continuous treatment doctrine in Arkansas

1997See Tullock v. Eck, 311 Ark. 564 , 845 S.W.2d 517 (1993); Treat v. Kreutzer, 290 Ark. 532 , 720 S.W.2d 716 (1986); Owen v. Wilson, 260 Ark. 21 , 537 S.W.2d 543 (1976); Williams v. Edmondson, 257 Ark. 837 , 250 S.W.2d 260 (1975); see also Note, Torts — Limitations on Actions — Arkansas Adopts Continuous Treatment Rule to Toll Statute of Limitations in Medical Malpractice Actions, 11 U.A.L.R.

1997See Tullock v. Eck, 311 Ark. 564 , 845 S.W.2d 517 (1993); Treat v. Kreutzer, 290 Ark. 532 , 720 S.W.2d 716 (1986); Owen v. Wilson, 260 Ark. 21 , 537 S.W.2d 543 (1976); Williams v. Edmondson, 257 Ark. 837 , 250 S.W.2d 260 (1975); see also Note, Torts — Limitations on Actions — Arkansas Adopts Continuous Treatment Rule to Toll Statute of Limitations in Medical Malpractice Actions, 11 U.A.L.R.

1990In Farley v. Goode, 219 Va. 969 , 252 S.E.2d 594 (1979), which we cited and relied upon in the Lane case, the Virginia Supreme Court made it clear that “by ‘continuous treatment’ we do not mean mere continuity of a general physician-patient relationship; we mean diagnosis and treatment ‘for the same or related illnesses or injuries, continuing after the alleged acts of malpractice. . . .”’ The court noted parenthetically “that the rule applied . . . presupposes that a continuous course of improper examination or treatment which is substantially uninterrupted is proved as a matter of fact.” It

1990In Farley v. Goode, 219 Va. 969 , 252 S.E.2d 594 (1979), which we cited and relied upon in the Lane case, the Virginia Supreme Court made it clear that “by ‘continuous treatment’ we do not mean mere continuity of a general physician-patient relationship; we mean diagnosis and treatment ‘for the same or related illnesses or injuries, continuing after the alleged acts of malpractice. . . .”’ The court noted parenthetically “that the rule applied . . . presupposes that a continuous course of improper examination or treatment which is substantially uninterrupted is proved as a matter of fact.” It

2005See Raynor v. Kyser, 338 Ark. 366 , 993 S.W.2d 913 (1999); Wright v. Sharma, 330 Ark. 704 , 956 S.W.2d 191 (1997); Pastchol v. St.

2005See Raynor v. Kyser, 338 Ark. 366 , 993 S.W.2d 913 (1999); Wright v. Sharma, 330 Ark. 704 , 956 S.W.2d 191 (1997); Pastchol v. St.

1999After surveying the foregoing Arkansas decisions, this court concluded that the plaintiff had not suffered a medical injury, reasoning that “it is clear from our decisions that in order to be a ‘medical injury’ the injury must be the result of a ‘professional service,’ ‘a doctor’s treatment or order,’ or ‘a matter of medical science.’ ” Id. at 228 , 930 S.W.2d at 343 (citing Wyatt, 315 Ark. 547 , 868 S.W.2d 505 ; Bailey, 307 Ark. 14 , 817 S.W.2d 412 ).

1999After surveying the foregoing Arkansas decisions, this court concluded that the plaintiff had not suffered a medical injury, reasoning that “it is clear from our decisions that in order to be a ‘medical injury’ the injury must be the result of a ‘professional service,’ ‘a doctor’s treatment or order,’ or ‘a matter of medical science.’ ” Id. at 228 , 930 S.W.2d at 343 (citing Wyatt, 315 Ark. 547 , 868 S.W.2d 505 ; Bailey, 307 Ark. 14 , 817 S.W.2d 412 ).

1999After surveying the foregoing Arkansas decisions, this court concluded that the plaintiff had not suffered a medical injury, reasoning that “it is clear from our decisions that in order to be a ‘medical injury’ the injury must be the result of a ‘professional service,’ ‘a doctor’s treatment or order,’ or ‘a matter of medical science.’ ” Id. at 228 , 930 S.W.2d at 343 (citing Wyatt, 315 Ark. 547 , 868 S.W.2d 505 ; Bailey, 307 Ark. 14 , 817 S.W.2d 412 ).

