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10 Pennsylvania opinions name it 5 courts 1973–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kincy v. Petrogreen1 sentence2014See also id. at 498 (Saylor, J., concurring) (“A looser approach permitting automatic, retroactive consolidation of counts to encompass unstated cross-claims is untenable, since the potential for disorder, confusion, and surprise is simply too great.”). | 1 | 1 |
Wexler v. Hechtgreen2 sentences2010See, e.g., Laudenberger v. Port Auth. of Allegheny County, 496 Pa. 52, 66-67 , 436 A.2d 147, 155 (1981) (treating the promulgation of a rule awarding monetary damages for delay in civil cases as procedural rulemaking); Commonwealth v. Morris, 565 Pa. 1, 30 , 771 A.2d 721, 738 (2001) (holding that a stay of a capital prisoner's execution is "substantive"). [15] In the face of such decisions, one jurist has commented that "[t]he demarcation between laws bearing on substantive rights and those that are `purely procedural' is notoriously vexing and has fostered disagreement amongst generations of 2010See, e.g., Laudenberger v. Port Auth. of Allegheny County, 496 Pa. 52, 66-67 , 436 A.2d 147, 155 (1981) (treating the promulgation of a rule awarding monetary damages for delay in civil cases as procedural rulemaking); Commonwealth v. Morris, 565 Pa. 1, 30 , 771 A.2d 721, 738 (2001) (holding that a stay of a capital prisoner’s execution is “substantive”). 15 In the face of such decisions, one jurist has commented that “[t]he demarcation between laws bearing on substantive rights and those that are ‘purely procedural’ is notoriously vexing and has fostered disagreement amongst generations of ju | 1 | 1 |
Laudenberger v. Port Auth. of Alleghenygreen2 sentences2010See, e.g., Laudenberger v. Port Auth. of Allegheny County, 496 Pa. 52, 66-67 , 436 A.2d 147, 155 (1981) (treating the promulgation of a rule awarding monetary damages for delay in civil cases as procedural rulemaking); Commonwealth v. Morris, 565 Pa. 1, 30 , 771 A.2d 721, 738 (2001) (holding that a stay of a capital prisoner's execution is "substantive"). [15] In the face of such decisions, one jurist has commented that "[t]he demarcation between laws bearing on substantive rights and those that are `purely procedural' is notoriously vexing and has fostered disagreement amongst generations of 2010See, e.g., Laudenberger v. Port Auth. of Allegheny County, 496 Pa. 52, 66-67 , 436 A.2d 147, 155 (1981) (treating the promulgation of a rule awarding monetary damages for delay in civil cases as procedural rulemaking); Commonwealth v. Morris, 565 Pa. 1, 30 , 771 A.2d 721, 738 (2001) (holding that a stay of a capital prisoner's execution is "substantive"). [15] In the face of such decisions, one jurist has commented that "[t]he demarcation between laws bearing on substantive rights and those that are `purely procedural' is notoriously vexing and has fostered disagreement amongst generations of | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Morrisgreen2 sentences2010See, e.g., Laudenberger v. Port Auth. of Allegheny County, 496 Pa. 52, 66-67 , 436 A.2d 147, 155 (1981) (treating the promulgation of a rule awarding monetary damages for delay in civil cases as procedural rulemaking); Commonwealth v. Morris, 565 Pa. 1, 30 , 771 A.2d 721, 738 (2001) (holding that a stay of a capital prisoner's execution is "substantive"). [15] In the face of such decisions, one jurist has commented that "[t]he demarcation between laws bearing on substantive rights and those that are `purely procedural' is notoriously vexing and has fostered disagreement amongst generations of 2010See, e.g., Laudenberger v. Port Auth. of Allegheny County, 496 Pa. 52, 66-67 , 436 A.2d 147, 155 (1981) (treating the promulgation of a rule awarding monetary damages for delay in civil cases as procedural rulemaking); Commonwealth v. Morris, 565 Pa. 1, 30 , 771 A.2d 721, 738 (2001) (holding that a stay of a capital prisoner's execution is "substantive"). [15] In the face of such decisions, one jurist has commented that "[t]he demarcation between laws bearing on substantive rights and those that are `purely procedural' is notoriously vexing and has fostered disagreement amongst generations of | 1 | 1 |
Reichert v. TRW, INC.green2 sentences1993We cannot conclude that our Supreme Court intended such a result. 3 In ascertaining the intention of our Supreme Court in the promulgation of a rule, we are guided by Pa.R.C.P. 128, 42 Pa.C.S., which provides in relevant part: (a) That the Supreme Court does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable; ... (c) That the Supreme Court does not intend to violate the Constitution of the United States or of this Commonwealth; See also, Reichert v. TRW, Inc. Cutting Tools Division, 385 Pa.Super. 416, 428 , 561 A.2d 745, 752 (1989), alloc. granted, 525 Pa. 664 , 583 A. 1993We cannot conclude that our Supreme Court intended such a result. 3 In ascertaining the intention of our Supreme Court in the promulgation of a rule, we are guided by Pa.R.C.P. 128, 42 Pa.C.S., which provides in relevant part: (a) That the Supreme Court does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable; ... (c) That the Supreme Court does not intend to violate the Constitution of the United States or of this Commonwealth; See also, Reichert v. TRW, Inc. Cutting Tools Division, 385 Pa.Super. 416, 428 , 561 A.2d 745, 752 (1989), alloc. granted, 525 Pa. 664 , 583 A. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cutlip v. Shugars
