State argues that any error in Oregon

2025“Evidential error is not presumed to be prejudicial.” OEC 103(1).4 “Article VII (Amended), section 3, [of the Oregon Constitution] requires an appellate court to affirm a conviction, notwithstanding any evidentiary error, if there is little likelihood that the error affected the ver- dict.” State v. Gibson, 338 Or 560, 576 , 113 P3d 423 (2005) (citing State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 33 , 77 P3d 1111 (2003)). “[A] decision to exclude evidence relevant to bias or inter- est[,] which is [in] error, is reversible if it denies the jury an adequate opportunity to assess the credibility of a witness whose

2025“Evidential error is not presumed to be prejudicial.” OEC 103(1).4 “Article VII (Amended), section 3, [of the Oregon Constitution] requires an appellate court to affirm a conviction, notwithstanding any evidentiary error, if there is little likelihood that the error affected the ver- dict.” State v. Gibson, 338 Or 560, 576 , 113 P3d 423 (2005) (citing State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 33 , 77 P3d 1111 (2003)). “[A] decision to exclude evidence relevant to bias or inter- est[,] which is [in] error, is reversible if it denies the jury an adequate opportunity to assess the credibility of a witness whose

2025“Evidential error is not presumed to be prejudicial.” OEC 103(1).4 “Article VII (Amended), section 3, [of the Oregon Constitution] requires an appellate court to affirm a conviction, notwithstanding any evidentiary error, if there is little likelihood that the error affected the ver- dict.” State v. Gibson, 338 Or 560, 576 , 113 P3d 423 (2005) (citing State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 33 , 77 P3d 1111 (2003)). “[A] decision to exclude evidence relevant to bias or inter- est[,] which is [in] error, is reversible if it denies the jury an adequate opportunity to assess the credibility of a witness whose

2025“Evidential error is not presumed to be prejudicial.” OEC 103(1).4 “Article VII (Amended), section 3, [of the Oregon Constitution] requires an appellate court to affirm a conviction, notwithstanding any evidentiary error, if there is little likelihood that the error affected the ver- dict.” State v. Gibson, 338 Or 560, 576 , 113 P3d 423 (2005) (citing State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 33 , 77 P3d 1111 (2003)). “[A] decision to exclude evidence relevant to bias or inter- est[,] which is [in] error, is reversible if it denies the jury an adequate opportunity to assess the credibility of a witness whose

2025“Evidential error is not presumed to be prejudicial.” OEC 103(1).4 “Article VII (Amended), section 3, [of the Oregon Constitution] requires an appellate court to affirm a conviction, notwithstanding any evidentiary error, if there is little likelihood that the error affected the ver- dict.” State v. Gibson, 338 Or 560, 576 , 113 P3d 423 (2005) (citing State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 33 , 77 P3d 1111 (2003)). “[A] decision to exclude evidence relevant to bias or inter- est[,] which is [in] error, is reversible if it denies the jury an adequate opportunity to assess the credibility of a witness whose

2025“Evidential error is not presumed to be prejudicial.” OEC 103(1).4 “Article VII (Amended), section 3, [of the Oregon Constitution] requires an appellate court to affirm a conviction, notwithstanding any evidentiary error, if there is little likelihood that the error affected the ver- dict.” State v. Gibson, 338 Or 560, 576 , 113 P3d 423 (2005) (citing State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 33 , 77 P3d 1111 (2003)). “[A] decision to exclude evidence relevant to bias or inter- est[,] which is [in] error, is reversible if it denies the jury an adequate opportunity to assess the credibility of a witness whose

2023When determining whether the lack of a concurrence instruction was harmless, this court views the lack of an instruction “in the context of the evidence and record at trial, including the parties’ theories of the case with respect to the various charges and defenses at issue.” State v. Ashkins, 357 Or 642, 660 , 357 P3d 490 (2015).

2023When determining whether the lack of a concurrence instruction was harmless, this court views the lack of an instruction “in the context of the evidence and record at trial, including the parties’ theories of the case with respect to the various charges and defenses at issue.” State v. Ashkins, 357 Or 642, 660 , 357 P3d 490 (2015).

2022To find that an error is plain “does not imply any mis- take by a trial court.” State v. Zavala, 361 Or 377 , 380 n 1, 393 P3d 230 (2017).

2022To find that an error is plain “does not imply any mis- take by a trial court.” State v. Zavala, 361 Or 377 , 380 n 1, 393 P3d 230 (2017).

2021“Good cause” appears several times in the Oregon Revised Statutes, but does not have a “precise, all- encompassing definition.” State v. Storkus, 308 Or App 257, 264 , 479 P3d 320 (2020) (citations omitted) (discussing the term in the context of a defendant’s statutory right to a speedy trial).

