whistleblower claim in Texas

2025“Because immunity is waived only for viable claims, the elements of a whistleblower claim are jurisdictional facts necessary for determining whether the [plaintiff's] claim falls within the jurisdictional confines of section 554.0035.” Id. (citing City of Fort Worth v. Pridgen, 653 S.W.3d 176 , 181 (Tex. 2022); see also Lueck, 290 S.W.3d at 882 .

2024See Lueck, 290 S.W.3d at 885–86 (dismissing whistleblower claim with prejudice because plaintiff’s pleadings showed he could not establish the “report” element of a whistleblower claim and thus affirmatively negated jurisdiction).

2017See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 554.0035 (West 2012); City of Fort Worth v. Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d 62, 67 (Tex.2000); County of El Paso v. Latimer, 431 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.), • The elements of a whistleblower claim are “(1) that the plaintiff was a public employee, (2) that the defendant was a state agency or local government, (3) that the plaintiff reported in good faith a violation of law (4) to an appropriate law enforcement agency, and (5) that the plaintiffs report was the but-for cause of the defendant’s suspending, firing, or otherwise discriminating against the plaint

2017See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 554.0035 (West 2012); City of Fort Worth v. Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d 62, 67 (Tex.2000); County of El Paso v. Latimer, 431 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.), • The elements of a whistleblower claim are “(1) that the plaintiff was a public employee, (2) that the defendant was a state agency or local government, (3) that the plaintiff reported in good faith a violation of law (4) to an appropriate law enforcement agency, and (5) that the plaintiffs report was the but-for cause of the defendant’s suspending, firing, or otherwise discriminating against the plaint

2017However, there must be "some law prohibiting the complained-of conduct to give rise to a whistleblower claim." Id.

2014But there “must be some law prohibiting the complained of conduct to give rise to a Whistleblower claim.” Llanes, 64 S.W.3d at 642 .

2013See Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Needham, 82 S.W.3d 314, 321 (Tex. 2002).

2012See Needham, 82 S.W.3d at 320-21 (concluding that test for good-faith applicable to employee’s belief that making report to appropriate law-enforcement authority is same as belief that reporting violation of law).

2018See Clark, 544 S.W.3d at 785 (noting that “once a defendant challenges the plaintiff’s case with evidence, the jurisdictional inquiry focuses on the evidence and whether the plaintiff can create a fact issue”); Guillaume v. City of Greenville, 247 S.W.3d 457, 461 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2008, no pet.) (suggesting that a plaintiff must establish but-for causation to prove a whistleblower claim).

2017See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 554.0035 (West 2012); City of Fort Worth v. Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d 62, 67 (Tex.2000); County of El Paso v. Latimer, 431 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.), • The elements of a whistleblower claim are “(1) that the plaintiff was a public employee, (2) that the defendant was a state agency or local government, (3) that the plaintiff reported in good faith a violation of law (4) to an appropriate law enforcement agency, and (5) that the plaintiffs report was the but-for cause of the defendant’s suspending, firing, or otherwise discriminating against the plaint

2017See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 554.0035 (West 2012); City of Fort Worth v. Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d 62, 67 (Tex.2000); County of El Paso v. Latimer, 431 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.), • The elements of a whistleblower claim are “(1) that the plaintiff was a public employee, (2) that the defendant was a state agency or local government, (3) that the plaintiff reported in good faith a violation of law (4) to an appropriate law enforcement agency, and (5) that the plaintiffs report was the but-for cause of the defendant’s suspending, firing, or otherwise discriminating against the plaint

2016Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Hinds, 904 S.W.2d 629 , 633- 34 (Tex. 1995).

2015See Cnty. of Bexar v. Steward, 139 S.W.3d 354, 358 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, no pet.) (holding that, where the alleged discriminatory action was a demotion, a report that was made after the plaintiff received notice of that demotion failed to meet the causation element for a whistleblower claim); see also Canutillo Indep.

2008We recognize other courts have assumed the elements of a Whistleblower claim are a jurisdictional facts See Bexar County v. Lopez, 94 S.W.3d 711 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.); County of Bexar v. Steward, 139 S.W.3d 354 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet.); City of Waco v. Lopez, 183 S.W.3d 825 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005), rev’d on other grounds, 259 S.W.3d 147 (Tex., 2008).