green
1 sentence2006As such, the rule clearly directs that the court take into consideration both monthly income and the delineated monthly obligations in making a determination of IFP status. ¶ 15 Moreover, Pa.R.C.P. 128(b) provides that in ascertaining the intention of our Supreme Court in the promulgation of a rule of court, the courts of this Commonwealth are guided, inter alia, by the presumption “[t]hat the Supreme Court intends the entire rule ... to be effective and certain.” Cutlip v. Shugars, 815 A.2d 1060 (Pa.Super.2003). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Openbrier v. General Mills, Inc.
green
2 sentences2003In support of her position, plaintiff cited Openbrier v. General Mills Inc., 340 Pa. 167 , 16 A.2d 379 (1940), in which the Supreme Court affirmed a decision permitting a defendant to be sued in Washington County. 2003In support of her position, plaintiff cited Openbrier v. General Mills Inc., 340 Pa. 167 , 16 A.2d 379 (1940), in which the Supreme Court affirmed a decision permitting a defendant to be sued in Washington County. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Commonwealth v. Finley
green
2 sentences1988Consequently, though I am inclined to agree with Judge Wieand that the promulgation of a rule for future cases is unnecessary to the disposition of this case and beyond the function of this Court, in response to the suggestion of the majority regarding Turner's implications for future cases, I note that I would definitely not construe Turner to require that a Finley letter contain an explanation of "why petitioner's issues were meritless." NOTES [1] Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 , 107 S.Ct. 1990 , 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987). [2] Commonwealth v. Finley, 330 Pa.Super. 313 , 479 A.2d 568 (1984) 1988Consequently, though I am inclined to agree with Judge Wieand that the promulgation of a rule for future cases is unnecessary to the disposition of this case and beyond the function of this Court, in response to the suggestion of the majority regarding Turner's implications for future cases, I note that I would definitely not construe Turner to require that a Finley letter contain an explanation of "why petitioner's issues were meritless." NOTES [1] Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 , 107 S.Ct. 1990 , 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987). [2] Commonwealth v. Finley, 330 Pa.Super. 313 , 479 A.2d 568 (1984) | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Pennsylvania v. Finley
green
2 sentences1988Consequently, though I am inclined to agree with Judge Wieand that the promulgation of a rule for future cases is unnecessary to the disposition of this case and beyond the function of this Court, in response to the suggestion of the majority regarding Turner's implications for future cases, I note that I would definitely not construe Turner to require that a Finley letter contain an explanation of "why petitioner's issues were meritless." NOTES [1] Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 , 107 S.Ct. 1990 , 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987). [2] Commonwealth v. Finley, 330 Pa.Super. 313 , 479 A.2d 568 (1984) 1988Consequently, though I am inclined to agree with Judge Wieand that the promulgation of a rule for future cases is unnecessary to the disposition of this case and beyond the function of this Court, in response to the suggestion of the majority regarding Turner's implications for future cases, I note that I would definitely not construe Turner to require that a Finley letter contain an explanation of "why petitioner's issues were meritless." NOTES [1] Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 , 107 S.Ct. 1990 , 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987). [2] Commonwealth v. Finley, 330 Pa.Super. 313 , 479 A.2d 568 (1984) | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Hacker v. Pennsylvania Horse Racing Commission
green
2 sentences1983In Hacker v. Pennsylvania Horse Racing Commission, 46 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 263 , 405 A.2d 1379 (1979), we said that the purpose of the Commission’s promulgation of the rule prohibiting the presence of any foreign substance was to eliminate any of the prohibited drugs in order to ensure the integrity of the race and the confidence of the public in the fairness of races. 1983In Hacker v. Pennsylvania Horse Racing Commission, 46 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 263 , 405 A.2d 1379 (1979), we said that the purpose of the Commission’s promulgation of the rule prohibiting the presence of any foreign substance was to eliminate any of the prohibited drugs in order to ensure the integrity of the race and the confidence of the public in the fairness of races. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Wolf v. Colorado
red
