liquidated damages clause (New Jersey) · Go Syfert
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liquidated damages clause in New Jersey

19 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2024 4 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (11)

CaseFollowedCited
Wasserman's Inc. v. Township of Middletowngreen
nj · 1994 · cited in 4 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1998–2024
2 sentences

2022A liquidated damages clause is enforceable so long as [](a) the amount so fixed ["]is a reasonable forecast of just compensation for the harm that is caused by the breach," and (b) the harm that is caused by the breach is one that ["]is incapable or very difficult A-0290-20 7 of accurate estimate." Wasserman's Inc. v. Township of Middleton, 137 N.J. 238, 250 (1994) [quoting Westmount Country Club v. Kameny 82 N.J.

1998A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a penalty. [Id. at 252, 645 A.2d 100 .] Moreover, the Court noted that although courts in the past have determined the enforceability of a liquidated damages clause at the time of the making of the contract, “the modern trend is towards assessing reasonableness either at the time of contract formation or at the time of the breach.” Id. at 251, 645 A.2d 100 .

44
MetLife v. Washington Ave. Assoc.green
nj · 1999 · cited in 4 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2006–2024
2 sentences

2024L.P., 159 N.J. 484, 495 (1999). "[T]he 'overall single test of validity' is whether the liquidated damages clause is 'reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.'" Sullivan, 465 N.J.

2020Assocs., 159 N.J. 484, 494 (1999).] The Court has held that "the difficulty in assessing damages, intention of the parties, the actual damages sustained, and the bargaining power of the parties all affect the validity of a stipulated damages clause," and that the "overall single test of validity" is whether the liquidated damages clause is "reasonable under the totality of the circumstances." Id. at 495 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

24
Borden Co. v. Manleygreen
nj · 1942 · cited in 2 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998
2 sentences

1998See, e.g., Borden Company, Pioneer Ice Cream Division v. Manley, 127 N.J.L. 461, 463 , 23 A.2d 281 (Sup.Ct.1942) (“[i]f it appears that the parties have provided for an excessive sum in a case where the real damages are certain or readily reducible to certainty by proof, then the sum fixed is deemed a penalty and not enforceable.”) We are thus persuaded that the five percent late charge fails to meet the liquidated damages test for two reasons.

1998See, e.g., Borden Company, Pioneer Ice Cream Division v. Manley, 127 N.J.L. 461, 463 , 23 A.2d 281 (Sup.Ct.1942) (“[i]f it appears that the parties have provided for an excessive sum in a case where the real damages are certain or readily reducible to certainty by proof, then the sum fixed is deemed a penalty and not enforceable.”) We are thus persuaded that the five percent late charge fails to meet the liquidated damages test for two reasons.

22
Casamasino v. City of Jersey Citygreen
nj · 1999 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022Estoppel is an equitable doctrine grounded in "the fundamental duty of fair dealing imposed by law." Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 178 (2003) (quoting Casamasino v. City of Jersey City, 158 N.J. 333, 354 (1999)).

11
Knorr v. Smealgreen
nj · 2003 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022Estoppel is an equitable doctrine grounded in "the fundamental duty of fair dealing imposed by law." Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 178 (2003) (quoting Casamasino v. City of Jersey City, 158 N.J. 333, 354 (1999)).

11
Milhollin v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc.green
gactapp · 2005 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
1 sentence

2007Id. at 76-77. *41 The Court of Appeals, Second District, in California reviewed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant after determining that the CAP's forfeiture provisions did not violate section 201 and section 202 of the California Labor Code in Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc., 126 Cal.App. 4th 726 , 23 Cal.Rptr. 3d 920 (2 Dist.2005).

11
Kutzin v. Pirniegreen
nj · 1991 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
2 sentences

1997II In Kutzin v. Pirnie, 124 N.J. 500 , 591 A.2d 932 (1991), the Court held that absent a liquidated damages clause in a contract for the sale of real estate, a purchaser in breach was entitled to the return of that portion of the deposit which exceeded the seller’s actual loss.

1997II In Kutzin v. Pirnie, 124 N.J. 500 , 591 A.2d 932 (1991), the Court held that absent a liquidated damages clause in a contract for the sale of real estate, a purchaser in breach was entitled to the return of that portion of the deposit which exceeded the seller’s actual loss.

