legally sufficient claim in Texas

2007At the suppression hearing, however, appellant argued that his confession was inadmissible only because his requests to terminate the interview were not honored as required by Miranda and the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. 7 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74 , 86 S.Ct. at 1627 ; Tex.Code CRiM.

2007At the suppression hearing, however, appellant argued that his confession was inadmissible only because his requests to terminate the interview were not honored as required by Miranda and the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. 7 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74 , 86 S.Ct. at 1627 ; Tex.Code CRiM.

2001Apolinar , 820 S.W.2d at 794 .

1996Apolinar, 820 S.W.2d at 794 .

2015If the court finds such a showing has been made, it then determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim." {Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53 , 67 {Equilon Enterprises).) The present appeal concerns, in particular, the second step under the statutory analysis—namely, whether appellants have demonstrated a probability of prevailing on their claim for slander of title. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) In orderto establish a probability of prevailing on a cause of action in the context of an anti-SLAPP motion, a plaintiff must sta

2015Motion to Strike Under Section 425.16 Was Properly Granted Under the first step of the analysis under section 425.16, respondents must make a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action arose from protected activity within the meaning of the statute. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1); Equilon Enterprises, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 67 ; Overstock.com, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 699 .) Here, the complaint for slander of title was premised on a single activity: the recording of the lis pendens.

2015Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 412 .) Put another way, the plaintiff "must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment ifthe evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited." (Matson v. Dvorak (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 539, 548 ; accord, Rosenaur v. Scherer (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 260, 274 .) In deciding the question of potential merit, the trial court considers the pleadings and evidentiary submissions of both the plaintiffand the defendant (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2)); though the court doe

2015Motion to Strike Under Section 425.16 Was Properly Granted Under the first step of the analysis under section 425.16, respondents must make a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action arose from protected activity within the meaning of the statute. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1); Equilon Enterprises, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 67 ; Overstock.com, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 699 .) Here, the complaint for slander of title was premised on a single activity: the recording of the lis pendens.

2015If the court finds such a showing has been made, it then determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim." {Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53 , 67 {Equilon Enterprises).) The present appeal concerns, in particular, the second step under the statutory analysis—namely, whether appellants have demonstrated a probability of prevailing on their claim for slander of title. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) In orderto establish a probability of prevailing on a cause of action in the context of an anti-SLAPP motion, a plaintiff must sta

2015The rights of litigants and attorneys to bring nonfrivolous civil actions," 'even if it is extremely unlikely that they will win'" (Sheldon Appel, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 885 ), would be unduly burdened were they exposed to tort liability for malicious prosecution for actions that had been found potentially meritorious under section 425.16. [ 28 Cal.4th 821 ] In order to establish a probability of prevailing on the claim (§425.16, subd. (b)(1)), a plaintiff responding to an anti-SLAPP motion must" 'state[] and substantiate!] a legally sufficient claim.'" (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope &Opport

2015If the court finds such a showing has been made, it then determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim." {Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53 , 67 {Equilon Enterprises).) The present appeal concerns, in particular, the second step under the statutory analysis—namely, whether appellants have demonstrated a probability of prevailing on their claim for slander of title. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) In orderto establish a probability of prevailing on a cause of action in the context of an anti-SLAPP motion, a plaintiff must sta

2015The rights of litigants and attorneys to bring nonfrivolous civil actions," 'even if it is extremely unlikely that they will win'" (Sheldon Appel, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 885 ), would be unduly burdened were they exposed to tort liability for malicious prosecution for actions that had been found potentially meritorious under section 425.16. [ 28 Cal.4th 821 ] In order to establish a probability of prevailing on the claim (§425.16, subd. (b)(1)), a plaintiff responding to an anti-SLAPP motion must" 'state[] and substantiate!] a legally sufficient claim.'" (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope &Opport

2015If the court finds such a showing has been made, it then determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim." {Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53 , 67 {Equilon Enterprises).) The present appeal concerns, in particular, the second step under the statutory analysis—namely, whether appellants have demonstrated a probability of prevailing on their claim for slander of title. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) In orderto establish a probability of prevailing on a cause of action in the context of an anti-SLAPP motion, a plaintiff must sta

2015If the court finds such a showing has been made, it then determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim." {Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53 , 67 {Equilon Enterprises).) The present appeal concerns, in particular, the second step under the statutory analysis—namely, whether appellants have demonstrated a probability of prevailing on their claim for slander of title. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) In orderto establish a probability of prevailing on a cause of action in the context of an anti-SLAPP motion, a plaintiff must sta

2015Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 412 .) Put another way, the plaintiff "must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment ifthe evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited." (Matson v. Dvorak (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 539, 548 ; accord, Rosenaur v. Scherer (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 260, 274 .) In deciding the question of potential merit, the trial court considers the pleadings and evidentiary submissions of both the plaintiffand the defendant (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2)); though the court doe

1997In Clewis , the Court of Criminal Appeals expressly stated that courts of appeals, in addition to reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence under a legally sufficient standard, also have the authority to review the factual sufficiency of the evidence provided the point is properly presented on appeal. 922 S.W.2d at 132-34 .

1991Villarreal v. State, 172 Tex.Cr.R. 213 , 355 S.W.2d 516 cert. denied, 371 U.S. 867 , 83 S.Ct. 127 , 9 L.Ed.2d 103 .

1991Villarreal v. State, 172 Tex.Cr.R. 213 , 355 S.W.2d 516 cert. denied, 371 U.S. 867 , 83 S.Ct. 127 , 9 L.Ed.2d 103 .

1991Villarreal v. State, 172 Tex.Cr.R. 213 , 355 S.W.2d 516 cert. denied, 371 U.S. 867 , 83 S.Ct. 127 , 9 L.Ed.2d 103 .

1991Villarreal v. State, 172 Tex.Cr.R. 213 , 355 S.W.2d 516 cert. denied, 371 U.S. 867 , 83 S.Ct. 127 , 9 L.Ed.2d 103 .