statement of the general rule in Alabama

2025Co. of N.Y. v. Murphy, (II), 231 Ala. 680 , 166 So. 604 , (1936), and Gunn, (II), supra, are cited, among others, in Roden & Son v. State, 30 Ala. App. 229 , 3 So. 2d 420 [(1941)], as authority for the statement of the general principle that '… a judgment in a civil case is not conclusive as res judicata in a criminal case, or vice versa, there being no mutuality of parties and a different degree of proof, respectively, being required. …' " 295 Ala. at 249 , 326 So. 2d at 736-37 (emphasis added).

2025Co. of N.Y. v. Murphy, (II), 231 Ala. 680 , 166 So. 604 , (1936), and Gunn, (II), supra, are cited, among others, in Roden & Son v. State, 30 Ala. App. 229 , 3 So. 2d 420 [(1941)], as authority for the statement of the general principle that '… a judgment in a civil case is not conclusive as res judicata in a criminal case, or vice versa, there being no mutuality of parties and a different degree of proof, respectively, being required. …' " 295 Ala. at 249 , 326 So. 2d at 736-37 (emphasis added).

2025Co. of N.Y. v. Murphy, (II), 231 Ala. 680 , 166 So. 604 , (1936), and Gunn, (II), supra, are cited, among others, in Roden & Son v. State, 30 Ala. App. 229 , 3 So. 2d 420 [(1941)], as authority for the statement of the general principle that '… a judgment in a civil case is not conclusive as res judicata in a criminal case, or vice versa, there being no mutuality of parties and a different degree of proof, respectively, being required. …' " 295 Ala. at 249 , 326 So. 2d at 736-37 (emphasis added).

2025Co. of N.Y. v. Murphy, (II), 231 Ala. 680 , 166 So. 604 , (1936), and Gunn, (II), supra, are cited, among others, in Roden & Son v. State, 30 Ala. App. 229 , 3 So. 2d 420 [(1941)], as authority for the statement of the general principle that '… a judgment in a civil case is not conclusive as res judicata in a criminal case, or vice versa, there being no mutuality of parties and a different degree of proof, respectively, being required. …' " 295 Ala. at 249 , 326 So. 2d at 736-37 (emphasis added).

1981Gribble v. Cox, 349 So.2d 1141 (Ala. 1977).

1981Gribble v. Cox , 349 So.2d 1141 (Ala. 1977).

1977Nor do we take issue with the statement of the general principle of law governing the effect of notice, or actual knowledge, to a senior lienholder of the existence of a junior lien when the senior makes advances under his mortgage, Hampton v. Gulf Federal Savings Loan Association , 287 Ala. 172 , 249 So.2d 829 (1971), although we point out that the issues discussed in the dissent in that case, dealing with exceptions to this general rule, are not presented in the case before us.

1977Nor do we take issue with the statement of the general principle of law governing the effect of notice, or actual knowledge, to a senior lienholder of the existence of a junior lien when the senior makes advances under his mortgage, Hampton v. Gulf Federal Savings Loan Association , 287 Ala. 172 , 249 So.2d 829 (1971), although we point out that the issues discussed in the dissent in that case, dealing with exceptions to this general rule, are not presented in the case before us.

1956See also In re Force, supra. A statement of the general rule is also found in 2 C.J.S., Adoption of Children, § 21(2), p. 390: “Where * * * an adoption is attempted without the consent of a natural parent because of a divorce, there must be a final dissolution of the mar *306 riage, with no rights reserved to the parent deprived of custody.” In Stone v. Dickerson, supra, the mother was, under the terms of the divorce decree, given custody of the child with the right of visitation in the natural father and the right to take the child to his mother’s home two Sundays each month.

1939Ex parte Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 235 Ala. 82 , 178 So. 63 .

1939Ex parte Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 235 Ala. 82 , 178 So. 63 .

1937Raisler v. Oliver & Co., 97 Ala. 710 , 12 So. 238 , 38 Am.St.Rep. 213 ; Ferguson, pro ami, v. Lowery et al., 54 Ala. 510 , 25 Am.Rep. 718 .

1937Raisler v. Oliver & Co., 97 Ala. 710 , 12 So. 238 , 38 Am.St.Rep. 213 ; Ferguson, pro ami, v. Lowery et al., 54 Ala. 510 , 25 Am.Rep. 718 .

1931It can, however, and usually does, raise new issues relating to that subject-matter; may present equities relating to the subject-matter, which arise between co-defendants, but which are not shown by the original bill, and, generally, may be resorted to, to secure such moulding or modification of complainant’s relief, as to secure full relief to all parties.” Sims Chancery Pract. § 647; Ashe-Garson Co. v. Bonifay, 147 Ala. 376 , 41 So. 816 , and citations; Nelson v. Dunn, 15 Ala. 501 -513.