1999After surveying the foregoing Arkansas decisions, this court concluded that the plaintiff had not suffered a medical injury, reasoning that “it is clear from our decisions that in order to be a ‘medical injury’ the injury must be the result of a ‘professional service,’ ‘a doctor’s treatment or order,’ or ‘a matter of medical science.’ ” Id. at 228 , 930 S.W.2d at 343 (citing Wyatt, 315 Ark. 547 , 868 S.W.2d 505 ; Bailey, 307 Ark. 14 , 817 S.W.2d 412 ).

1999After surveying the foregoing Arkansas decisions, this court concluded that the plaintiff had not suffered a medical injury, reasoning that “it is clear from our decisions that in order to be a ‘medical injury’ the injury must be the result of a ‘professional service,’ ‘a doctor’s treatment or order,’ or ‘a matter of medical science.’ ” Id. at 228 , 930 S.W.2d at 343 (citing Wyatt, 315 Ark. 547 , 868 S.W.2d 505 ; Bailey, 307 Ark. 14 , 817 S.W.2d 412 ).

1999After surveying the foregoing Arkansas decisions, this court concluded that the plaintiff had not suffered a medical injury, reasoning that “it is clear from our decisions that in order to be a ‘medical injury’ the injury must be the result of a ‘professional service,’ ‘a doctor’s treatment or order,’ or ‘a matter of medical science.’ ” Id. at 228 , 930 S.W.2d at 343 (citing Wyatt, 315 Ark. 547 , 868 S.W.2d 505 ; Bailey, 307 Ark. 14 , 817 S.W.2d 412 ).

1997See Tullock v. Eck, 311 Ark. 564 , 845 S.W.2d 517 (1993); Treat v. Kreutzer, 290 Ark. 532 , 720 S.W.2d 716 (1986); Owen v. Wilson, 260 Ark. 21 , 537 S.W.2d 543 (1976); Williams v. Edmondson, 257 Ark. 837 , 250 S.W.2d 260 (1975); see also Note, Torts — Limitations on Actions — Arkansas Adopts Continuous Treatment Rule to Toll Statute of Limitations in Medical Malpractice Actions, 11 U.A.L.R.

1997See Tullock v. Eck, 311 Ark. 564 , 845 S.W.2d 517 (1993); Treat v. Kreutzer, 290 Ark. 532 , 720 S.W.2d 716 (1986); Owen v. Wilson, 260 Ark. 21 , 537 S.W.2d 543 (1976); Williams v. Edmondson, 257 Ark. 837 , 250 S.W.2d 260 (1975); see also Note, Torts — Limitations on Actions — Arkansas Adopts Continuous Treatment Rule to Toll Statute of Limitations in Medical Malpractice Actions, 11 U.A.L.R.

1993For example, the case of Bernado v. Ayerest Laboratories, 470 N.Y.S.2d 395 (A.D. 1 Dept. 1984), held the continuous treatment doctrine did not apply, but there, the patient undertook self treatment by continuing use of a drug prescribed many years before — long after the prescribing doctor had discontinued treatment.

1990The majority opinion states that Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137 , 215 A.2d 825 (1966), “stated that where the facts show continuing medical or surgical treatment for a particular illness or condition in the course of which there is malpractice producing or aggravating harm, the patient’s cause of action accrues at the end of the treatment for that particular illness, injury or condition, unless he knew sooner or reasonably should have known of the injury or harm, in which case the limitation starts to run with actual or constructive knowledge.” That was not the holding of the case.

1990The majority opinion states that Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137 , 215 A.2d 825 (1966), “stated that where the facts show continuing medical or surgical treatment for a particular illness or condition in the course of which there is malpractice producing or aggravating harm, the patient’s cause of action accrues at the end of the treatment for that particular illness, injury or condition, unless he knew sooner or reasonably should have known of the injury or harm, in which case the limitation starts to run with actual or constructive knowledge.” That was not the holding of the case.

1990So, for example, in Davis v. City of New York, 38 N.Y.2d 257 , 379 N.Y.S.2d 721 , 342 N.E.2d 516 (1975), the court found that where there was misdiagnosis by a city-run cancer detection center involving several contacts at intervals and surgery for cancer at another hospital, there was not continuous treatment, merely intermittent services which did not qualify as continuous treatment.

1990So, for example, in Davis v. City of New York, 38 N.Y.2d 257 , 379 N.Y.S.2d 721 , 342 N.E.2d 516 (1975), the court found that where there was misdiagnosis by a city-run cancer detection center involving several contacts at intervals and surgery for cancer at another hospital, there was not continuous treatment, merely intermittent services which did not qualify as continuous treatment.