legally sufficient claim (California) · Go Syfert
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legally sufficient claim in California

431 California opinions name it 4 courts 1995–2026 183 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (69)

CaseFollowedCited
Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidesterred
cal · 2002 · cited in 86 California opinions naming this issue, 2002–2026
2 sentences

2026To establish the requisite probability of prevailing, the plaintiff need only have “ ‘stated and substantiated a legally sufficient claim.’ ” (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1123 .) “Put another way, the plaintiff ‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’ ” (Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 821 (Wilson); Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 88-89.) “ ‘In deciding

2025The second prong analysis required under section 425.16 requires the plaintiff to “establish[ ] that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) To establish this probability, “the plaintiff need only have ‘ “stated and substantiated a legally sufficient claim.” ’ ” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 88 (Navellier).) “Put another way, the plaintiff ‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the

4386
Navellier v. Slettengreen
cal · 2002 · cited in 82 California opinions naming this issue, 2003–2026
2 sentences

2025It is intended to discourage “strategic lawsuits against public participation by imposing the litigation costs on the party seeking to ‘chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances.’ ” (Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1131 .) It “subjects to potential dismissal only those actions in which the plaintiff cannot ‘state[] and substantiate[] a legally sufficient claim.’ ” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 93 .) The statute does not hinder the “constitutional right to petition the court to redress legitimate

2025The second prong analysis required under section 425.16 requires the plaintiff to “establish[ ] that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) To establish this probability, “the plaintiff need only have ‘ “stated and substantiated a legally sufficient claim.” ’ ” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 88 (Navellier).) “Put another way, the plaintiff ‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the

3682
Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafifgreen
cal · 2006 · cited in 44 California opinions naming this issue, 2008–2026
2 sentences

2025In the second phase of the anti-SLAPP analysis, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to establish a probability it will prevail on the claim. [Citation.] The plaintiff need only state and substantiate a legally sufficient claim. [Citation.] The plaintiff’s evidence is accepted as true; the defendant’s evidence is evaluated to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s showing as a 4 matter of law. [Citation.] The procedure is meant to prevent abusive SLAPP suits, while allowing ‘claims with the requisite minimal merit [to] proceed.’“ (City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, 420 .

2024As many authorities have noted, “[t]he second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis has been described as a summary-judgment-like procedure” (see Neurelis, Inc. v. Aquestive Therapeutics, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 769 , 784 (Neurelis)) in which the threshold for the requisite evidentiary showing by the defense is “ ‘not high.’ ” (Id. at p. 793.) “The court determines whether ‘ “the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.” ’ [Citation.] The plaintiff ‘ “may not rely solely on its complaint, even if verified; i

3244
Sweetwater Union High Sch. Dist. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co.green
cal · 2019 · cited in 50 California opinions naming this issue, 2019–2026
2 sentences

2023(Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 940 (Sweetwater Union).) At this stage, the court must determine “ ‘whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.

2023To do so, plaintiff must state and substantiate a legally sufficient claim [citation], thereby demonstrating his case has at least minimal merit [citation]. [¶] ‘Put another way, the plaintiff “must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” ’ ” (Finton Construction, Inc. v. Bidna & Keys, APLC (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 200, 211 .) “[A]t the second stage of an anti-SLAPP hearing, the court may consider affidavits, declarations, and their

2650
Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunitygreen
cal · 1999 · cited in 50 California opinions naming this issue, 2000–2026
2 sentences

2026To establish the requisite probability of prevailing, the plaintiff need only have “ ‘stated and substantiated a legally sufficient claim.’ ” (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1123 .) “Put another way, the plaintiff ‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’ ” (Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 821 (Wilson); Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 88-89.) “ ‘In deciding