2 sentences1977Retroactivity has generated a large body of judicial and scholarly debate. 27 The first major United States *189 Supreme Court case to confront the issue was Linkletter v. Walker, supra. In Linkletter , the Court declined to apply Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed. 2d 1081 (1961), 28 to state convictions which had become final 29 prior to the overruling of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 , 69 S.Ct. 1359 , 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949). 30 Linkletter was the first case in which a majority of the Supreme Court recognized its power to give constitutional rules prospective operation: 31 “It 1977Retroactivity has generated a large body of judicial and scholarly debate. 27 The first major United States *189 Supreme Court case to confront the issue was Linkletter v. Walker, supra. In Linkletter , the Court declined to apply Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed. 2d 1081 (1961), 28 to state convictions which had become final 29 prior to the overruling of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 , 69 S.Ct. 1359 , 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949). 30 Linkletter was the first case in which a majority of the Supreme Court recognized its power to give constitutional rules prospective operation: 31 “It | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Linkletter v. Walker
red
2 sentences1977Retroactivity has generated a large body of judicial and scholarly debate. 27 The first major United States *189 Supreme Court case to confront the issue was Linkletter v. Walker, supra. In Linkletter , the Court declined to apply Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed. 2d 1081 (1961), 28 to state convictions which had become final 29 prior to the overruling of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 , 69 S.Ct. 1359 , 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949). 30 Linkletter was the first case in which a majority of the Supreme Court recognized its power to give constitutional rules prospective operation: 31 “It 1977Retroactivity has generated a large body of judicial and scholarly debate. 27 The first major United States *189 Supreme Court case to confront the issue was Linkletter v. Walker, supra. In Linkletter , the Court declined to apply Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed. 2d 1081 (1961), 28 to state convictions which had become final 29 prior to the overruling of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 , 69 S.Ct. 1359 , 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949). 30 Linkletter was the first case in which a majority of the Supreme Court recognized its power to give constitutional rules prospective operation: 31 “It | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Mapp v. Ohio
green
2 sentences1977Retroactivity has generated a large body of judicial and scholarly debate. 27 The first major United States *189 Supreme Court case to confront the issue was Linkletter v. Walker, supra. In Linkletter , the Court declined to apply Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed. 2d 1081 (1961), 28 to state convictions which had become final 29 prior to the overruling of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 , 69 S.Ct. 1359 , 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949). 30 Linkletter was the first case in which a majority of the Supreme Court recognized its power to give constitutional rules prospective operation: 31 “It 1977Retroactivity has generated a large body of judicial and scholarly debate. 27 The first major United States *189 Supreme Court case to confront the issue was Linkletter v. Walker, supra. In Linkletter , the Court declined to apply Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed. 2d 1081 (1961), 28 to state convictions which had become final 29 prior to the overruling of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 , 69 S.Ct. 1359 , 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949). 30 Linkletter was the first case in which a majority of the Supreme Court recognized its power to give constitutional rules prospective operation: 31 “It | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Boddie v. Connecticut
green
2 sentences1975Since the promulgation of the rule under the mandate of Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 , 91 S.Ct. 780 , 28 L.Ed 2d 113 (1971), we have been deciding the issue of eligibility on a case by case basis after notice to the county and to the defendant. 1975Since the promulgation of the rule under the mandate of Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 , 91 S.Ct. 780 , 28 L.Ed 2d 113 (1971), we have been deciding the issue of eligibility on a case by case basis after notice to the county and to the defendant. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Laughner v. Allegheny County
green
2 sentences1973I there advanced the view that this unsatisfactory rule, developed as it was by the common law, was a fit subject for abrogation by judicial action: ". . . the judiciary's traditional responsibility for adapting and improving the doctrines of the common law, particularly in the area of torts, coupled with its original role in the promulgation of the immunity rule, indicate that the judiciary is a natural and proper agent of change in the present case, unless there are countervailing considerations of such strength as to demonstrate the unwisdom of such a conclusion." Id. at 582 . 1973I there advanced the view that this unsatisfactory rule, developed as it was by the common law, was a fit subject for abrogation by judicial action: “. . . the judiciary’s traditional responsibility for adapting and improving the doctrines of the common law, particularly in the area of torts, coupled with its original role in the promulgation of the immunity rule, indicate that the judiciary is a natural and proper agent of change in the present case, unless there are countervailing considerations of such strength as to demonstrate the unwisdom of such a conclusion.” Id. at 582 . | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.