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10 California opinions name it 3 courts 1983–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Guerragreen2 sentences2017Retroactivity The Conservator argues we should not apply Sanchez retroactively to LPS jury trials pending on appeal, based on justifiable reliance by litigants on the prior contrary rule. ( People v. Guerra (1984) 37 Cal.3d 385 , 399, 208 Cal.Rptr. 162 , 690 P.2d 635 .) When a decision establishes a new rule, and there is " 'clear break with the past' ... i.e., when the decision (1) explicitly overrules a precedent of this court [citation], or (2) disapproves a practice impliedly sanctioned by prior decisions of this court [citation], or (3) disapproves a longstanding and widespread practice e 2017Retroactivity The Conservator argues we should not apply Sanchez retroactively to LPS jury trials pending on appeal, based on justifiable reliance by litigants on the prior contrary rule. ( People v. Guerra (1984) 37 Cal.3d 385 , 399, 208 Cal.Rptr. 162 , 690 P.2d 635 .) When a decision establishes a new rule, and there is " 'clear break with the past' ... i.e., when the decision (1) explicitly overrules a precedent of this court [citation], or (2) disapproves a practice impliedly sanctioned by prior decisions of this court [citation], or (3) disapproves a longstanding and widespread practice e | 3 | 6 |
Stovall v. Dennogreen2 sentences1996(Ibid.) 7 “Once resolved that a decision establishes a new standard, the California courts define the retroactive effect of that decision under the tripartite test based upon Stovall v. Demo [(1967)] 388 U.S. 293 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 ].” (Donaldson v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 38 .) “Under this test, the court considers three factors: ‘(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application of the new standards.’ (St 1996(Ibid.) 7 “Once resolved that a decision establishes a new standard, the California courts define the retroactive effect of that decision under the tripartite test based upon Stovall v. Demo [(1967)] 388 U.S. 293 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 ].” (Donaldson v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 38 .) “Under this test, the court considers three factors: ‘(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application of the new standards.’ (St | 1 | 5 |
Donaldson v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1996(Ibid.) 7 “Once resolved that a decision establishes a new standard, the California courts define the retroactive effect of that decision under the tripartite test based upon Stovall v. Demo [(1967)] 388 U.S. 293 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 ].” (Donaldson v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 38 .) “Under this test, the court considers three factors: ‘(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application of the new standards.’ (St 1985In all such cases the ordinary assumption of retrospective operation [citations] takes full effect.” (Donaldson v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 24, 36-37 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 704 , 672 P.2d 110 ].) If a decision establishes a new rule contrary to one already in existence the retroactive effect of that decision is determined by application of the test derived from Stovall v. Denno (1967) 388 U.S. 293 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 ], (People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 401 .) Since Cicero established a definition for force different from that which was commonly understood, application of | 1 | 2 |
People v. Hedgecockgreen1 sentence2017(People v. Hedgecock (1990) 51 Cal.3d 395, 410, fn. 4 .) 8 Sanchez unquestionably established a new rule of law, contrary to evidentiary rules and practice recognized and expressly authorized in Gardeley and Montiel. | 1 | 1 |
Brennan v. Tremco Inc.green2 sentences2013(Brennan v. Tremco, Inc. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 310, 318 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 790 , 20 P.3d 1086 ].) In deciding to give a decision retroactive effect, the threshold inquiry is whether the decision establishes a new rule of law. 2013(Brennan v. Tremco, Inc. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 310, 318 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 790 , 20 P.3d 1086 ].) In deciding to give a decision retroactive effect, the threshold inquiry is whether the decision establishes a new rule of law. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Garciagreen2 sentences1985“Under [that] test, the court considers three factors: ‘(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application of the new standards.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Garcia (1984) 36 Cal.3d 539, 548 [ 205 Cal.Rptr. 265 , 684 P.2d 826 ].) The factors, however, are not of equal weight. 1985“Under [that] test, the court considers three factors: ‘(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application of the new standards.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Garcia (1984) 36 Cal.3d 539, 548 [ 205 Cal.Rptr. 265 , 684 P.2d 826 ].) The factors, however, are not of equal weight. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Johnsongreen2 sentences1983Thus, in its departure from past precedent, even though in the context of statutory interpretation, De Lancie appears to represent the type of break from prior law which may justify nonretroactivity under United States v. Johnson . [9] *38 Once resolved that a decision establishes a new standard, the California courts define the retroactive effect of that decision under the tripartite test based upon Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 U.S. 293 . (3) People v. Kaanehe (1977) 19 Cal.3d 1 [ 136 Cal. Rptr. 409 , 559 P.2d 1028 ], explains the California practice: "Whether a judicial decision establishing 1983Thus, in its departure from past precedent, even though in the context of statutory interpretation, De Lancie appears to represent the type of break from prior law which may justify nonretroactivity under United States v. Johnson . [9] *38 Once resolved that a decision establishes a new standard, the California courts define the retroactive effect of that decision under the tripartite test based upon Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 U.S. 293 . (3) People v. Kaanehe (1977) 19 Cal.3d 1 [ 136 Cal. Rptr. 409 , 559 P.2d 1028 ], explains the California practice: "Whether a judicial decision establishing | 1 | 1 |