2025(Id. at p. 395.) The critical question is whether 11 “allegations of protected activity . . . are asserted as grounds for relief.” (Ibid., italics omitted.) If the court finds the defendant has made the threshold showing, the analysis proceeds to the second step, under which the court “determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.” (Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 67 ; § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) To establish the requisite probability of prevailing, the plaintiff need only have “ ‘stated and substantiated a legally sufficient claim.’ ” (Briggs v. Ede

2250
Baral v. Schnittgreen
cal · 2016 · cited in 113 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2026
2 sentences

2026(Baral, at p. 384.) “First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 384 .) Second, if the defendant succeeds, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 384 ; see also 6 Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 61 .) The court undertakes “a ‘summary-judgment-like procedure’ ” in which “[i]ts inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient clai

2026(Baral, at p. 384.) “First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 384 .) Second, if the defendant succeeds, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 384 ; see also 6 Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 61 .) The court undertakes “a ‘summary-judgment-like procedure’ ” in which “[i]ts inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient clai

21113
Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc.green
cal · 2002 · cited in 48 California opinions naming this issue, 2002–2026
2 sentences

2026To establish the requisite probability of prevailing, the plaintiff need only have “ ‘stated and substantiated a legally sufficient claim.’ ” (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1123 .) “Put another way, the plaintiff ‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’ ” (Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 821 (Wilson); Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 88-89.) “ ‘In deciding

2026To establish the requisite probability of prevailing, the plaintiff need only have “ ‘stated and substantiated a legally sufficient claim.’ ” (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1123 .) “Put another way, the plaintiff ‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’ ” (Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 821 (Wilson); Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 88-89.) “ ‘In deciding

2048
Oasis West Realty v. Goldmangreen
cal · 2011 · cited in 42 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2026
2 sentences

2023If the court finds such a showing has been made, it then determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.” (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67 .) “ ‘Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute—i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merit—is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute.’ ” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 820 (Oasis).) The second stage of the anti-SLAPP test has been described “as a ‘summary-judgment

2023If the court finds such a showing has been made, it then determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.” (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67 .) “ ‘Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute—i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merit—is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute.’ ” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 820 (Oasis).) The second stage of the anti-SLAPP test has been described “as a ‘summary-judgment

1542
Taus v. Loftusgreen
cal · 2007 · cited in 26 California opinions naming this issue, 2007–2026
2 sentences

2024Step Two: Probability of Success on the Merits If a defendant makes its required showing in the first step, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 384 .) In evaluating the second step, the court “accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true” and “evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law.” (Id. at p. 385.) To establish a probability of prevailing on the claim, a plaintiff “‘must “‘state[] and substantiate[] a legally sufficien

2023(See Cole v. Patricia A. Meyer & Associates, APC (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1105 [“plaintiff’s cause of action needs to have only “‘minimal merit” [citation]’ to survive an anti-SLAPP motion”].) “To do so, [Bell] must state and substantiate a legally sufficient claim.” (Finton Construction, Inc. v. Bidna & Keys, APLC (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 200, 211 .) “The tort of defamation ‘involves (a) a publication that is (b) false, (c) defamatory, and (d) unprivileged, and that (e) has a natural tendency to injure or that causes special damage.’ [Citation]” (Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 720 ,

1326
Rusheen v. Cohengreen
cal · 2006 · cited in 20 California opinions naming this issue, 2006–2025
2 sentences

2025To establish a probability of prevailing on the merits, a plaintiff need only have “ ‘stated and substantiated a legally sufficient claim.’ ” (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 63 .) “ ‘Put another way, the plaintiff “must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” ’ ” (Rusheen v. Cohen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1056 .) “ ‘[T]he plaintiff [must] establish a probability he or she will prevail on the clai

2022To do so, the plaintiff must state and substantiate a legally sufficient claim (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1122-1123 ), thereby demonstrating the case has at least ‘“‘minimal merit.’”’ (Cole v. Patricia A. Meyer & Associates, APC (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1105 .) “On appeal, ‘[w]e review an order granting an anti-SLAPP motion de novo, applying the same two-step procedure as the trial court.’ (Cole v. Patricia A. Meyer & Associates, APC, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 1105 .) In conducting our review, ‘[w]e consider “the pleadings, and supporting and

