liquidated damages clause (Arizona) · Go Syfert
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liquidated damages clause in Arizona

10 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2022 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (4)

CaseFollowedCited
Dobson Bay Club II DD, LLC v. La Sonrisa De Siena, LLCgreen
ariz · 2017 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022The party seeking to avoid enforcement of a liquidated damages clause—here, the Youngs— “has the burden of persuading [the 3 YOUNG, et al. v. ALLEN HOMES Decision of the Court court] that the provision imposes an unenforceable penalty.” Id. at 112, ¶ 17 .

11
Dreamland Villa Community Club, Inc. v. Raimeygreen
arizctapp · 2010 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
1 sentence

2018Id. at 111, ¶ 18; Dreamland Villa Cmty. Club, Inc. v. Raimey, 224 Ariz. 42, 46, ¶ 16 (App. 2010).

11
Wasserman's Inc. v. Township of Middletowngreen
nj · 1994 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016See Wasserman’s Inc. v. Twp. of Middletown, 137 N.J. 238 , 645 A.2d 100, 107 (1994) (“Two of the most au thoritative statements concerning liquidated damages are contained in the Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, both of which emphasize reasonableness as the touchstone.”). ¶ 11 La Sonrisa argues that the liquidated damages fee at issue should be enforced because two sophisticated parties, both represented by counsel, specifically agreed to the 5% late fee.

2016See Wasserman’s Inc. v. Twp. of Middletown, 137 N.J. 238 , 645 A.2d 100, 107 (1994) (“Two of the most au thoritative statements concerning liquidated damages are contained in the Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, both of which emphasize reasonableness as the touchstone.”). ¶ 11 La Sonrisa argues that the liquidated damages fee at issue should be enforced because two sophisticated parties, both represented by counsel, specifically agreed to the 5% late fee.

11
Wyatt v. Wehmuellergreen
ariz · 1991 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008
2 sentences

2008(Emphasis added.) 6 Therefore, we must determine whether the legislature intended that a liquidated damages clause included in a cooperative marketing association marketing agreement be enforced in accordance with its terms without regard to common-law principles limiting the enforceability of such a clause. 7 *596 ¶ 12 “The primary principle of statutory interpretation is to determine and give effect to legislative intent.” Wyatt v. Wehmueller, 167 Ariz. 281, 284 , 806 P.2d 870, 873 (1991).

2008(Emphasis added.) 6 Therefore, we must determine whether the legislature intended that a liquidated damages clause included in a cooperative marketing association marketing agreement be enforced in accordance with its terms without regard to common-law principles limiting the enforceability of such a clause. 7 *596 ¶ 12 “The primary principle of statutory interpretation is to determine and give effect to legislative intent.” Wyatt v. Wehmueller, 167 Ariz. 281, 284 , 806 P.2d 870, 873 (1991).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (10)

CaseCitedYears
Dean Vivian Homes, Inc. v. Sebera's Plumbing & Appliances, Inc. green
texapp · 1981
1 sentence

2018In Dean Vivian, the claim asserted by the plaintiff was also for balance due on an open account, but did include a claim for interest based on a written agreement. 615 S.W.2d at 923–24.

12018–2018
Miller Cattle Co. v. Mattice green
ariz · 1931
2 sentences

2017To decide the matter, we do not apply any bright-line rules but construe the clause “according to the circumstances of the case, and in the light of all the facts surrounding it.” Miller Cattle, 38 Ariz. at 190 , 298 P. at 643 . ¶18 We review the grant of partial summary judgment de novo as an issue of law.

2017To decide the matter, we do not apply any bright-line rules but construe the clause “according to the circumstances of the case, and in the light of all the facts surrounding it.” Miller Cattle, 38 Ariz. at 190 , 298 P. at 643 . ¶18 We review the grant of partial summary judgment de novo as an issue of law.

12017–2017
Pima Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Rampello green
arizctapp · 1991
2 sentences

2016And, in Rampello , the court specifically noted that “the amount retained upon a contract’s breach will be considered a penalty if it is unreasonable,” thereby confirming that a liquidated damages clause cannot be evaluated in a vacuum. 168 Ariz. at 300 , 812 P.2d at 1118 (citing Marshall v. Patzman, 81 Ariz. 367 , 306 P.2d 287 (1957)).

2016And, in Rampello , the court specifically noted that “the amount retained upon a contract’s breach will be considered a penalty if it is unreasonable,” thereby confirming that a liquidated damages clause cannot be evaluated in a vacuum. 168 Ariz. at 300 , 812 P.2d at 1118 (citing Marshall v. Patzman, 81 Ariz. 367 , 306 P.2d 287 (1957)).

