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27 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2026 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
The People v. Leflergreen2 sentences2013See People v. Scott, 148 Ill. 2d 479, 546-47 (1992) (citing People v. Lefler, 38 Ill. 2d 216, 221 (1967)) (whether a photograph of the deceased should be admitted falls within a trial court's discretion). ¶ 97 Defendant first argues the video was irrelevant. 2013See People v. Scott, 148 Ill. 2d 479, 546-47 (1992) (whether a photograph of the deceased should be admitted falls within a trial court’s discretion (citing People v. Lefler, 38 Ill. 2d 216, 221 (1967))). ¶ 97 Defendant first argues the video was irrelevant. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Scottgreen2 sentences2013See People v. Scott, 148 Ill. 2d 479, 546-47 (1992) (citing People v. Lefler, 38 Ill. 2d 216, 221 (1967)) (whether a photograph of the deceased should be admitted falls within a trial court's discretion). ¶ 97 Defendant first argues the video was irrelevant. 2013See People v. Scott, 148 Ill. 2d 479, 546-47 (1992) (whether a photograph of the deceased should be admitted falls within a trial court’s discretion (citing People v. Lefler, 38 Ill. 2d 216, 221 (1967))). ¶ 97 Defendant first argues the video was irrelevant. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Hallgreen1 sentence2026Here, the State argues that any error resulting from the improper admission of evidence was harmless because the evidence “was so overwhelming that no fair-minded jury could have voted for acquittal.” ¶ 62 “The erroneous admission of other-crimes evidence requires reversal ‘only if the evidence was “a material factor in the defendant’s conviction such that, without the evidence, the verdict likely would have been different.” ’ ” People v. Kendrick, 2023 IL App (3d) 200127, ¶ 24 (quoting People v. Adkins, 239 Ill. 2d 1, 23 (2010), quoting People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 339 (2000)). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Rolandis G.green1 sentence2026In determining the nature of an error, the court may “(1) focus on the error to determine whether it might have contributed to the conviction; (2) examine the other properly admitted evidence to determine whether it overwhelmingly supports the conviction; or (3) determine whether the improperly admitted evidence is merely cumulative or duplicates properly admitted evidence.” In re Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d 13, 43 (2008). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jacksongreen1 sentence2026However, the law is clear that where “the record is devoid of information indicating the nature of defendant’s allegations,” “we cannot determine whether that error was harmless.” People v. Jackson, 243 Ill. App. 3d 1026, 1037 (1993); see Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 81 (explaining that when the record is insufficient, “it is simply not possible to conclude that the trial court’s failure to conduct an inquiry into those allegations was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Mooregreen1 sentence2026However, the law is clear that where “the record is devoid of information indicating the nature of defendant’s allegations,” “we cannot determine whether that error was harmless.” People v. Jackson, 243 Ill. App. 3d 1026, 1037 (1993); see Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 81 (explaining that when the record is insufficient, “it is simply not possible to conclude that the trial court’s failure to conduct an inquiry into those allegations was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Kendrickgreen1 sentence2026Here, the State argues that any error resulting from the improper admission of evidence was harmless because the evidence “was so overwhelming that no fair-minded jury could have voted for acquittal.” ¶ 62 “The erroneous admission of other-crimes evidence requires reversal ‘only if the evidence was “a material factor in the defendant’s conviction such that, without the evidence, the verdict likely would have been different.” ’ ” People v. Kendrick, 2023 IL App (3d) 200127, ¶ 24 (quoting People v. Adkins, 239 Ill. 2d 1, 23 (2010), quoting People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 339 (2000)). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Adkinsgreen1 sentence2026Here, the State argues that any error resulting from the improper admission of evidence was harmless because the evidence “was so overwhelming that no fair-minded jury could have voted for acquittal.” ¶ 62 “The erroneous admission of other-crimes evidence requires reversal ‘only if the evidence was “a material factor in the defendant’s conviction such that, without the evidence, the verdict likely would have been different.” ’ ” People v. Kendrick, 2023 IL App (3d) 200127, ¶ 24 (quoting People v. Adkins, 239 Ill. 2d 1, 23 (2010), quoting People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 339 (2000)). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Nealgreen1 sentence2025This finding is also in accordance with this court’s decision in People v. Neal, 2020 IL App (4th) 170869, ¶¶ 172, 174 , where we accepted the State’s concession of error in instructing potential jurors using the preamendment language, “ ‘failure to testify.’ ”; but see Beacham v. Walker, 231 Ill. 2d 51, 60 (2008) (stating a reviewing court is not bound by a party’s concession of error). ¶ 57 The State argues that any error made by the trial court was cured by defense counsel’s restatement of the correct principle soon thereafter. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Thompsongreen1 sentence2023People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 611 (2010). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Pelogreen1 sentence2021An evidentiary issue will be deemed “harmless when no reasonable probability exists that the jury would have acquitted the defendant absent the error.” People v. Pelo, 404 Ill. App. 3d 839, 865 (2010), abrogated on other grounds by People v. Veach, 2017 IL 120649, ¶¶ 39, 48 ; see also In re E.H., 224 Ill. 2d 172, 180 (2006) (explaining the difference between harmless error review for evidentiary issues—the reasonable probability standard—and harmless error review for constitutional issues—the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard (emphasis omitted)). ¶ 48 From our review, there is no reasonable | 1 | 1 |