920
Rosenthal v. Great Western Financial Securities Corp.green
cal · 1996 · cited in 18 California opinions naming this issue, 1999–2021
2 sentences

2009Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 412 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 875 , 926 P.2d 1061 ].) The court below found that plaintiffs stated a legally sufficient claim in that their complaint is “legally sufficient to establish the elements of malicious prosecution.” The pivotal question is therefore whether plaintiffs adequately substantiated that claim.

2009Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 412 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 875 , 926 P.2d 1061 ].) The court below found that plaintiffs stated a legally sufficient claim in that their complaint is “legally sufficient to establish the elements of malicious prosecution.” The pivotal question is therefore whether plaintiffs adequately substantiated that claim.

918
College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen
cal · 1994 · cited in 11 California opinions naming this issue, 1995–2021
2 sentences

2021It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law.’ ” (Sweetwater, supra, 6 Cal.5th at 12 p. 940, quoting Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384-385 (Baral); accord, Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 269, fn. 3 (Soukup).) Courts have described this procedure as a “motion for summary judgment in ‘reverse.’ Rather than requiring the defendant to defeat the plaintiff’s pleading by showing it is legally or factually meritless, the motion requires the plaintiff t

2021It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law.’ ” (Sweetwater, supra, 6 Cal.5th at 12 p. 940, quoting Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384-385 (Baral); accord, Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 269, fn. 3 (Soukup).) Courts have described this procedure as a “motion for summary judgment in ‘reverse.’ Rather than requiring the defendant to defeat the plaintiff’s pleading by showing it is legally or factually meritless, the motion requires the plaintiff t

911
Cole v. Patricia a. Meyer & Associates, APCgreen
calctapp · 2012 · cited in 15 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2023
2 sentences

2023(See Cole v. Patricia A. Meyer & Associates, APC (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1105 [“plaintiff’s cause of action needs to have only “‘minimal merit” [citation]’ to survive an anti-SLAPP motion”].) “To do so, [Bell] must state and substantiate a legally sufficient claim.” (Finton Construction, Inc. v. Bidna & Keys, APLC (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 200, 211 .) “The tort of defamation ‘involves (a) a publication that is (b) false, (c) defamatory, and (d) unprivileged, and that (e) has a natural tendency to injure or that causes special damage.’ [Citation]” (Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 720 ,

2022To do so, the plaintiff must state and substantiate a legally sufficient claim (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1122-1123 ), thereby demonstrating the case has at least ‘“‘minimal merit.’”’ (Cole v. Patricia A. Meyer & Associates, APC (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1105 .) “On appeal, ‘[w]e review an order granting an anti-SLAPP motion de novo, applying the same two-step procedure as the trial court.’ (Cole v. Patricia A. Meyer & Associates, APC, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 1105 .) In conducting our review, ‘[w]e consider “the pleadings, and supporting and

815
Yu v. Signet Bank/Virginiagreen
calctapp · 2002 · cited in 7 California opinions naming this issue, 2003–2026
2 sentences

2026To establish the requisite probability of prevailing, the plaintiff need only have “ ‘stated and substantiated a legally sufficient claim.’ ” (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1123 .) “Put another way, the plaintiff ‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’ ” (Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 821 (Wilson); Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 88-89.) “ ‘In deciding

2022Did the Association meet its burden to show a probability of prevailing on claims based on the building permit application? “‘In order to establish a probability of prevailing on the claim (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1)), a plaintiff responding to an anti-SLAPP motion must “‘state [ ] and substantiate [ ] a legally sufficient claim.’” [Citations.] Put another way, the plaintiff “must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence 11 submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” [Citations.