11
Haromy v. Sawyergreen
nev · 1982 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994
2 sentences

1994Calamari & Perillo, supra, § 14-31 at 643; see, e.g., Mattvidi Assocs. v. Nationsbank of Va., 100 Md.App. 71 , 639 A.2d 228, 238 (1994) (noting that “[n]ot only is placing the burden of proof on the party seeking to invalidate a liquidated damages clause the majority rule, it is also the only rule consistent with normal principles of contract law”); Haromy v. Sawyer, 98 Nev. 544, 654 P.2d 1022, 1023 (1982) (observing' that “[generally, liquidated damage provisions are prima facie valid”); Wassenaar, supra, 331 N.W.2d at 367 (determining that “the party challenging the contract! ] carries the b

1994Calamari & Perillo, supra, § 14-31 at 643; see, e.g., Mattvidi Assocs. v. Nationsbank of Va., 100 Md.App. 71 , 639 A.2d 228, 238 (1994) (noting that “[n]ot only is placing the burden of proof on the party seeking to invalidate a liquidated damages clause the majority rule, it is also the only rule consistent with normal principles of contract law”); Haromy v. Sawyer, 98 Nev. 544, 654 P.2d 1022, 1023 (1982) (observing' that “[generally, liquidated damage provisions are prima facie valid”); Wassenaar, supra, 331 N.W.2d at 367 (determining that “the party challenging the contract! ] carries the b

11
Wassenaar v. Panosgreen
wis · 1983 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994
2 sentences

1994Uncertainty or difficulty in assessing damages is best viewed not as an independent test, Calamari and Perillo, supra, § 14-31 at 641; Goetz & Scott, supra, 77 Colum.L.Rev. at 559 (stating, “liquidated damages provisions have seldom been voided solely because the damages were easy to estimate”), but rather as an element of assessing the reasonableness of a liquidated damages clause, Wassenaar, supra, 331 N.W.2d at 363 .

1994Calamari & Perillo, supra, § 14-31 at 643; see, e.g., Mattvidi Assocs. v. Nationsbank of Va., 100 Md.App. 71 , 639 A.2d 228, 238 (1994) (noting that “[n]ot only is placing the burden of proof on the party seeking to invalidate a liquidated damages clause the majority rule, it is also the only rule consistent with normal principles of contract law”); Haromy v. Sawyer, 98 Nev. 544, 654 P.2d 1022, 1023 (1982) (observing' that “[generally, liquidated damage provisions are prima facie valid”); Wassenaar, supra, 331 N.W.2d at 367 (determining that “the party challenging the contract! ] carries the b

11
Mattvidi Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Nationsbank of Virginia, N.A.green
mdctspecapp · 1994 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994
2 sentences

1994Calamari & Perillo, supra, § 14-31 at 643; see, e.g., Mattvidi Assocs. v. Nationsbank of Va., 100 Md.App. 71 , 639 A.2d 228, 238 (1994) (noting that “[n]ot only is placing the burden of proof on the party seeking to invalidate a liquidated damages clause the majority rule, it is also the only rule consistent with normal principles of contract law”); Haromy v. Sawyer, 98 Nev. 544, 654 P.2d 1022, 1023 (1982) (observing' that “[generally, liquidated damage provisions are prima facie valid”); Wassenaar, supra, 331 N.W.2d at 367 (determining that “the party challenging the contract! ] carries the b

1994Calamari & Perillo, supra, § 14-31 at 643; see, e.g., Mattvidi Assocs. v. Nationsbank of Va., 100 Md.App. 71 , 639 A.2d 228, 238 (1994) (noting that “[n]ot only is placing the burden of proof on the party seeking to invalidate a liquidated damages clause the majority rule, it is also the only rule consistent with normal principles of contract law”); Haromy v. Sawyer, 98 Nev. 544, 654 P.2d 1022, 1023 (1982) (observing' that “[generally, liquidated damage provisions are prima facie valid”); Wassenaar, supra, 331 N.W.2d at 367 (determining that “the party challenging the contract! ] carries the b

11
Stone v. City of Arcolagreen
illappct · 1989 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1992–1992
1 sentence

1992If the contractor fails to complete the additional work, the owner's remedy is to have someone else complete it and sue the contractor to recover the expense. [ Id. at 1338.] That rule was applied in Monsen Engineering Co. v. Tami-Githens, Inc., 219 N.J.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (14)

CaseCitedYears
Westmount Country Club v. Kameny green
njsuperctappdiv · 1964
2 sentences

2022Super. at 206 ).] However, "[u]ncertainty or difficulty in assessing damages is best viewed not as an independent test, but rather as an element of assessing the reasonableness of a liquidated damages clause." Ibid. (citations omitted).