1931It can, however, and usually does, raise new issues relating to that subject-matter; may present equities relating to the subject-matter, which arise between co-defendants, but which are not shown by the original bill, and, generally, may be resorted to, to secure such moulding or modification of complainant’s relief, as to secure full relief to all parties.” Sims Chancery Pract. § 647; Ashe-Garson Co. v. Bonifay, 147 Ala. 376 , 41 So. 816 , and citations; Nelson v. Dunn, 15 Ala. 501 -513.

1931It can, however, and usually does, raise new issues relating to that subject-matter; may present equities relating to the subject-matter, which arise between co-defendants, but which are not shown by the original bill, and, generally, may be resorted to, to secure such moulding or modification of complainant’s relief, as to secure full relief to all parties.” Sims Chancery Pract. § 647; Ashe-Garson Co. v. Bonifay, 147 Ala. 376 , 41 So. 816 , and citations; Nelson v. Dunn, 15 Ala. 501 -513.

1931A statement of the general rule upon that subject is made by Stone, X, in Davis v. Cook, 65 Ala. 617, 625 , which seems to have been very commonly accepted as accurate and complete, as follows: “We agree that, in the absence of special circumstances, the cross-bill can bring forward no new subject-matter, not presented in the original bill.

1920Co. v. McNeeley, 58 Wash. 223 , 108 Pac. 621 , 28 L.

1920Co. v. McNeeley, 58 Wash. 223 , 108 Pac. 621 , 28 L.

1920Plaintiff’s evidence tended to show that ordinarily a car of corn varied from 20,000 to 60,000 pounds. [7] The foregoing rule by our court for *195 the measure oi damages for nondelivery of personal property, pursuant to contract of sale, is in line with the statement of the general rule by Mr. Sutherland in his work on Damages, vol. 2 (4th Ed.) § 651, p. 2279, that— “If the sale is of a carload of goods, no particular car being specified, the damages are to be assessed on the basis of the quantity which an ordinary car will contain.” Seefeld v. Thacker, 93 Wis. 518, 520 , 67 N. W. 1142 ; Eloy

1920Plaintiff’s evidence tended to show that ordinarily a car of corn varied from 20,000 to 60,000 pounds. [7] The foregoing rule by our court for *195 the measure oi damages for nondelivery of personal property, pursuant to contract of sale, is in line with the statement of the general rule by Mr. Sutherland in his work on Damages, vol. 2 (4th Ed.) § 651, p. 2279, that— “If the sale is of a carload of goods, no particular car being specified, the damages are to be assessed on the basis of the quantity which an ordinary car will contain.” Seefeld v. Thacker, 93 Wis. 518, 520 , 67 N. W. 1142 ; Eloy

1920Plaintiff’s evidence tended to show that ordinarily a car of corn varied from 20,000 to 60,000 pounds. [7] The foregoing rule by our court for *195 the measure oi damages for nondelivery of personal property, pursuant to contract of sale, is in line with the statement of the general rule by Mr. Sutherland in his work on Damages, vol. 2 (4th Ed.) § 651, p. 2279, that— “If the sale is of a carload of goods, no particular car being specified, the damages are to be assessed on the basis of the quantity which an ordinary car will contain.” Seefeld v. Thacker, 93 Wis. 518, 520 , 67 N. W. 1142 ; Eloy

1920Plaintiff’s evidence tended to show that ordinarily a car of corn varied from 20,000 to 60,000 pounds. [7] The foregoing rule by our court for *195 the measure oi damages for nondelivery of personal property, pursuant to contract of sale, is in line with the statement of the general rule by Mr. Sutherland in his work on Damages, vol. 2 (4th Ed.) § 651, p. 2279, that— “If the sale is of a carload of goods, no particular car being specified, the damages are to be assessed on the basis of the quantity which an ordinary car will contain.” Seefeld v. Thacker, 93 Wis. 518, 520 , 67 N. W. 1142 ; Eloy

1894In Hughes v. Anderson, 68 Ala. 280 , supra, it was said by Stone,!., after a statement of the general doctrine, as we have expressed it that it could not be “enforced in the strict letter, without impeding agricultural progress, and without hindering industrial enterprises.

1888As said in Spence v. Simmons, 16 Ala. 828 , “a judgment should show the plaintiff who recovers, the defendant against whom the recovery is had, and the specific thing or amount of money recovered.” This statement of the general rule, however, must not be understood as meaning; that only the mere entry of what the court considered or adjudged, disconnected from the other parts of the record, can be looked to, and that such entry itself must show, in terms, the material requisites.