77
Monster Energy Company v. Schechtergreen
cal · 2019 · cited in 22 California opinions naming this issue, 2020–2026
2 sentences

2025(Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 788 (Monster Energy).) We do not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims; rather, our inquiry is limited to whether Cocoa has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.

2025The second prong analysis required under section 425.16 requires the plaintiff to “establish[ ] that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) To establish this probability, “the plaintiff need only have ‘ “stated and substantiated a legally sufficient claim.” ’ ” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 88 (Navellier).) “Put another way, the plaintiff ‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the

622
HMS Capital, Inc. v. Lawyers Title Co.green
calctapp · 2004 · cited in 21 California opinions naming this issue, 2006–2026
2 sentences

2023Rather, the court’s responsibility is to accept as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff ….” (HMS Capital, Inc. v. Lawyers Title Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 204, 212 .) With respect to the second prong, “in order to establish the requisite probability of prevailing (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1)), the plaintiff need only have ‘ “stated and substantiated a legally sufficient claim.” ’ [Citations.] ‘Put another way, the plaintiff “must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidenc

2022Rather, the court’s responsibility is to accept as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff….” (HMS Capital, Inc. v. Lawyers Title Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 204, 212 .) With respect to the second prong, “in order to establish the requisite probability of prevailing (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1)), the plaintiff need only have ‘ “stated and substantiated a legally sufficient claim.” ’ [Citations.] ‘Put another way, the plaintiff “must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence

621
Park v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univ.green
cal · 2017 · cited in 21 California opinions naming this issue, 2017–2025
2 sentences

2024Probability of Prevailing Since the interference claim arose from protected activity, we proceed to the second step where the church must demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the claim, meaning the claim has “at least ‘minimal merit.’ ” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1061 .) “In order to establish a probability of prevailing on the claim (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1)), a plaintiff responding to an anti-SLAPP motion must ‘ “state[] and substantiate[] a legally sufficient claim.” ’ [Citations.] Put another way, the plaintiff ‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supp

2024Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376 , 384–385.) “We review de novo the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP motion. [Citation.] We exercise independent judgment in determining whether, based on our own review of the record, the challenged claims arise from protected activity. [Citations.] In addition to the pleadings, we may consider affidavits concerning the facts upon which liability is based. [Citations.] We do not, however,

621
Flatley v. Maurogreen
cal · 2006 · cited in 15 California opinions naming this issue, 2007–2023
2 sentences

2021The anti-SLAPP second prong has been described as a “ ‘ “summary-judgment- like procedure.” ’ ” (Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co., supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 940.) The court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims, rather the inquiry is limited “to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.” (Ibid.) In so deciding, the litigation privilege may be considered, “in that it may present a substantive defense a plaintiff must overcome to demonstrate a probab

2016(Mendoza v. ADP Screening & Selection Services, Inc. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1644, 1654 .) With respect to the second prong in the special motion to strike analysis, "in order to establish the requisite probability of prevailing (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1)), the plaintiff need only have ' "stated and substantiated a legally sufficient claim." ' [Citations.] 'Put another way, the plaintiff "must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited." '

515
Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc.green
calctapp · 2004 · cited in 10 California opinions naming this issue, 2005–2016
2 sentences

2015Corbin Cannot Demonstrate a Probability of Prevailing on the Merits Because The Litigation Privilege Bars Her Defamation Cause of Action " 'In order to establish a probability of prevailing on the claim . . . , a plaintiff responding to an anti-SLAPP motion must " 'state[ ] and substantiate[ ] a legally sufficient claim.' " [Citations.] Put another way, the plaintiff "must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited." [Citations.] In de

2015Once Mobilitie satisfied its burden to demonstrate the Business and Professions Code section 16600 cause of action arose from protected activity, the burden shifted to Lodder to establish, with admissible evidence, a “probability” of prevailing on that cause of action. (§ 425.16, subd. (b); Robertson v. Rodriguez (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 347, 355 .) It was Lodder’s burden to show he “stated and substantiated a legally sufficient claim.” (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1123 .) “Put another way, the plaintiff ‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legall

