continuous treatment doctrine in New York

2022"The statute is tolled until after a plaintiff's last treatment, however, 'when the course of treatment which includes the wrongful acts or omissions has run continuously and is related to the same original condition or complaint'" ( Massie v Crawford , 78 NY2d at 519, quoting McDermott v Torre , 56 NY2d 399, 405 [internal quotation marks omitted]). "'Under the continuous treatment doctrine, the limitations period does not begin to run until the end of the course of treatment if three conditions are met: (1) the patient continued to seek, and in fact obtained, an actual course of treatment fro

2022Indeed, the Court of Appeals has clarified that the continuous treatment doctrine does not "delay[ ] the action's accrual" ( McDermott v Torre , 56 NY2d 399, 407 ).

2024Further, because those processes firmly ended on that date, the continuous treatment doctrine does not toll the statute of limitations ( see Nykorchuck v Henriques , 78 NY2d 255, 258 [1991]).

2024Further, because those processes firmly ended on that date, the continuous treatment doctrine does not toll the statute of limitations ( see Nykorchuck v Henriques , 78 NY2d 255, 258 [1991]).

2014While medical malpractice claims generally accrue at the time the malpractice is committed, the continuous treatment doctrine provides that “when the course of treatment which includes the wrongful acts or omissions has run continuously and is related to the same original condition or complaint, that ‘accrual’ comes only at the end of the treatment” (Borgia v City of New York, 12 NY2d 151, 155 [1962]; see CPLR 214-a; Nykorchuck v Henriques, 78 NY2d 255, 258 [1991]).

2014While medical malpractice claims generally accrue at the time the malpractice is committed, the continuous treatment doctrine provides that “when the course of treatment which includes the wrongful acts or omissions has run continuously and is related to the same original condition or complaint, that ‘accrual’ comes only at the end of the treatment” (Borgia v City of New York, 12 NY2d 151, 155 [1962]; see CPLR 214-a; Nykorchuck v Henriques, 78 NY2d 255, 258 [1991]).

2025In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled by the application of the continuous treatment doctrine ( see Massie v Crawford , 78 NY2d 516, 519 ; Proano v Gutman , 211 AD3d at 982).

2022Regardless, to suggest that the mere questioning of a patient about his or her family history for a wide array of conditions creates a course of treatment for one of those conditions would eviscerate the continuous treatment doctrine ( see Massie v Crawford , 78 NY2d 516, 519 ).

2022The article acknowledges that "aging and menopause are inextricably linked," and that "[p]rincipal health concerns of menopausal women include vasomotor symptoms, urogenital atrophy, osteoporosis, cardiovascular disease, cancer, psychiatric symptoms, cognitive decline, and sexual problems." Accepting the plaintiff's expansive view that the mere status of receiving treatment for menopausal symptoms necessarily encompasses all conditions related to menopause and aging, would undermine the sound policy reasons behind the continuous treatment doctrine ( see id. ; Massie v Crawford , 78 NY2d at 519

2014“Given plaintiffs lack of awareness of a condition warranting further treatment, the purpose of the continuous treatment doctrine would not be served by its application here” (Young, 91 NY2d at 297 ; see also id. at 296 [“a patient who is not aware of the need for further treatment of a condition is not faced with the dilemma that the doctrine is designed to prevent”]; Rizk v Cohen, 73 NY2d at 104 [there was “no sound basis for applying the continuous treatment doctrine” where the plaintiff was “unaware of the need for further treatment”]).

2024The continuous treatment doctrine contains three principal elements: '(l) the patient 'continued to seek and in fact obtained an actual course of treatment from th defendant ph sician during the relevant p riod '; (2) th course of treatment was for the arne conditions or complaints underlying the plaintiffs medical malpractice claim ; and (3) the treatment is ' continuous"' Hail v. Bologne e, 210 A.D.3d 958 178 .Y. .3d 564 (2d Dept. 2022)· Hillary v. Gerstein, 178 A.D.3d 674 114 N.Y.S.3d 440 (2d Dept. 2019); Gomez v. Kalz, 61 A.D.3d 108 , 874 .Y.S.2d 161 (2d Dept. 2009).

2024"The underlying premise of the continuous treatment doctrine is that the [dentist]-patient relationship is marked by continuing trust and confidence and that the patient should not be put to the disadvantage of questioning the [dentist]'s skill in the midst of treatment, since the commencement of litigation during ongoing treatment necessarily interrupts the course of treatment itself" ( Gomez v Katz , 61 AD3d 108, 111 [2d Dept 2009] [citations omitted]; see Labshere v Petroski , 32 AD3d 645, 647 [3d [*2]Dept 2006]).