2016The elements of a Whistleblower claim “are jurisdictional and may not be waived.” University of Houston v. Barth, 403 S.W.3d 851, 854 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam).

2016The elements of a Whistleblower claim “are jurisdictional and may not be waived.” University of Houston v. Barth, 403 S.W.3d 851, 854 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam).

2016See 2016 Tex. LEXIS 178, at *5 (agreeing with McMillen that “section 1396p(b) relates to the Commission’s program at issue in this case, which allegedly involved attempting to recover Medicaid payments from certain beneficiaries”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1); McElyea, 239 S.W.3d at 850 (requiring “some law prohibiting the complained-of conduct to give rise to a whistleblower claim”).

2016See id. § 554.002(a); McElyea, 239 S.W.3d at 849 (listing elements of Whistleblower claim).

2011See Parsons v. Dallas County, 197 S.W.3d 915, 919-20 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.) (holding that the notice provisions of the TTCA provide the exclusive notice requirements for suits thereunder and the plaintiff was thus not required to comply with the presentment requirement); Gregg County v. Farrar, 933 S.W.2d 769, 772-73 (Tex.App.-Austin 1996, pet. denied) (holding that presentment to the county is not required in a whistleblower claim because the administrative exhaustion requirements of the Whistleblower Act provide the requisite notice to the county); see also Upton v. Brown, 960 S.W.2

2011See Parsons v. Dallas County, 197 S.W.3d 915, 919-20 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (holding that the notice provisions of the TTCA provide the exclusive notice requirements for suits thereunder and the plaintiff was thus not required to comply with the presentment requirement); Gregg County v. Farrar, 4 933 S.W.2d 769, 772-73 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, pet. denied) (holding that presentment to the county is not required in a whistleblower claim because the administrative exhaustion requirements of the Whistleblower Act provide the requisite notice to the county); see also Upton v. Brown, 960 S

2014Considering these express terms, we conclude that, unlike Lawson’s agreement that settled his Whistleblower claim, the PUA does not settle or dispose of any claim for which the City’s immunity was waived. 4 See Lawson, 87 S.W.3d at 522-23 .

2014Thus, Appellees’ breach of contract cause of action does not inherit the taking claim’s waiver of immunity. 5 See id. *514 Because the City’s immunity to Appel-lees’ breach of contract cause of action was not waived under Lawson , the trial court was required to grant the City’s plea absent some other waiver of the City’s immunity.

2008See Barfield, 898 S.W.2d at 298 (“This election-of- remedies provision . . . persuades us, in the end, that the Legislature must have intended to waive political subdivisions’ immunity for liability imposed by the Anti-Retaliation Law [in labor code chapter 451].”).

2008See Barfield , 898 S.W.2d at 298 ("This election-of-remedies provision . . . persuades us, in the end, that the Legislature must have intended to waive political subdivisions' immunity for liability imposed by the Anti-Retaliation Law [in labor code chapter 451].").

2005Id. § 554.002; Duvall v. Texas Dep’t of Human Servs., 82 S.W.3d 474, 478 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.).

2005Id . § 554.002; Duvall v. Texas Dep't of Human Servs. , 82 S.W.3d 474, 478 (Tex. App.--Austin 2002, no pet.).

2017Recognizing that Ramirez's burden of proof at this stage does not involve a significant inquiry into the substance of his Whistleblower claim, see Lueck, 290 S.W.3d at 884 , we conclude that Ramirez has presented evidence that he reported a violation of law in good faith. 6 See Hart, 917 S.W.2d at 784 .

2005“Good faith” has been interpreted to mean that “(1) the employee believed that the conduct reported was a violation of the law and (2) the employee’s belief was reasonable in light of the employee’s training and experience.” Wichita County v. Hart, 917 S.W.2d 779, 784 (Tex.1996).

