statement of the general rule in Michigan

1982But it is not proper to divide up the testimony on which the people propose to rest their case, and nothing which tends to prove the commission of the crime itself or its immediate surroundings can be classed as rebutting evidence under ordinary circumstances, if at all.” This statement of the general rule was adopted by the Michigan Supreme Court in People v McGillen #1, 392 Mich 251, 265-266 ; 220 NW2d 677 (1974).

1982But it is not proper to divide up the testimony on which the people propose to rest their case, and nothing which tends to prove the commission of the crime itself or its immediate surroundings can be classed as rebutting evidence under ordinary circumstances, if at all.” This statement of the general rule was adopted by the Michigan Supreme Court in People v McGillen #1, 392 Mich 251, 265-266 ; 220 NW2d 677 (1974).

1968Also pertinent. is the annotation: Wife’s right of action for loss of consortium, 23 ALR2d 1378, 1384, and the comment, Common law liability of the liquor vendor, 18 W Res L R 251 (1966). 26 Gullikson v. Gjorud (1890), 82 Mich 503, 505 ; Vice v. Sherberneau (1908), 152 Mich 601, 606 ; Kreiter v. Nichols (1874), 28 Mich 496, 497 ; In re Miller’s Estate (1910), 160 Mich 309, 317 ; Jones v. Bourrie (1963), 369 Mich 473, 476 ; 30 Am Jur, Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 544, 546.

1968Also pertinent. is the annotation: Wife’s right of action for loss of consortium, 23 ALR2d 1378, 1384, and the comment, Common law liability of the liquor vendor, 18 W Res L R 251 (1966). 26 Gullikson v. Gjorud (1890), 82 Mich 503, 505 ; Vice v. Sherberneau (1908), 152 Mich 601, 606 ; Kreiter v. Nichols (1874), 28 Mich 496, 497 ; In re Miller’s Estate (1910), 160 Mich 309, 317 ; Jones v. Bourrie (1963), 369 Mich 473, 476 ; 30 Am Jur, Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 544, 546.

1968Also pertinent. is the annotation: Wife’s right of action for loss of consortium, 23 ALR2d 1378, 1384, and the comment, Common law liability of the liquor vendor, 18 W Res L R 251 (1966). 26 Gullikson v. Gjorud (1890), 82 Mich 503, 505 ; Vice v. Sherberneau (1908), 152 Mich 601, 606 ; Kreiter v. Nichols (1874), 28 Mich 496, 497 ; In re Miller’s Estate (1910), 160 Mich 309, 317 ; Jones v. Bourrie (1963), 369 Mich 473, 476 ; 30 Am Jur, Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 544, 546.

1968Also pertinent. is the annotation: Wife’s right of action for loss of consortium, 23 ALR2d 1378, 1384, and the comment, Common law liability of the liquor vendor, 18 W Res L R 251 (1966). 26 Gullikson v. Gjorud (1890), 82 Mich 503, 505 ; Vice v. Sherberneau (1908), 152 Mich 601, 606 ; Kreiter v. Nichols (1874), 28 Mich 496, 497 ; In re Miller’s Estate (1910), 160 Mich 309, 317 ; Jones v. Bourrie (1963), 369 Mich 473, 476 ; 30 Am Jur, Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 544, 546.

1968Also pertinent. is the annotation: Wife’s right of action for loss of consortium, 23 ALR2d 1378, 1384, and the comment, Common law liability of the liquor vendor, 18 W Res L R 251 (1966). 26 Gullikson v. Gjorud (1890), 82 Mich 503, 505 ; Vice v. Sherberneau (1908), 152 Mich 601, 606 ; Kreiter v. Nichols (1874), 28 Mich 496, 497 ; In re Miller’s Estate (1910), 160 Mich 309, 317 ; Jones v. Bourrie (1963), 369 Mich 473, 476 ; 30 Am Jur, Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 544, 546.

1960The statement of the general rule in Werker v. McGrain, 315 Mich 287, 291 , is applicable here.

1960It was there said: “If there is substantial evidence tending to support the verdict it should not be set aside even though this Court might be in doubt as to the ultimate facts.” See, also, Day v. Troyer, 341 Mich 189 ; Bennett v. Hill, 342 Mich 754 .

1960It was there said: “If there is substantial evidence tending to support the verdict it should not be set aside even though this Court might be in doubt as to the ultimate facts.” See, also, Day v. Troyer, 341 Mich 189 ; Bennett v. Hill, 342 Mich 754 .

