deprivation of this important property interest is significant. [2] ¶ 20 In Moore we relied on Warner v. Trombetta, 348 F.Supp. 1068 (M.D.Pa.1972), aff'd, 410 U.S. 919 , 93 S.Ct. 1392 , 35 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973), and again it is precisely on point.

22005–2005
Felker v. Turpin green
scotus · 1996
2 sentences

2004Felker, 518 U.S. at 664 .

2004Felker, 518 U.S. at 664 , 116 S.Ct. 2333 .

22004–2004
Matter of Personal Restraint of Runyan green
wash · 2000
2 sentences

2011Id. at 444 .

2011With regard to collateral attacks on judgments in criminal proceedings, history gives contextual meaning to what types of judgments and sentences have been considered without any time limits as well as what it means for a judgment and sentence to be “invalid on its face.” ¶53 The first time that RCW 10.73.090(1) came before us for interpretation was in Runyan, 121 Wn.2d 432 , where the principal claim was that the one-year time bar in RCW 10.73.090(1) violated the suspension clause of the Washington State Constitution.

12011–2011
In Re Clark green
wash · 1945
1 sentence

2011E.g., Clark, 24 Wn.2d at 111 ; Behrens, 24 Wn.2d at 133 (proceeding to obtain a writ of habeas corpus was not available where the judgment did “not show upon its face, nor when read in connection with any applicable statute, that it [wa]s void”). ¶64 In enacting RCW 10.73.090(1), the legislature understood the scope of the right to collaterally attack a judgment in a criminal case as protected by the suspension clause and as it had developed at common law.

12011–2011
In re Lybarger green
wash · 1891
2 sentences

2011Runyan, 121 Wn.2d at 441-43 . ¶55 At common law, that “the petitioner was held by any process or judgment good upon its face not only precluded inquiry into the validity of such process or judgment, but also precluded inquiry as to the facts of his being held by such process or judgment at all” In re Habeas Corpus of Lybarger, 2 Wash. 131, 134 , 25 P. 1075 (1891) (emphasis added).

2011Runyan, 121 Wn.2d at 441-43 . ¶55 At common law, that “the petitioner was held by any process or judgment good upon its face not only precluded inquiry into the validity of such process or judgment, but also precluded inquiry as to the facts of his being held by such process or judgment at all” In re Habeas Corpus of Lybarger, 2 Wash. 131, 134 , 25 P. 1075 (1891) (emphasis added).

12011–2011
Barr v. Thorp Credit, Inc. green
scotus · 1973
1 sentence

2005The risk of erroneous deprivation of this important property interest is significant. [2] ¶ 20 In Moore we relied on Warner v. Trombetta, 348 F.Supp. 1068 (M.D.Pa.1972), aff'd, 410 U.S. 919 , 93 S.Ct. 1392 , 35 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973), and again it is precisely on point.

12005–2005
In re Disbarment of Thaler green
scotus · 1973
1 sentence

2005The risk of erroneous deprivation of this important property interest is significant. [2] ¶ 20 In Moore we relied on Warner v. Trombetta, 348 F.Supp. 1068 (M.D.Pa.1972), aff'd, 410 U.S. 919 , 93 S.Ct. 1392 , 35 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973), and again it is precisely on point.

12005–2005
Allen v. Foster green
scotus · 1973
1 sentence

2005The risk of erroneous deprivation of this important property interest is significant. [2] ¶ 20 In Moore we relied on Warner v. Trombetta, 348 F.Supp. 1068 (M.D.Pa.1972), aff'd, 410 U.S. 919 , 93 S.Ct. 1392 , 35 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973), and again it is precisely on point.

12005–2005
Harmon v. McNutt green
wash · 1978
2 sentences

2000The equal protection clauses of both the state and federal constitutions require that "persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive like treatment." Harmon v. McNutt, 91 Wn.2d 126, 130 , 587 P.2d 537 (1978).

2000The equal protection clauses of both the state and federal constitutions require that "persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive like treatment." Harmon v. McNutt, 91 Wn.2d 126, 130 , 587 P.2d 537 (1978).

12000–2000
Toliver v. Olsen green
wash · 1987
2 sentences

2000Toliver v. Olsen, 109 Wn.2d 607, 609 , 746 P.2d 809 (1987).

2000Toliver v. Olsen, 109 Wn.2d 607, 609 , 746 P.2d 809 (1987).

12000–2000
Voigt v. Mahoney green
wash · 1941
2 sentences

2000Voigt v. Mahoney, 10 Wn.2d 157, 162-63 , 116 P.2d 300 (1941).

2000Voigt v. Mahoney, 10 Wn.2d 157, 162-63 , 116 P.2d 300 (1941).

12000–2000
State v. Womack green
wash · 1973
2 sentences

1975See RCW 46.20.308 (4); State v. Womack, 82 Wn.2d 382, 386 , 510 P.2d 1133 (1973).

1975See RCW 46.20.308 (4); State v. Womack, 82 Wn.2d 382, 386 , 510 P.2d 1133 (1973).

11975–1975

Statutes the citing opinions construe

WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.090 (4) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.100 (4) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 46.20.289 (4) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 46.20.324 (4) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 66.44.365 (4) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 7.36.130 (4)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

IL 29 (1979–2021) PA 23 (1914–2024) CA 22 (1919–2021) LA 20 (1935–2018) CT 18 (1990–2000) TX 16 (1924–2015) FL 12 (1934–2014) AL 12 (1979–2005) OH 11 (1984–2026) NY 10 (1979–2020) WA 9 (1975–2011) AZ 7 (1984–2024) IA 5 (1928–2012) WY 5 (1923–2011) ME 5 (1995–2018) WV 4 (2010–2019) NM 4 (1986–2020) GA 4 (1970–2007) OR 4 (1980–2014) KY 3 (1957–2006) ID 3 (1990–2018) MN 3 (1893–2007) MA 3 (1943–2008) KS 3 (1934–2024) WI 3 (2004–2018) CO 3 (1980–1987) MO 3 (1960–2021) VT 2 (2000–2025) NE 2 (1888–2018) TN 2 (1927–1954) IN 2 (1898–1973) SC 2 (2006–2020) AR 2 (1922–2017) NJ 2 (1874–1933) RI 2 (1988–1993) ND 2 (1999–1999) DC 2 (1978–2015)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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