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10 California opinions name it 1 courts 1957–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jackson v. Board of Educationgreen2 sentences1990Co. v. County of Riverside, supra, 106 Cal. App.3d at p. 188 .) In appropriate cases, where the public entity has suffered no prejudice, substantial compliance will be found. ( Elias v. Bernardino County Flood Control Dist., supra, 68 Cal. App.3d at p. 74 ; Donohue v. State of California (1986) 178 Cal. App.3d 795, 804 [ 224 Cal. Rptr. 57 ].) "So long as the purposes of the claims statute are effectuated, its requirements should be given a liberal construction in order to permit full adjudication of the case on its merits." ( Dilts v. Cantua Elementary School Dist., supra, 189 Cal. App.3d at p 1990Co. v. County of Riverside, supra, 106 Cal. App.3d at p. 188 .) In appropriate cases, where the public entity has suffered no prejudice, substantial compliance will be found. ( Elias v. Bernardino County Flood Control Dist., supra, 68 Cal. App.3d at p. 74 ; Donohue v. State of California (1986) 178 Cal. App.3d 795, 804 [ 224 Cal. Rptr. 57 ].) "So long as the purposes of the claims statute are effectuated, its requirements should be given a liberal construction in order to permit full adjudication of the case on its merits." ( Dilts v. Cantua Elementary School Dist., supra, 189 Cal. App.3d at p | 3 | 4 |
Donohue v. State of Californiagreen2 sentences1990(Elias v. Bernardino County Flood Control Dist., supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at p. 74 ; Donohue v. State of California (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 795, 804 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 57 ].) “So long as the purposes of the claims statute are effectuated, its requirements should be given a liberal construction in order to permit full adjudication of the case on its merits.” (Dilts v. Cantua Elementary School Dist., supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 33 ; Minsky v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 113, 123 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 102 , 520 P.2d 726 ].) On the other hand, “[t]he doctrine of substantial compliance is not applicable 1990(Elias v. Bernardino County Flood Control Dist., supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at p. 74 ; Donohue v. State of California (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 795, 804 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 57 ].) “So long as the purposes of the claims statute are effectuated, its requirements should be given a liberal construction in order to permit full adjudication of the case on its merits.” (Dilts v. Cantua Elementary School Dist., supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 33 ; Minsky v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 113, 123 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 102 , 520 P.2d 726 ].) On the other hand, “[t]he doctrine of substantial compliance is not applicable | 2 | 2 |
Minsky v. City of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences1990(Elias v. Bernardino County Flood Control Dist., supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at p. 74 ; Donohue v. State of California (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 795, 804 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 57 ].) “So long as the purposes of the claims statute are effectuated, its requirements should be given a liberal construction in order to permit full adjudication of the case on its merits.” (Dilts v. Cantua Elementary School Dist., supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 33 ; Minsky v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 113, 123 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 102 , 520 P.2d 726 ].) On the other hand, “[t]he doctrine of substantial compliance is not applicable 1990(Elias v. Bernardino County Flood Control Dist., supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at p. 74 ; Donohue v. State of California (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 795, 804 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 57 ].) “So long as the purposes of the claims statute are effectuated, its requirements should be given a liberal construction in order to permit full adjudication of the case on its merits.” (Dilts v. Cantua Elementary School Dist., supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 33 ; Minsky v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 113, 123 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 102 , 520 P.2d 726 ].) On the other hand, “[t]he doctrine of substantial compliance is not applicable | 2 | 2 |