2018Plaintiff did just that and, contrary to her contention, Patel later noting her treatment by other medical providers and issuing a courtesy renewal of a prescription at the request of a pharmacy did not suggest that more treatment was "explicitly anticipated by both" plaintiff and Patel so as to implicate the continuous treatment doctrine ( Richardson v Orentreich , 64 NY2d 896, 898 [1985]; see Nykorchuck v Henriques , 78 NY2d 255, 258-259 [1991]; Fuller v Aberdale , 130 AD3d 1277, 1281-1282 [2015]; Boyle v Fox , 51 AD3d at 1244 ).

2014Thus, the continuous treatment doctrine applies when further treatment is explicitly anticipated by both physician and patient, as manifested in the form of a regularly scheduled appointment for the near future, agreed upon during that last visit, which is for the purpose of administering ongoing corrective efforts for the same or a related condition (see Richardson v Orentreich, 64 NY2d 896, 898-899 [1985]; Schrank v Lederman, 52 AD3d 494 [2008]).

2016We respectfully disagree with our dissenting colleague’s view that “because the parties only contemplated treatment after September 5, 2003 on an ‘as needed basis,’ the continuous treatment doctrine does not apply.” The determination whether continuous treatment exists “must focus on the patient” (Rizk v Cohen, 73 NY2d 98, 104 ) and, “[i]n determining whether plaintiff[] raised an issue of fact concerning the applicability of the continuous treatment doctrine, [her] version of the facts must be accepted as true” (Scribner v Harvey, 245 AD2d 1120, 1121 ).

2016We respectfully disagree with our dissenting colleague’s view that “because the parties only contemplated treatment after September 5, 2003 on an ‘as needed basis,’ the continuous treatment doctrine does not apply.” The determination whether continuous treatment exists “must focus on the patient” (Rizk v Cohen, 73 NY2d 98, 104 [1989]) and, “[i]n determining whether plaintiff[ ] raised an issue of fact concerning the applicability of the continuous treatment doctrine, [her] version of the facts must be accepted as true” (Scribner v Harvey, 245 AD2d 1120, 1121 [1997]).

2024Heron v New York City Health and Hospitals Corp., 98 NY2d 263 [2002]).

2024Heron v New York City Health and Hospitals Corp., 98 NY2d 263 [2002]).

2012Thus, given that the patient was not aware of the need for further treatment of this condition, the decedent was not faced with the dilemma that the continuous treatment doctrine is designed to prevent, i.e. interrupting the treatment or monitoring a condition in order to protect her rights (Young, 91 NY2d at 296 ; Allende, 90 NY2d at 337-338 ).

2003The principle has also evolved that even if the hospital expected the patient to return for follow-up treatments, in order for the continuous treatment doctrine to apply, the plaintiff patient also must intend to do so in connection with the injury for which treatment was being sought ( Allende, supra).

2015However, in opposition, the plaintiffs raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled by the continuous treatment doctrine (see Miccio v Gerdis, 120 AD3d 639, 640 [2014]; Chestnut v Bobb-McKoy, 94 AD3d 659, 660-661 [2012]; Chkhartishvili v Volovoy, 44AD3d 893, 893 [2007]; Couch v County of Suffolk, 296 AD2d 194, 196 [2002]).

2014Thus, a physician or hospital cannot defeat the application of the continuous treatment doctrine merely because of a failure to make a correct diagnosis as to the underlying condition, where it treated the patient continuously over the relevant time period for symptoms that are ultimately traced to that condition (see Chestnut v Bobb-McKoy, 94 AD3d 659, 661 [2012]; Chkhartishvili v Volovoy, 44 AD3d 893, 893-894 [2007]; Couch v County of Suffolk, 296 AD2d 194, 197 [2002]).

2020Where, as here, a malpractice claim is predicated upon an alleged failure to properly diagnose a condition, "the continuous treatment doctrine may apply as long as the symptoms being treated indicate the presence of that condition" ( Simons v Bassett Health Care , 73 AD3d 1252, 1254 [3d Dept 2010]; Wilson , 112 AD3d at 500).

2013The continuous treatment doctrine serves to toll the limitations period during a patient’s course of treatment with his or her physician (see Simons v Bassett Health Care, 73 AD3d 1252, 1254 [2010]; Aulita v Chang, 44 AD3d 1206, 1208 [2007]).

