legally sufficient claim in Connecticut

2002To state a legally sufficient claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must establish four elements: “(1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress; or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was a likely result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the defendant’s conduct was the cause of the plaintiffs distress; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 253 .

1996In response, the plaintiff contends that his allegation that he suffered "great CT Page 4113 humiliation, distress and mental anguish" is sufficient, as it is equivalent to use of the phrase "severe emotional distress." For a plaintiff to state a legally sufficient claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, "[i]t must be shown: (1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress; or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was a likely result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the defendant's conduct was the cause of th

1996This court has earlier considered this issue in Diaz v. Camacho , Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 304103 (August 24, 1994, Ballen, J.) in which the court, after analyzing the supreme court decisions in Strazza v. McKittrick , 146 Conn. 714 , 156 A.2d 149 (1959), Amodio v. Cunningham , 182 Conn. 80 , 438 A.2d 6 (1980) and Maloney v. Conroy , 208 Conn. 392 , 545 A.2d 1059 (1988), stated that " Maloney and Amodio do not address the question of whether CT Page 1745 a legally sufficient claim for bystander emotional distress exists when a plaintiff contempor

1996This court has earlier considered this issue in Diaz v. Camacho , Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 304103 (August 24, 1994, Ballen, J.) in which the court, after analyzing the supreme court decisions in Strazza v. McKittrick , 146 Conn. 714 , 156 A.2d 149 (1959), Amodio v. Cunningham , 182 Conn. 80 , 438 A.2d 6 (1980) and Maloney v. Conroy , 208 Conn. 392 , 545 A.2d 1059 (1988), stated that " Maloney and Amodio do not address the question of whether CT Page 1745 a legally sufficient claim for bystander emotional distress exists when a plaintiff contempor

2000Fifth, Somma v. Gracey, 15 Conn. App. 371, 378 , 544 A.2d 668 (1988), stands for the proposition that apportionment applies to a legal malpractice action sounding in negligence.

2000Fifth, Somma v. Gracey, 15 Conn. App. 371, 378 , 544 A.2d 668 (1988), stands for the proposition that apportionment applies to a legal malpractice action sounding in negligence.

2024See, e.g., Escobar-Santana v. State, 347 Conn. 601 , 625–28, 298 A.3d 1222 (2023) (applying liberal rule of construction to interpret, as medical mal- practice claim, count of complaint that had been pleaded as bystander emotional distress claim); Doe v. Cochran, 332 Conn. 325, 330, 336 , 210 A.3d 469 (2019) (applying principle of liberal construction to conclude that plain- tiff’s ‘‘allegations reasonably can be understood to sound in ordinary negligence,’’ despite defendant’s con- tention ‘‘that the plaintiff’s one count complaint sounds in medical malpractice’’); Presidential Village, LLC v

2024See, e.g., Escobar-Santana v. State, 347 Conn. 601 , 625–28, 298 A.3d 1222 (2023) (applying liberal rule of construction to interpret, as medical mal- practice claim, count of complaint that had been pleaded as bystander emotional distress claim); Doe v. Cochran, 332 Conn. 325, 330, 336 , 210 A.3d 469 (2019) (applying principle of liberal construction to conclude that plain- tiff’s ‘‘allegations reasonably can be understood to sound in ordinary negligence,’’ despite defendant’s con- tention ‘‘that the plaintiff’s one count complaint sounds in medical malpractice’’); Presidential Village, LLC v

2024See, e.g., Escobar-Santana v. State, 347 Conn. 601 , 625–28, 298 A.3d 1222 (2023) (applying liberal rule of construction to interpret, as medical mal- practice claim, count of complaint that had been pleaded as bystander emotional distress claim); Doe v. Cochran, 332 Conn. 325, 330, 336 , 210 A.3d 469 (2019) (applying principle of liberal construction to conclude that plain- tiff’s ‘‘allegations reasonably can be understood to sound in ordinary negligence,’’ despite defendant’s con- tention ‘‘that the plaintiff’s one count complaint sounds in medical malpractice’’); Presidential Village, LLC v

