continuous treatment doctrine in Connecticut

2016Our cases have consistently stated that the policy underlying the continuous treatment doctrine seeks to ‘‘[maintain] the physician/patient relationship in the belief that the most efficacious medical care will be obtained when the attending physician remains on a case from onset to cure.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grey v. Stamford Health System, Inc., supra, 282 Conn. 752 ; Blanchette v. Barrett, 229 Conn. 256, 276 , 640 A.2d 74 (1994); Connell v. Colwell, 214 Conn. 242, 253 , 571 A.2d 116 (1990) (same); see also Grey v. Stamford Health System, Inc., supra, 752 (‘‘[t]he doc- trine

2016Our cases have consistently stated that the policy underlying the continuous treatment doctrine seeks to ‘‘[maintain] the physician/patient relationship in the belief that the most efficacious medical care will be obtained when the attending physician remains on a case from onset to cure.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grey v. Stamford Health System, Inc., supra, 282 Conn. 752 ; Blanchette v. Barrett, 229 Conn. 256, 276 , 640 A.2d 74 (1994); Connell v. Colwell, 214 Conn. 242, 253 , 571 A.2d 116 (1990) (same); see also Grey v. Stamford Health System, Inc., supra, 752 (‘‘[t]he doc- trine

2016Our cases have consistently stated that the policy underlying the continuous treatment doctrine seeks to ‘‘[maintain] the physician/patient relationship in the belief that the most efficacious medical care will be obtained when the attending physician remains on a case from onset to cure.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grey v. Stamford Health System, Inc., supra, 282 Conn. 752 ; Blanchette v. Barrett, 229 Conn. 256, 276 , 640 A.2d 74 (1994); Connell v. Colwell, 214 Conn. 242, 253 , 571 A.2d 116 (1990) (same); see also Grey v. Stamford Health System, Inc., supra, 752 (‘‘[t]he doc- trine

2016Our cases have consistently stated that the policy underlying the continuous treatment doctrine seeks to ‘‘[maintain] the physician/patient relationship in the belief that the most efficacious medical care will be obtained when the attending physician remains on a case from onset to cure.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grey v. Stamford Health System, Inc., supra, 282 Conn. 752 ; Blanchette v. Barrett, 229 Conn. 256, 276 , 640 A.2d 74 (1994); Connell v. Colwell, 214 Conn. 242, 253 , 571 A.2d 116 (1990) (same); see also Grey v. Stamford Health System, Inc., supra, 752 (‘‘[t]he doc- trine

2016Thus, there will be con- tinuing treatment when a patient, instructed that he or she does not need further attention, soon returns to the doctor because of continued pain in that area for which medical attention was first sought.’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted.]);12 Miccio v. Gerdis, supra, 120 App. Div. 3d 640 (‘‘a physician . . . cannot defeat the application of the continuous treatment doctrine merely because of a failure to make a correct diagnosis as to the underlying condition, where [the physician] treated the patient continuously over the relevant time period for symptoms that are

2014Id. 15 The third prong of the Grey test is not at issue in this appeal. 16 In states that have adopted a foreign object exception, that exception generally provides that when a foreign object is unintentionally left in a plaintiff’s body during a medical procedure, the statute of limitations is tolled until such time as the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reason- able diligence should have discovered, the presence of the foreign object.

2007Because we conclude that the continuous treatment doctrine does not apply to any of the defendants, we need not consider whether the plaintiffs action would have been timely if the doctrine had applied. 5 Cf. Rosato v. Mascardo, 82 Conn. App. 396, 402-408 , 844 A.2d 893 (2004) (when plaintiff discovers injury prior to expiration of repose period, statute of limitations begins to run from date that plaintiff discovers injury, not *753 date that treatment terminated); compare Ewing v. Beck, 520 A.2d. 653, 663-64 (Del. 1987) (rejecting continuous treatment doctrine because, when patient has notic

2006Vincent’s Medical Center, 252 Conn. 363 , 746 A.2d 753 (2000), tolled the statute of limitations until that time. 7 In response, the defendants rely on the Appellate Court’s subsequent decision in Golden v. Johnson Memorial Hospital, Inc., 66 Conn. App. 518 , *318 785 A.2d 234 , cert. denied, 259 Conn. 902 , 789 A.2d 990 (2001), and a variety of sister state cases, to demonstrate that Witt and Blanchette are distinguishable because, in this context of multiple consultations by members of the same radiology practice group, each of the two MRI readings in the present case constituted a separate

