promulgation rule in Oregon

2025Cite as 342 Or App 391 (2025) 395 notice and hearing that it finds practicable, if the agency prepares: “(a) A statement of its findings that its failure to act promptly will result in serious prejudice to the public inter- est or the interest of the parties concerned and the specific reasons for its findings of prejudice; “(b) A citation of the statutory or other legal authority relied upon and bearing upon the promulgation of the rule; “(c) A statement of the need for the rule and a state- ment of how the rule is intended to meet the need; “(d) A list of the principal documents, reports or s

2025Cite as 342 Or App 391 (2025) 395 “(5) Notwithstanding subsections (1) to (4) of this sec- tion [regarding notice and comment procedures for perma- nent rules], an agency may adopt, amend or suspend a rule without prior notice or hearing or upon any abbreviated notice and hearing that it finds practicable, if the agency prepares: “(a) A statement of its findings that its failure to act promptly will result in serious prejudice to the public inter- est or the interest of the parties concerned and the specific reasons for its findings of prejudice; “(b) A citation of the statutory or other legal

1959It was sufficient to initiate that adverse possession which, if persisted in for ten years continuously, ripens into title in fee simple in the adverse claimant, under such precedents as Caufield v. Clark, 17 Or. 473 ( 21 Pac. 443 , 11 Am.

1959It was sufficient to initiate that adverse possession which, if persisted in for ten years continuously, ripens into title in fee simple in the adverse claimant, under such precedents as Caufield v. Clark, 17 Or. 473 ( 21 Pac. 443 , 11 Am.

2022Because any change in law resulting from the promulgation of that rule is not substantive but procedural,1 to prevail petitioner must “demonstrate—through something other than speculation— that the change in law created a risk that petitioner’s term of incarceration would be extended beyond what it otherwise would have been.” Morrison v. Board of Parole, 277 Or App 861, 866 , 374 P3d 948 , rev den, 360 Or 465 (2016). 1 Although no statute or rule appears to have specifically authorized the board to permit persons with a substantial interest in a parole proceeding to make a statement at an exit

2022Because any change in law resulting from the promulgation of that rule is not substantive but procedural,1 to prevail petitioner must “demonstrate—through something other than speculation— that the change in law created a risk that petitioner’s term of incarceration would be extended beyond what it otherwise would have been.” Morrison v. Board of Parole, 277 Or App 861, 866 , 374 P3d 948 , rev den, 360 Or 465 (2016). 1 Although no statute or rule appears to have specifically authorized the board to permit persons with a substantial interest in a parole proceeding to make a statement at an exit

2020In light of that uncertainty, “certificate holders have questions and significant concerns regarding how the Council will proceed with pending requests for amendment, and ODOE “(a) A statement of its findings that its failure to act promptly will result in serious prejudice to the public interest or the interest of the parties con- cerned and the specific reasons for its findings of prejudice; “(b) A citation of the statutory or other legal authority relied upon and bearing upon the promulgation of the rule; “(c) A statement of the need for the rule and a statement of how the rule is intended

1988DLCD is correct in contending that the rule expresses an understanding of ORS 215.283(1)(f) which differs significantly from our interpretation of it. 3 It is not clear to us whether DLCD argues only that the rule is interpretive and that we should give it appropriate weight in construing the statute, see Knapp v. City of North Bend, 304 Or 34, 41 , 741 P2d 505 (1987), or whether DLCD also maintains that the promulgation of the rule was an exercise of LCDC’s legislatively-delegated policymaking authority and binds us if it “is within the range of [agency] discretion allowed by the more general

1988DLCD is correct in contending that the rule expresses an understanding of ORS 215.283(1)(f) which differs significantly from our interpretation of it. 3 It is not clear to us whether DLCD argues only that the rule is interpretive and that we should give it appropriate weight in construing the statute, see Knapp v. City of North Bend, 304 Or 34, 41 , 741 P2d 505 (1987), or whether DLCD also maintains that the promulgation of the rule was an exercise of LCDC’s legislatively-delegated policymaking authority and binds us if it “is within the range of [agency] discretion allowed by the more general

1988DLCD is correct in contending that the rule expresses an understanding of ORS 215.283(1)(f) which differs significantly from our interpretation of it. 3 It is not clear to us whether DLCD argues only that the rule is interpretive and that we should give it appropriate weight in construing the statute, see Knapp v. City of North Bend, 304 Or 34, 41 , 741 P2d 505 (1987), or whether DLCD also maintains that the promulgation of the rule was an exercise of LCDC’s legislatively-delegated policymaking authority and binds us if it “is within the range of [agency] discretion allowed by the more general

1988DLCD is correct in contending that the rule expresses an understanding of ORS 215.283(1)(f) which differs significantly from our interpretation of it. 3 It is not clear to us whether DLCD argues only that the rule is interpretive and that we should give it appropriate weight in construing the statute, see Knapp v. City of North Bend, 304 Or 34, 41 , 741 P2d 505 (1987), or whether DLCD also maintains that the promulgation of the rule was an exercise of LCDC’s legislatively-delegated policymaking authority and binds us if it “is within the range of [agency] discretion allowed by the more general

1987Defendant also relies on our decision in Carney v. Guard Publishing Co., 48 Or App 147 , 616 P2d 548 , modified 48 Or App 927 , 630 P2d 867 , rev den 290 Or 171 (1980), as support for its interpretation of “available.” The language it points to in Carney is, in its context, of no assistance to defendant.

1987Defendant also relies on our decision in Carney v. Guard Publishing Co., 48 Or App 147 , 616 P2d 548 , modified 48 Or App 927 , 630 P2d 867 , rev den 290 Or 171 (1980), as support for its interpretation of “available.” The language it points to in Carney is, in its context, of no assistance to defendant.

1987Defendant also relies on our decision in Carney v. Guard Publishing Co., 48 Or App 147 , 616 P2d 548 , modified 48 Or App 927 , 630 P2d 867 , rev den 290 Or 171 (1980), as support for its interpretation of “available.” The language it points to in Carney is, in its context, of no assistance to defendant.

1987Defendant also relies on our decision in Carney v. Guard Publishing Co., 48 Or App 147 , 616 P2d 548 , modified 48 Or App 927 , 630 P2d 867 , rev den 290 Or 171 (1980), as support for its interpretation of “available.” The language it points to in Carney is, in its context, of no assistance to defendant.

1980Burke v. Children’s Services Division, 26 Or App 145 , 552 P2d 592 (1976).

1980Burke v. Children’s Services Division, 26 Or App 145 , 552 P2d 592 (1976).

1966Reversed and remanded. ① In Linkletter v. Walker, supra, 381 US 618 , 85 S Ct 1731 , 14 L Ed2d 601, the Supreme Court said: “It is true that heretofore, without discussion, we have applied new constitutional rules to cases finalized before the promulgation of the rule.” 14 L Ed2d at 608.

1966Reversed and remanded. ① In Linkletter v. Walker, supra, 381 US 618 , 85 S Ct 1731 , 14 L Ed2d 601, the Supreme Court said: “It is true that heretofore, without discussion, we have applied new constitutional rules to cases finalized before the promulgation of the rule.” 14 L Ed2d at 608.