2024See, e.g., Escobar-Santana v. State, 347 Conn. 601 , 625–28, 298 A.3d 1222 (2023) (applying liberal rule of construction to interpret, as medical mal- practice claim, count of complaint that had been pleaded as bystander emotional distress claim); Doe v. Cochran, 332 Conn. 325, 330, 336 , 210 A.3d 469 (2019) (applying principle of liberal construction to conclude that plain- tiff’s ‘‘allegations reasonably can be understood to sound in ordinary negligence,’’ despite defendant’s con- tention ‘‘that the plaintiff’s one count complaint sounds in medical malpractice’’); Presidential Village, LLC v

2024See, e.g., Escobar-Santana v. State, 347 Conn. 601 , 625–28, 298 A.3d 1222 (2023) (applying liberal rule of construction to interpret, as medical malpractice claim, count of complaint that had been pleaded as bystander emotional distress claim); Doe v. Cochran, 332 Conn. 325, 330, 336 , 210 A.3d 469 (2019) (applying principle of liberal construction to con- clude that plaintiff’s ‘‘allegations reasonably can be understood to sound in ordinary negligence,’’ despite defendant’s contention ‘‘that the plaintiff’s one count complaint sounds in medical malpractice’’); Presiden- tial Village, LLC v.

2024See, e.g., Escobar-Santana v. State, 347 Conn. 601 , 625–28, 298 A.3d 1222 (2023) (applying liberal rule of construction to interpret, as medical mal- practice claim, count of complaint that had been pleaded as bystander emotional distress claim); Doe v. Cochran, 332 Conn. 325, 330, 336 , 210 A.3d 469 (2019) (applying principle of liberal construction to conclude that plain- tiff’s ‘‘allegations reasonably can be understood to sound in ordinary negligence,’’ despite defendant’s con- tention ‘‘that the plaintiff’s one count complaint sounds in medical malpractice’’); Presidential Village, LLC v

2024See, e.g., Escobar-Santana v. State, 347 Conn. 601 , 625–28, 298 A.3d 1222 (2023) (applying liberal rule of construction to interpret, as medical malpractice claim, count of complaint that had been pleaded as bystander emotional distress claim); Doe v. Cochran, 332 Conn. 325, 330, 336 , 210 A.3d 469 (2019) (applying principle of liberal construction to con- clude that plaintiff’s ‘‘allegations reasonably can be understood to sound in ordinary negligence,’’ despite defendant’s contention ‘‘that the plaintiff’s one count complaint sounds in medical malpractice’’); Presiden- tial Village, LLC v.

2024See, e.g., Escobar-Santana v. State, 347 Conn. 601 , 625–28, 298 A.3d 1222 (2023) (applying liberal rule of construction to interpret, as medical mal- practice claim, count of complaint that had been pleaded as bystander emotional distress claim); Doe v. Cochran, 332 Conn. 325, 330, 336 , 210 A.3d 469 (2019) (applying principle of liberal construction to conclude that plain- tiff’s ‘‘allegations reasonably can be understood to sound in ordinary negligence,’’ despite defendant’s con- tention ‘‘that the plaintiff’s one count complaint sounds in medical malpractice’’); Presidential Village, LLC v

2024See, e.g., Escobar-Santana v. State, 347 Conn. 601 , 625–28, 298 A.3d 1222 (2023) (applying liberal rule of construction to interpret, as medical mal- practice claim, count of complaint that had been pleaded as bystander emotional distress claim); Doe v. Cochran, 332 Conn. 325, 330, 336 , 210 A.3d 469 (2019) (applying principle of liberal construction to conclude that plain- tiff’s ‘‘allegations reasonably can be understood to sound in ordinary negligence,’’ despite defendant’s con- tention ‘‘that the plaintiff’s one count complaint sounds in medical malpractice’’); Presidential Village, LLC v

