whistleblower claim in Ohio

2002After being discharged, the plaintiff brought suit against the employer, alleging both a whistleblower claim, pursuant to R.C. 4113.52, and a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. {¶ 10} In Kulch, we recognized the abundance of Ohio statutory and constitutional provisions that support workplace safety and form the basis for Ohio’s public policy, which is “clearly in keeping with the laudable objectives of the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act.”2 Id., 78 Ohio St.3d at 152 , 677 N.E.2d at 322 .

2002After being discharged, the plaintiff brought suit against the employer, alleging both a whistleblower claim, pursuant to R.C. 4113.52, and a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. {¶ 10} In Kulch, we recognized the abundance of Ohio statutory and constitutional provisions that support workplace safety and form the basis for Ohio’s public policy, which is “clearly in keeping with the laudable objectives of the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act.”2 Id., 78 Ohio St.3d at 152 , 677 N.E.2d at 322 .

2025“Subject- matter jurisdiction refers to the constitutional or statutory power of a court to adjudicate a case.” Pivonka v. Corcoran, 2020-Ohio-3476, ¶ 20 .

2013Porter v. Ward, Richland App. No. 07 CA 33, 2007– Ohio5301, 2007 WL 2874308 , ¶ 34, citing Smiddy v. Wedding Party, Inc. (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 35 , 30 OBR 78, 506 N.E.2d 212 .

2013Porter v. Ward, Richland App. No. 07 CA 33, 2007– Ohio5301, 2007 WL 2874308 , ¶ 34, citing Smiddy v. Wedding Party, Inc. (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 35 , 30 OBR 78, 506 N.E.2d 212 .

2006"Failure to do so prevents the employee from claiming the protections embodied in the statute." Id. {¶ 21} In this case appellant clearly failed to commence a civil action under R.C. 4113.52 within 180 days of his discharge; accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing the whistleblower claim as it is time-barred. {¶ 22} Appellant's fourth claim, intentional infliction of emotion distress, was also dismissed by the trial court a being barred by the applicable statue of limitations.

2005No. 2002-L-052, 2003- {¶ 18} Ohio-703, at 25 citing, Doody v. Centerior Energy Corp. (2000), 137 Ohio App.3d 673 , 679 .

2003Instead, appellant brought a Greeley claim, that is, a common-law tort action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. {¶ 19} Specifically, appellant alleged in his complaint that “[he] was terminated as a result of expressing concerns” to management that “certain modifications that [appellee was] making to motorcycle engines were not safe.” As a result, appellant claimed that his termination was “contrary to statute and public policy, including Ohio’s tort laws, and constitutes a breach of [appellant’s] rights in violation of Ohio law as set forth in Greeley v. Miami Valley Maint

2003Instead, appellant brought a Greeley claim, that is, a common-law tort action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. {¶ 19} Specifically, appellant alleged in his complaint that “[he] was terminated as a result of expressing concerns” to management that “certain modifications that [appellee was] making to motorcycle engines were not safe.” As a result, appellant claimed that his termination was “contrary to statute and public policy, including Ohio’s tort laws, and constitutes a breach of [appellant’s] rights in violation of Ohio law as set forth in Greeley v. Miami Valley Maint

2003Accordingly, we find that the limitations period for common-law claims for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is four years as set forth in R.C. 2305.09(D).” (Emphasis added.) Pytlinski, 94 Ohio St.3d at 80 , 760 N.E.2d 385 . {¶ 18} In the instant matter, a review of appellant’s complaint reveals that he did not plead a whistleblower claim pursuant to R.C. 4113.52.

2003Accordingly, we find that the limitations period for common-law claims for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is four years as set forth in R.C. 2305.09(D).” (Emphasis added.) Pytlinski, 94 Ohio St.3d at 80 , 760 N.E.2d 385 . {¶ 18} In the instant matter, a review of appellant’s complaint reveals that he did not plead a whistleblower claim pursuant to R.C. 4113.52.

1999"R.C. 4113.52 , Ohio's `Whistleblower Act,' establishes guidelines by which an employee can bring to the attention of the employer or appropriate authorities illegal activities by either the employer or a co-employee without being discharged." Keefe v. Diocese of Catholic Church (1998), 121 Ohio App.3d 1 , 5 .

1994In affirming the trial court's dismissal of appellant's whistleblower claim, the majority relied on Hicks v. De La Cruz (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 71 , 74-75 , 6 O.O.3d 274 , 276-277, 369 N.E.2d 776 , 777-778 , concluding that the federal court's *Page 202 dismissal of the ERISA claim necessarily included the whistleblower claim and that collateral estoppel applies to such claim.

1994In affirming the trial court's dismissal of appellant's whistleblower claim, the majority relied on Hicks v. De La Cruz (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 71 , 74-75 , 6 O.O.3d 274 , 276-277, 369 N.E.2d 776 , 777-778 , concluding that the federal court's *Page 202 dismissal of the ERISA claim necessarily included the whistleblower claim and that collateral estoppel applies to such claim.