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22 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Sledgegreen2 sentences2002Citing State v. Sledge, 36 S.W.3d 152,156 (Tex.App.--Houston [1 st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied), the State argues that any waiver of sovereign immunity resulting from condemnation suit would not support a counterclaim for pre-judgment interest. 2002Citing State v. Sledge, 36 S.W.3d 152,156 (Tex.App.--Houston [1 st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied), the State argues that any waiver of sovereign immunity resulting from condemnation suit would not support a counterclaim for pre-judgment interest. | 4 | 4 |
Fesal v. Hutchinson Countygreen2 sentences2002Further, in Fesal v. Hutchinson County, 443 S.W.2d 937, 939 (Tex.Civ.App.--Amarillo 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e), we held that the county did not waive sovereign immunity from tort liability by filing its suit on a sworn account for services rendered a patient by the County Hospital. 2002Further, in Fesal v. Hutchinson County, 443 S.W.2d 937, 939 (Tex.Civ.App.--Amarillo 1969, writ ref’d n.r.e), we held that the county did not waive sovereign immunity from tort liability by filing its suit on a sworn account for services rendered a patient by the County Hospital. | 4 | 4 |
Cathey v. Stategreen2 sentences2007The State argues that any error in charging on the law of parties was “necessarily” harmless because the evidence “clearly supported a finding that appellant was responsible for the complainant’s murder as a primary actor.” See Cathey v. State, 992 S.W.2d 460, 466 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (“Even where proper objection is made at trial, we have held that where, as in the instant case, the evidence clearly supports a defendant’s guilt as the primary actor, error in charging on the law of parties was harmless.”); see also West v. State, Nos. 03-05-00206-CR, 03-05-00207-CR & 03-05-00208-CR, 2006 WL 244 2007The State argues that any error in charging on the law of parties was A necessarily @ harmless because the evidence A clearly supported a finding that appellant was responsible for the complainant = s murder as a primary actor. @ See Cathey v. State , 992 S.W.2d 460, 466 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Dominguez v. Stategreen2 sentences2006See Dominguez v. State, 62 S.W.3d 203, 208 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2000, pet. ref'd) (holding severance error was harmless because evidence of each crime would be admissible in a separate trial of the other offense as same transaction contextual evidence). 2006See Dominguez v. State, 62 S.W.3d 203, 208 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2000, pet. ref d) (holding severance error was harmless because evidence of each crime would be admissible in a separate trial of the other offense as same transaction contextual evidence). | 2 | 2 |
Mock v. Stategreen2 sentences1997Lindley v. State, 635 S.W.2d 541, 544 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1982); Mock v. State, 848 S.W.2d 215, 222 (Tex. App.El Paso 1992, pet. ref'd). 1997Lindley v. State, 635 S.W.2d 541, 544 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1982); Mock v. State, 848 S.W.2d 215, 222 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1992, pet. ref'd). | 2 | 2 |
Lindley v. Stategreen2 sentences1997Lindley v. State, 635 S.W.2d 541, 544 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1982); Mock v. State, 848 S.W.2d 215, 222 (Tex. App.El Paso 1992, pet. ref'd). 1997Lindley v. State, 635 S.W.2d 541, 544 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1982); Mock v. State, 848 S.W.2d 215, 222 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1992, pet. ref'd). | 2 | 2 |
Michigan v. Paynegreen2 sentences2015We need not [does] not clearly favor either retroactivity or prospectivity." /d. at 251, 89 S. Ct. at 1035; see Michigan decide whether a collateral estoppel claim is susceptible to harmless error analysis, for we find that v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47 , 55, 93 S. Ct. 1966 , 36 L. 2015We need not [does] not clearly favor either retroactivity or prospectivity." /d. at 251, 89 S. Ct. at 1035; see Michigan decide whether a collateral estoppel claim is susceptible to harmless error analysis, for we find that v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47 , 55, 93 S. Ct. 1966 , 36 L. | 1 | 1 |