2024See, e.g., Escobar-Santana v. State, 347 Conn. 601 , 625–28, 298 A.3d 1222 (2023) (applying liberal rule of construction to interpret, as medical mal- practice claim, count of complaint that had been pleaded as bystander emotional distress claim); Doe v. Cochran, 332 Conn. 325, 330, 336 , 210 A.3d 469 (2019) (applying principle of liberal construction to conclude that plain- tiff’s ‘‘allegations reasonably can be understood to sound in ordinary negligence,’’ despite defendant’s con- tention ‘‘that the plaintiff’s one count complaint sounds in medical malpractice’’); Presidential Village, LLC v

2019Instead, to state a legally sufficient claim for breach of the implied covenant sounding in contract, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted in bad faith.’’ (Citation omitted.) Blumberg Asso- ciates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Connecti- cut, Inc., 132 Conn. App. 85, 99 , 30 A.3d 38 (2011), aff’d, 311 Conn. 123 , 84 A.3d 840 (2014).

2019Instead, to state a legally sufficient claim for breach of the implied covenant sounding in contract, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted in bad faith.’’ (Citation omitted.) Blumberg Asso- ciates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Connecti- cut, Inc., 132 Conn. App. 85, 99 , 30 A.3d 38 (2011), aff’d, 311 Conn. 123 , 84 A.3d 840 (2014).

2003The plaintiff argued that the amended motion to modify custody should be stricken because (1) it did not allege a substantial change in circumstances; (2) was not in compliance with Practice Book § 25-26 (e); 1 and (3) the case referred to in the motion to modify, Savage v. Savage, 25 Conn. App. 693 , 596 A.2d 23 (1991), was named without citation and was not remotely related to the present case.

2003The plaintiff argued that the amended motion to modify custody should be stricken because (1) it did not allege a substantial change in circumstances; (2) was not in compliance with Practice Book § 25-26 (e); 1 and (3) the case referred to in the motion to modify, Savage v. Savage, 25 Conn. App. 693 , 596 A.2d 23 (1991), was named without citation and was not remotely related to the present case.

2000Section 42-110b (a) provides: "No person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." Section 42-110a (4) states: "'Trade' and 'commerce' means the advertising, the sale or rent or lease, the offering for sale or rent or lease, or the distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value in this state." "In order to allege a CUTPA violation properly, the plaintiff must allege, inter alia, that the acts complained of w

1999"In order to allege a CUTPA violation properly, the plaintiff must allege, inter alia, that the acts complained of were performed in a `trade or business.'" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pergament v. Green , 32 Conn. App. 644 , 655 , 630 A.2d 615 , cert. denied, 228 Conn. 903 , 634 A.2d 296 (1993).

2000Section 42-110b (a) provides: "No person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." Section 42-110a (4) states: "'Trade' and 'commerce' means the advertising, the sale or rent or lease, the offering for sale or rent or lease, or the distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value in this state." "In order to allege a CUTPA violation properly, the plaintiff must allege, inter alia, that the acts complained of w

1999"In order to allege a CUTPA violation properly, the plaintiff must allege, inter alia, that the acts complained of were performed in a `trade or business.'" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pergament v. Green , 32 Conn. App. 644 , 655 , 630 A.2d 615 , cert. denied, 228 Conn. 903 , 634 A.2d 296 (1993).

2000Section 42-110b (a) provides: "No person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." Section 42-110a (4) states: "'Trade' and 'commerce' means the advertising, the sale or rent or lease, the offering for sale or rent or lease, or the distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value in this state." "In order to allege a CUTPA violation properly, the plaintiff must allege, inter alia, that the acts complained of w

2000Section 42-110b (a) provides: "No person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." Section 42-110a (4) states: "'Trade' and 'commerce' means the advertising, the sale or rent or lease, the offering for sale or rent or lease, or the distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value in this state." "In order to allege a CUTPA violation properly, the plaintiff must allege, inter alia, that the acts complained of w

1998Petterson v. Weinstock , 106 Conn. 436 , 138 A. 433 (1927)." Branford v. Monaco , 48 Conn. App. 216 , 222 , ___ A.2d ___ (1998). "[T]he doctrine of unclean hands has generally been disallowed as a special defense in a foreclosure action.

