whistleblower claim in California

2017A whistleblower claim pursuant to Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (b), precludes an employer from retaliating against an employee *363 for disclosing information that may evidence improper government activity, if the purpose of the disclosure was to remedy the improper situation. ( Fahlen v. Sutter Central Valley Hospitals (2014) 58 Cal.4th 655 , 670, 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 165 , 318 P.3d 833 .) "[T]he anti-SLAPP statute was not intended to allow an employer to use a protected activity as the means to discriminate or retaliate and thereafter capitalize on the subterfuge by bringing an anti-SLA

2017A whistleblower claim pursuant to Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (b), precludes an employer from retaliating against an employee *363 for disclosing information that may evidence improper government activity, if the purpose of the disclosure was to remedy the improper situation. ( Fahlen v. Sutter Central Valley Hospitals (2014) 58 Cal.4th 655 , 670, 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 165 , 318 P.3d 833 .) "[T]he anti-SLAPP statute was not intended to allow an employer to use a protected activity as the means to discriminate or retaliate and thereafter capitalize on the subterfuge by bringing an anti-SLA

2022Joseph Health System (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 851, 861 , a decision issued by the Fourth District Court of Appeal a couple months before our October 6, 2017 opinion, which concluded the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to a surgeon’s cause of action for retaliation against a whistleblower in violation of Health and Safety Code section 1278.5 because the claim “arises from defendants’ retaliatory purpose or motive, and not from how that purpose is carried out, even if by speech or petitioning activity” in connection with peer review proceedings.

2022Joseph Health System (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 851, 861 , a decision issued by the Fourth District Court of Appeal a couple months before our October 6, 2017 opinion, which concluded the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to a surgeon’s cause of action for retaliation against a whistleblower in violation of Health and Safety Code section 1278.5 because the claim “arises from defendants’ retaliatory purpose or motive, and not from how that purpose is carried out, even if by speech or petitioning activity” in connection with peer review proceedings.

2017For reasons of public policy, actions against a public entity for claims of discharge from or termination of employment grounded on a whistleblower claim are not barred by governmental immunity. ( Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 726 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 665 .) 3.

2017For reasons of public policy, actions against a public entity for claims of discharge from or termination of employment grounded on a whistleblower claim are not barred by governmental immunity. ( Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 726 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 665 .) 3.

2017A whistleblower claim pursuant to Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (b), precludes an employer from retaliating against an employee *363 for disclosing information that may evidence improper government activity, if the purpose of the disclosure was to remedy the improper situation. ( Fahlen v. Sutter Central Valley Hospitals (2014) 58 Cal.4th 655 , 670, 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 165 , 318 P.3d 833 .) "[T]he anti-SLAPP statute was not intended to allow an employer to use a protected activity as the means to discriminate or retaliate and thereafter capitalize on the subterfuge by bringing an anti-SLA

2017A whistleblower claim pursuant to Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (b), precludes an employer from retaliating against an employee *363 for disclosing information that may evidence improper government activity, if the purpose of the disclosure was to remedy the improper situation. ( Fahlen v. Sutter Central Valley Hospitals (2014) 58 Cal.4th 655 , 670, 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 165 , 318 P.3d 833 .) "[T]he anti-SLAPP statute was not intended to allow an employer to use a protected activity as the means to discriminate or retaliate and thereafter capitalize on the subterfuge by bringing an anti-SLA

2017A whistleblower claim pursuant to Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (b), precludes an employer from retaliating against an employee *363 for disclosing information that may evidence improper government activity, if the purpose of the disclosure was to remedy the improper situation. ( Fahlen v. Sutter Central Valley Hospitals (2014) 58 Cal.4th 655 , 670, 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 165 , 318 P.3d 833 .) "[T]he anti-SLAPP statute was not intended to allow an employer to use a protected activity as the means to discriminate or retaliate and thereafter capitalize on the subterfuge by bringing an anti-SLA

