continuous treatment rule in Wyoming

2024It found “[t]here is nothing in the complaint that alleges, or even suggests, that [Ms. McNair’s] injuries stemmed from any occurrence other than the surgery on December 30, 2020.” The court distinguished our precedent applying the continuous treatment rule: This is not a case where there was a failure to diagnose, as in Metzger, 709 P.2d 414 ; where there was a series of surgeries and the negligence was not found until after the completion of the second surgery, as in Jauregui v. Mem’l Hosp. of Sweetwater Cnty., 2005 WY 59, ¶ 3 , 111 P.3d 914, 915 (Wyo. 2005), overruled on other grounds by Ha

2024These provisions are not relevant in this appeal. 6 inquiry is whether, in any given case, the medical provider “has provided a continuing course of care for the same or related complaints.” Metzger, 709 P.2d at 417 . [¶18] While not expressly stated, it appears the district court may have applied the single act exception to the continuous treatment rule.

2024It found “[t]here is nothing in the complaint that alleges, or even suggests, that [Ms. McNair’s] injuries stemmed from any occurrence other than the surgery on December 30, 2020.” The court distinguished our precedent applying the continuous treatment rule: This is not a case where there was a failure to diagnose, as in Metzger, 709 P.2d 414 ; where there was a series of surgeries and the negligence was not found until after the completion of the second surgery, as in Jauregui v. Mem’l Hosp. of Sweetwater Cnty., 2005 WY 59, ¶ 3 , 111 P.3d 914, 915 (Wyo. 2005), overruled on other grounds by Ha

2024It found “[t]here is nothing in the complaint that alleges, or even suggests, that [Ms. McNair’s] injuries stemmed from any occurrence other than the surgery on December 30, 2020.” The court distinguished our precedent applying the continuous treatment rule: This is not a case where there was a failure to diagnose, as in Metzger, 709 P.2d 414 ; where there was a series of surgeries and the negligence was not found until after the completion of the second surgery, as in Jauregui v. Mem’l Hosp. of Sweetwater Cnty., 2005 WY 59, ¶ 3 , 111 P.3d 914, 915 (Wyo. 2005), overruled on other grounds by Ha

2024Candelaria, ¶¶ 29–30, 475 P.3d at 555 ; Nobles, ¶¶ 12–13, 33, 301 P.3d at 520–21, 527. [¶16] The district court recognized our adoption of the continuous treatment rule in medical malpractice actions and determined the rule did not apply because Ms. McNair’s injury resulted from “a single act of negligence” rather than from several treatments.

2024In Nobles, we “decline[d] to adopt the single act exception to the continuous treatment rule in Wyoming” because it was “inconsistent with our precedent, not widely accepted, and difficult to apply[.]” Nobles, ¶ 44, 301 P.3d at 529 .

2013Echols v. Keeler, 735 P.2d 730, 731-32 (Wyo.1987); Sharsmith v. Hill, 764 P.2d 667, 669-71 (Wyo.1988); and Jauregui v. Memorial Hospital, 2005 WY 59, ¶¶ 9-15 , 111 P.3d 914, 917-19 (Wyo.2005). [119] In response to the Hospital's motion for summary judgment, Mr. Nobles presented evidence that would bring his case within the continuous treatment rule.

2013While it is true that the continuous treatment doctrine applies to cases involving a continuous course of treatment where no single act can be pointed to as the act of malpractice, see Sharsmith v. Hill, 764 P.2d 667 (Wyo.1988) (negligent misdiagnosis); Metzger v. Kalke, 709 P.2d 414 (Wyo.1985) (negligent misdiagnosis), the doctrine is not so strictly limited.

2013Echols v. Keeler, 735 P.2d 730, 731-32 (Wyo.1987); Sharsmith v. Hill, 764 P.2d 667, 669-71 (Wyo.1988); and Jauregui v. Memorial Hospital, 2005 WY 59, ¶¶ 9-15 , 111 P.3d 914, 917-19 (Wyo.2005). [119] In response to the Hospital's motion for summary judgment, Mr. Nobles presented evidence that would bring his case within the continuous treatment rule.

2013When applying the rule in a later case, the Wyoming Supreme Court stated that the "policies behind the continuous treatment rule would not be served" by applying it in a situation where the "plaintiff ... is not prejudiced by an inability to identify the treatment which might have caused his harm...." Echols v. Keeler, 735 P.2d 730, 732 (Wyo.1987).

2013The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "where ... a patient is able to identify the specific negligent treatment that caused his/her injury, the continuous treatment doctrine does not toll the statute of limitations." Roberts v. Francis, 128 F.3d 647, 651 (8th Cir.1997).

2013The limitation we observed in Echols-limiting the continuous treatment rule by "reference to the practitioner against whom claim is made"-does not apply in Mr. Nobles' case. [128] Third, the district court's reliance on the decision in Roberts, 128 F.3d 647 is misplaced.

2024Ms. McNair timely appealed. 3 STANDARD OF REVIEW [¶12] The district court dismissed Ms. McNair’s complaint under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for “fail[ure] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, “[w]e conduct a de novo review of the materials that were before the district court.” Matter of Est. of Britain, 2018 WY 101 , ¶ 11, 425 P.3d 978, 981 (Wyo. 2018) (citing Bush Land Dev.

2005However, we have consistently stated, “[t]he continuing representation doctrine is absent from our legal malpractice statute, and we decline to judicially adopt such a provision.” Connell v. Barrett, 949 P.2d 871, 874 (Wyo.1997) (quoting Hiltz v. Robert W.

2005Id. at ¶ 12, 111 P.3d at 918 (citing Doyle v. Kuch, 611 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn.App.2000)).