1998Petterson v. Weinstock, 106 Conn. 436 , 138 A. 433 (1927).

1998Petterson v. Weinstock , 106 Conn. 436 , 138 A. 433 (1927)." Branford v. Monaco , 48 Conn. App. 216 , 222 , ___ A.2d ___ (1998). "[T]he doctrine of unclean hands has generally been disallowed as a special defense in a foreclosure action.

1998Petterson v. Weinstock, 106 Conn. 436 , 138 A. 433 (1927).

1998"If the motion attacks the entire pleading, it will fail if any part or the pleading is legally sufficient." Grier v. West Haven Police CT Page 5428 Dept., 40 Conn. Sup. 221 , 222 , 487 A.2d 576 (1984), affirmed, 8 Conn. App. 142 , 510 A.2d 1376 (1986).

1998"If the motion attacks the entire pleading, it will fail if any part or the pleading is legally sufficient." Grier v. West Haven Police CT Page 5428 Dept., 40 Conn. Sup. 221 , 222 , 487 A.2d 576 (1984), affirmed, 8 Conn. App. 142 , 510 A.2d 1376 (1986).

1998"If the motion attacks the entire pleading, it will fail if any part or the pleading is legally sufficient." Grier v. West Haven Police CT Page 5428 Dept., 40 Conn. Sup. 221 , 222 , 487 A.2d 576 (1984), affirmed, 8 Conn. App. 142 , 510 A.2d 1376 (1986).

1998"If the motion attacks the entire pleading, it will fail if any part or the pleading is legally sufficient." Grier v. West Haven Police CT Page 5428 Dept., 40 Conn. Sup. 221 , 222 , 487 A.2d 576 (1984), affirmed, 8 Conn. App. 142 , 510 A.2d 1376 (1986).

1996In the count three, Godwin alleges that "[i]n the ordinary course of administering anesthesia around a patient's eyeball[,] one, exercising the degree of skill and learning of a qualified anesthesiologist, would not insert a needle into the eyeball, and such an insertion would not occur except through the negligent act of the party administering such anesthetic." (Complaint, count three, 16.) Reading the complaint liberally and "constru[ing] the facts in the complaint most favorably to the plaintiff"; Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, 208 Conn. 161 , 170 ; as the court is required to do,

1996In the count three, Godwin alleges that "[i]n the ordinary course of administering anesthesia around a patient's eyeball[,] one, exercising the degree of skill and learning of a qualified anesthesiologist, would not insert a needle into the eyeball, and such an insertion would not occur except through the negligent act of the party administering such anesthetic." (Complaint, count three, ¶ 6.) Reading the complaint liberally and "constru[ing] the facts in the complaint most favorably to the plaintiff"; Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, 208 Conn. 161 , 170 ; as the court is required to do

1996This court has earlier considered this issue in Diaz v. Camacho , Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 304103 (August 24, 1994, Ballen, J.) in which the court, after analyzing the supreme court decisions in Strazza v. McKittrick , 146 Conn. 714 , 156 A.2d 149 (1959), Amodio v. Cunningham , 182 Conn. 80 , 438 A.2d 6 (1980) and Maloney v. Conroy , 208 Conn. 392 , 545 A.2d 1059 (1988), stated that " Maloney and Amodio do not address the question of whether CT Page 1745 a legally sufficient claim for bystander emotional distress exists when a plaintiff contempor

1996This court has earlier considered this issue in Diaz v. Camacho , Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 304103 (August 24, 1994, Ballen, J.) in which the court, after analyzing the supreme court decisions in Strazza v. McKittrick , 146 Conn. 714 , 156 A.2d 149 (1959), Amodio v. Cunningham , 182 Conn. 80 , 438 A.2d 6 (1980) and Maloney v. Conroy , 208 Conn. 392 , 545 A.2d 1059 (1988), stated that " Maloney and Amodio do not address the question of whether CT Page 1745 a legally sufficient claim for bystander emotional distress exists when a plaintiff contempor