2015The burden then shifted to plaintiff to show triable issues of fact with respect to the application of the continuous treatment doctrine” (Waring v Kingston Diagnostic Radiology Ctr., 13 AD3d 1024, 1025 [2004]; see Cox v Kingsboro Med.

2015The burden then shifted to plaintiff to show triable issues of fact with respect to the application of the continuous treatment doctrine” (Waring v Kingston Diagnostic Radiology Ctr., 13 AD3d 1024, 1025 [2004]; see Cox v Kingsboro Med.

2017With respect to failure-to-diagnose cases, a physician "cannot escape liability under the continuous treatment doctrine merely because of a failure to make a correct diagnosis as to the underlying condition, where [he or she] treated the patient continuously over the relevant time period for symptoms that are ultimately traced to that condition" ( Chestnut v Bobb-McKoy, 94 AD3d at 661 ; see Miccio v Gerdis, 120 AD3d 639, 640 ).

2017With respect to failure-to-diagnose cases, a physician “cannot escape liability under the continuous treatment doctrine merely because of a failure to make a correct diagnosis as to the underlying condition, where [he or she] treated the patient continuously over the relevant time period for symptoms that are ultimately traced to that condition” (Chestnut v Bobb-McKoy, 94 AD3d at 661 ; see Miccio v Gerdis, 120 AD3d 639, 640 [2014]).

2012With respect to the continuous treatment doctrine, the record shows that plaintiffs mastectomy on November 20, 2001 and her breast reconstruction surgery on September 26, 2002 were separate and discrete procedures, as further treatment after plaintiffs mastectomy was not “explicitly anticipated” by both plaintiff and her doctors (Cox, 88 NY2d at 906-907 ; cf. Blaier v Cramer, 303 AD2d 301, 302 [2003]).

2012With respect to the continuous treatment doctrine, the record shows that plaintiffs mastectomy on November 20, 2001 and her breast reconstruction surgery on September 26, 2002 were separate and discrete procedures, as further treatment after plaintiffs mastectomy was not “explicitly anticipated” by both plaintiff and her doctors (Cox, 88 NY2d at 906-907 ; cf. Blaier v Cramer, 303 AD2d 301, 302 [2003]).

2018As to Gold, the continuous treatment doctrine may apply even though he retired in June of 2012, by imputing to him the continued treatment provided by other dentists in the practice ( see Watkins v Fromm , 108 AD2d 233, 240-242 ; see also Mule v Peloro , 60 AD3d 649, 650 ).

1999Moreover, where an agency relationship is shown to exist between two caregivers, continuing treatment by one will be imputed to the other for purposes of tolling the Statute of Limitations under the continuous treatment rule (see, McDermott v Torre, supra, at 407-408; Watkins v Fromm, supra, at 241 ).

2018Accordingly, a defendant cannot defeat the application of the continuous treatment doctrine merely because of a failure to make a correct diagnosis as to the underlying condition, if the defendant treated the plaintiff continuously over the relevant time period for symptoms that are ultimately traced to that condition ( see Miccio v Gerdis , 120 AD3d 639, 640 ; cf. Marrone v Klein , 33 AD3d 546 ; Pietromonaco v Schwartzman , 259 AD2d 474 ).

2017With respect to failure-to-diagnose cases, a physician “cannot escape liability under the continuous treatment doctrine merely because of a failure to make a correct diagnosis as to the underlying condition, where [he or she] treated the patient continuously over the relevant time period for symptoms that are ultimately traced to that condition” (Chestnut v Bobb-McKoy, 94 AD3d at 661 ; see Miccio v Gerdis, 120 AD3d 639, 640 [2014]).

2008Even continuing “monitoring” of a specific medical condition, as opposed to general physical examinations, is not necessarily outside the continuous treatment doctrine (see Ganess v City of New York, 85 NY2d 733, 736 [1995]).

1999The continuous treatment doctrine rests upon “the premise that it is in the patient’s best interest that an ongoing course of treatment be continued, rather than interrupted by a lawsuit, because ‘the doctor not only is in a position to identify and correct his or her malpractice, but is best placed to do so’ ” (Nykorchuck v Henriques, 78 NY2d 255, 258 , quoting McDermott v Torre, 56 NY2d 399, 408 ; see also, Ganess v City of New York, 85 NY2d 733, 735 ).

2018As to Gold, the continuous treatment doctrine may apply even though he retired in June of 2012, by imputing to him the continued treatment provided by other dentists in the practice ( see Watkins v Fromm , 108 AD2d 233, 240-242 ; see also Mule v Peloro , 60 AD3d 649, 650 ).