2017A whistleblower claim pursuant to Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (b), precludes an employer from retaliating against an employee *363 for disclosing information that may evidence improper government activity, if the purpose of the disclosure was to remedy the improper situation. ( Fahlen v. Sutter Central Valley Hospitals (2014) 58 Cal.4th 655 , 670, 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 165 , 318 P.3d 833 .) "[T]he anti-SLAPP statute was not intended to allow an employer to use a protected activity as the means to discriminate or retaliate and thereafter capitalize on the subterfuge by bringing an anti-SLA

2016The appellate court upheld the trial court’s refusal to grant the anti-SLAPP motion as regards the section 1278.5 action, 11 in the process expressly disagreeing with Nesson v. Northern Inyo County Local Hospital Dist. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 65 [ 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 446 ] (Nesson), to the degree that Nesson required a successful civil action in administrative mandate before a physician could bring a whistleblower claim under section 1278.5.

2016The appellate court upheld the trial court’s refusal to grant the anti-SLAPP motion as regards the section 1278.5 action, 11 in the process expressly disagreeing with Nesson v. Northern Inyo County Local Hospital Dist. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 65 [ 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 446 ] (Nesson), to the degree that Nesson required a successful civil action in administrative mandate before a physician could bring a whistleblower claim under section 1278.5.

2026Both cases are materially different because neither involved a protected disclosure under the “health or safety” prong of the CWPA. (§ 8547.2, subd. (e)(1)(B).) In Patten, a junior high school principal brought a whistleblower claim under Labor Code section 1102.5, which prohibits retaliation against an employee for disclosing information to a government or law enforcement agency “ ‘where the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of state or federal statute, or violation or noncompliance with a state or federal regulation.’ ” (Patten, supra, 134 Ca

2022(See Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 703, 709 [Labor Code “Section 1102.5 provides whistleblower protections to employees who disclose wrongdoing to authorities”].) the proposed action, the reasons therefor, a copy of the charges and materials upon which the action is based, and the right to respond, either orally or in writing, to the authority initially imposing discipline.’ [Citation.] The Supreme Court’s directive gave rise to an administrative procedure known as a Skelly hearing, in which an employee has the opportunity to respond to the charges upon which the

2022(Le Mere v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 237 , 246–247.) Robinson argues he substantially complied with the Government Claim Act.

2021In Fahlen, the Supreme Court held a physician may pursue an action under section 1278.5 to challenge an allegedly retaliatory hospital decision restricting or terminating the physician’s staff privileges without first seeking and obtaining a mandamus petition to overturn the hospital’s decision. ( Fahlen, supra, at p. 687 .) In Armin, the court extended Fahlen and concluded a physician may pursue an action under section 1278.5 while the allegedly retaliatory peer review proceedings that are the basis for the physician’s whistleblower claim are still pending. ( Armin, supra, at p. 828 .) The tr

2018For purposes of res judicata, a cause of action is "the right to obtain redress for a harm suffered, regardless of the specific remedy sought or the legal theory (common law or statutory) advanced." ( Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 788 , 798, 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 806 , 230 P.3d 342 .) One injury gives rise to a single claim for relief even if liability might be predicated on several legal theories. ( Ibid. ) "Thus, under the primary rights theory, the determinative factor is the harm suffered.

2018For purposes of res judicata, a cause of action is "the right to obtain redress for a harm suffered, regardless of the specific remedy sought or the legal theory (common law or statutory) advanced." ( Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 788 , 798, 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 806 , 230 P.3d 342 .) One injury gives rise to a single claim for relief even if liability might be predicated on several legal theories. ( Ibid. ) "Thus, under the primary rights theory, the determinative factor is the harm suffered.

2018In State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners v. Superior Court ( Arbuckle ) (2009) 45 Cal.4th 963 , 89 Cal.Rptr.3d 576 , 201 P.3d 457 the California Supreme Court concluded the Legislature intended that an administrative finding not be given preclusive effect in a subsequent civil lawsuit involving a whistleblower claim alleged by a state agency employee under the California Whistleblower Protection Act, Government Code sections 8547 through 8547.11.

