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7 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1913–1961 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Maynard v. Marshallgreen2 sentences1959The case of Maynard v. Marshall, 91 Ga. 840, 845 ( 18 S. E. 403 ), is cited by the plaintiff in error, wherein Judge Bleckley said: `It is also a general rule applicable to amending statutes, that they *286 are to be construed as intended to have operation on future transactions only, and as having no retroactive purpose not plainly expressed.' While the act of 1912 is amendatory of the law as then existing with reference to the venue of suits of the kind like the present, the statement of the general rule as to retroactive statutes made by Judge Bleckley can have no application to a case of t 1959The case of Maynard v. Marshall, 91 Ga. 840, 845 ( 18 S. E. 403 ), is cited by the plaintiff in error, wherein Judge Bleckley said: `It is also a general rule applicable to amending statutes, that they *286 are to be construed as intended to have operation on future transactions only, and as having no retroactive purpose not plainly expressed.' While the act of 1912 is amendatory of the law as then existing with reference to the venue of suits of the kind like the present, the statement of the general rule as to retroactive statutes made by Judge Bleckley can have no application to a case of t | 2 | 2 |
Werner v. Rawsongreen2 sentences1947Civil Code (1910), §§ 4567, 4578; Green v. Johnson, 153 Ga. 738 (4) ( 113 S. E. 402 ).” This court, in McCol *595 lum v. Loveless, 187 Ga. 262, 267 ( 200 S. E. 115 ), dealing with the question of diligence by the complaining party where reformation is sought, held: “The principle stated in the third note, which is taken verbatim from the Code [§ 37-212], was codified from the decision in Werner v. Rawson, 89 Ga. 619 ( 15 S. E. 813 ), which was largely based on a statement of the general principle given by the author of Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence. 1947Civil Code (1910), §§ 4567, 4578; Green v. Johnson, 153 Ga. 738 (4) ( 113 S. E. 402 ).” This court, in McCol *595 lum v. Loveless, 187 Ga. 262, 267 ( 200 S. E. 115 ), dealing with the question of diligence by the complaining party where reformation is sought, held: “The principle stated in the third note, which is taken verbatim from the Code [§ 37-212], was codified from the decision in Werner v. Rawson, 89 Ga. 619 ( 15 S. E. 813 ), which was largely based on a statement of the general principle given by the author of Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence. | 1 | 3 |
McCollum v. Lovelessgreen2 sentences1947Civil Code (1910), §§ 4567, 4578; Green v. Johnson, 153 Ga. 738 (4) ( 113 S. E. 402 ).” This court, in McCol *595 lum v. Loveless, 187 Ga. 262, 267 ( 200 S. E. 115 ), dealing with the question of diligence by the complaining party where reformation is sought, held: “The principle stated in the third note, which is taken verbatim from the Code [§ 37-212], was codified from the decision in Werner v. Rawson, 89 Ga. 619 ( 15 S. E. 813 ), which was largely based on a statement of the general principle given by the author of Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence. 1947Civil Code (1910), §§ 4567, 4578; Green v. Johnson, 153 Ga. 738 (4) ( 113 S. E. 402 ).” This court, in McCol *595 lum v. Loveless, 187 Ga. 262, 267 ( 200 S. E. 115 ), dealing with the question of diligence by the complaining party where reformation is sought, held: “The principle stated in the third note, which is taken verbatim from the Code [§ 37-212], was codified from the decision in Werner v. Rawson, 89 Ga. 619 ( 15 S. E. 813 ), which was largely based on a statement of the general principle given by the author of Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence. | 1 | 1 |
Kight v. Gaskingreen2 sentences1938As pointed out by Fish, Chief Justice, in Kight v. Gaskin, 139 Ga. 379, 385 ( 77 S. E. 390 ), one of the grounds of special demurrer was that the petition failed to allege “in what way it [the mistake] arose.” The case last cited is also an authority for the ruling that the petition now under review does sufficiently set forth how the alleged mutual mistake occurred, and what brought it about. • The principle stated in the third note, which is taken verbatim from the Code, was codified from the decision in Werner v. Rawson, 89 Ga. 619 ( 15 S. E. 813 ), which was largely based on a statement of 1938As pointed out by Fish, Chief Justice, in Kight v. Gaskin, 139 Ga. 379, 385 ( 77 S. E. 390 ), one of the grounds of special demurrer was that the petition failed to allege “in what way it [the mistake] arose.” The case last cited is also an authority for the ruling that the petition now under review does sufficiently set forth how the alleged mutual mistake occurred, and what brought it about. • The principle stated in the third note, which is taken verbatim from the Code, was codified from the decision in Werner v. Rawson, 89 Ga. 619 ( 15 S. E. 813 ), which was largely based on a statement of | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Green v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1947Civil Code (1910), §§ 4567, 4578; Green v. Johnson, 153 Ga. 738 (4) ( 113 S. E. 402 ).” This court, in McCol *595 lum v. Loveless, 187 Ga. 262, 267 ( 200 S. E. 115 ), dealing with the question of diligence by the complaining party where reformation is sought, held: “The principle stated in the third note, which is taken verbatim from the Code [§ 37-212], was codified from the decision in Werner v. Rawson, 89 Ga. 619 ( 15 S. E. 813 ), which was largely based on a statement of the general principle given by the author of Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence. 1947Civil Code (1910), §§ 4567, 4578; Green v. Johnson, 153 Ga. 738 (4) ( 113 S. E. 402 ).” This court, in McCol *595 lum v. Loveless, 187 Ga. 262, 267 ( 200 S. E. 115 ), dealing with the question of diligence by the complaining party where reformation is sought, held: “The principle stated in the third note, which is taken verbatim from the Code [§ 37-212], was codified from the decision in Werner v. Rawson, 89 Ga. 619 ( 15 S. E. 813 ), which was largely based on a statement of the general principle given by the author of Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence. | 2 | 1938–1947 |
Cain v. Varnadore
green
2 sentences1947The ruling is well fortified by the authorities generally, and was applied in Green v. Johnson, 153 Ga. 738 ( 113 S. E. 402 ), and in Cain v. Varnadore, 171 Ga. 497 ( 156 S. E. 216 ). 1947The ruling is well fortified by the authorities generally, and was applied in Green v. Johnson, 153 Ga. 738 ( 113 S. E. 402 ), and in Cain v. Varnadore, 171 Ga. 497 ( 156 S. E. 216 ). | 2 | 1938–1947 |
Moore v. Trainer
green
1 sentence1961From the statement of the general rule inhibiting the grant of an option to purchase trust property, even under a power of sale conferred by the will, *557 which we have quoted from Bogert at the beginning of this opinion, it is obvious that, in most cases, the courts have considered the granting of an option not to be in the best interest of the estate and the beneficiaries thereunder, as is aptly stated in Moore v. Trainer, 252 Pa. 367 , supra: “An executor or other trustee acts in a representative capacity and for the benefit of the cestui que trust. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Booth v. Huff
green
1 sentence1932Booth v. Huff, 116 Ga. 8 ( 12 S. E. 381 , 91 Am. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.