1996This court has earlier considered this issue in Diaz v. Camacho , Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 304103 (August 24, 1994, Ballen, J.) in which the court, after analyzing the supreme court decisions in Strazza v. McKittrick , 146 Conn. 714 , 156 A.2d 149 (1959), Amodio v. Cunningham , 182 Conn. 80 , 438 A.2d 6 (1980) and Maloney v. Conroy , 208 Conn. 392 , 545 A.2d 1059 (1988), stated that " Maloney and Amodio do not address the question of whether CT Page 1745 a legally sufficient claim for bystander emotional distress exists when a plaintiff contempor

1996This court has earlier considered this issue in Diaz v. Camacho , Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 304103 (August 24, 1994, Ballen, J.) in which the court, after analyzing the supreme court decisions in Strazza v. McKittrick , 146 Conn. 714 , 156 A.2d 149 (1959), Amodio v. Cunningham , 182 Conn. 80 , 438 A.2d 6 (1980) and Maloney v. Conroy , 208 Conn. 392 , 545 A.2d 1059 (1988), stated that " Maloney and Amodio do not address the question of whether CT Page 1745 a legally sufficient claim for bystander emotional distress exists when a plaintiff contempor

1992In their memorandum in support of their motion to strike, Wargo and FCSC maintain that Patterson's amended cross-claim fails to state a legally sufficient claim for indemnification because it has not sufficiently pleaded the existence of an independent legal relationship between Wargo and Patterson pursuant to Atkinson v. Berloni, 23 Conn. App. 325 , 580 A.2d 84 (1990).

1992In their memorandum in support of their motion to strike, Wargo and FCSC maintain that Patterson's amended cross-claim fails to state a legally sufficient claim for indemnification because it has not sufficiently pleaded the existence of an independent legal relationship between Wargo and Patterson pursuant to Atkinson v. Berloni, 23 Conn. App. 325 , 580 A.2d 84 (1990).

2024It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law. . . . [C]laims with the requisite minimal merit may proceed.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Baral v. Schnitt, 1 Cal. 5th 376 , 384–85, 376 P.3d 604 , 205 Cal. Rptr. 3d 475 (2016); see also Reeves v. Associated Newspapers, Ltd., App. Div. 3d , , N.Y.S.3d (2024) (motion to dismiss filed pursuant to New York anti-SLAPP statute ‘‘is analogous to an accelerated summary judgment m

2024It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law. . . . [C]laims with the requisite minimal merit may proceed.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Baral v. Schnitt, 1 Cal. 5th 376 , 384–85, 376 P.3d 604 , 205 Cal. Rptr. 3d 475 (2016); see also Reeves v. Associated Newspapers, Ltd., App. Div. 3d , , N.Y.S.3d (2024) (motion to dismiss filed pursuant to New York anti-SLAPP statute ‘‘is analogous to an accelerated summary judgment m

2024In 2019, our Supreme Court stated that ‘‘appellate case law recognizes that conduct occurring after the origination of the loan, after default, and even after the initiation of the foreclosure action may form a proper basis for defenses in a foreclosure action [including unclean hands and laches].’’ U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Blowers, 332 Conn. 656 , 672–73, 212 A.3d 226 (2019).

2024In 2019, our Supreme Court stated that ‘‘appellate case law recognizes that conduct occurring after the origination of the loan, after default, and even after the initiation of the foreclosure action may form a proper basis for defenses in a foreclosure action [including unclean hands and laches].’’ U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Blowers, 332 Conn. 656 , 672–73, 212 A.3d 226 (2019).

2023Relying on language in Rendahl v. Peluso, 173 Conn. App. 66 , 162 A.3d 1 (2017), the defendant argues that a plaintiff must plead and prove, as an essential element of the tort, that the fiduciary engaged in self-dealing.

2023Relying on language in Rendahl v. Peluso, 173 Conn. App. 66 , 162 A.3d 1 (2017), the defendant argues that a plaintiff must plead and prove, as an essential element of the tort, that the fiduciary engaged in self-dealing.