2007Because we conclude that the continuous treatment doctrine does not apply to any of the defendants, we need not consider whether the plaintiffs action would have been timely if the doctrine had applied. 5 Cf. Rosato v. Mascardo, 82 Conn. App. 396, 402-408 , 844 A.2d 893 (2004) (when plaintiff discovers injury prior to expiration of repose period, statute of limitations begins to run from date that plaintiff discovers injury, not *753 date that treatment terminated); compare Ewing v. Beck, 520 A.2d. 653, 663-64 (Del. 1987) (rejecting continuous treatment doctrine because, when patient has notic

2006Vincent’s Medical Center, 252 Conn. 363 , 746 A.2d 753 (2000), tolled the statute of limitations until that time. 7 In response, the defendants rely on the Appellate Court’s subsequent decision in Golden v. Johnson Memorial Hospital, Inc., 66 Conn. App. 518 , *318 785 A.2d 234 , cert. denied, 259 Conn. 902 , 789 A.2d 990 (2001), and a variety of sister state cases, to demonstrate that Witt and Blanchette are distinguishable because, in this context of multiple consultations by members of the same radiology practice group, each of the two MRI readings in the present case constituted a separate

2007Because we conclude that the continuous treatment doctrine does not apply to any of the defendants, we need not consider whether the plaintiffs action would have been timely if the doctrine had applied. 5 Cf. Rosato v. Mascardo, 82 Conn. App. 396, 402-408 , 844 A.2d 893 (2004) (when plaintiff discovers injury prior to expiration of repose period, statute of limitations begins to run from date that plaintiff discovers injury, not *753 date that treatment terminated); compare Ewing v. Beck, 520 A.2d. 653, 663-64 (Del. 1987) (rejecting continuous treatment doctrine because, when patient has notic

1993(Bradley allegedly retired from Bridgeport Radiology prior to the commencement of the present action.) In support of her argument, the plaintiff cites Watkins v. Fromm, 108 App.Div.2d 233 , 488 N.Y.S.2d 768 (2d Dept. 1985), in which the court held that the continuous treatment doctrine was applicable to toll the statute of limitations against physicians that allegedly committed malpractice, and who treated their relationship with the defendant group medical practice.

2007Because we conclude that the continuous treatment doctrine does not apply to any of the defendants, we need not consider whether the plaintiffs action would have been timely if the doctrine had applied. 5 Cf. Rosato v. Mascardo, 82 Conn. App. 396, 402-408 , 844 A.2d 893 (2004) (when plaintiff discovers injury prior to expiration of repose period, statute of limitations begins to run from date that plaintiff discovers injury, not *753 date that treatment terminated); compare Ewing v. Beck, 520 A.2d. 653, 663-64 (Del. 1987) (rejecting continuous treatment doctrine because, when patient has notic

2007Because we conclude that the continuous treatment doctrine does not apply to any of the defendants, we need not consider whether the plaintiffs action would have been timely if the doctrine had applied. 5 Cf. Rosato v. Mascardo, 82 Conn. App. 396, 402-408 , 844 A.2d 893 (2004) (when plaintiff discovers injury prior to expiration of repose period, statute of limitations begins to run from date that plaintiff discovers injury, not *753 date that treatment terminated); compare Ewing v. Beck, 520 A.2d. 653, 663-64 (Del. 1987) (rejecting continuous treatment doctrine because, when patient has notic

2019The Second Circuit questioned the extent to which it is appropriate to rely on continuous treatment cases for guidance when analyzing a case under the continuing course of conduct doctrine because of certain differences between the doctrines. **506 The doctrines differ in certain important respects but "share similar supporting rationales." Martinelli v. Fusi , supra, 290 Conn. at 356 , 963 A.2d 640 ; see Sean O'Kane A.I.A.

2019The Second Circuit questioned the extent to which it is appropriate to rely on continuous treatment cases for guidance when analyzing a case under the continuing course of conduct doctrine because of certain differences between the doctrines. **506 The doctrines differ in certain important respects but "share similar supporting rationales." Martinelli v. Fusi , supra, 290 Conn. at 356 , 963 A.2d 640 ; see Sean O'Kane A.I.A.