Cooper v. County of Buttegreen2 sentences1959(Citations.) ’ ’ In Whitson v. LaPay, 153 Cal.App.2d 584, 590 [ 315 P.2d 45 ], it is held that “The filing of an unverified claim is not a substantial compliance with a statute or ordinance requiring the filing of a verified claim (Spencer v. City of Calipatria, 9 Cal.App.2d 267, 269 [ 49 P.2d 320 ] ; Cooper v. County of Butte, 17 Cal.App.2d 43, 47 [ 61 P.2d 516 ]) and the doctrine of substantial compliance is not applicable to a claim which fails to state the claimant’s address where the statute or ordinance so requires. 1959(Citations.) ’ ’ In Whitson v. LaPay, 153 Cal.App.2d 584, 590 [ 315 P.2d 45 ], it is held that “The filing of an unverified claim is not a substantial compliance with a statute or ordinance requiring the filing of a verified claim (Spencer v. City of Calipatria, 9 Cal.App.2d 267, 269 [ 49 P.2d 320 ] ; Cooper v. County of Butte, 17 Cal.App.2d 43, 47 [ 61 P.2d 516 ]) and the doctrine of substantial compliance is not applicable to a claim which fails to state the claimant’s address where the statute or ordinance so requires. | 2 | 2 |
Spencer v. City of Calipatriagreen2 sentences1959(Citations.) ’ ’ In Whitson v. LaPay, 153 Cal.App.2d 584, 590 [ 315 P.2d 45 ], it is held that “The filing of an unverified claim is not a substantial compliance with a statute or ordinance requiring the filing of a verified claim (Spencer v. City of Calipatria, 9 Cal.App.2d 267, 269 [ 49 P.2d 320 ] ; Cooper v. County of Butte, 17 Cal.App.2d 43, 47 [ 61 P.2d 516 ]) and the doctrine of substantial compliance is not applicable to a claim which fails to state the claimant’s address where the statute or ordinance so requires. 1959(Citations.) ’ ’ In Whitson v. LaPay, 153 Cal.App.2d 584, 590 [ 315 P.2d 45 ], it is held that “The filing of an unverified claim is not a substantial compliance with a statute or ordinance requiring the filing of a verified claim (Spencer v. City of Calipatria, 9 Cal.App.2d 267, 269 [ 49 P.2d 320 ] ; Cooper v. County of Butte, 17 Cal.App.2d 43, 47 [ 61 P.2d 516 ]) and the doctrine of substantial compliance is not applicable to a claim which fails to state the claimant’s address where the statute or ordinance so requires. | 2 | 2 |
Eppstein v. City of Berkeleygreen2 sentences1959(Eppstein v. City of Berkeley, 52 Cal.App. 2d 395, 397 [ 126 P.2d 365 ].)” In Parodi v. City & County of San Francisco, 160 Cal.App.2d 577, 580 [ 325 P.2d 224 ], it is said: “The California cases considering claim statutes have held that substantial compliance with the statute only is required and have set forth what is necessary to constitute substantial compliance. 1959(Eppstein v. City of Berkeley, 52 Cal.App. 2d 395, 397 [ 126 P.2d 365 ].)” In Parodi v. City & County of San Francisco, 160 Cal.App.2d 577, 580 [ 325 P.2d 224 ], it is said: “The California cases considering claim statutes have held that substantial compliance with the statute only is required and have set forth what is necessary to constitute substantial compliance. | 2 | 2 |
Jamison v. State of Californiagreen2 sentences1994(See Jamison v. State of California (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 513, 517 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 496 ] [“The doctrine of substantial compliance is not applicable to a claim which is addressed to the wrong entity." (Italics in original.)]; Santee v. Santa Clara County Office of Education (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 702 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 605 ]; Johnson v. San Diego Unified School Dist. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 692, 697 [ 266 Cal.Rptr. 187 ].) In Johnson , the plaintiff filed a claim with the State Board of Control seeking recovery of damages arising from a local school district’s negligence. 1994(See Jamison v. State of California (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 513, 517 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 496 ] [“The doctrine of substantial compliance is not applicable to a claim which is addressed to the wrong entity." (Italics in original.)]; Santee v. Santa Clara County Office of Education (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 702 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 605 ]; Johnson v. San Diego Unified School Dist. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 692, 697 [ 266 Cal.Rptr. 187 ].) In Johnson , the plaintiff filed a claim with the State Board of Control seeking recovery of damages arising from a local school district’s negligence. | 1 | 3 |
