well-reasoned analysis in Ohio

1997The Supreme Court of Ohio in Fisher, supra, 49 Ohio St.3d at 277 , 551 N.E.2d at 1274 , made reference to Strother v. Morrison Cafeteria (Fla.1980), 383 So. 2d 623 , as having ‘* * * embarked on a well-reasoned analysis as to whether that court had developed inconsistent constructions of the basic coverage formula * * *.’ It was noted by the court in Strother, supra, at 625 , that it had, in some decisions, bifurcated the elements of ‘arising out of’ and ‘in the course of’ and in other cases merged them.

1997The Supreme Court of Ohio in Fisher, supra, 49 Ohio St.3d at 277 , 551 N.E.2d at 1274 , made reference to Strother v. Morrison Cafeteria (Fla.1980), 383 So. 2d 623 , as having ‘* * * embarked on a well-reasoned analysis as to whether that court had developed inconsistent constructions of the basic coverage formula * * *.’ It was noted by the court in Strother, supra, at 625 , that it had, in some decisions, bifurcated the elements of ‘arising out of’ and ‘in the course of’ and in other cases merged them.

1997In considering this issue, we find ourselves in agreement with the following well-reasoned analysis of Currie, supra, 644 F.Supp. at 1079 -1080: “One cannot read Thompson without being struck by the emphasis the court placed on the practical difficulties which the lack of a ‘readily identifiable’ victim placed on a duty to warn.

1997In considering this issue, we find ourselves in agreement with the following well-reasoned analysis of Currie, supra, 644 F.Supp. at 1079 - 1080: “One cannot read Thompson without being struck by the emphasis the court placed on the practical difficulties which the lack of a ‘readily identifiable’ victim placed on a duty to warn.

1997The Supreme Court of Ohio in Fisher, supra, 49 Ohio St.3d at 277 , 551 N.E.2d at 1274 , made reference to Strother v. Morrison Cafeteria (Fla.1980), 383 So. 2d 623 , as having ‘* * * embarked on a well-reasoned analysis as to whether that court had developed inconsistent constructions of the basic coverage formula * * *.’ It was noted by the court in Strother, supra, at 625 , that it had, in some decisions, bifurcated the elements of ‘arising out of’ and ‘in the course of’ and in other cases merged them.

1997The Supreme Court of Ohio in Fisher, supra, 49 Ohio St.3d at 277 , 551 N.E.2d at 1274 , made reference to Strother v. Morrison Cafeteria (Fla.1980), 383 So. 2d 623 , as having ‘* * * embarked on a well-reasoned analysis as to whether that court had developed inconsistent constructions of the basic coverage formula * * *.’ It was noted by the court in Strother, supra, at 625 , that it had, in some decisions, bifurcated the elements of ‘arising out of’ and ‘in the course of’ and in other cases merged them.

2019We agree with the Third District’s well-reasoned analysis with respect to R.C. 4511.13 violations.2 {¶ 21} Additionally, in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC., Inc., 467 U.S. 837 , 104 S.Ct. 2778 , 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), the court gives guidance concerning statutory interpretation.

2019We agree with the Third District’s well-reasoned analysis with respect to R.C. 4511.13 violations.2 {¶ 21} Additionally, in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC., Inc., 467 U.S. 837 , 104 S.Ct. 2778 , 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), the court gives guidance concerning statutory interpretation.

2017The Ohio Supreme Court has emphasized that a common pleas court can substitute its judgment for that of the administrative board or commission if it finds that there "is not a preponderance of reliable, probative and substantive evidence to support the board's decision." Kisil v. Sandusky , 12 Ohio St.3d 30 , 34, 465 N.E.2d 848 (1984).

2017The Ohio Supreme Court has emphasized that a common pleas court can substitute its judgment for that of the administrative board or commission if it finds that there "is not a preponderance of reliable, probative and substantive evidence to support the board's decision." Kisil v. Sandusky , 12 Ohio St.3d 30 , 34, 465 N.E.2d 848 (1984).

2014In addition to the Eighth District's decision in Venes, see Majority Opinion at ¶19, the First District recently provided a well-reasoned analysis of this issue in State v. White, 2013-Ohio-4225 , 1st.

2014Stark No. 2013CA00155, 2013-Ohio-5223 .

2008Relations Bd. (1991), 74 Ohio App.3d 3 , 598 N.E.2d 15 , the First Appellate District was confronted with the issue of whether a residency requirement for public employees was “terms or conditions of employment” subject to mandatory collective bargaining. {¶ 58} In answering the question in the affirmative, the First Appellate District provided the following well-reasoned analysis, citing Ohio’s collective-bargaining statutes: {¶ 59} “Mandatory subjects of collective bargaining are deemed to be matters of immediate concern that vitally affect the terms and conditions of employment of the barga

2008Relations Bd. (1991), 74 Ohio App.3d 3 , 598 N.E.2d 15 , the First Appellate District was confronted with the issue of whether a residency requirement for public employees was “terms or conditions of employment” subject to mandatory collective bargaining. {¶ 58} In answering the question in the affirmative, the First Appellate District provided the following well-reasoned analysis, citing Ohio’s collective-bargaining statutes: {¶ 59} “Mandatory subjects of collective bargaining are deemed to be matters of immediate concern that vitally affect the terms and conditions of employment of the barga

1990In Strother , the Supreme Court of Florida embarked on a well-reasoned analysis as to whether that court had developed inconsistent constructions of the basic coverage formula, stating as follows: “Although in several decisions, we have referred to the distinct and separate nature of the two elements of ‘arising out of’ and ‘in the course of,’ we have also, in other decisions, tended to merge these factors together into a test of work connectedness.” Id. at 624-625 .

1990The court went on to hold that “to be compensable, an injury must arise out of employment in the sense of causation and be in the course of employment in the sense of continuity of time, space, and circumstances.” Id. at 628 .

1985In a well-reasoned analysis authored by Justice Locher, this court held that “[n]o party may discredit a medical report which finds a workers’ compensation claimant to be permanently and totally disabled as a result of two allowed conditions by treating, as one report, distinct reports, each of which evaluates only one of the allowed conditions.” Id. at syllabus.

1985Further, Justice Locher emphasized the inapplicability of Teece, supra, to a situation such as the one at bar where “no testimony exists which could effectively undermine, as did the one report in Teece, the credibility of * * * reports * * * which evaluated [the claimant's] physical and psychiatric conditions and found him to be permanently and totally disabled.” Id. at 60.