1956The conclusion reached with reference to the sufficiency of plaintiff’s bill of complaint finds support in the statement of the general principle recognized and applied in Spelman v. Addison, 300 Mich 690, 702 .

1951The situation presented is well within the statement of the general principle in People v. Aikin, 66 Mich 460, 470 (11 Am St Rep 512), cited by counsel for defendant: “The true and only just rule as regards the joinder of counts in an information or indictment seems to be, if the different counts are drawn and used with a view to one and the same transaction, so that one of them,- upon the trial, may be found to meet the evidence, the court will not interfere with the proceeding, as such an object is a legitimate one. • It is a proceeding calculated to promote justice, and cannot confuse or pr

1951The situation presented is well within the statement of the general principle in People v. Aikin, 66 Mich 460, 470 (11 Am St Rep 512), cited by counsel for defendant: “The true and only just rule as regards the joinder of counts in an information or indictment seems to be, if the different counts are drawn and used with a view to one and the same transaction, so that one of them,- upon the trial, may be found to meet the evidence, the court will not interfere with the proceeding, as such an object is a legitimate one. • It is a proceeding calculated to promote justice, and cannot confuse or pr

1951The situation presented is well within the statement of the general principle in People v. Aikin, 66 Mich 460, 470 (11 Am St Rep 512), cited by counsel for defendant: “The true and only just rule as regards the joinder of counts in an information or indictment seems to be, if the different counts are drawn and used with a view to one and the same transaction, so that one of them,- upon the trial, may be found to meet the evidence, the court will not interfere with the proceeding, as such an object is a legitimate one. • It is a proceeding calculated to promote justice, and cannot confuse or pr

1932The statement of the general rule in Allore v. Jewell, 94 U. S. 506 , was quoted with approval in Bilman v. Kolarik, supra. *679 “It may be stated as settled law that whenever there is great weakness of mind in a person executing a conveyance of land, arising from age, sickness, or any other cause, though not amounting to absolute disqualification, and the consideration given for the property is grossly inadequate, a court of equity will, upon proper and seasonable application of the injured party, or his representatives or heirs, interfere and set the conveyance aside.” Allore v. Jewell, supr

1932The statement of the general rule in Allore v. Jewell, 94 U. S. 506 , was quoted with approval in Bilman v. Kolarik, supra. *679 “It may be stated as settled law that whenever there is great weakness of mind in a person executing a conveyance of land, arising from age, sickness, or any other cause, though not amounting to absolute disqualification, and the consideration given for the property is grossly inadequate, a court of equity will, upon proper and seasonable application of the injured party, or his representatives or heirs, interfere and set the conveyance aside.” Allore v. Jewell, supr

1932In Steele v. Banninga, 225 Mich. 547 , at p. 556 it is said: “The dividing line between a false representation and a mere opinion is not well marked, and cannot be marked in the abstract, as it must necessarily depend upon the facts in a case.

1932The statement of the general rule in Allore v. Jewell, 94 U. S. 506 , was quoted with approval in Bilman v. Kolarik, supra. *679 “It may be stated as settled law that whenever there is great weakness of mind in a person executing a conveyance of land, arising from age, sickness, or any other cause, though not amounting to absolute disqualification, and the consideration given for the property is grossly inadequate, a court of equity will, upon proper and seasonable application of the injured party, or his representatives or heirs, interfere and set the conveyance aside.” Allore v. Jewell, supr

1932This is a statement of the general rule, but the rule established by the weight of authority is that false statements of value intentionally made to one who is in ignorance of the quality and value, under circumstances indicating a purpose that such statements are to be relied upon, and where the party to whom they are made has no opportunity to examine the property, may be treated as an affirmation of fact and fraudulent.” Pinch v. Hotaling, 142 Mich. 521, 525 .

1919This is a statement of the general rule, but .the rule established by the weight of authority is that false statements of value intentionally made to one who is in ignorance of the quality and value, under circumstances indicating a purpose that such statements are to be relied upon, and where the party to whom they are made has no opportunity to examine the property, may be treated as an affirmation of fact and fraudulent,” — citing Collins v. Jackson, 54 Mich. 186 ; Maxted v. Fowler, 94 Mich. 109 ; 16 Cyc. p. 749; 14 Am. & Eng.