whistleblower claim in Minnesota

2010Id. at 202-203 . [4] Although the plurality does not reach the issue, Sybaritic also argues that an in-house attorney should be precluded from asserting a whistleblower claim based on the attorney's professional responsibilities.

2009Obst v. Microtron, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 196, 204 (Minn.2000) (concluding that a report that raised safety concerns about a windshield-wiper device did not allege illegal conduct necessary to support a whistleblower claim); Hedglin v. City of Willmar, 582 N.W.2d 897, 902 (Minn.1998) (concluding that a report alleging that firefighters were “showing up at fire calls while drunk” suggested reprehensible conduct but did not present a violation of a law such that the report would be protected); Nordling v. N. States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 504 (Minn.1991) (concluding that a report about behavior tha

2011Cf. Donahue v. Sehwegman, Lundberg, Woessner & Kluth, P.A., 586 N.W.2d 811, 816-17 (Minn.App.1998) (noting but not analyzing plaintiffs constructive discharge argument), review denied (Minn. Feb. 18, 1999), overruled on other grounds, Anderson-Johanningmeier v. Mid-Minnesota Women’s Ctr., Inc., 637 N.W.2d 270, 275-77 (Minn.2002).

2009Anderson-Johanningmeier v. Mid-Minnesota Women's Ctr., Inc., 637 N.W.2d 270, 273 (Minn.2002); see also 17 Stephen F. Befort, Minnesota Practice-Employment Law & Practice § 11.1 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing the employment-at-will doctrine).

2008The court referred to Grundtner's duties because, as the court explained in a parenthetical, a plaintiff does "not have a whistleblower claim when her stated purpose in reporting was to fulfill her responsibilities." Id. (citing Gee, 700 N.W.2d at 556 (affirming summary judgment where plaintiff made alleged report "not with the purpose of exposing an illegality, but to contradict" information provided by supervisor during decisionmaking process)).

2007See Gee, 700 N.W.2d at 556 (holding that the plaintiff did not have a whistleblower claim when her stated purpose in reporting was to fulfill her responsibilities as a faculty advisor).

2009Obst v. Microtron, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 196, 204 (Minn.2000) (concluding that a report that raised safety concerns about a windshield-wiper device did not allege illegal conduct necessary to support a whistleblower claim); Hedglin v. City of Willmar, 582 N.W.2d 897, 902 (Minn.1998) (concluding that a report alleging that firefighters were “showing up at fire calls while drunk” suggested reprehensible conduct but did not present a violation of a law such that the report would be protected); Nordling v. N. States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 504 (Minn.1991) (concluding that a report about behavior tha

2009Obst v. Microtron, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 196, 204 (Minn.2000) (concluding that a report that raised safety concerns about a windshield-wiper device did not allege illegal conduct necessary to support a whistleblower claim); Hedglin v. City of Willmar, 582 N.W.2d 897, 902 (Minn.1998) (concluding that a report alleging that firefighters were "showing up at fire calls while drunk" suggested reprehensible conduct but did not present a violation of a law such that the report would be protected); Nordling v. N. States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 504 (Minn.1991) (concluding that a report about behavior tha

2024Grp., Inc., 794 N.W.2d 652, 662 (Minn. App. 2011) (“Neither the supreme court nor this court has applied the constructive discharge doctrine to a whistleblower claim.”), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 19, 2011).

2016In the first, Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715 (Minn.App.1991), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 29, 1991), the court of appeals held that a former pastor could not bring a defamation claim and a whistleblower claim against the church that had terminated her based on statements that were made during the course of her termination. 7 Id. at 718, 720 .

2016In the first, Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715 (Minn.App.1991), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 29, 1991), the court of appeals held that a former pastor could not bring a defamation claim and a whistleblower claim against the church that had terminated her based on statements that were made during the course of her termination. 7 Id. at 718, 720 .

2011Cf. Donahue v. Sehwegman, Lundberg, Woessner & Kluth, P.A., 586 N.W.2d 811, 816-17 (Minn.App.1998) (noting but not analyzing plaintiffs constructive discharge argument), review denied (Minn. Feb. 18, 1999), overruled on other grounds, Anderson-Johanningmeier v. Mid-Minnesota Women’s Ctr., Inc., 637 N.W.2d 270, 275-77 (Minn.2002).

2009We then relied on Obst in our short analysis of this issue in Abraham v. County of Hennepin: A whistleblower claim need not identify the specific law or rule that the employee suspects has been violated, so long as there is a federal or state law or rule adopted pursuant to law that is implicated by the employee’s complaint, the employee reported the violation or suspected violation in good faith, and the employee alleges facts that, if proven, would constitute a violation of law or rule adopted pursuant to law. 639 N.W.2d 342 , 354-55 (Minn.2002) (emphasis added) (citing Obst, 614 N.W.2d at 2

2009Abraham v. County of Hennepin, 639 N.W.2d 342, 354-55 (Minn.2002) (“A whistleblower claim need not identify the specific law or rule that the employee suspects has been violated, so long as there is a federal or state law or rule adopted pursuant to law that is implicated by the employee’s complaint, the employee reported the violation or suspected violation in good faith, and the employee alleges facts that, if proven, would constitute a violation of law or rule adopted pursuant to law.”).

2009Obst v. Microtron, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 196, 204 (Minn.2000) (concluding that a report that raised safety concerns about a windshield-wiper device did not allege illegal conduct necessary to support a whistleblower claim); Hedglin v. City of Willmar, 582 N.W.2d 897, 902 (Minn.1998) (concluding that a report alleging that firefighters were “showing up at fire calls while drunk” suggested reprehensible conduct but did not present a violation of a law such that the report would be protected); Nordling v. N. States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 504 (Minn.1991) (concluding that a report about behavior tha

2009Our holding in Abraham, that the employee does not have to identify in the pleadings the law or rule suspected to have been violated to be protected by the whis-tleblower statute, as long as some law is implicated, goes against requiring such legal analysis from employees. 18 In Hedglin , we stated that the reported conduct must “implicate possible state law violations,” and we continued to use the term “implicated” in referring to the connection between a statute or rule and the whistleblower claim. 582 N.W.2d at 902 (emphasis added).

2007More importantly, a whistleblower claim ripens into a viable cause of action not when an employee suffers “some” damage in connection with her whistle-blowing activities, but when the employee suffers “adverse employment action” that effects a “material change in the terms or conditions of her employment.” Lee, 672 N.W.2d at 374 (quotation omitted).

1997State by Beaulieu v. Mounds View, 518 N.W.2d 567, 571 (Minn.1994) (official immunity available as defense to claim based on violation of Human Rights Act); Rico v. State, 472 N.W.2d 100 , 106 n. 3 (Minn.1991) (declining to decide if official immunity was a defense to a whistleblower claim when the cause of action arose before the statute was enacted).

1997State by Beaulieu v. Mounds View, 518 N.W.2d 567, 571 (Minn.1994) (official immunity available as defense to claim based on violation of Human Rights Act); Rico v. State, 472 N.W.2d 100 , 106 n. 3 (Minn.1991) (declining to decide if official immunity was a defense to a whistleblower claim when the cause of action arose before the statute was enacted).

1995Thompson, 845 F.Supp. at 674 (citing Hubbard v. United Press Int'l Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 444 (Minn.1983)).

1995Thompson, 845 F.Supp. at 674 (citing Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 444 (Minn. 1983)).

1995In Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref., an employer allegedly fired an employee for refusing to put leaded gas in a car equipped to receive only unleaded gas; the employee believed that doing so was unlawful. 396 N.W.2d 588, 589 (Minn.App.1986), aff'd, 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn.1987).