2018However, this two-prong Westmount test "is best viewed not as an independent test, but rather as an element of assessing the reasonableness of a liquidated damages clause." Ibid. (citation omitted). "[T]he more uncertain the damages caused by a breach, the more latitude courts gave the parties on their estimate of damages." Metlife Capital Fin.

51997–2022
Central Steel Drum Co. v. Gold Cooperage, Inc. green
njsuperctappdiv · 1985
2 sentences

1997Although we do not consider the validity or enforceability of a liquidated damages clause in this case, we are reminded of Professor Corbin’s warning: “Penalties and forfeitures are not favored; and calling an outrageous penalty by the more kindly name of liquidated damages does not absolve it from its sin.” Defaulting Vendee, supra, 40 Yale L.J. at 1016; cf. Central Steel Drum Co. v. Gold Cooperage, Inc. supra, 200 N.J.Super. 251 , 491 A.2d 49 (considering validity of liquidated damages clause). [Id. at 517-18, 591 A.2d 932 .] Van Es v. Honeyleaf Properties, Inc., 253 N.J.Super. 566 , 602 A.2

1997Although we do not consider the validity or enforceability of a liquidated damages clause in this case, we are reminded of Professor Corbin’s warning: “Penalties and forfeitures are not favored; and calling an outrageous penalty by the more kindly name of liquidated damages does not absolve it from its sin.” Defaulting Vendee, supra, 40 Yale L.J. at 1016; cf. Central Steel Drum Co. v. Gold Cooperage, Inc. supra, 200 N.J.Super. 251 , 491 A.2d 49 (considering validity of liquidated damages clause). [Id. at 517-18, 591 A.2d 932 .] Van Es v. Honeyleaf Properties, Inc., 253 N.J.Super. 566 , 602 A.2

21991–1997
Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp. green
nj · 1989
2 sentences

2013Applying the liberal standard that is applied to motions for dismissal pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e), see Printing Mart-Morristown, supra, 116 N.J. at 746 , 563 A.2d 31 , the appellate panel found that the complaint asserted CFA and negligent misrepresentation claims by alleging that “the landlords have imposed charges on their tenants, denominated as attorney’s fees, that exceed the landlords’ actual cost for in-house legal representation.” As pai’t of its analysis, the Appellate Division rejected defendants’ argument that the attorneys’ fee provision should be sustained because it was a liquidat

2013Applying the liberal standard that is applied to motions for dismissal pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e), see Printing Mart-Morristown, supra, 116 N.J. at 746 , 563 A.2d 31 , the appellate panel found that the complaint asserted CFA and negligent misrepresentation claims by alleging that “the landlords have imposed charges on their tenants, denominated as attorney’s fees, that exceed the landlords’ actual cost for in-house legal representation.” As pai’t of its analysis, the Appellate Division rejected defendants’ argument that the attorneys’ fee provision should be sustained because it was a liquidat

12013–2013
Callano v. Oakwood Park Homes Corp. green
njsuperctappdiv · 1966
2 sentences

2011Quasi-contractual recovery on the basis of quantum meruit “ ‘rests on the equitable principle that a person shall not be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another.’” Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 128 N.J. 427, 437 , 608 A.2d 280 (1992) (quoting Callano v. Oakwood Park Homes Corp., 91 N.J.Super. 105, 108 , 219 A.2d 332 (App.Div.1966)).

2011Quasi-contractual recovery on the basis of quantum meruit “ ‘rests on the equitable principle that a person shall not be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another.’” Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 128 N.J. 427, 437 , 608 A.2d 280 (1992) (quoting Callano v. Oakwood Park Homes Corp., 91 N.J.Super. 105, 108 , 219 A.2d 332 (App.Div.1966)).

12011–2011
Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan green
nj · 1992
2 sentences

2011Quasi-contractual recovery on the basis of quantum meruit “ ‘rests on the equitable principle that a person shall not be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another.’” Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 128 N.J. 427, 437 , 608 A.2d 280 (1992) (quoting Callano v. Oakwood Park Homes Corp., 91 N.J.Super. 105, 108 , 219 A.2d 332 (App.Div.1966)).