2011See Parsons v. Dallas County, 197 S.W.3d 915, 919-20 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.) (holding that the notice provisions of the TTCA provide the exclusive notice requirements for suits thereunder and the plaintiff was thus not required to comply with the presentment requirement); Gregg County v. Farrar, 933 S.W.2d 769, 772-73 (Tex.App.-Austin 1996, pet. denied) (holding that presentment to the county is not required in a whistleblower claim because the administrative exhaustion requirements of the Whistleblower Act provide the requisite notice to the county); see also Upton v. Brown, 960 S.W.2

2011See Parsons v. Dallas County, 197 S.W.3d 915, 919-20 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (holding that the notice provisions of the TTCA provide the exclusive notice requirements for suits thereunder and the plaintiff was thus not required to comply with the presentment requirement); Gregg County v. Farrar, 4 933 S.W.2d 769, 772-73 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, pet. denied) (holding that presentment to the county is not required in a whistleblower claim because the administrative exhaustion requirements of the Whistleblower Act provide the requisite notice to the county); see also Upton v. Brown, 960 S

2011See Parsons v. Dallas County, 197 S.W.3d 915, 919-20 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.) (holding that the notice provisions of the TTCA provide the exclusive notice requirements for suits thereunder and the plaintiff was thus not required to comply with the presentment requirement); Gregg County v. Farrar, 933 S.W.2d 769, 772-73 (Tex.App.-Austin 1996, pet. denied) (holding that presentment to the county is not required in a whistleblower claim because the administrative exhaustion requirements of the Whistleblower Act provide the requisite notice to the county); see also Upton v. Brown, 960 S.W.2

2011See Parsons v. Dallas County, 197 S.W.3d 915, 919-20 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (holding that the notice provisions of the TTCA provide the exclusive notice requirements for suits thereunder and the plaintiff was thus not required to comply with the presentment requirement); Gregg County v. Farrar, 4 933 S.W.2d 769, 772-73 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, pet. denied) (holding that presentment to the county is not required in a whistleblower claim because the administrative exhaustion requirements of the Whistleblower Act provide the requisite notice to the county); see also Upton v. Brown, 960 S

2011See Parsons v. Dallas County, 197 S.W.3d 915, 919-20 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.) (holding that the notice provisions of the TTCA provide the exclusive notice requirements for suits thereunder and the plaintiff was thus not required to comply with the presentment requirement); Gregg County v. Farrar, 933 S.W.2d 769, 772-73 (Tex.App.-Austin 1996, pet. denied) (holding that presentment to the county is not required in a whistleblower claim because the administrative exhaustion requirements of the Whistleblower Act provide the requisite notice to the county); see also Upton v. Brown, 960 S.W.2

2011See Parsons v. Dallas County, 197 S.W.3d 915, 919-20 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (holding that the notice provisions of the TTCA provide the exclusive notice requirements for suits thereunder and the plaintiff was thus not required to comply with the presentment requirement); Gregg County v. Farrar, 4 933 S.W.2d 769, 772-73 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, pet. denied) (holding that presentment to the county is not required in a whistleblower claim because the administrative exhaustion requirements of the Whistleblower Act provide the requisite notice to the county); see also Upton v. Brown, 960 S

2010On the same day, the supreme court, in a per curiam opinion, reversed this Court’s opinion in Okoli , explaining that, under Lueck , whether Okoli made “a good faith report of a violation of law to an appropriate law enforcement authority is a jurisdictional question.” Tex. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. v. Okoli , 295 S.W.3d 667, 668 (Tex. 2009).

2010On the same day, the supreme court, in a per curiam opinion, reversed this Court’s opinion in Okoli, explaining that, under Lueck, whether Okoli made “a good faith report of a violation of law to an appropriate law enforcement authority is a jurisdictional question.” Tex. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. v. Okoli 295 S.W.3d 667, 668 (Tex.2009).

2008See Schindley v. Northeast Tex. Cmty. Coll., 13 S.W.3d 62, 67 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, pet. denied); Villarreal v. Williams, 971 S.W.2d 622, 626 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.).

2008See Schindley v. Northeast Tex. Cmty. Coll., 13 S.W.3d 62, 67 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000, pet. denied); Villarreal v. Williams, 971 S.W.2d 622, 626 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.).