2018In State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners v. Superior Court ( Arbuckle ) (2009) 45 Cal.4th 963 , 89 Cal.Rptr.3d 576 , 201 P.3d 457 the California Supreme Court concluded the Legislature intended that an administrative finding not be given preclusive effect in a subsequent civil lawsuit involving a whistleblower claim alleged by a state agency employee under the California Whistleblower Protection Act, Government Code sections 8547 through 8547.11.

2017A whistleblower claim pursuant to Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (b), precludes an employer from retaliating against an employee *363 for disclosing information that may evidence improper government activity, if the purpose of the disclosure was to remedy the improper situation. ( Fahlen v. Sutter Central Valley Hospitals (2014) 58 Cal.4th 655 , 670, 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 165 , 318 P.3d 833 .) "[T]he anti-SLAPP statute was not intended to allow an employer to use a protected activity as the means to discriminate or retaliate and thereafter capitalize on the subterfuge by bringing an anti-SLA

2017A whistleblower claim pursuant to Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (b), precludes an employer from retaliating against an employee *363 for disclosing information that may evidence improper government activity, if the purpose of the disclosure was to remedy the improper situation. ( Fahlen v. Sutter Central Valley Hospitals (2014) 58 Cal.4th 655 , 670, 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 165 , 318 P.3d 833 .) "[T]he anti-SLAPP statute was not intended to allow an employer to use a protected activity as the means to discriminate or retaliate and thereafter capitalize on the subterfuge by bringing an anti-SLA

2012(Id. at p. 1541.) “Based on CDCR’s act of continuing the investigation after his retirement, [the plaintiff] filed a complaint alleging that CDCR took retaliatory action against him as a whistleblower in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5.” (Ibid.) He-alleged that other CDCR employees had created a “ ‘web of lies.’ ” (Ibid.) The appellate court concluded, among other things, that “the objected-to statements and writings, i.e., the allegedly false reports of criminal activity, were made in connection with an issue under consideration by an authorized official proceeding and thus constitute[

2012(Id. at p. 1541.) “Based on CDCR’s act of continuing the investigation after his retirement, [the plaintiff] filed a complaint alleging that CDCR took retaliatory action against him as a whistleblower in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5.” (Ibid.) He-alleged that other CDCR employees had created a “ ‘web of lies.’ ” (Ibid.) The appellate court concluded, among other things, that “the objected-to statements and writings, i.e., the allegedly false reports of criminal activity, were made in connection with an issue under consideration by an authorized official proceeding and thus constitute[

2007(See Williams v. Housing Authority of Los Angeles (2004) 121 Cal. App.4th 708, 729-731 , 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 374 [as to non-FEHA-related claims, normal exhaustion rules apply].) Instead, as we have explained, where an employee receives an unfavorable administrative decision, "We serve judicial economy by giving collateral estoppel effect" to that decision, which "requires employees challenging administrative findings to do so in the appropriate forum, by filing a writ of administrative mandamus petition in superior court." ( Schifando, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1090 , 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 457 , 79 P.3d 569

2007(See Williams v. Housing Authority of Los Angeles (2004) 121 Cal. App.4th 708, 729-731 , 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 374 [as to non-FEHA-related claims, normal exhaustion rules apply].) Instead, as we have explained, where an employee receives an unfavorable administrative decision, "We serve judicial economy by giving collateral estoppel effect" to that decision, which "requires employees challenging administrative findings to do so in the appropriate forum, by filing a writ of administrative mandamus petition in superior court." ( Schifando, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1090 , 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 457 , 79 P.3d 569

2007(See Williams v. Housing Authority of Los Angeles (2004) 121 Cal. App.4th 708, 729-731 , 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 374 [as to non-FEHA-related claims, normal exhaustion rules apply].) Instead, as we have explained, where an employee receives an unfavorable administrative decision, "We serve judicial economy by giving collateral estoppel effect" to that decision, which "requires employees challenging administrative findings to do so in the appropriate forum, by filing a writ of administrative mandamus petition in superior court." ( Schifando, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1090 , 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 457 , 79 P.3d 569