2018As to Gold, the continuous treatment doctrine may apply even though he retired in June of 2012, by imputing to him the continued treatment provided by other dentists in the practice ( see Watkins v Fromm , 108 AD2d 233, 240-242 ; see also Mule v Peloro , 60 AD3d 649, 650 ).

2010We thus conclude that the two biopsies were “discrete and complete” events that cannot be linked by way of the continuous treatment doctrine (Davis v City of New York, 38 NY2d 257, 260 [1975]).

2002The doctrine of continuous treatment, however, may toll the 90-day period within which a notice of claim must be filed under General Municipal Law § 50-e (see Davis v City of New York, 38 NY2d 257, 259 [1975]).

2008Although the Second Department has held that “the continuous treatment doctrine is inapplicable where the interval of time between visits or treatments exceeds the applicable period of limitations” (Marmol v Green, 7 AD3d 682, 682 [2004], quoting Grellet v City of New York, 118 AD2d 141, 149 [2d Dept 1986]), that rule is contrary to the Court of Appeals’ pronouncement in Massie and is not followed in the other Departments (see e.g.

2004Although the appellants demonstrated, prima facie, that the alleged malpractice occurred over a substantial period of time before the plaintiff served the notice of claim, and although “it is the rule in the Second Department that the continuous treatment doctrine is inapplicable where the interval of time between visits or treatments exceeds the applicable period of limitations” (Grellet v City of New York, 118 AD2d 141, 149 [1986]), the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to the interval of time between visits in the instant case (see generally Borgia v City of New York, 12 NY2d 151

2005However, in order to impute one physician’s treatment of a patient to another physician for purposes of the continuous treatment doctrine, there must be evidence of “an agency or other relevant relationship” between the two physicians (Meath v Mishrick, 68 NY2d 992, 994 [1986]; McDermott v Torre, 56 NY2d 399 [1982]; see also Conway v Nassau County Med.

2002Although plaintiff’s primary care physician is the medical director of the Hospital, the postoperative care that she provided cannot be imputed to the Hospital for purposes of the continuous treatment doctrine because plaintiff’s claim against the Hospital is vicarious only, arising from the Hospital’s relationship with the anesthesiologist, and there is no proof of a relevant relationship between the primary care physician and the anesthesiologist (see Walsh v Faxton-Children’s Hosp., 192 AD2d 1106, 1106-1107 ; see also Meath v Mishrick, 68 NY2d 992, 994 ; Colon v City of New York, 287 AD2d 5

2009The underlying premise of the continuous treatment doctrine is that the doctor-patient relationship is marked by continuing trust and confidence and that the patient should not be put to the disadvantage of questioning the doctor’s skill in the midst of treatment, since the commencement of litigation during ongoing treatment necessarily interrupts the course of treatment itself (see Massie v Crawford, 78 NY2d 516, 519 [1991]; see also Coyne v Bersani, 61 NY2d 939, 940 [1984]; Siegel v Kranis, 29 AD2d 477, 480 [1968]).

2000However, the Supreme Court correctly determined that the continuous treatment doctrine did not apply, because the plaintiff did not have “continuing trust and confidence” (Coyne v Bersani, 61 NY2d 939, 940 ) in the doctors at the defendant’s hospital, or “contemplare] any continuity of relationship” (Allende v New York City Health & Hosps.

2025In Marabello v City of New York (99 AD2d 133 [2d Dept 1984]), the Second Department first dealt with the "novel issue" of whether the continuous treatment doctrine may apply across different facilities within the common ownership of New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation.

2025In Marabello v City of New York ( 99 AD2d 133 [2d Dept 1984]), the Second Department first dealt with the "novel issue" of whether the continuous treatment doctrine may apply across different facilities within the common ownership of New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation.

2016Here, in opposition to Mid Hudson’s prima facie showing that the time in which to commence this action against it had expired, the plaintiff failed to raise a question of fact as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled pursuant to the continuous treatment doctrine (see Curcio v Ippolito, 63 NY2d 967, 969 [1984]; cf. Vaughn v City of New York, 4 AD3d 412, 414 [2004]; Parker v Jankunas, 227 AD2d 537, 537-538 [1996]).

2003The continuous treatment doctrine did not toll the statute of limitations with respect to those claims involving Dr. Petti for treatment provided more than 2V2 years prior to the commencement of this action, as it was undisputed that Dr. Petti did not provide treatment between April 1993 and 1997 (see Curcio v Ippolito, 63 NY2d 967 [1984]; Matter of Bulger v Nassau County Med.