2016Co., 326 Ark. 140, 146 , 929 S.W.2d 713 (1996) (‘‘the continuous treatment doctrine becomes relevant when the medical negligence consists of a series of negligent acts or, a continuing course of improper treatment’’ [emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted]); Langner v. Simpson, 533 N.W.2d 511, 522 (Iowa 1995) (‘‘[t]o prevail under the continuum of negligent treatment doctrine, the plaintiff must show [1] that there was a continuous and unbro- ken course of negligent treatment, and [2] that the treat- ment was so related as to constitute one continuing wrong’’ [internal quotatio

2016Co., 326 Ark. 140, 146 , 929 S.W.2d 713 (1996) (‘‘the continuous treatment doctrine becomes relevant when the medical negligence consists of a series of negligent acts or, a continuing course of improper treatment’’ [emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted]); Langner v. Simpson, 533 N.W.2d 511, 522 (Iowa 1995) (‘‘[t]o prevail under the continuum of negligent treatment doctrine, the plaintiff must show [1] that there was a continuous and unbro- ken course of negligent treatment, and [2] that the treat- ment was so related as to constitute one continuing wrong’’ [internal quotatio

2016Co., 326 Ark. 140, 146 , 929 S.W.2d 713 (1996) (‘‘the continuous treatment doctrine becomes relevant when the medical negligence consists of a series of negligent acts or, a continuing course of improper treatment’’ [emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted]); Langner v. Simpson, 533 N.W.2d 511, 522 (Iowa 1995) (‘‘[t]o prevail under the continuum of negligent treatment doctrine, the plaintiff must show [1] that there was a continuous and unbro- ken course of negligent treatment, and [2] that the treat- ment was so related as to constitute one continuing wrong’’ [internal quotatio

2016Co., 326 Ark. 140, 146 , 929 S.W.2d 713 (1996) (‘‘the continuous treatment doctrine becomes relevant when the medical negligence consists of a series of negligent acts or, a continuing course of improper treatment’’ [emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted]); Langner v. Simpson, 533 N.W.2d 511, 522 (Iowa 1995) (‘‘[t]o prevail under the continuum of negligent treatment doctrine, the plaintiff must show [1] that there was a continuous and unbro- ken course of negligent treatment, and [2] that the treat- ment was so related as to constitute one continuing wrong’’ [internal quotatio

2016This conclusion ‘‘is compelled by the policy underlying the continuous treatment doctrine, i.e., that a patient should not be required to interrupt corrective medical treatment by a physician and under- mine the trust in the physician-patient relationship in order to ensure a timely claim . . . .’’ (Citation omit- ted.) Couch v. Suffolk, 296 App. Div. 2d 194, 197, 746 N.Y.S.2d 187 (2002). ‘‘Although it seems incongruous that subsequent treatment can occur without affirma- tive action by the physician since the term treatment connotes the presence of action, in certain situations treatment can

2009Eye Physicians of Central Connecticut, P.C., supra, 287 Conn. 177 . 16 See also Allende v. New York City Health & Hospital Corp., 90 N.Y.2d 333, 338, 683 N.E.2d 317 , 660 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1997) (one element of doctrine is that further treatment, most often in form of regularly scheduled appointment for near future, is explicitly anticipated by both parties); id., 339 (policies underlying doctrine not implicated when plaintiff no longer had faith or trust in defendant, or intent to seek further treatment from defendant); Nykorchuck v. Henriques, 78 N.Y.2d 255, 259 , 577 N.E.2d 1026 , 573 N.Y.S.2d

2009Although we are not persuaded that such consultations properly can be considered continuing treatment; see id., 760 (“it is clear that the continuous treatment doctrine is applicable to providers of consultative . . . services only in narrowly circumscribed circumstances”); Zielinski v. Kotsoris, 279 Conn. 312, 328 , 901 A.2d 1207 (2006) (isolated and discrete consultative services “will not, without more, give rise to a . . . treatment relationship for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations”); we conclude that any reliance on such conduct to trigger the continuing treatment doctrine i