2011Quasi-contractual recovery on the basis of quantum meruit “ ‘rests on the equitable principle that a person shall not be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another.’” Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 128 N.J. 427, 437 , 608 A.2d 280 (1992) (quoting Callano v. Oakwood Park Homes Corp., 91 N.J.Super. 105, 108 , 219 A.2d 332 (App.Div.1966)).

12011–2011
Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc. green
calctapp · 2005
2 sentences

2007Id. at 76-77. *41 The Court of Appeals, Second District, in California reviewed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant after determining that the CAP's forfeiture provisions did not violate section 201 and section 202 of the California Labor Code in Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc., 126 Cal.App. 4th 726 , 23 Cal.Rptr. 3d 920 (2 Dist.2005).

2007Id. at 76-77. *41 The Court of Appeals, Second District, in California reviewed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant after determining that the CAP's forfeiture provisions did not violate section 201 and section 202 of the California Labor Code in Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc., 126 Cal.App. 4th 726 , 23 Cal.Rptr. 3d 920 (2 Dist.2005).

12007–2007
Legge Ind. v. Kushner Hebrew Acad. green
njsuperctappdiv · 2000
1 sentence

2005We have found no ease holding that a lien claimant has such limited protection. [ Id. at 556-57, 756 A.2d 608 .] We reach the same conclusion as to the liquidated damages claim ECP has against NEPCO.

12005–2005
Van Es v. HONEYLOAF PROPERTIES, INC. green
njsuperctappdiv · 1992
2 sentences

1997Although we do not consider the validity or enforceability of a liquidated damages clause in this case, we are reminded of Professor Corbin’s warning: “Penalties and forfeitures are not favored; and calling an outrageous penalty by the more kindly name of liquidated damages does not absolve it from its sin.” Defaulting Vendee, supra, 40 Yale L.J. at 1016; cf. Central Steel Drum Co. v. Gold Cooperage, Inc. supra, 200 N.J.Super. 251 , 491 A.2d 49 (considering validity of liquidated damages clause). [Id. at 517-18, 591 A.2d 932 .] Van Es v. Honeyleaf Properties, Inc., 253 N.J.Super. 566 , 602 A.2

1997Although we do not consider the validity or enforceability of a liquidated damages clause in this case, we are reminded of Professor Corbin’s warning: “Penalties and forfeitures are not favored; and calling an outrageous penalty by the more kindly name of liquidated damages does not absolve it from its sin.” Defaulting Vendee, supra, 40 Yale L.J. at 1016; cf. Central Steel Drum Co. v. Gold Cooperage, Inc. supra, 200 N.J.Super. 251 , 491 A.2d 49 (considering validity of liquidated damages clause). [Id. at 517-18, 591 A.2d 932 .] Van Es v. Honeyleaf Properties, Inc., 253 N.J.Super. 566 , 602 A.2

11997–1997
Perry v. Moran green
wash · 1989
2 sentences

1995Super. 566 , 357 A. 2d 37 (Law Div. 1976). [2] On reconsideration in Perry, 111 Wash. 2d 885 , 766 P. 2d 1096 , the Washington Supreme Court found it premature to determine the reasonableness of the liquidated damages clause, because that question, raised by the employee, had not been decided in the trial court.

1995Super. 566 , 357 A. 2d 37 (Law Div. 1976). [2] On reconsideration in Perry, 111 Wash. 2d 885 , 766 P. 2d 1096 , the Washington Supreme Court found it premature to determine the reasonableness of the liquidated damages clause, because that question, raised by the employee, had not been decided in the trial court.

11995–1995
A & P Sheet Metal Co., Inc. v. Edward Hansen, Inc. green
njsuperctappdiv · 1976
1 sentence

1995Super. 566 , 357 A. 2d 37 (Law Div. 1976). [2] On reconsideration in Perry, 111 Wash. 2d 885 , 766 P. 2d 1096 , the Washington Supreme Court found it premature to determine the reasonableness of the liquidated damages clause, because that question, raised by the employee, had not been decided in the trial court.

11995–1995
Broadway Maintenance Corp. v. Rutgers green
nj · 1982
2 sentences

1992Considering the nature of this project, Perini might have bargained for a “no damages for delay” clause, see Broadway Maintenance Corp. v. Rutgers, 90 N.J. 253 , 447 A.2d 906 (1982), or a liquidated damages clause in the contract.

