promulgation rule in Texas

1983In Industrial Foundation of the South v. Texas Industrial Accident Board, 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976), the Supreme Court of Texas said that, while a rule enacted by a public body may have the force and effect of statute in other contexts, a governmental agency is not permitted to bring its records within the ambit of the exception of section 3(a)(1) merely by the promulgation of a rule.

1983In Industrial Foundation of the South v. Texas Industrial Accident Board, 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976), the Supreme Court of Texas said that, while a rule enacted by a public body may have the force p. 516 Honorable Stan Schlueter - Page 3 (JM-122) and effect of statute in other contexts, a governmental agency is not permitted to bring its records within the ambit of the exception of section 3(a)(l) merely by the promulgation of a rule.

1990Samples, 762 S.W.2d at 753 .

1986Bullock v. Hewlett-Packard, 628 S.W.2d 754 (Tex.1982).

1937Thus the case is brought clearly within the rule announced . by the Supreme Court in the case of Magnolia Petroleum Co. et al., Relators, v. New Process Production Co. et al., Respondents, supra, as follows: “It cannot be said that to allow the Railroad Commission to exercise original jurisdiction to pass on the question of changed conditions, where applications for well permits have been refused as the result of court judgments, would be to allow the commission to pass on and nullify the judgments of courts, because, as already shown, such judgments only adjudicate such matters up to the time

1933(No. 7996) 68 S.W.2d 625 , and Lon A. Smith et al. v. Maurice Stewart (No. 8069) 68 S.W.2d 627 , which were submitted and regarded as companion cases to the instant case, the majority view holding in effect that, since the parties acquired the respective small tracts of land involved in these suits subsequent to the promulgation of rule 37 in 1919, they would never be entitled to drill any well or wells on either of the tracts of land.

1933(No. 7996) 68 S.W.2d 625 , and Lon A. Smith et al. v. Maurice Stewart (No. 8069) 68 S.W.2d 627 , which were submitted and regarded as companion cases to the instant case, the majority view holding in effect that, since the parties acquired the respective small tracts of land involved in these suits subsequent to the promulgation of rule 37 in 1919, they would never be entitled to drill any well or wells on either of the tracts of land.

1931In Golden v. Odiorne, 112 Tex. 547 , 548 , 249 S.W. 822 , 823 , Judge McClendon, for the Commission, said: "The evident purpose of rule 62a was to prevent the reversal of trial court judgments for technical and unsubstantial errors, and to cast the burden of showing prejudice upon the party complaining of the erroneous ruling, so far, at least, as it was within his power to do so. * * * Under the doctrine of harmless error, our courts have always declined to disturb a ruling or judgment of the trial court, athough palpably erroneous, where it appeared that no injury resulted to the complaining

1931In Golden v. Odiorne, 112 Tex. 547, 548 , 249 S. W. 822, 823 , Judge Mc-Clendon, for the Commission, said: “The evident purpose of rule 62a was to prevent the reversal of trial court judgments for technical and unsubstantial errors, and to cast the burden of showing prejudice upon the party complaining of the erroneous 'ruling, so far, at least, as it was within his power to do so. * * * Under the doctrine of harmless error, our courts have always declined to disturb a ruling or judgment of the trial court, athough palpably erroneous, where it appeared that no injury resulted to the complainin

1931Rule 62a provides, among other things, that "no judgment shall be reversed on appeal and a new trial ordered in any cause on the ground that the trial court has committed an error of law in the course of the trial, unless the appellate court shall be of opinion that the error complained of amounted to such a denial of the rights of the parties as was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment in the case. * * * " In Wells Fargo Co. v. Benjamin, 165 S.W. 120 , 127 , Judge Hodges, speaking for the Texarkana court, said: "But we take it that the pr

1931Rule 62a provides, among other things, that “no judgment shall be reversed on appeal and a new trial ordered in any cause on the ground that the trial court has committed an error of law in the course of the trial, unless the appellate court shall be of opinion that the error complained of amounted to such a denial of the rights of the parties as was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment in the case. * * * ” In Wells Fargo & Co. v. Benjamin, 165 S. W. 120, 127 , Judge Hodges, speaking for the Texarkana court, said: “But we take it that the

1923The authorities cited by appellant applicable to this point were decided prior to the promulgation of rule 62a, supra, and they are as follows: Simpson v. Thompson, 43 Tex. Civ.

1923The authorities cited by appellant applicable to this point were decided prior to the promulgation of rule 62a, supra, and they are as follows: Simpson v. Thompson, 43 Tex. Civ.

1923App. 273 , 95 S.W. 94 ; and Riensch v. Naylon, 51 Tex. Civ.

1923App. 273 , 95 S. W. 94 ; and Riensch v. Naylon, 51 Tex. Civ.

1922App.) 166 S. W. 460 ; Scott v. Townsend (Tex. Civ.

1913Before the promulgation of this rule, it was held in a number of cases that “an erroneous charge, which manifestly from the record could have worked no injury, and did not affect the rights of the parties, was no ground for reversal.” Salinas v. Wright, 11 Tex. 572 ; Garter v. Eames, 44 Tex. 544 ; Loper v. Robinson, 54 Tex. 510 .

1913Before the promulgation of this rule, it was held in a number of cases that “an erroneous charge, which manifestly from the record could have worked no injury, and did not affect the rights of the parties, was no ground for reversal.” Salinas v. Wright, 11 Tex. 572 ; Garter v. Eames, 44 Tex. 544 ; Loper v. Robinson, 54 Tex. 510 .

1913Before the promulgation of this rule, it was held in a number of cases that “an erroneous charge, which manifestly from the record could have worked no injury, and did not affect the rights of the parties, was no ground for reversal.” Salinas v. Wright, 11 Tex. 572 ; Garter v. Eames, 44 Tex. 544 ; Loper v. Robinson, 54 Tex. 510 .