continuous treatment doctrine in Texas

1992In Parrott v. Rand, 126 A.D.2d 621 , 511 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1987), suit was filed on June 27, 1983, for misdiagnosis of basal cell carcinoma “on June 27,1979.” The court said, “where as here, the patient is relying solely upon his continued use of a medication long after the last contact with the physician who prescribed it, we find the continuous treatment doctrine to be inapplicable.” Id. 511 N.Y.S.2d at 58 .

1992In Parrott v. Rand, 126 A.D.2d 621 , 511 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1987), suit was filed on June 27, 1983, for misdiagnosis of basal cell carcinoma “on June 27,1979.” The court said, “where as here, the patient is relying solely upon his continued use of a medication long after the last contact with the physician who prescribed it, we find the continuous treatment doctrine to be inapplicable.” Id. 511 N.Y.S.2d at 58 .

1992In Parrott v. Rand, 126 A.D.2d 621 , 511 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1987), suit was filed on June 27, 1983, for misdiagnosis of basal cell carcinoma “on June 27,1979.” The court said, “where as here, the patient is relying solely upon his continued use of a medication long after the last contact with the physician who prescribed it, we find the continuous treatment doctrine to be inapplicable.” Id. 511 N.Y.S.2d at 58 .

1991Wheeler v. Schmid Laboratories, Inc., 451 N.W.2d 133, 138-39 (N.D.1990); Froysland v. Altenburg, 439 N.W.2d 797 (N.D.1989); Parrott v. Rand, 126 A.D.2d 621 , 511 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1987).

1996Kimball, 741 S.W.2d at 372 ; see also Chambers v. Conaway, 883 S.W.2d 156 (Tex.1993); Rowntree v. Hunsucker, 833 5.W.2d 103, 105-06 (Tex.1992).

1996Kimball, 741 S.W.2d at 372 ; see also Chambers v. Conaway, 883 S.W.2d 156 (Tex.1993); Rowntree v. Hunsucker, 833 S.W.2d 103, 105-06 (Tex.1992).

1994Under the continuous treatment doctrine exception, however, the 2¡¿-year period does not begin to run until the end of the course of treatment “ “when the course of treatment which includes the wrongful acts or omissions has run continuously and is related to the same original condition or complaint’” (McDermott v. Torre, supra, 56 N.Y.2d [399] at 405, 452 N.Y.S.2d 351 , 437 N.E.2d 1108 , quoting Borgia v. City of New York, supra, 12 N.Y.2d [151] at 155, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319 , 187 N.E.2d 777 ).

1994Under the continuous treatment doctrine exception, however, the 2¡¿-year period does not begin to run until the end of the course of treatment “ “when the course of treatment which includes the wrongful acts or omissions has run continuously and is related to the same original condition or complaint’” (McDermott v. Torre, supra, 56 N.Y.2d [399] at 405, 452 N.Y.S.2d 351 , 437 N.E.2d 1108 , quoting Borgia v. City of New York, supra, 12 N.Y.2d [151] at 155, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319 , 187 N.E.2d 777 ).

1994Under the continuous treatment doctrine exception, however, the 2¡¿-year period does not begin to run until the end of the course of treatment “ “when the course of treatment which includes the wrongful acts or omissions has run continuously and is related to the same original condition or complaint’” (McDermott v. Torre, supra, 56 N.Y.2d [399] at 405, 452 N.Y.S.2d 351 , 437 N.E.2d 1108 , quoting Borgia v. City of New York, supra, 12 N.Y.2d [151] at 155, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319 , 187 N.E.2d 777 ).

1994Under the continuous treatment doctrine exception, however, the 2¡¿-year period does not begin to run until the end of the course of treatment “ “when the course of treatment which includes the wrongful acts or omissions has run continuously and is related to the same original condition or complaint’” (McDermott v. Torre, supra, 56 N.Y.2d [399] at 405, 452 N.Y.S.2d 351 , 437 N.E.2d 1108 , quoting Borgia v. City of New York, supra, 12 N.Y.2d [151] at 155, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319 , 187 N.E.2d 777 ).

1992In Bernardo v. Ayerest Laboratories, 99 A.D.2d 430 , 470 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1984), the suit was for injury caused by the drug Premarin.

1992In Bernardo v. Ayerest Laboratories, 99 A.D.2d 430 , 470 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1984), the suit was for injury caused by the drug Premarin.

1992The court held that “the continuous treatment doctrine has no application where, as here, the patient undertakes self-treatment by continuing use of a drug prescribed many years before, long after she has discontinued treatment by the prescribing doctor.” Id. 494 N.Y.S.2d at 542 .

1992The court held that “the continuous treatment doctrine has no application where, as here, the patient undertakes self-treatment by continuing use of a drug prescribed many years before, long after she has discontinued treatment by the prescribing doctor.” Id. 494 N.Y.S.2d at 542 .

1991Wheeler v. Schmid Laboratories, Inc., 451 N.W.2d 133, 138-39 (N.D.1990); Froysland v. Altenburg, 439 N.W.2d 797 (N.D.1989); Parrott v. Rand, 126 A.D.2d 621 , 511 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1987).

1984Here it is used as an exception to the continuous treatment doctrine, which does not apply "where the patient, prior to termination of the treatment, discovers, or has an opportunity to discover, the act of malpractice and his injury”; and where the exception arises from the facts of the case, ”[t]he cases ... hold that even though the treatment has not yet terminated, the limitation period commences to run from the time the patient discovers the pertinent facts.” Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 368 , 383 (1961). . 550 S.W.2d at page 20 , the Court states: [t]he primary purpose of a statute of limitations

1984R.2d 368, 383 (1961). [4] 550 S.W.2d at page 20 , the Court states: [t]he primary purpose of a statute of limitations is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time so that the opposing party has a fair opportunity to defend while witnesses are available and the evidence is fresh in their minds....