2009Although we are not persuaded that such consultations properly can be considered continuing treatment; see id., 760 (“it is clear that the continuous treatment doctrine is applicable to providers of consultative . . . services only in narrowly circumscribed circumstances”); Zielinski v. Kotsoris, 279 Conn. 312, 328 , 901 A.2d 1207 (2006) (isolated and discrete consultative services “will not, without more, give rise to a . . . treatment relationship for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations”); we conclude that any reliance on such conduct to trigger the continuing treatment doctrine i

2009A comparison of the elements of the continuous treatment doctrine with the elements of the continuing course of conduct doctrine reveals that the primary difference between the doctrines is that the former focuses on the plaintiffs reasonable expectation that the treatment for an existing condition will be ongoing, while the latter focuses on the defendant’s duty to the plaintiff arising from his knowledge of the plaintiffs condition.” (Citation omitted.) Grey v. Stamford Health System, Inc., 282 Conn. 745, 754-55 , 924 A.2d 831 (2007). 5 “[I]t is well established that ignorance of the fact th

2009A comparison of the elements of the continuous treatment doctrine with the elements of the continuing course of conduct doctrine reveals that the primary difference between the doctrines is that the former focuses on the plaintiffs reasonable expectation that the treatment for an existing condition will be ongoing, while the latter focuses on the defendant’s duty to the plaintiff arising from his knowledge of the plaintiffs condition.” (Citation omitted.) Grey v. Stamford Health System, Inc., 282 Conn. 745, 754-55 , 924 A.2d 831 (2007). 5 “[I]t is well established that ignorance of the fact th

2009David Marder & Associates, LLC, 110 Conn. App. 679, 685 , 956 A.2d 581 (2008).

2009David Marder & Associates, LLC, 110 Conn. App. 679, 685 , 956 A.2d 581 (2008).

2007Beebe v. East Haddam, 48 Conn. App. 60, 67 , 708 A.2d 231 (1998) (“the policy of statutes of limitation includes promoting repose by giving security and stabil *760 ity to human affairs.” [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2007Beebe v. East Haddam, 48 Conn. App. 60, 67 , 708 A.2d 231 (1998) (“the policy of statutes of limitation includes promoting repose by giving security and stabil *760 ity to human affairs.” [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2007Because we conclude that the continuous treatment doctrine does not apply to any of the defendants, we need not consider whether the plaintiffs action would have been timely if the doctrine had applied. 5 Cf. Rosato v. Mascardo, 82 Conn. App. 396, 402-408 , 844 A.2d 893 (2004) (when plaintiff discovers injury prior to expiration of repose period, statute of limitations begins to run from date that plaintiff discovers injury, not *753 date that treatment terminated); compare Ewing v. Beck, 520 A.2d. 653, 663-64 (Del. 1987) (rejecting continuous treatment doctrine because, when patient has notic

2007Because we conclude that the continuous treatment doctrine does not apply to any of the defendants, we need not consider whether the plaintiffs action would have been timely if the doctrine had applied. 5 Cf. Rosato v. Mascardo, 82 Conn. App. 396, 402-408 , 844 A.2d 893 (2004) (when plaintiff discovers injury prior to expiration of repose period, statute of limitations begins to run from date that plaintiff discovers injury, not *753 date that treatment terminated); compare Ewing v. Beck, 520 A.2d. 653, 663-64 (Del. 1987) (rejecting continuous treatment doctrine because, when patient has notic

2007See Elkin v. Goodman, 24 App. Div. 3d 717, 719, 808 N.Y.S.2d 405 (2005) (continuous treatment doctrine did not apply when neither plaintiff nor defendant anticipated successive magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans, treating physician independently analyzed MRI scans and defendant made no decisions as to plaintiffs treatment); Sweet v. Austin, 226 App. Div. 2d 942, 943-44, 641 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1996) (continuous treatment doctrine did not apply when there was no evidence of contact between plaintiff and defendant between successive computerized tomography (CT) scans or that further treatment afte

2007See Elkin v. Goodman, 24 App. Div. 3d 717, 719, 808 N.Y.S.2d 405 (2005) (continuous treatment doctrine did not apply when neither plaintiff nor defendant anticipated successive magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans, treating physician independently analyzed MRI scans and defendant made no decisions as to plaintiffs treatment); Sweet v. Austin, 226 App. Div. 2d 942, 943-44, 641 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1996) (continuous treatment doctrine did not apply when there was no evidence of contact between plaintiff and defendant between successive computerized tomography (CT) scans or that further treatment afte