510
Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfinogreen
cal · 2005 · cited in 8 California opinions naming this issue, 2007–2024
2 sentences

2024Step Two: Probability of Success on the Merits If a defendant makes its required showing in the first step, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 384 .) In evaluating the second step, the court “accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true” and “evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law.” (Id. at p. 385.) To establish a probability of prevailing on the claim, a plaintiff “‘must “‘state[] and substantiate[] a legally sufficien

2015Probability of prevailing Because the trial court correctly determined that appellants’ claims against the respondents arose from conduct that is protected under section 425.16, we must now determine whether appellants met their burden of “demonstrat[ing] a probability of prevailing on the claim[s].” (Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 67 .) To satisfy this burden, “the plaintiff must ‘state[] and substantiate[] a legally sufficient claim.’ [Citation.] ‘Put another way, the plaintiff “must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing

58
Kyle v. Carmongreen
calctapp · 1999 · cited in 7 California opinions naming this issue, 2001–2006
57
Laker v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univ.green
calctapp5d · 2019 · cited in 6 California opinions naming this issue, 2021–2026
56
Rosenaur v. Scherergreen
calctapp · 2001 · cited in 5 California opinions naming this issue, 2002–2014
55
ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jacksongreen
calctapp · 2001 · cited in 10 California opinions naming this issue, 2003–2026
2 sentences

2020(Ibid.) To satisfy the probability of prevailing standard, “[t]he plaintiff need only state and substantiate a legally sufficient claim. [Citation.] The plaintiff's evidence is accepted as true; the defendant's evidence is evaluated to determine if it defeats the plaintiff's showing as a matter of law.” (City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, 420 (Montebello).) Although the opposing party need only show “minimal merit” to satisfy the burden, (Montebello, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 420 ), the plaintiff cannot rely 32 on the allegations of the complaint, but must produce evidence that w

2014In this step, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to “‘“demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.”’” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 820 ; ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1010 .) To make a prima facie showing a plaintiff is required “to ‘“state[] and substantiate[] a legally sufficient claim. [Citations.]”’ [Citation.] More specifically, he had to adduce competent, admissible eviden

410
Paulus v. Bob Lynch Ford, Inc.green
calctapp · 2006 · cited in 8 California opinions naming this issue, 2006–2025
2 sentences

2025DISCUSSION Because this court has determined that Pham’s claims arose from Olivia’s protected activity, Pham bore the burden at the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis of showing that her claims have at least “ ‘minimal merit’ ”—i.e., “ ‘a minimum level of legal sufficiency and triability.’ ” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 891 (Wilson) [noting plaintiff’s “second-step burden is a limited one”]; Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 738 .) In our de novo review, we neither “ ‘ “weigh evidence [n]or resolve conflicting factual claims” ’ ” but limi

2020Rather, the court’s responsibility is to accept as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff . . . .” (HMS Capital, Inc. v. Lawyers Title Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 204, 212 .) With respect to the second prong, “in order to establish the requisite probability of prevailing (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1)), the plaintiff need only have ‘ “stated and substantiated a legally sufficient claim.” ’ [Citations.] ‘Put another way, the plaintiff “must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the ev

48
Matson v. Dvorakgreen
calctapp · 1995 · cited in 8 California opinions naming this issue, 2002–2024
2 sentences

2024To meet this burden, Jeffrey must “demonstrate that the [cross-]complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the [cross-complainant] is credited.” (Matson v. Dvorak (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 539, 548 .) “This step of the anti-SLAPP analysis ‘has been described as a summary-judgment-like procedure. [Citation.] The court determines whether “ ‘the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.’ ” [Citation.]

