legally sufficient claim in New York

2025The arguments he is raising in terms of never having contracted with Plaintiff, never having incurred the underlying debt, and obtaining gas and oil from someone else are barred by the doctrine of res judicata from the action in which the 2014 judgment was obtained ( see Jones Morrison, LLP v Schloss , 155 AD3d at 705-706 ).

2025Our role, however, is—as it has always been—to determine whether plaintiffs have presented a legally sufficient claim for resolution by the courts ( compare CFE I , 86 NY2d 307; CFE II, 100 NY2d 893; Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v State of New York, 8 NY3d 14 [2006]; Aristy-Farer, 29 NY3d 501, with Paynter, 100 NY2d 434; NYCLU, 4 NY3d 175).

2025Our role, however, is—as it has always been—to determine whether plaintiffs have presented a legally sufficient claim for resolution by the courts ( compare CFE I , 86 NY2d 307; CFE II, 100 NY2d 893; Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v State of New York, 8 NY3d 14 [2006]; Aristy-Farer, 29 NY3d 501, with Paynter, 100 NY2d 434; NYCLU, 4 NY3d 175).

2025Our role, however, is—as it has always been—to determine whether plaintiffs have presented a legally sufficient claim for resolution by the courts ( compare CFE I , 86 NY2d 307; CFE II, 100 NY2d 893; Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v State of New York, 8 NY3d 14 [2006]; Aristy-Farer, 29 NY3d 501, with Paynter, 100 NY2d 434; NYCLU, 4 NY3d 175).

2025Our role, however, is—as it has always been—to determine whether plaintiffs have presented a legally sufficient claim for resolution by the courts ( compare CFE I , 86 NY2d 307; CFE II, 100 NY2d 893; Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v State of New York, 8 NY3d 14 [2006]; Aristy-Farer, 29 NY3d 501, with Paynter, 100 NY2d 434; NYCLU, 4 NY3d 175).

2025Our role, however, is—as it has always been—to determine whether plaintiffs have presented a legally sufficient claim for resolution by the courts ( compare CFE I , 86 NY2d 307; CFE II, 100 NY2d 893; Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v State of New York, 8 NY3d 14 [2006]; Aristy-Farer, 29 NY3d 501, with Paynter, 100 NY2d 434; NYCLU, 4 NY3d 175).

2025Our role, however, is—as it has always been—to determine whether plaintiffs have presented a legally sufficient claim for resolution by the courts ( compare CFE I , 86 NY2d 307; CFE II, 100 NY2d 893; Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v State of New York, 8 NY3d 14 [2006]; Aristy-Farer, 29 NY3d 501, with Paynter, 100 NY2d 434; NYCLU, 4 NY3d 175).

2025Our role, however, is—as it has always been—to determine whether plaintiffs have presented a legally sufficient claim for resolution by the courts ( compare CFE I , 86 NY2d 307; CFE II, 100 NY2d 893; Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v State of New York, 8 NY3d 14 [2006]; Aristy-Farer, 29 NY3d 501, with Paynter, 100 NY2d 434; NYCLU, 4 NY3d 175).

2025Our role, however, is—as it has always been—to determine whether plaintiffs have presented a legally sufficient claim for resolution by the courts ( compare CFE I , 86 NY2d 307; CFE II, 100 NY2d 893; Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v State of New York, 8 NY3d 14 [2006]; Aristy-Farer, 29 NY3d 501, with Paynter, 100 NY2d 434; NYCLU, 4 NY3d 175).

2025Our role, however, is—as it has always been—to determine whether plaintiffs have presented a legally sufficient claim for resolution by the courts ( compare CFE I , 86 NY2d 307; CFE II, 100 NY2d 893; Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v State of New York, 8 NY3d 14 [2006]; Aristy-Farer, 29 NY3d 501, with Paynter, 100 NY2d 434; NYCLU, 4 NY3d 175).

2025Our role, however, is—as it has always been—to determine whether plaintiffs have presented a legally sufficient claim for resolution by the courts ( compare CFE I , 86 NY2d 307; CFE II, 100 NY2d 893; Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v State of New York, 8 NY3d 14 [2006]; Aristy-Farer, 29 NY3d 501, with Paynter, 100 NY2d 434; NYCLU, 4 NY3d 175).

2025Our role, however, is—as it has always been—to determine whether plaintiffs have presented a legally sufficient claim for resolution by the courts ( compare CFE I , 86 NY2d 307; CFE II, 100 NY2d 893; Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v State of New York, 8 NY3d 14 [2006]; Aristy-Farer, 29 NY3d 501, with Paynter, 100 NY2d 434; NYCLU, 4 NY3d 175).

2025Our role, however, is—as it has always been—to determine whether plaintiffs have presented a legally sufficient claim for resolution by the courts ( compare CFE I , 86 NY2d 307; CFE II, 100 NY2d 893; Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v State of New York, 8 NY3d 14 [2006]; Aristy-Farer, 29 NY3d 501, with Paynter, 100 NY2d 434; NYCLU, 4 NY3d 175).

1999To the extent such accord was executed, defendants would have a legally sufficient defense of accord and satisfaction (cf., General Obligations Law § 15-501 [2]), and plaintiffs renewed motion for summary judgment was therefore properly denied (see, Denburg v Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 82 NY2d 375, 384 ).

1983In short, the situation is comparable to the “de facto tenure” in Perry v Sindermann (supra), which the Supreme Court found to state a legally sufficient claim to a constitutionally protected property interest.

1981In this regard, the court notes the decision of the Family Court, Suffolk County, in Matter of Baum ( 86 Misc 2d 409 , affd 61 AD2d 123 ).

1975The filing of such an affidavit, even for an ulterior purpose, does not, without more, constitute a legally sufficient claim for abuse of process (Williams v Williams, 23 NY2d 592 , supra; cf. Board of Educ. of Farmingdale Union Free School Dist. v Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Assn., Local 1889, AFT AFL-CIO, 46 AD2d 794 ).

1975The filing of such an affidavit, even for an ulterior purpose, does not, without more, constitute a legally sufficient claim for abuse of process (Williams v Williams, 23 NY2d 592 , supra; cf. Board of Educ. of Farmingdale Union Free School Dist. v Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Assn., Local 1889, AFT AFL-CIO, 46 AD2d 794 ).

1974The proposed amendment of appellant’s answer so as to permit appellant affirmatively to plead that plaintiff William Mitchell is limited to recovery of benefits allowed under the Workmen’s Compensation Law should have been granted, since the amendment sets forth a legally sufficient defense (De Giuseppe v. City of New York, 273 App. Div. 1010 , mot. for lv. to app. den. 298 N. Y. 932 ; Rauch v. Jones, 4 N Y 2d 592; Workmen’s Compensation Law, §§ 11, 29).

1934In their brief on the former appeal before this court the respondents (plaintiffs herein) made the following contention: “ Summary judgment cannot be granted, where the facts contained in the opposing affidavit reveal a legally sufficient defense or a counterclaim, though the pleading thereof be imperfect or non-existent (Curry v. Mackenzie, 239 N. Y. 267 ).