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11 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 2014–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Baird v. Bairdgreen2 sentences2025“Courts applying this individualized objective standard have considered such factors as the [petitioner’s] background, the [petitioner’s] knowledge of and relationship with the [respondent], any history of abuse between the parties, . . . and the cumulative effect of [the respondent’s] repetitive conduct.” Baird, 2014 UT 08, ¶ 27 (quotation simplified). 2023Baird itself made clear that the factors it outlined were just a list of factors that ―[c]ourts applying this individualized objective standard have considered.‖ Baird, 2014 UT 8, ¶ 27 . | 3 | 7 |
State v. Orselloyellow2 sentences2014When assessing these and other relevant factors, however, courts must avoid succumbing to a purely subjective analysis, which is inconsistent with the objective standard’s intent to “protect[ ] against criminalizing conduct that only an unreasonably sensitive or paranoid victim would find harassing” *736 so as to reduce the risk of “a truly innocent defendant falling within the ambit of [a stalking statute].” State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 79 (Minn.1996) (Stringer, J., dissenting). ¶ 28 In considering Robert’s request for an injunction, the district court repeatedly focused on the fact that 2014When assessing these and other relevant factors, however, courts must avoid succumbing to a purely subjective analysis, which is inconsistent with the objective standard’s intent to “protect[] against criminalizing conduct that only an unreasonably sensitive or paranoid victim would find harassing” so as to reduce the risk of “a truly innocent defendant falling within the ambit of [a stalking statute].” State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 79 (Minn. 1996) (Stringer, J., dissenting). 6 H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 815 A.2d 405, 417 (N.J. 2003). 7 State v. Hinchliffe, 987 A.2d 988, 997 (Vt. 2009). 8 Cesare v. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Phelpsgreen2 sentences2014For example, conduct such as sending the victim a dozen roses “may seem benign and loving to the casual observer,” but could “mean a very different thing” when “understood in the context of the victim’s experience.” Id. ¶ 27 Courts applying this individualized objective standard have considered such factors as the victim’s background, 6 the victim’s knowledge of and relationship with the defendant, 7 any history of abuse between the parties, 8 the location of the alleged stalking and its proximity to the victim’s children, if any, 9 and the cumulative effect of defendant’s repetitive conduct. 2014For example, conduct such as sending the victim a dozen roses “may seem benign and loving to the casual observer,” but could “mean a very different thing” when “understood in the context of the victim’s experience.” Id. ¶ 27 Courts applying this individualized objective standard have considered such factors as the victim’s background, 6 the victim’s knowledge of and relationship with the defendant, 7 any history of abuse between the parties, 8 the location of the alleged stalking and its proximity to the victim’s children, if any, 9 and the cumulative effect of defendant’s repetitive conduct. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Millergreen2 sentences2023“Courts applying this individualized objective standard have considered such factors as the victim’s background, the victim’s knowledge of and relationship with the defendant, any history of abuse between the parties, . . . and the cumulative effect of defendant’s repetitive conduct.” Id. ¶ 27 (cleaned up) (emphasis added); see also Miller, 2023 UT 3 , ¶¶ 83-86 (noting that the factors listed in Baird are not exhaustive of the behaviors “that could, in certain circumstances, cause a victim emotional distress”). 10 9. 2023But by “including ‘in the victim’s circumstances’ as part of the ‘reasonable person’ definition,” the statute “provides for an individualized objective standard,” meaning that “a court must consider the entire context surrounding [the] defendant’s conduct.” Id. ¶ 26; see also State v. Miller, 2023 UT 3, ¶¶ 82, 91 (reciting the same standard); Utah Code § 76-5-106.5(1)(a)(v) (defining a reasonable person as “a reasonable person in the victim’s circumstances”). 9 Thus, “acts that seem perfectly innocent or even well intentioned may constitute stalking. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Hinchliffegreen1 sentence2014When assessing these and other relevant factors, however, courts must avoid succumbing to a purely subjective analysis, which is inconsistent with the objective standard’s intent to “protect[] against criminalizing conduct that only an unreasonably sensitive or paranoid victim would find harassing” so as to reduce the risk of “a truly innocent defendant falling within the ambit of [a stalking statute].” State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 79 (Minn. 1996) (Stringer, J., dissenting). 6 H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 815 A.2d 405, 417 (N.J. 2003). 7 State v. Hinchliffe, 987 A.2d 988, 997 (Vt. 2009). 8 Cesare v. | 1 | 1 |
H.E.S. v. J.C.S.green1 sentence2014When assessing these and other relevant factors, however, courts must avoid succumbing to a purely subjective analysis, which is inconsistent with the objective standard’s intent to “protect[] against criminalizing conduct that only an unreasonably sensitive or paranoid victim would find harassing” so as to reduce the risk of “a truly innocent defendant falling within the ambit of [a stalking statute].” State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 79 (Minn. 1996) (Stringer, J., dissenting). 6 H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 815 A.2d 405, 417 (N.J. 2003). 7 State v. Hinchliffe, 987 A.2d 988, 997 (Vt. 2009). 8 Cesare v. | 1 | 1 |
Cesare v. Cesaregreen1 sentence2014When assessing these and other relevant factors, however, courts must avoid succumbing to a purely subjective analysis, which is inconsistent with the objective standard’s intent to “protect[] against criminalizing conduct that only an unreasonably sensitive or paranoid victim would find harassing” so as to reduce the risk of “a truly innocent defendant falling within the ambit of [a stalking statute].” State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 79 (Minn. 1996) (Stringer, J., dissenting). 6 H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 815 A.2d 405, 417 (N.J. 2003). 7 State v. Hinchliffe, 987 A.2d 988, 997 (Vt. 2009). 8 Cesare v. | 1 | 1 |