1992Considering the nature of this project, Perini might have bargained for a “no damages for delay” clause, see Broadway Maintenance Corp. v. Rutgers, 90 N.J. 253 , 447 A.2d 906 (1982), or a liquidated damages clause in the contract.

11992–1992
Monsen Engineering Co. v. Tami-Githens, Inc. green
njsuperctappdiv · 1987
2 sentences

1992If the contractor fails to complete the additional work, the owner’s remedy is to have someone else complete it and sue the contractor to recover the expense. [Id. at 1338.] That rule was applied in Monsen Engineering Co. v. TamiGithens, Inc., 219 N.J.Super. 241 , 530 A.2d 313 (App.Div.1987), a case involving a liquidated damages clause in a contract for the installation of heating systems in a public-housing project.

1992If the contractor fails to complete the additional work, the owner’s remedy is to have someone else complete it and sue the contractor to recover the expense. [Id. at 1338.] That rule was applied in Monsen Engineering Co. v. TamiGithens, Inc., 219 N.J.Super. 241 , 530 A.2d 313 (App.Div.1987), a case involving a liquidated damages clause in a contract for the installation of heating systems in a public-housing project.

11992–1992
Schwartz v. Syver green
wis · 1953
2 sentences

1991By 1953 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin was able to state that its holding was “in accord with the trend of modern decisions which recognize that when the result of retention of moneys paid upon a contract by a vendee who later repudiates his obligation is a clear[ ] unjust enrichment of the vendor, the vendor may be required to return such part of the payments as exceeds the loss which the vendee’s default causes him.” Schwartz v. Syver, 264 Wis. 526, 531 , 59 N.W.2d 489, 492 .

1991By 1953 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin was able to state that its holding was “in accord with the trend of modern decisions which recognize that when the result of retention of moneys paid upon a contract by a vendee who later repudiates his obligation is a clear[ ] unjust enrichment of the vendor, the vendor may be required to return such part of the payments as exceeds the loss which the vendee’s default causes him.” Schwartz v. Syver, 264 Wis. 526, 531 , 59 N.W.2d 489, 492 .

11991–1991
Seekins v. King green
ri · 1941
2 sentences

1991In 1941 the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, in the context of a suit to recover a deposit by a buyer who had breached a real-estate contract, stated the common-law rule but recognized an “exception” allowing recovery for a defaulting vendee in the absence of a liquidated-damages clause “in certain instances where a person has received from another a benefit the retention of which would be unjust under some legal principle or situation which equity has established or recognized.” Seekins v. King, 66 R.I. 105, 110 , 17 A.2d 869, 871 .

1991In 1941 the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, in the context of a suit to recover a deposit by a buyer who had breached a real-estate contract, stated the common-law rule but recognized an “exception” allowing recovery for a defaulting vendee in the absence of a liquidated-damages clause “in certain instances where a person has received from another a benefit the retention of which would be unjust under some legal principle or situation which equity has established or recognized.” Seekins v. King, 66 R.I. 105, 110 , 17 A.2d 869, 871 .

11991–1991

Where else courts name it

NY 113 (1868–2026) IL 73 (1971–2025) TX 70 (1942–2026) CA 57 (1960–2025) OH 41 (1982–2025) MA 37 (1959–2026) FL 37 (1962–2025) CT 36 (1964–2022) IN 35 (1976–2026) MO 30 (1966–2021) PA 26 (1966–2025) GA 21 (1978–2026) MD 19 (1987–2023) NJ 19 (1991–2024) CO 18 (1971–2025) WA 16 (1979–2026) ND 13 (1975–2007) KS 12 (1981–2024) NC 11 (1987–2026) ID 11 (1971–2025) AZ 10 (1989–2022) WI 10 (1975–2025) VA 9 (1988–2025) UT 8 (1993–2013) AL 8 (1991–2026) ME 7 (1985–2022) MI 7 (1986–2026) MN 6 (1986–2024) AK 6 (1977–2012) DC 6 (1969–2019) MT 6 (1976–2020) TN 6 (1985–2019) LA 6 (1962–2018) OR 5 (1979–1998) VT 5 (1991–2025) NH 5 (1990–2020) WV 4 (1994–2024) WY 4 (1978–2015) SD 4 (1984–2005) DE 4 (1992–2021) NM 4 (1986–2020) SC 3 (2013–2024) IA 3 (1976–2024) RI 3 (1992–2009) NV 2 (1990–1993) OK 2 (1988–2008) KY 2 (1985–2024)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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