2015First, a plaintiff seeking to meet its obligation on the second prong of analysis of an anti-SLAPP motion must substantiate a legally sufficient claim; it “‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and is supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’” (Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 821 , quoting Matson v. Dvorak (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 539, 548 .) And the evidence presented by a plaintiff to sustain its burden on the second prong must be admissible

48
Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc. v. Fitzgibbonsgreen
calctapp · 2006 · cited in 5 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2023
45
Barry v. State Bar of Cal.green
cal · 2017 · cited in 4 California opinions naming this issue, 2019–2021
44
Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarchegreen
cal · 2003 · cited in 29 California opinions naming this issue, 2004–2025
2 sentences

2025DISCUSSION Because this court has determined that Pham’s claims arose from Olivia’s protected activity, Pham bore the burden at the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis of showing that her claims have at least “ ‘minimal merit’ ”—i.e., “ ‘a minimum level of legal sufficiency and triability.’ ” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 891 (Wilson) [noting plaintiff’s “second-step burden is a limited one”]; Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 738 .) In our de novo review, we neither “ ‘ “weigh evidence [n]or resolve conflicting factual claims” ’ ” but limi

2022(Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 741 .) The trial court decides an anti-SLAPP motion after “consider[ing] the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2).) If the defendant shows the challenged claim arises from protected activity, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384 .) The court’s inquiry “is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally suff

329
Tuchscher Development Enterprises, Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port Districtgreen
calctapp · 2003 · cited in 7 California opinions naming this issue, 2007–2023
2 sentences

2023If the court finds such a showing has been made, it then determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.” (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67 .) “ ‘Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute—i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merit—is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute.’ ” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 820 (Oasis).) The second stage of the anti-SLAPP test has been described “as a ‘summary-judgment

2022If the court finds such a showing has been made, it then determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.” (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67 .) “ ‘Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute—i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merit—is 13 a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute.’ ” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 820 (Oasis West Realty).) The second stage of the anti-SLAPP test has been described “as a ‘s

37
Burrill v. Nair CA3green
calctapp · 2013 · cited in 7 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2017
2 sentences

2017Instead, we accept as true all evidence favorable to the plaintiff." ' " *489 ( Burrill v. Nair (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 357 , 378-379, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 332 , disapproved in part in Baral , at p. 396, fn. 11, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 475 , 376 P.3d 604 .) This second step has been described as a " 'summary-judgment-like procedure.' " ( Baral , at p. 384, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 475 , 376 P.3d 604 .) A court's second step "inquiry is limited to whether the [opposing party] has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a *591 prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. [The court] ... e

2017Instead, we accept as true all evidence favorable to the plaintiff." ' " *489 ( Burrill v. Nair (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 357 , 378-379, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 332 , disapproved in part in Baral , at p. 396, fn. 11, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 475 , 376 P.3d 604 .) This second step has been described as a " 'summary-judgment-like procedure.' " ( Baral , at p. 384, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 475 , 376 P.3d 604 .) A court's second step "inquiry is limited to whether the [opposing party] has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a *591 prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. [The court] ... e

37
Vogel v. Felicegreen
calctapp · 2005 · cited in 6 California opinions naming this issue, 2007–2025
36
Whitehall v. Cnty. of San Bernardinogreen
calctapp5d · 2017 · cited in 5 California opinions naming this issue, 2019–2023
35
Church of Scientology v. Wollersheimgreen
calctapp · 1996 · cited in 4 California opinions naming this issue, 2001–2026
34
Schroeder v. Irvine City Councilgreen
calctapp · 2002 · cited in 4 California opinions naming this issue, 2005–2025
34
Tichinin v. City of Morgan Hillgreen
calctapp · 2009 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
33
Grenier v. Taylorgreen
calctapp · 2015 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
33
Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc.green
cal · 2019 · cited in 24 California opinions naming this issue, 2019–2025
2 sentences