Vennus v. Stategreen1 sentence2014The State does not dispute that Allen failed to satisfy the statutory qualifications for expert testimony for such determinations but the State responds to Owens’ complaint regarding this fact by arguing that (1) any error regarding Allen’s qualifications to testify is invited error, (2) when all the circumstances are taken into consideration, admitting Allen’s testimony was not error, and (3) there was other evidence of competence before the jury. 2 A. Invited Error The State argues that any error regarding Allen’s testimony was invited error because the trial court found that the order appoi | 1 | 1 |
Druery v. Stategreen1 sentence2014The State does not dispute that Allen failed to satisfy the statutory qualifications for expert testimony for such determinations but the State responds to Owens’ complaint regarding this fact by arguing that (1) any error regarding Allen’s qualifications to testify is invited error, (2) when all the circumstances are taken into consideration, admitting Allen’s testimony was not error, and (3) there was other evidence of competence before the jury. 2 A. Invited Error The State argues that any error regarding Allen’s testimony was invited error because the trial court found that the order appoi | 1 | 1 |
Ferrel v. Stategreen1 sentence2004"A defendant is entitled to an instruction on self-defense if the issue is raised by the evidence, whether that evidence is strong or weak, unimpeached or contradicted, and regardless of what the trial court may think about the credibility of the defense." Ferrel v. State , 55 S.W.3d 586, 591 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Stategreen1 sentence2003Assuming that article 44.46(1) applies and a harm analysis under Rule 44.2(b) is required, questions we do not decide, for the reasons explained below, we conclude that it is likely the error had "some adverse effect on the proceedings." Johnson v. State, 43 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex.Cr.App. 2001) (en banc). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Grovesgreen1 sentence1994State v. Groves, 837 S.W.2d 103, 105-106 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Arrington, Charles
green
2 sentences2015Arrington, 451 S.W.3d at 835–37. 2015Arrington, 451 S.W.3d at 835-37 . | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Almanza v. State
green
2 sentences2010We review claims of jury charge error under the two-pronged test set out in Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. 2010We review claims of jury charge error under the two-pronged test set out in Almanza v. State , 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Salazar v. State
green
1 sentence2014While Juror Ramirez said that he could be impartial, this is only one factor because a juror who claims “that the fact that he withheld information will not affect his verdict is not dispositive of the issue where the information is material and therefore likely to affect the juror’s verdict.” Franklin II, 138 S.W.3d at 354–55 (quoting Salazar, 562 S.W.2d at 482 ). 15 In other cases where a juror failed to disclose a relationship to a witness or a party, such error was found to be harmless where the defense affirmatively waived the opportunity to question the juror once the withheld informatio | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Franklin v. State
green
1 sentence2014While Juror Ramirez said that he could be impartial, this is only one factor because a juror who claims “that the fact that he withheld information will not affect his verdict is not dispositive of the issue where the information is material and therefore likely to affect the juror’s verdict.” Franklin II, 138 S.W.3d at 354–55 (quoting Salazar, 562 S.W.2d at 482 ). 15 In other cases where a juror failed to disclose a relationship to a witness or a party, such error was found to be harmless where the defense affirmatively waived the opportunity to question the juror once the withheld informatio | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2010Custodial Interrogation “Custodial interrogation” means “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 , 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 2010Custodial Interrogation “Custodial interrogation” means “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 , 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Davis v. Alaska
green
2 sentences1983The State overlooks the fact that the denial of the right of effective cross-examination in this case is “constitutional error of the first magnitude and no amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure it.” Davis v. Alaska, supra, 415 U.S. at 318 , 94 S.Ct. at 1111 . 1983The State overlooks the fact that the denial of the right of effective cross-examination in this case is “constitutional error of the first magnitude and no amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure it.” Davis v. Alaska, supra, 415 U.S. at 318 , 94 S.Ct. at 1111 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.