Johnson v. San Diego Unified School Districtgreen2 sentences1994(See Jamison v. State of California (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 513, 517 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 496 ] [“The doctrine of substantial compliance is not applicable to a claim which is addressed to the wrong entity." (Italics in original.)]; Santee v. Santa Clara County Office of Education (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 702 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 605 ]; Johnson v. San Diego Unified School Dist. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 692, 697 [ 266 Cal.Rptr. 187 ].) In Johnson , the plaintiff filed a claim with the State Board of Control seeking recovery of damages arising from a local school district’s negligence. 1994(See Jamison v. State of California (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 513, 517 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 496 ] [“The doctrine of substantial compliance is not applicable to a claim which is addressed to the wrong entity." (Italics in original.)]; Santee v. Santa Clara County Office of Education (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 702 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 605 ]; Johnson v. San Diego Unified School Dist. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 692, 697 [ 266 Cal.Rptr. 187 ].) In Johnson , the plaintiff filed a claim with the State Board of Control seeking recovery of damages arising from a local school district’s negligence. | 1 | 1 |
McGranahan v. Rio Vista Joint Union High School Districtgreen2 sentences1969(McGranahan v. Rio Vista etc. School Dist., 224 Cal.App.2d 624, 630 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 798 ].) 5 On its face the statute requiring the board to give a claimant notice of “insufficiency of claim ’ ’ implies the prior presentation of such claim. 1969(McGranahan v. Rio Vista etc. School Dist., 224 Cal.App.2d 624, 630 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 798 ].) 5 On its face the statute requiring the board to give a claimant notice of “insufficiency of claim ’ ’ implies the prior presentation of such claim. | 1 | 1 |
Whitson v. LaPaygreen2 sentences1959(Citations.) ’ ’ In Whitson v. LaPay, 153 Cal.App.2d 584, 590 [ 315 P.2d 45 ], it is held that “The filing of an unverified claim is not a substantial compliance with a statute or ordinance requiring the filing of a verified claim (Spencer v. City of Calipatria, 9 Cal.App.2d 267, 269 [ 49 P.2d 320 ] ; Cooper v. County of Butte, 17 Cal.App.2d 43, 47 [ 61 P.2d 516 ]) and the doctrine of substantial compliance is not applicable to a claim which fails to state the claimant’s address where the statute or ordinance so requires. 1959(Citations.) ’ ’ In Whitson v. LaPay, 153 Cal.App.2d 584, 590 [ 315 P.2d 45 ], it is held that “The filing of an unverified claim is not a substantial compliance with a statute or ordinance requiring the filing of a verified claim (Spencer v. City of Calipatria, 9 Cal.App.2d 267, 269 [ 49 P.2d 320 ] ; Cooper v. County of Butte, 17 Cal.App.2d 43, 47 [ 61 P.2d 516 ]) and the doctrine of substantial compliance is not applicable to a claim which fails to state the claimant’s address where the statute or ordinance so requires. | 1 | 1 |
Parodi v. City & County of San Franciscogreen2 sentences1959(Eppstein v. City of Berkeley, 52 Cal.App. 2d 395, 397 [ 126 P.2d 365 ].)” In Parodi v. City & County of San Francisco, 160 Cal.App.2d 577, 580 [ 325 P.2d 224 ], it is said: “The California cases considering claim statutes have held that substantial compliance with the statute only is required and have set forth what is necessary to constitute substantial compliance. 1959(Eppstein v. City of Berkeley, 52 Cal.App. 2d 395, 397 [ 126 P.2d 365 ].)” In Parodi v. City & County of San Francisco, 160 Cal.App.2d 577, 580 [ 325 P.2d 224 ], it is said: “The California cases considering claim statutes have held that substantial compliance with the statute only is required and have set forth what is necessary to constitute substantial compliance. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dilts v. Cantua Elementary School District
green
2 sentences1990Co. v. County of Riverside, supra, 106 Cal. App.3d at p. 188 .) In appropriate cases, where the public entity has suffered no prejudice, substantial compliance will be found. ( Elias v. Bernardino County Flood Control Dist., supra, 68 Cal. App.3d at p. 74 ; Donohue v. State of California (1986) 178 Cal. App.3d 795, 804 [ 224 Cal. Rptr. 57 ].) "So long as the purposes of the claims statute are effectuated, its requirements should be given a liberal construction in order to permit full adjudication of the case on its merits." ( Dilts v. Cantua Elementary School Dist., supra, 189 Cal. App.3d at p 1990(Elias v. Bernardino County Flood Control Dist., supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at p. 74 ; Donohue v. State of California (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 795, 804 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 57 ].) “So long as the purposes of the claims statute are effectuated, its requirements should be given a liberal construction in order to permit full adjudication of the case on its merits.” (Dilts v. Cantua Elementary School Dist., supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 33 ; Minsky v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 113, 123 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 102 , 520 P.2d 726 ].) On the other hand, “[t]he doctrine of substantial compliance is not applicable | 2 | 1990–1990 |