Bruton v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2021We rejected this same argument in Singletary, finding that “the admission of the prejudicial statements was not cured by a limiting instruction ‘because of the substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions to the contrary, looked to the incriminating extra-judicial statements in determining the petitioner’s guilt.’ ” Singletary, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 1086 (quoting Bruton v. -14- United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968)); see also People v. Shorty, 408 Ill. App. 3d 504, 511-12 (2011) (limiting instruction could not cure error in admitting hearsay testimony that informant told police that de | 1 | 1 |
People v. Shortygreen1 sentence2021We rejected this same argument in Singletary, finding that “the admission of the prejudicial statements was not cured by a limiting instruction ‘because of the substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions to the contrary, looked to the incriminating extra-judicial statements in determining the petitioner’s guilt.’ ” Singletary, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 1086 (quoting Bruton v. -14- United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968)); see also People v. Shorty, 408 Ill. App. 3d 504, 511-12 (2011) (limiting instruction could not cure error in admitting hearsay testimony that informant told police that de | 1 | 1 |
People v. Pecorarogreen1 sentence2020Alternatively, the State argues that any error in not conducting a Krankel inquiry was harmless. ¶ 26 The State relies on People v. Pecoraro, 144 Ill. 2d 1, 15 (1991) for the proposition that Krankel is inapplicable in situations where the attorney who allegedly rendered ineffective assistance was privately retained. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Walkergreen1 sentence2012People v. Walker, 232 Ill. 2d 113, 124-25 (2009). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Beacham v. Walkergreen1 sentence2025This finding is also in accordance with this court’s decision in People v. Neal, 2020 IL App (4th) 170869, ¶¶ 172, 174 , where we accepted the State’s concession of error in instructing potential jurors using the preamendment language, “ ‘failure to testify.’ ”; but see Beacham v. Walker, 231 Ill. 2d 51, 60 (2008) (stating a reviewing court is not bound by a party’s concession of error). ¶ 57 The State argues that any error made by the trial court was cured by defense counsel’s restatement of the correct principle soon thereafter. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Thornton
green
2 sentences2020People v. Thornton, 2020 IL App (1st) 170753, ¶ 23 . ¶ 38 The State argues that any error in the trial court using defendant’s immigration status as a basis to find probable cause for arrest was invited error, because, at the hearing on defendant’s motion for a new trial, defense counsel argued that they “had early alleged that it was an illegal arrest, but [he thought that] the fact that the defendant didn’t have any immigration status in the United States probably vitiate[d] that argument, so [he would] turn to the next step.” The State argues that, having conceded defendant’s lack of immigr 2020People v. Thornton, 2020 IL App (1st) 170753, ¶ 23 . ¶ 38 The State argues that any error in the trial court using defendant’s immigration status as a basis to find probable cause for arrest was invited error because, at the hearing on defendant’s motion for a new trial, defense counsel argued that they “had early alleged that it was an illegal arrest, but [he thought that] the fact that the defendant didn’t have any immigration status in the United States probably vitiate[d] that argument, so [he would] turn to the next step.” The State argues that, having conceded defendant’s lack of immigra | 2 | 2020–2020 |
People v. McCarthy
green
2 sentences2012Murder is not any of those offenses, and defendant therefore asserts that a prior conviction for domestic battery is not admissible in a murder prosecution. ¶ 22 The State in response submits that defendant's interpretation of section 115-20 is contrary to the plain meaning and legislative intent because it effectively eliminates from subsection (a) the phrase "types of offenses." In the alternative, the State argues that any error in the admission of the prior domestic battery conviction for propensity purposes was harmless given that the conviction would have been admissible in any event to 2012Murder is not any of those offenses, and defendant therefore asserts that a prior conviction for domestic battery is not admissible in a murder prosecution. ¶ 22 The State in response submits that defendant’s interpretation of section 115-20 is contrary to the plain meaning and legislative intent because it effectively eliminates from subsection (a) the phrase “types of offenses.” In the alternative, the State argues that any error in the admission of the prior domestic battery conviction for propensity purposes was harmless given that the conviction would have been admissible in any event to | 2 | 2012–2012 |
People v. Lewis
green