Cooper v. Coopergreen1 sentence2014See Cooper v. Cooper, 144 P.3d 451, 456 (Alaska 2006) (explaining that the “objective standard [applied to stalking cases] is individualized”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ragsdale v. Fishler
green
2 sentences2022Under this standard, the “subjective effect of the respondent’s conduct on the petitioner is irrelevant.” Ragsdale, 2021 UT 29 , ¶ 45. 2022And this holistic approach is likewise consistent with Ragsdale’s insistence that a district court should consider the “entire context surrounding” the conduct when making the fear determination under the individualized objective standard. 2021 UT 29 , ¶¶ 44, 48. ¶30 Here, the neighbor testified that she saw Hartman drive by “at least 20 times” before calling police and “easily 25, 30 times” after calling the police. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Richins v. Weldon
green
2 sentences2024“Another consideration could be whether the behavior might cause damage to one’s reputation, relationships, or livelihood.” Id. (cleaned up). ¶58 With regard to the consideration of whether a course of conduct might cause damage to one’s reputation, relationship, or livelihood, the stalking case of Richins v. Weldon, 2023 UT App 147 , 541 P.3d 274 , is instructive. 2024“Courts applying this individualized objective standard have considered such factors as the victim’s background, the victim’s knowledge of and relationship with the defendant, any history of abuse between the parties, the location of the alleged stalking, and the cumulative effect of the defendant’s repetitive conduct.” Id. (cleaned up). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Noel v. James
green
1 sentence2022“Furthermore, under an individualized objective standard, a court may consider whether the defendant had knowledge of a particular vulnerability of the victim and then acted with full knowledge of the victim’s vulnerability.” Id. (cleaned up). ¶18 Under this standard, it is far from obvious that a reasonable person in Noel’s circumstances would have feared for his safety or suffered emotional distress, given the context in 20200565-CA 8 2022 UT App 33 Noel v. James which James’s conduct took place. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Corona-Leyva v. Hartman
green
2 sentences2022In the full context of the court’s other statements, we understand the court to have based its ruling on the subjective fears of Corona-Leyva and his neighbor, rather than a determination that the element had been met under the individualized objective standard required by Baird. 20200948-CA 9 2022 UT App 45 Corona-Leyva v. Hartman reasonable person in Corona-Leyva’s circumstances would have had such fear. ¶28 Second, if Hartman means to instead suggest that there’s no evidence from which the court could find that a reasonable person in Corona-Leyva’s circumstances would have any such fear, we 2022In this sense, the element is analyzed under “an individualized objective standard.” Id. ¶ 26. 20200948-CA 7 2022 UT App 45 Corona-Leyva v. Hartman ¶23 In past cases, the supreme court has vacated injunctions based on courts’ failures to either apply an objective standard at all or instead to apply the individualized gloss to that objective standard. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Roper v. Shovan
neutral
2 sentences2014When assessing these and other relevant factors, however, courts must avoid succumbing to a purely subjective analysis, which is inconsistent with the objective standard’s intent to “protect[] against criminalizing conduct that only an unreasonably sensitive or paranoid victim would find harassing” so as to reduce the risk of “a truly innocent defendant falling within the ambit of [a stalking statute].” State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 79 (Minn. 1996) (Stringer, J., dissenting). 6 H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 815 A.2d 405, 417 (N.J. 2003). 7 State v. Hinchliffe, 987 A.2d 988, 997 (Vt. 2009). 8 Cesare v. 2014When assessing these and other relevant factors, however, courts must avoid succumbing to a purely subjective analysis, which is inconsistent with the objective standard’s intent to “protect[] against criminalizing conduct that only an unreasonably sensitive or paranoid victim would find harassing” so as to reduce the risk of “a truly innocent defendant falling within the ambit of [a stalking statute].” State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 79 (Minn. 1996) (Stringer, J., dissenting). 6 H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 815 A.2d 405, 417 (N.J. 2003). 7 State v. Hinchliffe, 987 A.2d 988, 997 (Vt. 2009). 8 Cesare v. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Coombs v. Dietrich
green
2 sentences2014When assessing these and other relevant factors, however, courts must avoid succumbing to a purely subjective analysis, which is inconsistent with the objective standard’s intent to “protect[] against criminalizing conduct that only an unreasonably sensitive or paranoid victim would find harassing” so as to reduce the risk of “a truly innocent defendant falling within the ambit of [a stalking statute].” State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 79 (Minn. 1996) (Stringer, J., dissenting). 6 H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 815 A.2d 405, 417 (N.J. 2003). 7 State v. Hinchliffe, 987 A.2d 988, 997 (Vt. 2009). 8 Cesare v. 2014When assessing these and other relevant factors, however, courts must avoid succumbing to a purely subjective analysis, which is inconsistent with the objective standard’s intent to “protect[] against criminalizing conduct that only an unreasonably sensitive or paranoid victim would find harassing” so as to reduce the risk of “a truly innocent defendant falling within the ambit of [a stalking statute].” State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 79 (Minn. 1996) (Stringer, J., dissenting). 6 H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 815 A.2d 405, 417 (N.J. 2003). 7 State v. Hinchliffe, 987 A.2d 988, 997 (Vt. 2009). 8 Cesare v. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.