2021“Good cause” appears several times in the Oregon Revised Statutes, but does not have a “precise, all- encompassing definition.” State v. Storkus, 308 Or App 257, 264 , 479 P3d 320 (2020) (citations omitted) (discussing the term in the context of a defendant’s statutory right to a speedy trial).

2020The state argues that any error was harm- less, at least with respect to the substance abuse evaluation fee, because it is a mandatory fee, and the victim impact panel fee, because defendant had already been ordered to attend a victim impact panel in a different case. 1 “The right to be present at sentencing has both statutory and consti- tutional sources.” State v. Jacobs, 200 Or App 665, 671 , 117 P3d 290 (2005) (identifying the statutory source as ORS 137.030 and the constitutional sources as Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United State

2020The state argues that any error was harm- less, at least with respect to the substance abuse evaluation fee, because it is a mandatory fee, and the victim impact panel fee, because defendant had already been ordered to attend a victim impact panel in a different case. 1 “The right to be present at sentencing has both statutory and consti- tutional sources.” State v. Jacobs, 200 Or App 665, 671 , 117 P3d 290 (2005) (identifying the statutory source as ORS 137.030 and the constitutional sources as Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United State

2015Even assuming that defendant was required to preserve the assigned error, we agree with him that the trial court’s remarks amounted to plain legal error in the light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Webb v. Texas, 409 US 95, 98 , 93 S Ct 351 , 34 L Ed 2d 330 (1972), that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a trial court from administering overly coercive warnings regarding the risks of testifying falsely. 2 State v. Brown, 310 Or 347, 355-56 , 800 P2d 259 (1990) (setting out the requirements for error apparent on the record).

2015Even assuming that defendant was required to preserve the assigned error, we agree with him that the trial court’s remarks amounted to plain legal error in the light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Webb v. Texas, 409 US 95, 98 , 93 S Ct 351 , 34 L Ed 2d 330 (1972), that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a trial court from administering overly coercive warnings regarding the risks of testifying falsely. 2 State v. Brown, 310 Or 347, 355-56 , 800 P2d 259 (1990) (setting out the requirements for error apparent on the record).

2015Even assuming that defendant was required to preserve the assigned error, we agree with him that the trial court’s remarks amounted to plain legal error in the light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Webb v. Texas, 409 US 95, 98 , 93 S Ct 351 , 34 L Ed 2d 330 (1972), that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a trial court from administering overly coercive warnings regarding the risks of testifying falsely. 2 State v. Brown, 310 Or 347, 355-56 , 800 P2d 259 (1990) (setting out the requirements for error apparent on the record).

2015Even assuming that defendant was required to preserve the assigned error, we agree with him that the trial court’s remarks amounted to plain legal error in the light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Webb v. Texas, 409 US 95, 98 , 93 S Ct 351 , 34 L Ed 2d 330 (1972), that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a trial court from administering overly coercive warnings regarding the risks of testifying falsely. 2 State v. Brown, 310 Or 347, 355-56 , 800 P2d 259 (1990) (setting out the requirements for error apparent on the record).

2015We note that the state argues that any error is not plain error because it is possible that a “defendant might not want such an instruction depending on his defense theory,” such as when a concurrence instruction “might serve to focus the jury’s attention on discrete factual occurrences that a defendant does not want emphasized.” Although the state frames that argument as relevant to whether any error was “obvious,” we understand the state’s argument to be placed more properly within the framework applied by the Supreme Court in State v. Gornick, 340 Or 160 , 130 P3d 780 (2006).

2015We note that the state argues that any error is not plain error because it is possible that a “defendant might not want such an instruction depending on his defense theory,” such as when a concurrence instruction “might serve to focus the jury’s attention on discrete factual occurrences that a defendant does not want emphasized.” Although the state frames that argument as relevant to whether any error was “obvious,” we understand the state’s argument to be placed more properly within the framework applied by the Supreme Court in State v. Gornick, 340 Or 160 , 130 P3d 780 (2006).

2013For its first argument, the state relies on State v. Washington, 273 Or 829, 836 , 543 P2d 1058 (1975), where the court held that a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense is proper where “the jury could rationally find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense and innocent of the greater.” The state contends that “that rule suggests that the requested instruction must bear some rational relationship to a theory presented by one of the parties to the case.” We disagree.

2013For its first argument, the state relies on State v. Washington, 273 Or 829, 836 , 543 P2d 1058 (1975), where the court held that a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense is proper where “the jury could rationally find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense and innocent of the greater.” The state contends that “that rule suggests that the requested instruction must bear some rational relationship to a theory presented by one of the parties to the case.” We disagree.

2013We have rejected similar arguments on multiple occasions, most recently in State v. Zolotoff, 253 Or App 593 , 291 P3d 781 (2012), and we reject it again, here, for the same reasons.

2013We have rejected similar arguments on multiple occasions, most recently in State v. Zolotoff, 253 Or App 593 , 291 P3d 781 (2012), and we reject it again, here, for the same reasons.