2 sentences2011The State argues that any error was cured by the trial judge's subsequent admonishments and instructions to the jury. ¶ 86 Defendant cites People v. Lewis, 269 Ill.App.3d 523 , 206 Ill.Dec. 938 , 646 N.E.2d 305 (1995), in support of his contention that the trial court's subsequent admonishment and instructions to the jury did not cure the error. 2011The State argues that any error was cured by the trial judge’s subsequent admonishments and instructions to the jury. ¶ 86 Defendant cites People v. Lewis, 269 Ill. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
People v. Burgess
green
2 sentences1997Citing People v. Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d 289 , 680 N.E.2d 357 (1997), the State argues that any error in failing to hold a fitness hearing was harmless because defendant was evaluated by a psychologist and found fit prior to his plea. 1997Citing People v. Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d 289 , 680 N.E.2d 357 (1997), the State argues that any error in failing to hold a fitness hearing was harmless because defendant was evaluated by a psychologist and found fit prior to his plea. | 2 | 1997–1997 |
People v. Enoch
green
2 sentences1993In order to preserve an issue for review, defendant must make a contemporaneous trial objection and renew that objection in a written post-trial motion. ( People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill.2d 176, 186 , 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 271 , 522 N.E.2d 1124, 1130 .) Defense counsel objected when the prosecutor held up a picture of the victim before the jury members and told them to remember the picture if they started thinking that "somebody like Mr. Washington deserves a break." Defendant also raised this objection in his post-trial motion for a new trial. 1993In order to preserve an issue for review, defendant must make a contemporaneous trial objection and renew that objection in a written post-trial motion. ( People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill.2d 176, 186 , 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 271 , 522 N.E.2d 1124, 1130 .) Defense counsel objected when the prosecutor held up a picture of the victim before the jury members and told them to remember the picture if they started thinking that "somebody like Mr. Washington deserves a break." Defendant also raised this objection in his post-trial motion for a new trial. | 2 | 1991–1993 |
People v. Ratliff
green
1 sentence2026The State’s Waiver Argument ¶ 42 Citing our supreme court’s holding in People v. Ratliff, 2024 IL 129356, ¶ 24 , that a guilty plea serves as an affirmative waiver of all non-jurisdictional errors arising before the plea, the State argues that any challenge to the validity of Mr. Mageo’s 2019 waiver of counsel was not a basis on which postplea counsel could possibly have challenged his 2023 guilty plea. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Barnes
green
1 sentence2025We agree with defendant that A.W.’s presence in the courtroom constituted error, however, we agree with the State that the error was harmless. ¶ 87 “The decision whether to admit or exclude evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent a clear showing of abuse of that discretion resulting in manifest prejudice to the defendant.” People v. Barnes, 2013 IL App (1st) 112873, ¶ 41 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Tate
green
1 sentence2022People v. Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 8 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Singletary
green
1 sentence2021We rejected this same argument in Singletary, finding that “the admission of the prejudicial statements was not cured by a limiting instruction ‘because of the substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions to the contrary, looked to the incriminating extra-judicial statements in determining the petitioner’s guilt.’ ” Singletary, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 1086 (quoting Bruton v. -14- United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968)); see also People v. Shorty, 408 Ill. App. 3d 504, 511-12 (2011) (limiting instruction could not cure error in admitting hearsay testimony that informant told police that de | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Lewis
green
1 sentence2011The State argues that any error was cured by the trial judge's subsequent admonishments and instructions to the jury. ¶ 86 Defendant cites People v. Lewis, 269 Ill.App.3d 523 , 206 Ill.Dec. 938 , 646 N.E.2d 305 (1995), in support of his contention that the trial court's subsequent admonishment and instructions to the jury did not cure the error. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
People v. West
green
1 sentence1993The admission of hearsay is not reversible error if there is no reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant if the hearsay testimony had been excluded (People v. West (1992), 234 Ill. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
People v. Pitts
green
2 sentences1984The State argues that any error as to the voir dire was harmless, and cites People v. Pitts (1982), 104 Ill. 1984The State argues that any error as to the voir dire was harmless, and cites People v. Pitts (1982), 104 Ill. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
People v. Bartik
green
1 sentence1984The State argues that any error committed by the trial court should be considered waived, since defendant did not raise it in his Rule 604(d) motion. (87 Ill. 2d R. 604(d); People v. Bartik (1981), 94 Ill. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Chapman v. California
yellow
2 sentences1979The United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 17 L. 1979The United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 17 L. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.