2007(See Williams v. Housing Authority of Los Angeles (2004) 121 Cal. App.4th 708, 729-731 , 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 374 [as to non-FEHA-related claims, normal exhaustion rules apply].) Instead, as we have explained, where an employee receives an unfavorable administrative decision, "We serve judicial economy by giving collateral estoppel effect" to that decision, which "requires employees challenging administrative findings to do so in the appropriate forum, by filing a writ of administrative mandamus petition in superior court." ( Schifando, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1090 , 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 457 , 79 P.3d 569

2007Murray concluded then-recent amendments to FEHA applied retrospectively to the claims and for that reason strict compliance with the Tort Claims Act was unnecessary, as FEHA contains its own time limitations which Murray's tort claim met. ( Id. at pp. 1358-1361, 95 Cal. Rptr.2d 28 .) Murray does not support Arbuckle's assertion that filing a tort claim exhausts administrative remedies for a non-FEHA claim, particularly a whistleblower claim.

2007(See Williams v. Housing Authority of Los Angeles (2004) 121 Cal. App.4th 708, 729-731 , 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 374 [as to non-FEHA-related claims, normal exhaustion rules apply].) Instead, as we have explained, where an employee receives an unfavorable administrative decision, "We serve judicial economy by giving collateral estoppel effect" to that decision, which "requires employees challenging administrative findings to do so in the appropriate forum, by filing a writ of administrative mandamus petition in superior court." ( Schifando, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1090 , 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 457 , 79 P.3d 569

2007(See Williams v. Housing Authority of Los Angeles (2004) 121 Cal. App.4th 708, 729-731 , 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 374 [as to non-FEHA-related claims, normal exhaustion rules apply].) Instead, as we have explained, where an employee receives an unfavorable administrative decision, "We serve judicial economy by giving collateral estoppel effect" to that decision, which "requires employees challenging administrative findings to do so in the appropriate forum, by filing a writ of administrative mandamus petition in superior court." ( Schifando, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1090 , 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 457 , 79 P.3d 569

2005The Regents’ separate statement of undisputed facts also asserted other facts, e.g., that plaintiff’s separation was confirmed in a Shelly hearing (Shelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 539 P.2d 774 ] (Shelly)), that plaintiff had reemployment rights for one year after separation, that in 2000 plaintiff expressed interest in a job that was never created, that plaintiff was disabled in 2000 from a 1999 car accident in Florida, that plaintiff lied on the resume he submitted to get the job at the Clinic.

2005The Regents’ separate statement of undisputed facts also asserted other facts, e.g., that plaintiff’s separation was confirmed in a Shelly hearing (Shelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 539 P.2d 774 ] (Shelly)), that plaintiff had reemployment rights for one year after separation, that in 2000 plaintiff expressed interest in a job that was never created, that plaintiff was disabled in 2000 from a 1999 car accident in Florida, that plaintiff lied on the resume he submitted to get the job at the Clinic.

2005(Shoemaker, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 1423 .) We noted that the coverage of the immunity statute and the whistleblower statute conflicted, where, as in Shoemaker , “public employees [and their employers] [were] accused of using official authority to ‘discourage, restrain, interfere with, coerce and discriminate against’ [a whistleblowing] public employee by means of a judicial or administrative proceeding.” ( 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 1423 .) Since the whistleblower statute was narrower in purpose and scope than the immunity statute, the whistleblower statute prevailed where the two conflicted. ( 2

2005(Shoemaker, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 1423 .) We noted that the coverage of the immunity statute and the whistleblower statute conflicted, where, as in Shoemaker , “public employees [and their employers] [were] accused of using official authority to ‘discourage, restrain, interfere with, coerce and discriminate against’ [a whistleblowing] public employee by means of a judicial or administrative proceeding.” ( 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 1423 .) Since the whistleblower statute was narrower in purpose and scope than the immunity statute, the whistleblower statute prevailed where the two conflicted. ( 2