2025DISCUSSION Because this court has determined that Pham’s claims arose from Olivia’s protected activity, Pham bore the burden at the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis of showing that her claims have at least “ ‘minimal merit’ ”—i.e., “ ‘a minimum level of legal sufficiency and triability.’ ” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 891 (Wilson) [noting plaintiff’s “second-step burden is a limited one”]; Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 738 .) In our de novo review, we neither “ ‘ “weigh evidence [n]or resolve conflicting factual claims” ’ ” but limi

2022If conduct that supplies a necessary element of a claim is protected, the defendant’s burden at the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis has been carried, regardless of any alleged motivations that supply other elements of the claim.” (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 892 .) The burden then shifts to the plaintiff, who satisfies his second step burden by stating “ ‘ “a legally sufficient claim” ’ ” and making “ ‘ “a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 891.) Alta Loma, the case on which the trial court relied, was decided before Wilson, but it

224
City of Montebello v. Vasquezgreen
cal · 2016 · cited in 8 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2025
2 sentences

2025In the second phase of the anti-SLAPP analysis, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to establish a probability it will prevail on the claim. [Citation.] The plaintiff need only state and substantiate a legally sufficient claim. [Citation.] The plaintiff’s evidence is accepted as true; the defendant’s evidence is evaluated to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s showing as a matter of law. [Citation.] The procedure is meant to prevent abusive SLAPP suits, while allowing ‘claims with the requisite minimal merit [to] proceed.’” (City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, 420 .)

2025In the second phase of the anti-SLAPP analysis, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to establish a probability it will prevail on the claim. [Citation.] The plaintiff need only state and substantiate a legally sufficient claim. [Citation.] The plaintiff’s evidence is accepted as true; the defendant’s evidence is evaluated to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s showing as a 4 matter of law. [Citation.] The procedure is meant to prevent abusive SLAPP suits, while allowing ‘claims with the requisite minimal merit [to] proceed.’“ (City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, 420 .

28
Gilbert v. Sykesgreen
calctapp · 2007 · cited in 5 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2024
25

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (11)

CaseCitedYears
Dwight R. v. Christy B. green
calctapp · 2013
52014–2026
City of Alhambra v. D'Ausilio green
calctapp · 2011
52015–2024
Tuszynska v. Cunningham green
calctapp · 2011
52016–2017
Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism green
cal · 2018
42021–2026
Finton Construction, Inc. v. Bidna & Keys, APLC green
calctapp · 2015
42016–2023
San Diegans for Open Gov't v. San Diego State Univ. Research Found. green
calctapp5d · 2017
42019–2022
DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Co. v. Superior Court green
calctapp · 2000
42014–2021
NYGÅRD, INC. v. Uusi-Kerttula green
calctapp · 2008
42013–2014
Wong v. Jing green
calctapp · 2010
32022–2023
Overstock.com, Inc. v. Gradient Analytics, Inc. green
calctapp · 2007
32015–2021
City of Costa Mesa v. D'Alessio Investments green
calctapp · 2013
32019–2019

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CA § Cal. Civil Code § 47 (112) CA § Cal. Civil Code § 45 (30) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 452 (28) CA § Cal. Civil Code § 44 (21) CA § Cal. Civil Code § 46 (14)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 431 (1995–2026) MN 117 (1980–2025) FL 113 (1979–2026) CT 84 (1968–2024) IL 31 (1976–2026) PA 22 (1991–2024) WA 17 (2015–2025) GA 15 (1916–2025) NV 13 (1993–2020) OR 10 (1996–2026) NC 9 (1992–2023) TX 8 (1991–2015) NY 8 (1934–2025) KS 7 (1995–2020) MA 7 (1978–2019) IN 5 (1978–2017) AZ 4 (1958–2023) CO 4 (2022–2026) UT 4 (1997–2020) DC 4 (1983–2021) WI 3 (1991–2003) MI 3 (1975–2023) MD 3 (2002–2006) OH 2 (2007–2025) NJ 2 (1950–2019) ME 2 (1977–2008) MO 2 (1992–1995)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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