Fare v. Joe R.green2 sentences1983On the other hand, retroactivity is not customarily required when the interest to be vindicated is one which is merely collateral to a fair determination of guilt or innocence. [Citation.]" ( 19 Cal.3d at p. 10 ; accord, In re Joe R. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 496, 511 [ 165 Cal. Rptr. 837 , 612 P.2d 927 ].) [10] (4) In search and seizure cases, the tripartite test leads generally to the conclusion that a decision should not be given retroactive effect. [11] As explained *39 in Kaanehe , in such a case "[e]xclusion is not necessary to ensure the reliability of the fact-finding process at trial. 1983On the other hand, retroactivity is not customarily required when the interest to be vindicated is one which is merely collateral to a fair determination of guilt or innocence. [Citation.]" ( 19 Cal.3d at p. 10 ; accord, In re Joe R. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 496, 511 [ 165 Cal. Rptr. 837 , 612 P.2d 927 ].) [10] (4) In search and seizure cases, the tripartite test leads generally to the conclusion that a decision should not be given retroactive effect. [11] As explained *39 in Kaanehe , in such a case "[e]xclusion is not necessary to ensure the reliability of the fact-finding process at trial. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Kaanehe
green
2 sentences1996(Ibid.) 7 “Once resolved that a decision establishes a new standard, the California courts define the retroactive effect of that decision under the tripartite test based upon Stovall v. Demo [(1967)] 388 U.S. 293 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 ].” (Donaldson v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 38 .) “Under this test, the court considers three factors: ‘(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application of the new standards.’ (St 1983Thus, in its departure from past precedent, even though in the context of statutory interpretation, De Lancie appears to represent the type of break from prior law which may justify nonretroactivity under United States v. Johnson . [9] *38 Once resolved that a decision establishes a new standard, the California courts define the retroactive effect of that decision under the tripartite test based upon Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 U.S. 293 . (3) People v. Kaanehe (1977) 19 Cal.3d 1 [ 136 Cal. Rptr. 409 , 559 P.2d 1028 ], explains the California practice: "Whether a judicial decision establishing | 4 | 1983–1996 |
People v. Escobar
green
1 sentence1996(See Corners, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d 139 ; Lafantasie, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d 758 ; Escobar, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d 1504 .) A decision establishes a new rule of law only if it explicitly overrules a precedent of the California Supreme Court, or disapproves a long-standing and widespread practice expressly approved by a near-unanimous body of lower court authorities. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
People v. Corners
green
1 sentence1996(See Corners, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d 139 ; Lafantasie, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d 758 ; Escobar, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d 1504 .) A decision establishes a new rule of law only if it explicitly overrules a precedent of the California Supreme Court, or disapproves a long-standing and widespread practice expressly approved by a near-unanimous body of lower court authorities. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
People v. Lafantasie
green
1 sentence1996(See Corners, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d 139 ; Lafantasie, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d 758 ; Escobar, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d 1504 .) A decision establishes a new rule of law only if it explicitly overrules a precedent of the California Supreme Court, or disapproves a long-standing and widespread practice expressly approved by a near-unanimous body of lower court authorities. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
In Re Brown
green
2 sentences1996(Ibid.) 7 “Once resolved that a decision establishes a new standard, the California courts define the retroactive effect of that decision under the tripartite test based upon Stovall v. Demo [(1967)] 388 U.S. 293 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 ].” (Donaldson v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 38 .) “Under this test, the court considers three factors: ‘(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application of the new standards.’ (St 1996(Ibid.) 7 “Once resolved that a decision establishes a new standard, the California courts define the retroactive effect of that decision under the tripartite test based upon Stovall v. Demo [(1967)] 388 U.S. 293 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 ].” (Donaldson v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 38 .) “Under this test, the court considers three factors: ‘(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application of the new standards.’ (St | 1 | 1996–1996 |
People v. Willett
green
1 sentence1996(Ibid.) 7 “Once resolved that a decision establishes a new standard, the California courts define the retroactive effect of that decision under the tripartite test based upon Stovall v. Demo [(1967)] 388 U.S. 293 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 ].” (Donaldson v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 38 .) “Under this test, the court considers three factors: ‘(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application of the new standards.’ (St | 1 | 1996–1996 |
People v. Ruster
green
2 sentences1996(Id., at pp. 665, 667.) People v. Ruster [(1974)] 40 Cal.App.3d 865 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 572 ] held that although the probation officer did not report the defendant’s imprisonment to the court within 30 days of being notified, the defendant’s notification did not comply with section 1203.2a requirements which would allow the court to impose sentence on the defendant. 1996(Id., at pp. 665, 667.) People v. Ruster [(1974)] 40 Cal.App.3d 865 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 572 ] held that although the probation officer did not report the defendant’s imprisonment to the court within 30 days of being notified, the defendant’s notification did not comply with section 1203.2a requirements which would allow the court to impose sentence on the defendant. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
United States v. Johnson
red
2 sentences1984According to United States v. Johnson (1982) 457 U.S. 537 [ 73 L.Ed.2d 202 , 102 S.Ct. 2579 ], ‘[s]uch a break has been recognized only when a decision explicitly overrules a past precedent of this Court [citations], or disapproves a practice this Court has arguably sanctioned in prior cases [citations], or overturns a longstanding and widespread practice to which this Court has not spoken, but which a near-unanimous body of lower court authority has expressly approved.’ [Citation.] “Once resolved that a decision establishes a new standard, the California courts define the retroactive effect o 1984According to United States v. Johnson (1982) 457 U.S. 537 [ 73 L.Ed.2d 202 , 102 S.Ct. 2579 ], ‘[s]uch a break has been recognized only when a decision explicitly overrules a past precedent of this Court [citations], or disapproves a practice this Court has arguably sanctioned in prior cases [citations], or overturns a longstanding and widespread practice to which this Court has not spoken, but which a near-unanimous body of lower court authority has expressly approved.’ [Citation.] “Once resolved that a decision establishes a new standard, the California courts define the retroactive effect o | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.