Elias v. San Bernardino County Flood Control District
green
2 sentences1990Co. v. County of Riverside, supra, 106 Cal. App.3d at p. 188 .) In appropriate cases, where the public entity has suffered no prejudice, substantial compliance will be found. ( Elias v. Bernardino County Flood Control Dist., supra, 68 Cal. App.3d at p. 74 ; Donohue v. State of California (1986) 178 Cal. App.3d 795, 804 [ 224 Cal. Rptr. 57 ].) "So long as the purposes of the claims statute are effectuated, its requirements should be given a liberal construction in order to permit full adjudication of the case on its merits." ( Dilts v. Cantua Elementary School Dist., supra, 189 Cal. App.3d at p 1990(Elias v. Bernardino County Flood Control Dist., supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at p. 74 ; Donohue v. State of California (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 795, 804 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 57 ].) “So long as the purposes of the claims statute are effectuated, its requirements should be given a liberal construction in order to permit full adjudication of the case on its merits.” (Dilts v. Cantua Elementary School Dist., supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 33 ; Minsky v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 113, 123 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 102 , 520 P.2d 726 ].) On the other hand, “[t]he doctrine of substantial compliance is not applicable | 2 | 1990–1990 |
Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hosp.
green
1 sentence2023Code, § 900 et seq.), “ ‘[t]he doctrine of substantial compliance is not applicable to a claim which is addressed to the wrong entity’ ”].) “A trial court lacks jurisdiction in the fundamental sense where there is ‘ . . . an absence of authority over . . . the parties.’ ” (Thompson Pacific Construction, Inc. v. City of Sunnyvale (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 525, 538 .) “ ‘[A] collateral attack on a final judgment may be made at any time when the judgment under challenge is void because of an absence of “fundamental jurisdiction.” ’ ” (Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hospital (2017) 2 Cal.5th 330, 339 .) Be | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Thompson Pacific Construction Inc. v. City of Sunnyvale
green
1 sentence2023Code, § 900 et seq.), “ ‘[t]he doctrine of substantial compliance is not applicable to a claim which is addressed to the wrong entity’ ”].) “A trial court lacks jurisdiction in the fundamental sense where there is ‘ . . . an absence of authority over . . . the parties.’ ” (Thompson Pacific Construction, Inc. v. City of Sunnyvale (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 525, 538 .) “ ‘[A] collateral attack on a final judgment may be made at any time when the judgment under challenge is void because of an absence of “fundamental jurisdiction.” ’ ” (Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hospital (2017) 2 Cal.5th 330, 339 .) Be | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Santee v. Santa Clara County Office of Education
green
2 sentences1994(See Jamison v. State of California (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 513, 517 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 496 ] [“The doctrine of substantial compliance is not applicable to a claim which is addressed to the wrong entity." (Italics in original.)]; Santee v. Santa Clara County Office of Education (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 702 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 605 ]; Johnson v. San Diego Unified School Dist. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 692, 697 [ 266 Cal.Rptr. 187 ].) In Johnson , the plaintiff filed a claim with the State Board of Control seeking recovery of damages arising from a local school district’s negligence. 1994(See Jamison v. State of California (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 513, 517 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 496 ] [“The doctrine of substantial compliance is not applicable to a claim which is addressed to the wrong entity." (Italics in original.)]; Santee v. Santa Clara County Office of Education (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 702 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 605 ]; Johnson v. San Diego Unified School Dist. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 692, 697 [ 266 Cal.Rptr. 187 ].) In Johnson , the plaintiff filed a claim with the State Board of Control seeking recovery of damages arising from a local school district’s negligence. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. County of Riverside