12016–2016
Marshall v. Patzman green
ariz · 1957
2 sentences

2016And, in Rampello , the court specifically noted that “the amount retained upon a contract’s breach will be considered a penalty if it is unreasonable,” thereby confirming that a liquidated damages clause cannot be evaluated in a vacuum. 168 Ariz. at 300 , 812 P.2d at 1118 (citing Marshall v. Patzman, 81 Ariz. 367 , 306 P.2d 287 (1957)).

2016And, in Rampello , the court specifically noted that “the amount retained upon a contract’s breach will be considered a penalty if it is unreasonable,” thereby confirming that a liquidated damages clause cannot be evaluated in a vacuum. 168 Ariz. at 300 , 812 P.2d at 1118 (citing Marshall v. Patzman, 81 Ariz. 367 , 306 P.2d 287 (1957)).

12016–2016
MECHANICAL AIR ENGINEER. v. Totem Const. green
arizctapp · 1989
2 sentences

2016The circumstances here are substantially different than Rampello, 168 Ariz. at 299 , 812 P.2d at 1117 , which involved the forfeiture of an earnest money deposit, and Mechanical Air, 166 Ariz. at 192 , 801 P.2d at 427 , which involved predetermined damages for construction delays. ¶ 18 Moreover, accepting La Sonrisa’s argument would mean a court could never compare anticipated and actual losses, which would be contrary to Restatement § 356’s express language, comments, and illustrations, as well as pertinent ease law.

2016The circumstances here are substantially different than Rampello, 168 Ariz. at 299 , 812 P.2d at 1117 , which involved the forfeiture of an earnest money deposit, and Mechanical Air, 166 Ariz. at 192 , 801 P.2d at 427 , which involved predetermined damages for construction delays. ¶ 18 Moreover, accepting La Sonrisa’s argument would mean a court could never compare anticipated and actual losses, which would be contrary to Restatement § 356’s express language, comments, and illustrations, as well as pertinent ease law.

12016–2016
Med+ Plus Neck & Back Pain Center v. Noffsinger green
illappct · 2000
1 sentence

2014Kostiner, 813 N.E.2d at 1130 (quoting Noffsinger, 726 N.E.2d at 693 ).

12014–2014
Jameson Realty Group v. Kostiner green
illappct · 2004
1 sentence

2014Kostiner, 813 N.E.2d at 1130 (quoting Noffsinger, 726 N.E.2d at 693 ).

12014–2014
Lyons v. Philippart green
arizctapp · 1983
1 sentence

2008Id.

12008–2008
Mahoney v. Tingley green
· 1975
2 sentences

1996Therefore, the doctrine of equitable estoppel is not applicable in this case. 85 Wash.2d at 101 , 529 P.2d at 1072 .

1996Therefore, the doctrine of equitable estoppel is not applicable in this case. 85 Wash.2d at 101 , 529 P.2d at 1072 .

11996–1996
Santa Cruz County v. Burgoon green
· 1909
2 sentences

1989A preliminary injunction will not be issued when the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law, Santa Cruz County v. Burgoon, 12 Ariz. 295 , 100 P. 792 (1906), or when the plaintiff will not suffer irreparable harm.

1989A preliminary injunction will not be issued when the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law, Santa Cruz County v. Burgoon, 12 Ariz. 295 , 100 P. 792 (1906), or when the plaintiff will not suffer irreparable harm.

11989–1989

Statutes the citing opinions construe

AZ § Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-341.01 (5) AZ § Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2101 (4)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

NY 113 (1868–2026) IL 73 (1971–2025) TX 70 (1942–2026) CA 57 (1960–2025) OH 41 (1982–2025) MA 37 (1959–2026) FL 37 (1962–2025) CT 36 (1964–2022) IN 35 (1976–2026) MO 30 (1966–2021) PA 26 (1966–2025) GA 21 (1978–2026) MD 19 (1987–2023) NJ 19 (1991–2024) CO 18 (1971–2025) WA 16 (1979–2026) ND 13 (1975–2007) KS 12 (1981–2024) NC 11 (1987–2026) ID 11 (1971–2025) AZ 10 (1989–2022) WI 10 (1975–2025) VA 9 (1988–2025) UT 8 (1993–2013) AL 8 (1991–2026) ME 7 (1985–2022) MI 7 (1986–2026) MN 6 (1986–2024) AK 6 (1977–2012) DC 6 (1969–2019) MT 6 (1976–2020) TN 6 (1985–2019) LA 6 (1962–2018) OR 5 (1979–1998) VT 5 (1991–2025) NH 5 (1990–2020) WV 4 (1994–2024) WY 4 (1978–2015) SD 4 (1984–2005) DE 4 (1992–2021) NM 4 (1986–2020) SC 3 (2013–2024) IA 3 (1976–2024) RI 3 (1992–2009) NV 2 (1990–1993) OK 2 (1988–2008) KY 2 (1985–2024)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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