2008We recognize other courts have assumed the elements of a Whistleblower claim are a jurisdictional facts See Bexar County v. Lopez, 94 S.W.3d 711 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.); County of Bexar v. Steward, 139 S.W.3d 354 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet.); City of Waco v. Lopez, 183 S.W.3d 825 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005), rev’d on other grounds, 259 S.W.3d 147 (Tex., 2008).

2008We recognize other courts have assumed the elements of a Whistleblower claim are a jurisdictional facts See Bexar County v. Lopez, 94 S.W.3d 711 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.); County of Bexar v. Steward, 139 S.W.3d 354 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet.); City of Waco v. Lopez, 183 S.W.3d 825 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005), rev’d on other grounds, 259 S.W.3d 147 (Tex., 2008).

2020Whistleblower Claim To establish liability on a whistleblower claim, the public employee must prove the governmental entity retaliated against him because he, in good faith, reported a violation of law by either the employer or another public employee to an appropriate law enforcement official, someone the employee reasonably believed 23 See Clark, 544 S.W.3d at 770 ; Andrade v. NAACP of Austin, 345 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. 2011); City of Beaumont v. Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d 143, 147-150 (Tex. 1995). 24 Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 554.0035. 25 Id. 11 possessed the authority needed to investigate his complai

2007See Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Needham, 82 S.W.3d 314 (Tex.2002); City of Beaumont v. Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d 143 (Tex.1995).

2008The courts of appeals that have directly addressed this issue have held otherwise. 1 See Tex. Dep’t of Transportation v. Garda, 243 S.W.3d 759 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christie 2007, pet. filed); Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Okoli, 01-07-00103-CV, 2007 WL 1844897 , 263 S.W.3d 275 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] June 28, 2007, pet. filed); State v. Lueck, 212 S.W.3d 630 (Tex.App.-Austin 2006, pet. granted).

2008The courts of appeals that have directly addressed this issue have held otherwise. [1] See Tex. Dep't of Transportation v. Garcia, 243 S.W.3d 759 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christie 2007, pet. filed); Tex. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Okoli, 01-07-00103-CV, 2007 WL 1844897 , ___ S.W.3d ___, ___ (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] June 28, 2007, pet. filed); State v. Lueck, 212 S.W.3d 630 (Tex.App.-Austin 2006, pet. granted).

2025A plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that a violation of the TWA has occurred are not sufficient to defeat a plea to the jurisdiction, because “[a]llowing a plaintiff’s pleadings to stand on bare allegations, alone, without allowing the State to challenge plaintiff’s compliance with [an] immunity statute, would practically eliminate the use of pleas to the jurisdiction, which [courts] have already approved as the proper ‘procedural vehicle to challenge subject matter jurisdiction in trial courts for over a century and a half.’” Lueck, -7- 290 S.W.3d at 884 (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 232 ).

2011State v. Lueck, 290 S.W.3d 876, 883 (Tex. 2009) (holding that the elements of a whistleblower claim are jurisdictional facts); Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225, 227 (Tex. 2004) (holding that "if a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we consider relevant evidence submitted by the parties when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised").

2020Whistleblower Claim To establish liability on a whistleblower claim, the public employee must prove the governmental entity retaliated against him because he, in good faith, reported a violation of law by either the employer or another public employee to an appropriate law enforcement official, someone the employee reasonably believed 23 See Clark, 544 S.W.3d at 770 ; Andrade v. NAACP of Austin, 345 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. 2011); City of Beaumont v. Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d 143, 147-150 (Tex. 1995). 24 Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 554.0035. 25 Id. 11 possessed the authority needed to investigate his complai

2018See Clark, 544 S.W.3d at 785 (noting that “once a defendant challenges the plaintiff’s case with evidence, the jurisdictional inquiry focuses on the evidence and whether the plaintiff can create a fact issue”); Guillaume v. City of Greenville, 247 S.W.3d 457, 461 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2008, no pet.) (suggesting that a plaintiff must establish but-for causation to prove a whistleblower claim).

2010Robinson , 216 S.W.3d at 43–44.

2010Id. at 40 .