green
1 sentence1990Co. v. County of Riverside, supra, 106 Cal. App.3d at p. 188 .) In appropriate cases, where the public entity has suffered no prejudice, substantial compliance will be found. ( Elias v. Bernardino County Flood Control Dist., supra, 68 Cal. App.3d at p. 74 ; Donohue v. State of California (1986) 178 Cal. App.3d 795, 804 [ 224 Cal. Rptr. 57 ].) "So long as the purposes of the claims statute are effectuated, its requirements should be given a liberal construction in order to permit full adjudication of the case on its merits." ( Dilts v. Cantua Elementary School Dist., supra, 189 Cal. App.3d at p | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Venstone Stone v. District of Columbia
green
2 sentences1973In Stone v. District of Columbia, 237 F.2d 28 [ 99 App.D.C. 32 ], certiorari denied 352 U.S. 934 [ 1 L.Ed.2d 160 , 77 S.Ct. 221 ], notice was delivered to the legal department rather than the designated statutory official; this procedure was held “equivalent to notice to the Commissioners for the purposes of” the statute. ( 237 F.2d at p. 30 .) The following conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing cases: (1) The doctrine of substantial compliance is not applicable to a claim which is addressed to the wrong entity. 1973In Stone v. District of Columbia, 237 F.2d 28 [ 99 App.D.C. 32 ], certiorari denied 352 U.S. 934 [ 1 L.Ed.2d 160 , 77 S.Ct. 221 ], notice was delivered to the legal department rather than the designated statutory official; this procedure was held “equivalent to notice to the Commissioners for the purposes of” the statute. ( 237 F.2d at p. 30 .) The following conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing cases: (1) The doctrine of substantial compliance is not applicable to a claim which is addressed to the wrong entity. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
District of Columbia v. Stone
green
2 sentences1973In Stone v. District of Columbia, 237 F.2d 28 [ 99 App.D.C. 32 ], certiorari denied 352 U.S. 934 [ 1 L.Ed.2d 160 , 77 S.Ct. 221 ], notice was delivered to the legal department rather than the designated statutory official; this procedure was held “equivalent to notice to the Commissioners for the purposes of” the statute. ( 237 F.2d at p. 30 .) The following conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing cases: (1) The doctrine of substantial compliance is not applicable to a claim which is addressed to the wrong entity. 1973In Stone v. District of Columbia, 237 F.2d 28 [ 99 App.D.C. 32 ], certiorari denied 352 U.S. 934 [ 1 L.Ed.2d 160 , 77 S.Ct. 221 ], notice was delivered to the legal department rather than the designated statutory official; this procedure was held “equivalent to notice to the Commissioners for the purposes of” the statute. ( 237 F.2d at p. 30 .) The following conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing cases: (1) The doctrine of substantial compliance is not applicable to a claim which is addressed to the wrong entity. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Cruise v. City & County of San Francisco
green
1 sentence1964The plaintiff next cites Farrell v. County of Placer, 23 Cal.2d 624 [ 145 P.2d 570 , 153 A.L.R. 323 ], and Cruise v. City & County of San Francisco, 101 Cal.App.2d 558 [225 *630 P.2d 988], and contends that the district is estopped by the conduct of its agents from insisting that the claim be filed within the statutory time. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Farrell v. County of Placer
green
2 sentences1964The plaintiff next cites Farrell v. County of Placer, 23 Cal.2d 624 [ 145 P.2d 570 , 153 A.L.R. 323 ], and Cruise v. City & County of San Francisco, 101 Cal.App.2d 558 [225 *630 P.2d 988], and contends that the district is estopped by the conduct of its agents from insisting that the claim be filed within the statutory time. 1964The plaintiff next cites Farrell v. County of Placer, 23 Cal.2d 624 [ 145 P.2d 570 , 153 A.L.R. 323 ], and Cruise v. City & County of San Francisco, 101 Cal.App.2d 558 [225 *630 P.2d 988], and contends that the district is estopped by the conduct of its agents from insisting that the claim be filed within the statutory time. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.